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Overall Developments
OVERALL
DEVELOPMENTS
Denmark: Structural reform
The recently proposed reform of structures and areas of
responsibility in the public sector will have major consequences
for employment policy and services in Denmark.
Current structures 
Until now, efforts to find jobs for unemployed people in
Denmark have operated under two systems: a municipal
programme for recipients of welfare benefits, and a National
Employment Service (AF Arbejdsformidlingen) programme for
those receiving unemployment insurance compensation. The
two systems have both similarities and differences.
The municipal programme is locally administered. The 271 local
authorities organise and implement programmes for residents
who are receiving welfare benefits. The local authority selects a
programme for each recipient, based on his or her situation.
Welfare benefit recipients include those with problems other
than unemployment. The municipal system therefore covers a
broad spectrum of problems, many of them social in nature
(such as mental or physical health problems or addiction).
The programme for unemployed people who are receiving
unemployment compensation is administered by the National
Employment Service.It consists of 14 AF regions,corresponding
to the country’s 14 counties or administrative districts. There are
approximately 60 AF service units. Trade unions and employers’
associations participate in the administration of regional
programmes through membership of regional labour market
councils. Unemployment compensation can run for four years,
with the right to receive and an obligation to accept job offers
and/or training offers. At the end of this period, recipients can be
transferred to welfare benefits under certain conditions.
Every year, more than 1.2 million people have contact with
some aspect of these systems for varying periods of time,
including those who receive sickness benefits. The AF is
responsible for slightly less than two-fifths of this group, while
municipalities deal with the remaining three-fifths. Overall,
AF employees work approximately 2,100 person-years on
employment-related matters, while local authorities’
estimated personnel expenditure in this area amounts to
approximately 6,200 person-years. In addition, trade unions’
unemployment insurance systems account for about 5,000
person-years of work.
Reform to a comprehensive approach towards
unemployment programmes
The new government that took office in 2001 established an
Employment Ministry to co-ordinate the employment policy
efforts of local and national governments. This was done by
transferring the labour market section of the Social Affairs
Ministry to what was then the Labour Ministry.
In autumn 2002, the government proposed a reform called
‘More People into Employment’, which gained the support of a
majority of the political parties as well as trade unions and
employers’ organisations. Since then, the Danish parliament
(the Folketing) has consistently passed the necessary legislation
to maintain the programme. The reform programme consists of
the following seven main points:
• a co-ordinated labour-market system;
• putting people to work more quickly, with fewer
intermediate stages;
• involving more players/external providers in the overall effort
to provide jobs;
• using simple and active programmes – simplification without
reduction;
• making it pay to work;
• simplification, less bureaucracy, and harmonisation; and
• establishing an Employment Council to co-ordinate 
overall effort.
A co-ordinated labour-market system 
‘More People into Employment’ is intended to ensure greater
co-ordination of the efforts made by municipalities on behalf
of welfare recipients and by the AF on behalf of those entitled
to unemployment insurance compensation. There have already
been several positive and concrete co-operation projects
between the AF and municipalities. However, the continuing
division between the two systems has meant a considerable
overlap in services. ‘More People into Employment’is therefore
a step towards ensuring a co-ordinated system in the future.
The government would like to see a greater degree of co-
ordination and co-operation between the two systems, based on
this vision of a future unified system. Co-ordinating the two
systems’ efforts should result in further improvements which
will benefit both unemployed people and business.
There will be continuous harmonisation of the service provided
by the two systems with regard to opportunities, rights and
obligations. There are plans, for example, to use a joint model
for all applicant interviews.
In order to move towards a unified system, the AF has been
required to make co-operation agreements with municipalities.
Financial support has also been provided for a form of trial co-
operation between the AF and municipalities, using labour
market centres. A total of 30 million Danish kroner (DKK) (a
little over 4 million euro) was allocated for this purpose in 2003
and 2004. The National Labour Market Authority distributes
funds on the basis of joint applications from municipalities and
the AF. Some 10-12 co-operation projects were launched in
2003-4. Labour market centres are seen as a means of testing
greater joint efforts by local and county employment services.
Structural Commission
In October 2002, the government set up the Structural
Commission to review public services and their areas of
responsibility, including the division of responsibility among
different levels of government – national,county and municipal.
The commission submitted its report in January 2004. Labour8 Autumn 2004 |  European Employment Observatory Review
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market and employment policy programmes were naturally
included in the areas reviewed by the commission, which
recommended setting up a unified system under municipal
administration. Trade unions and employers’ organisations, on
the other hand, wanted a unified system to be administered by
the national AF organisation.
The government’s negotiations with the Social Democratic
Party and National Liberal Party subsequently broke down,and
the government presented a programme for comprehensive
municipal reform with the support of the Danish People’s Party.
This agreement provides for major changes in employment
service programmes. In concrete terms, new joint jobcentres will
be established in all municipalities around the country. AF and
municipal employment officers will occupy the same premises,
so that unemployed people and businesses seeking staff will only
need to contact one office. The AF will still be responsible for
those receiving unemployment benefits,while municipalities will
handle the cases of individuals receiving welfare, rehabilitation
and sickness benefits, as well as other groups. The number of
municipalities will be reduced from 271 to approximately 100.
Even though there will still be a division of responsibility,
jobcentre personnel will no longer be restricted to handling
cases from their target groups. Experienced and competent
employment officers from the AF and municipal systems will be
brought together under one roof. This will create a strong
employment service in a high quality, professional environment.
Joint jobcentres will encourage personnel to use their expertise
across target-group boundaries.
All of these jobcentres will be able to assist both those on
welfare and those who receive unemployment benefits. Among
other things, they will help people to register or deregister as
unemployed, provide assistance in writing or updating CVs,
help with job searches and provide advice. In approximately 40
of the largest municipalities, jobcentres will be able to provide
people on unemployment benefits with all types of job offers.
Smaller jobcentres, on the other hand, will have to refer certain
categories of unemployed people, such as those at risk of
becoming long-term unemployed, to one of the 40 larger
jobcentres. The first of these new jobcentres will open at the end
of 2005. A jobcentre should be operating in all municipalities no
later than 1 January 2007.
Pilot jobcentres will be set up in about 10 municipalities, where
local authorities will provide employment services on behalf of
the state to those receiving unemployment benefits. The state
will still be responsible for services to this group of
unemployed people, but the municipality will provide
employment office services.
There will thus be various different types of jobcentre in the
future. It has been agreed that starting in 2007, once the new
system has become established, an evaluation will be conducted
to document and assess experience of it.
Another important consequence of this reform is the
replacement of the current 14 AF regions with four large
regions. The state run regional units will monitor jobcentres’
efforts and intervene if the results are not satisfactory. The
regions should also ensure that bottlenecks are cleared and that
measures can be taken quickly when large enterprises close
down. Unlike the current system, regions will also monitor and
take action to help municipalities’ target groups. This should
provide a better overview of the job situation as a whole.
Unions and employers’ organisations are represented at local,
regional and national levels, where they advise municipal
councils, regional authorities and the Employment Minister.
The reform does not change the responsibilities of ‘A kasse’, the
unions’unemployment insurance scheme.
Denmark: Spring legislation package 
In March 2004, the government presented its ‘spring package’,
allocating 9 billion DKK (1.2 billion euro) to specific measures
intended to help to stimulate economic recovery. The initiative is
expected to increase the number of people in work by 12,000
during 2004.The most significant aspects of this legislation are tax
relief and greater public investment.
In addition, however, there are a number of initiatives to enable
unemployed people to retrain or improve their qualifications,
and to provide firms with the best possible conditions for
recruiting and retaining qualified personnel. Additional
funding of more than 500 million DKK (67.2 million euro) will
be provided over the next four years for retraining and
improving qualifications in the labour force. The programme is
directed primarily at unemployed people, people with little
vocational training, and trained workers who have difficulty in
reading and writing.
The government has launched the following new initiatives:
• There will be programmes to improve the qualifications of
unemployed people with  little vocational training;additional
training for workers with little vocational training; and
vocational training for people who have recently become
unemployed.
• More young people on welfare benefits will receive vocational
training.This will be achieved by allowing local authorities to
require that these individuals enter a training programme. If
they refuse, benefits can be withdrawn.
• 3,000 trained workers who have difficulty in reading and
writing will receive Danish language instruction.
• More people will be given the opportunity to train for jobs in
the social services and healthcare sectors. Among other
things, this will enable adults with refugee or immigrant
backgrounds and those who have difficulties in reading and
writing to participate in a vocational training programme.
The National Employment Service (AF) has launched a new job
database (www.jobnet.dk) called ‘Hotjob’, which lists jobs that
have been vacant for some time, and which could be done by
most people. Hotjob lists positions that employers say do not
require any special qualifications. Hotjob can be used by
businesses and jobseekers, as well as by the AF and
municipalities in their efforts to provide employment.
The Hotjob list offers work as messengers, cleaning and kitchen
staff, sales assistants in stores, removal workers, restaurant staff,
warehouse personnel, jobs in caring for elderly and disabled
people, industrial production, and temporary replacements for
employees on holiday.Jobs are available throughout the country.
Around 80 new positions are advertised every day, with the daily
total reaching approximately 450. Hotjob has proved popularAutumn 2004 |  European Employment Observatory Review 9
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with jobseekers.Each listing shows an average of almost 100 hits
on the website a day, and experience has shown that Hotjobs are
filled more quickly than others.
Last spring, the AF launched a campaign to create more jobs
with training in the workplace – the wage subsidy programme.
The wage subsidy campaign was launched because on-the-job
training has generally proved much more effective in getting
people back to work than training programmes. The AF has
obtained a total of 10,700 jobs – 2,000 more than the original
objective. About 40% of these jobs were created in private firms,
and 60% in the public sector. By comparison, private-sector jobs
made up only 28% of all wage subsidy jobs filled in 2003.
AF regions have had good results from using private telephone
sales organisations to contact businesses and tell them about
wage subsidy opportunities and make appointments for visits by
AF representatives.
The AF has also had good contacts with municipalities in order
to establish more wage subsidy jobs. These contacts have been
supported by the Employment Minister, who wrote to all
mayors and chairs of county councils, informing them about the
campaign to provide the AF with wage subsidy jobs. The
Employment and Finance Ministers also wrote instructing all
state institutions to play a positive part in the programme.
During the campaign, there has been close weekly follow-up on
the results of these efforts,in all AF regions.A weekly newsletter
on the status of the campaign has been sent to all AF personnel.
The National Labour Market Authority and the AF intend to
assess whether ideas and experience from this campaign can be
used in the future. Among other things, they will evaluate the
effect of using telephone-sales centres for employment
initiatives. There will also be a survey of the campaign’s
effectiveness in helping unemployed people to find new jobs.
Last spring, the government also presented six new initiatives, at
a total cost of 65 million DKK (8.7 million euro), which are
intended to ensure that as many university graduates as possible
have the chance to test their abilities in a job, and that as many
firms as possible have the opportunity to try out academically
trained personnel. The initiatives aim to do the following:
• involve more players;
• provide an additional 30 million DKK (4 million euro) for
70 more positions for people with PhD degrees, to ensure
that talent is not lost while the country waits for an
economic upswing;
• set up a nationwide campaign to create more jobs in small
and medium-sized enterprises;
• provide introductory courses for university graduates to help
them find jobs in the private sector;
• provide more state-sponsored jobs with workplace
training, which can function as a springboard to jobs in the
private sector;
• set up a new information campaign to interest entrepreneurs
in hiring unemployed university graduates.
This represents follow-up on a ten-point action plan launched by
the government and the Danish Confederation of Professional
Associations in the spring of 2003.The government would like to
strengthen this initiative, because economic recovery has been
delayed. The number of unemployed university graduates
increased by 5,500 in 2003 alone.
Germany: Radical reform of the
labour market 
Legislation to introduce modern labour market services has
provided the framework for reorientation of labour market
policy in Germany. The reform focuses on creating conditions
and formulating measures to promote employment, restructure
the social security system for jobseekers, and reform the
employment service.
The Job-AQTIV Act marked the legislative launch of this
reform process. The central theme was a targeted mix of active
measures and social security, following the principle of actively
encouraging and motivating people to seek work – Fördern und
Fordern. This was combined with developing a systematic,
preventive approach to unemployment as a core element of
labour market policy.
The Modern Labour Market Services Acts One and Two, which
came into force in January 2003, further developed this
approach. These acts aimed to open up employment
opportunities for jobseekers. On 1 January 2004, the Modern
Labour Market Services Act Three formed the legal basis for
reorganising the Federal Employment Agency, reorienting its
organisational structures and activities at all levels (including
regional offices).
As before,individuals who have been in contributory employment
for a period of 12 months within the last three years (to be
reduced to 12 months within the last two years, from 1 February
2006) can claim unemployment benefit. Unemployment benefit
for those with children is equivalent to 67% of the (overall) net
wage, and 60% for all others. As of 1 February 2006, individuals
aged under 55 will generally be entitled to claim such benefit for
up to 12 months, extended to a maximum of 18 months for those
aged over 55.
The amalgamation of unemployment assistance and social
security benefit on 1 January 2005 into a basic jobseekers’
assistance scheme (referred to as unemployment benefit II) will
bring about wide-reaching reform. What were formerly two co-
existing welfare systems funded and administered by different
sources have become a single, unified system. One aim of the
new system is to try to meet the specific integration needs of
groups requiring special support in the labour market (e.g. long-
term unemployed people) more effectively than before. In so
doing, and in providing them with the social security they need,
the principle of Fördern und Fordern will be implemented under
an integrated system. Some 5.4 million people will benefit
directly or indirectly from the new system.
Uniform system of basic support 
The jobseekers’ assistance scheme will support all individuals
aged 15-65 who are able to work but who require special
assistance, and their relatives. The system offers services,
payments and benefits in kind. Jobseekers will be assisted
through a special facility, generally within a team set up jointly
by the municipality and the local Employment Agency;
jobcentres will be established as one-stop shops. This will make10 Autumn 2004 |  European Employment Observatory Review
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access to services and support easier. The underlying philosophy
is to provide tailor-made assistance to those who are able to
work, but require special assistance.
The municipal support facilities are responsible for providing
accommodation and heating costs, childcare services, debt and
addiction counselling, psychosocial assistance and various one-
off requirements not specified in the general regulations (e.g.
basic items in terms of clothing and housing, or assistance for
residential school trips).
The Employment Agency is responsible for providing all other
services under the jobseekers’ assistance scheme. These include
all labour market rehabilitation services (such as counselling,
placements, promoting job-creation measures and encouraging
training and vocational training) and support services
(unemployment benefit II, social security benefit) except for
accommodation and heating costs and various one-off
requirements.
Alongside the joint team model, a few municipalities have set up
a six-year pilot scheme enabling them to take responsibility for
running all aspects of the scheme.In addition to their own tasks,
they pay out unemployment benefit II instead of the
Employment Agency, and are responsible for reintegrating
benefit recipients into work.
So what specifically is the Fördern und Fordern concept of
encouraging and motivating people to find work?
Encouragement (Fördern)
Help from a personal adviser
A personal adviser conducts an in-depth profiling interview
with the jobseeker to determine the barriers preventing them
from taking up an employment placement. A jointly compiled
integration agreement, which is binding on both jobseeker and
adviser, sets out the steps to reintegrate the jobseeker into the
labour market. As a general rule, a personal adviser should not
be responsible for more than 75 jobseekers and any relatives
living with them in their ‘community in need’.
New services
The integration agreement details the jobseeker’s responsibilities,
in terms of proactively seeking work, and the services to be
provided by the jobseekers’assistance scheme. All jobseekers are
offered the specific services they need to reintegrate them into the
labour market (e.g. education or training courses). A personal
adviser may also offer additional services geared towards
individual needs – for example, any work clothing required, or
funding towards obtaining a driving licence.
Work for young people
In future, anyone aged under 25 who applies for jobseekers’
assistance will immediately receive a reintegration offer. This
will involve a work opportunity, training or education to help
them to obtain a qualification, or practical work experience.
It pays to work
Through tax allowances, the threshold above which every extra
euro earned is taken into account in respect of unemployment
benefit II will not apply until an individual’s gross monthly
income exceeds 1,500 euro (the previous figure was  691 euro).
This will benefit families in particular.
Integration bonus
A new introduction from 1 January 2005 is the availability of an
integration bonus. Individuals who are able to work but require
special assistance may claim this benefit if they accept a job
offering a wage which will not be enough for them to live on.
The personal adviser decides whether an integration bonus is
required in order to encourage a jobseeker to accept an offer of
employment, and how much the subsidy should be. Individuals
are not automatically entitled by law to a wage subsidy.
Child supplement for families 
A child supplement will be paid to parents whose earnings are
sufficient for them to live on, but not enough to cover the costs
associated with their children. The child supplement will be paid
together with child benefit, which will avoid working parents
applying for assistance under the jobseekers’ scheme solely for
maintenance of their children.Families in low income situations
will therefore be dependent on unemployment benefit II and
social security benefit.
Parents whose earnings exceed their personal need for
unemployment benefit II or social security benefit will be
charged up to a maximum of 70% of the child supplement,
thereby providing an added financial incentive for them to work.
Social security
In future,all individuals who are able to work but require special
assistance, and receive unemployment benefit II, will have
contributions paid towards health insurance and homecare
insurance, provided that they do not already have family
insurance. They will also be covered by statutory pension
insurance on the basis of the minimum contribution.
Accordingly, for the first time, individuals who are able to work
but require special assistance, and who previously claimed social
security benefit, will receive their own pension cover together
with statutory health and homecare insurances.
Motivation (Fordern)
Reasonable work
Any individual who receives assistance must make every effort to
find a job as quickly as possible, so that they no longer depend on
support from the state.Any job is therefore considered reasonable
for jobseekers requiring special assistance. Accordingly, they may
not reject an offer of employment because:
• it is different to their previous job or in an occupation for
which they are not trained;
• it is located further away than their previous job; or
• the employment conditions are less favourable than those of
their previous job.
Nor can a job be considered unreasonable because it offers a
wage which is below a collectively agreed level or less than
average local wages. However, the job may not be illegal or
offend common decency.Autumn 2004 |  European Employment Observatory Review 11
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Rejecting an employment offer 
Unemployment benefit II is a form of social security benefit
granted to those in need, and is funded by the taxpayer.
Anyone who rejects any reasonable offer of employment,
training, work opportunity or reintegration measure will have
their unemployment benefit II reduced by approximately 100 euro
for three months.This also applies to individuals who fail to make
satisfactory efforts to find work.The temporary subsidy paid for a
maximum of two years during the transition from unemployment
benefit to unemployment benefit II will also be withdrawn.
If a jobseeker aged under 25 in need of special assistance turns
down a reasonable offer of employment, training, reintegration
measure or work opportunity, they will receive no financial
support for three months.During this time,accommodation and
heating costs will be paid directly to the landlord. However, the
individual will continue to have access to counselling and
assistance as well as all integration services. As with those aged
over 25, in such cases additional financial or material services
may also be provided.
Estonia: Recent changes in the labour
market
Since 2001, employment and unemployment trends in Estonia
have changed. As a result of improvement in the economic
situation, employment started to rise and unemployment started
to fall.However,economic inactivity continued to grow until 2003,
then decreased.
According to Labour Force Survey data in 2003, as a yearly
average 594,000 of the population aged 15-74 were employed,
66,000 were unemployed and 387,000 were economically
inactive. According to Labour Market Board data, the number
of unemployed people registered at state employment offices
was 43,000 in the same period.
Although the activity rate (69.8%) and employment rate (62.6%)
increased in 2003 compared with 2002, these figures are much
lower than the European Union (EU) average. The employment
rate of women in Estonia (58.8%) is, however, higher than the EU
average and already exceeds the Lisbon summit’s target set for
2005 (57%). The employment rate for older people is also high
(52.1%) and exceeds the target set for 2010 (50%).A relatively high
age of exit from the labour market (61.6) in Estonia compared
with the EU average is caused by a gradual rise in the pension age.
Despite increasing employment, the unemployment rate is still
high at 10%. It is especially high for young people (20.6%) and
long-term unemployed people (46% of all unemployed people).
Overall, more men than women are unemployed, but the
situation for young unemployed people is the opposite. In 2003,
the unemployment rate of young women reached 26%, and that
of young men 16.9%.
New Employment Strategy
The Employment Strategy 2004-2008, approved by the Estonian
Government in May 2004, sets out new policy developments.
The aim is to meet the challenge of improving labour market
performance and increasing employment opportunities,
especially for the most disadvantaged groups of people.
The Employment Strategy is in accordance with the broader
European Employment Strategy and Employment Guidelines,
as well as the Lisbon targets of achieving full employment. The
strategy covers the provision of active labour market measures
and suggests several changes to Estonia’s employment services.
The new look of the Employment Service is seen as more client-
oriented, work-focused (as opposed to benefit-focused) and
effective. Necessary amendments to labour market legislation
(Social Protection of the Unemployed Act,Employment Service
Act) on the basis of the Employment Strategy are currently
being drafted.
The Employment Strategy emphasises the importance of
minimising the duration of unemployment, as well as
motivating and supporting people to move from receiving
benefits to being active in the labour market. To achieve this,
active labour market measures need to be effective and
accessible by all those who need them. As well as widening the
range and increasing the quality of active labour market
measures, the strategy foresees improved working methods in
employment offices. An individual approach to unemployed
people (case-management techniques) and joint working with
other institutions (e.g. rehabilitation teams, social insurance
departments, vocational training centres) as well as good co-
operation with employers will all play a crucial role in changing
the Employment Service from passive to active.
Greece: Recent developments
Promotion of part-time work
In Greece, part-time employment is limited in scale. In the
context of efforts to encourage this form of work, part-time
employment in the public sector was introduced in 2003 (Law
3174/03). More recently, Law 3250/2004, which amended Law
3174/2003, now allows public sector institutions to recruit
unemployed people on a part-time basis in order to promote
certain social services. Under the new law, local, prefectural and
regional authorities are allowed to recruit part-time personnel
under fixed-term contracts in order to provide these social
services. The services mentioned by the law relate to:
• home care for elderly and disabled people;
• school guards and road safety for pupils;
• social inclusion measures for immigrants; and
• cultural events and citizen awareness campaigns.
Selection of applicants for the new posts is to be based on social
criteria. The new law includes changes to the groups from
which the personnel to be hired can be drawn. People with
several children are included, and long-term unemployed
people can benefit.
More specifically, 30% of the posts foreseen by the new
legislation will be filled by unemployed workers (above 30 years
of age) who have exhausted their unemployment benefits, and
20% by unemployed workers who are close to retirement.
Further, 20% of the posts are reserved for workers registered as
unemployed for a period of at least 18 months, 10% for women
with young children, and 10% for disabled people. For most12 Autumn 2004 |  European Employment Observatory Review
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categories, there is a provision that women will occupy 60% of
the posts.
Presidential decrees regulating fixed-term
contracts
Two recent Presidential Decrees (PD 180/2004 and PD164)
regulate the process and prerequisites for those working under
fixed-term contracts to become permanent employees in the
private and public sectors respectively. With these Presidential
Decrees, Greek legislation falls into line with EU Directive
1999/70/EC by establishing rules to regulate fixed-term
contracts in the private and public sectors, and also by
regulating the employment status of those who currently work
under successive fixed-term contracts.
Latvia: Recent economic and labour
market developments
The reforms accomplished in Latvia and integration into the
European Union (EU) have had a positive impact on economic
development. The Latvian economy has become one of the
fastest growing in Europe. In 2003, gross domestic product grew
by 7.5%, and in the first quarter of 2004 by 8.8%.
To ensure balanced and sustainable growth of the national
economy, the Ministry of Economics – in co-operation with
other ministries and organisations – has developed the draft
‘Unified Strategy for the National Economy’. This strategy
provides a system of more than 50 indicators to chart Latvia’s
process of convergence to the average level of EU countries in
all areas characterising the quality of life.
As a result of a combination of factors such as economic
fluctuation, expectations of inflation  and anticipated price
increases arising from accession to the EU, inflation in July 2004
compared with July 2003 has increased by 6.7%. However, the
Ministry of Economics forecasts that over the coming years
inflation will gradually return to its previous levels.
Successful economic growth has recently made a positive impact
on the main labour market indicators. The activity rate was
69.2% in 2003, an increase of 0.4 percentage points over the
previous year. The employment rate was 61.8% (an increase of
1.4 percentage points), and the unemployment rate was 10.5%,
which was a decrease of 2.1 percentage points compared with
the previous year. These figures are improving year by year.
The main increase in the number of employed people during the
last year can be seen in construction, transport and
communications as well as in financial mediation. However,
there are still significant regional differences in the employment
situation. For example, registered unemployment rates in the
rural areas of the Latgale region (in eastern Latvia) are still very
high. The high level of long-term unemployment is also
noteworthy, although the situation is gradually improving.
Integration into the EU: main employment
policy initiatives
Latvia’s first National Action Plan (NAP) for Employment was
developed in 2000, in accordance with the concept ‘On
promoting employment in the country’ adopted by the Cabinet
of Ministers in 1999. This provided for the development of an
annual NAP for Employment, in line with EU employment
policies. However, this year is the first time when Latvia, as a
new EU Member State, must submit a NAP for Employment to
the European Commission.
The NAP for Employment 2004 was developed by a steering
group comprising representatives from the Ministries of
Economics, Welfare, Education and Science, Agriculture, and
Regional Development and Local Governments; the State
Employment Agency; and the Union of Local and Regional
Governments of Latvia, Free Trade Unions Federation and
Latvian Employers’Confederation.
The NAP’s employment promotion measures are closely linked
to implementation of the employment policy priorities set out in
the Joint Assessment Paper, the Single Programming Document
2004-2006 and the European Employment Guidelines 2003-
2005, as well as country specific recommendations.
In the NAP for Employment, the objectives and measures set
out under each of ten specific guidelines in order to achieve
three overarching objectives were chosen in relation to the
current situation in the Latvian labour market, as well as
available financial resources. Within the EU framework, the
assistance of high-level specialists from the Federal Ministry of
Economics and Labour in Germany was available during
drafting of Latvia’s NAP for Employment 2004. Nevertheless,
there is still much to do to improve the organisation and co-
ordination of the developing process of the NAP for
Employment in Latvia.
As a new Member State, Latvia has access to the EU Structural
Funds for the first time. Effective and full absorption of the
financial resources available from EU funds represents a
challenge because of a lack of institutional capacity and
appropriate experience.
Policy priority
The priority ‘Development of human resources and promotion
of employment’, co-financed by the European Social Fund (133
million euro), is set out in the Single Programming Document
2004-2006. Under this priority, the following measures (see also
Figure 1) will be implemented:
• combating social exclusion;
• development of education and continuing training; and
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Remarkable work has been done by civil servants from the
various ministries, State Employment Agency and other
institutions in developing national programmes and projects,
aid schemes and open calls for projects. For example, the
following national programmes have been developed within the
framework of the priority:
•‘ Support for active labour market measures’ (33.7 million
euro);
•‘ Capacity building of the institutions responsible for
developing and implementing labour market and gender-
equality policies, as well as capacity building of other
relevant institutions, organisations and project promoters,
including non-governmental organisations’ (10.9 million
euro); and 
•‘ Promotion of research on labour market issues, including
studies on ethnic minorities and the gender-equality situation
in the labour market’(4.5 million euro).
Nevertheless, co-ordination of the planning process for the
absorption of EU funds needs to be improved,and more support
needs to be provided to prepare projects of good quality.
Latvia: Pension reform 
Latvia is the first of the Central and Eastern European countries
to begin to radically reform its pension system and implement a
new approach in its pension system framework.
In the former Soviet Union, full employment and favourable
demographics meant that it was possible to have a low pension
age (55 for women and 60 for men). The Soviet-style pay as you
go (PAYG) state pension scheme led to greatly increased
expenditure on pensions. People were not interested in paying
taxes because the amount of the pension was not related to the
contributions paid; undeclared employment increased rapidly.
In the meantime, the ageing population would necessitate an
increase in the statutory minimum retirement age.
Efforts were made to improve the system in the years 1991 to
1993. Legislation to regulate the pension system at that time
made the state take the main responsibility for providing
security in old age. But the conditions for receiving the pension
were too generous and over the long term the state would not be
able to finance this system.Therefore Latvia decided to radically
reform its pension system and build one that could comply with
the new social and economic conditions of a market economy.
The concept of pension reform was adopted in 1995.
The targets to be achieved in implementing the pension reform
were to:
• create a pension system based on everyone’s motivation to
ensure a secure old age (the amount of pension being related
to the amount of social insurance contributions paid);
• create a three-level pension scheme, sharing the responsibility
of the individual and the state in providing security in old age;
• increase the statutory minimum retirement age; and
• provide the opportunity to invest the accumulation of
contributions, thus developing financial and capital markets.
The three-tier pension system
The reformed pension system in Latvia consists of three tiers,
as follows:
• First tier (implemented in January 1996) – contribution-
defined state pension scheme (Notional Defined Contribution
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PAYG). Latvia was one of the first countries in the world to
implement a notional contribution-defined state pension scheme,
originally designed for Sweden. The compulsory non-state
funded pension scheme differs considerably from traditional
PAYG schemes. The principle of intergenerational solidarity is
still applied, as the actual contributions are used to finance
current expenditure on pensions. The difference is that social
insurance contributions are recorded in notional individual
accounts, with the accumulated pension capital indexed
according to the wage index.
• Second tier (launched July 2001) – mandatory state-funded
pension scheme. Participation in the second tier is compulsory
for those who were under the age of 30 on 1 July 2001 (i.e.born
after 1 July 1971), but voluntary for those born between 2 July
1951 and 1 July 2001. Additional savings in this tier are made
by people investing part of the resources registered in their
individual account (see Figure 1 for the proportions) into
stocks, shares, bonds and other securities as well as in bank
deposits. Investing is done by a licensed fund manager. At the
end of 2003, seven licensed fund managers (including the State
Treasury) were offering 17 different investment schemes. These
schemes are divided according to the investment policy used:
there are conservative, integrated and active pension schemes,
depending on the risk and profit made from investments.By 31
December 2003, there were 495,062 people involved in the
second tier of pensions.
• Third tier (operating from July 1998) – private voluntary
pension scheme. Everyone has the option to create additional
savings for their pension by paying contributions into private
pension funds.
Social insurance contributions (20% of contribution wage) are
divided between the first and second tiers as shown in Figure 1.
Raising the retirement age 
As indicated above, in the Soviet era the statutory minimum
retirement age was 55 for women and 60 for men; many
opportunities were also given for earlier retirement. One of the
aims of pension reform in Latvia was to gradually raise the
retirement age, in order to secure the stability and sustainability
of the pension system and ensure an acceptable balance between
the working and non-working population.
In determining the new age for retirement, it was necessary to
take into consideration that average life expectancy in Latvia for
those born in 2002 is 71.7 (65.4 for men and 76.8 for women).
For this reason, raising the statutory minimum retirement age
above 62 was considered to be too far-reaching. Latvia is also
moving towards an equal retirement age of 62 for women and
men (see Figure 2). For men, a retirement age of 62 has already
been reached (from January 2003); for women, it will be reached
in 2008. The current retirement age for women is 60 (from 1 July
2004); raising it to 62 is being carried out on a step-by-step basis.
Up to mid-2005, the law provides for the possibility of retiring
two years before the age of 62 for men and two years before the
increasing schedule to 62 for women if the period of social
insurance contribution is not less than 30 years. Those with
insurance contributions of more than 30 years who have
brought up five or more children or a handicapped child to the
age of eight have the right to retire five years before the statutory
minimum retirement age.
The employment rate of older workers (aged 55 to 64) has risen
since 2000 from 36% to 44% in 2003, mainly because of raising
the statutory minimum retirement age. The reformed
contributory pension scheme is also expected to encourage
people to extend their working life, because the principle of
“retire later – get still more”is being applied.
The new pension scheme was created as an insurance system
based on everyone’s motivation to achieve financial security in
old age. Nevertheless, pension reform has been more rapid than
the improvement in living standards for pensioners, partly
because the beneficiaries of the reformed system will be the
rising generation and generations to come. The reform of the
pension system is expected to stimulate active ageing,discourage
early retirement and encourage work after retirement.
Hungary: Recent labour market trends
According to the Labour Force Survey,the number of employed
people in Hungary was 3,892,800 in the first part of 2004, which
equates to an increase of 40,000 over the last two years. The
number of employed people increased mainly between 2002 and
2003; the data show stagnation of employment over the past
year. The number of employed women has increased by 30,000
during the last two years, while the change in the number of
employed men has been very small (within statistical sampling
error). The dynamic growth in women’s employment also
occurred in the period 2002-3.
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Figure 2: Changes in statutory minimum retirement age
Years 1st tier 2nd tier
2001-2006 18% 2%
2007 16% 4%
2008 12% 8%
2009 11% 9%
From 2010 10% 10%
Figure 1: Division of insurance contributions for pensions
between the first and second tiers 
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The employment rate for the 15-64 age group was 56.6% in the
first half of 2004.This represents a 0.6 percentage point increase
during the last two years. In spite of this improving trend, the
Hungarian employment rate lags behind the EU average.
The unemployment rate presents a more favourable picture in
terms of international comparison. It was 6% in the first half of
2004. This was 0.3 percentage points higher than two years
earlier, but still much lower than the EU average.
Taking a longer-term view of recent trends in the labour market,
it can be seen that the dynamic growth in employment – which
started in the second half of the 1990s – came to a halt as a
consequence of the recession in the world economy. The
government temporarily stimulated the labour market. The
most important new measure was the revision of wages in the
public sector, which caused significant structural changes in
employment by sector and gender. The number of people
employed in the service sector has grown strongly, and the
number of women employed in this sector has also increased.As
a result of a more than 20% wage increase in real terms in the
state sector, vacancies in education, public healthcare and to an
extent in public administration have been filled.
Compared with the first half of 2002, the number of people
employed in education and public administration has increased
by 25,000 in both cases, by 32,000 in health and social work, and
by more than 40,000 in the field of real estate, renting and
business activities. Other parts of the service sector, however,
have shown some (less significant) decreases in employment, so
that the net growth in employment in the service sector has
amounted to 110,000 over two years (see Figure 1). The value
of this development is limited by the fact that it has been
concentrated mostly in state services.
Another important trend is that the construction industry has
shown continuous increase.The number of people employed in
this industry has increased by 40,000 during the last two years
(see Figure 1). This suggests that the recession in the
Hungarian economy is gradually receding. However, economic
growth over the past year has still not entailed significant
growth in employment.
Figure 1 also shows that the improving employment trend of
the service sector is overshadowed by stagnation in
manufacturing, where the number of workers has decreased by
66,000 over the last two years. The decline has appeared in
almost every branch of manufacturing; the drop in
employment has particularly hit the textile, leather and food
industries.
Since 2002, remarkable growth in activity has been
experienced, and both employment and unemployment have
increased. This is a new phenomenon in the Hungarian labour
market. One reason for the increase in unemployment is that
the significant wage increases in real terms have activated
people who were economically inactive, and they have started
to seek jobs again.
The age profile of workers has changed considerably in recent
years, partly because of the ageing population. The number of
workers aged 15-24 has declined by 85,000 during the last two
years, while the number of those aged over 50 has increased by
120,000 over the same period. The reasons are manifold: the
expansion of education has reduced young people’s willingness
to seek a permanent job; student employment has decreased
too, partly as a consequence of the student’s credit; the higher
retirement age has increased the number of older people in
work; and since older workers stay longer in the labour market,
demand for career starters has shrunk.
Despite this shift in employment towards the older age
brackets, the employment rate of the older population is below
the EU average. Hungary lags behind most of all in this sphere
of employment. In the first half of the 1990s, many workers
moved out of unemployment into inactivity. Getting this
group back into employment requires considerable efforts on
the part of the government.
A new phenomenon of the Hungarian labour market is
unemployment among young people with a degree. This is
partly a consequence of the expansion in education. At this
recent stage of economic development, graduates cannot be
entirely absorbed by the economy. In many cases, the
profession attained does not meet the labour market’s demand.
According to the unemployment register, the number of
unemployed young graduates has increased, and their
proportion among registered unemployed school leavers has
also grown in recent years. The government has introduced a
new central programme targeted at this special category of
career starters, to enhance their labour market integration. In
this new programme, young graduates are offered work places
in public administration for up to a year.
Seasonal or non-permanent employment has shown an increase
this year. The number of those employed through the use of a
‘casual work card’ is about 50% higher than a year ago. Despite
the growing trend, this form of temporary working remains a
subsidiary factor in employment.
In spite of the weak employment performance, enterprises have
shown an increase in demand for labour. Growing demand has
appeared in central Hungary and the more developed western
part of the country, mainly in seasonally sensitive sectors.
Vacancies grew in the first half of 2004 by more than 50% in
agriculture, 30% in sale, retail trade, hotels and restaurants, and
by 20% in construction. Registered vacancies increased in the
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Figure 1: Changes in employment by major sectors in
Hungary between the first half of 2002 and 2004 (1,000s
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whole national economy by about 10% compared with the
previous year.
The low employment rate – coupled with a growing labour
shortage – reflects structural tensions in the Hungarian labour
market. This is confirmed by the fact that the number of foreign
workers with official permits increased by 13,000 in the first half
of 2004 compared with the previous year. The number of
permitted foreign workers amounts to 62,000, comprising
mostly non-EU citizens.
Malta: Consultation on the National
Action Plan for Employment 
In light of Malta’s accession to the European Union (EU), the
Maltese government has drafted the country’s first National
Action Plan (NAP) for Employment. The draft consultation
plan sets out Malta’s employment priorities and the strategic
elements to be pursued between 2005 and 2010. The principal
strategies covered by the plan include:
• improving the levels of education and certification among the
workforce;
• raising the national employment rate;
• enhancing the business environment;
• increasing productivity in the public sector;
• modernising the public employment service; and 
• improving the governance of labour market policies.
Table 1 sets out some of these targets as referred to in the plan.
To reach these targets, the plan provides for 55 measures as well
as 30 European Social Fund (ESF) projects, which have been
approved for funding and will run from 2004-6. The measures
still have to be discussed by the consultees prior to presenting
the NAP to the European Commission. The following are some
of the measures included in the draft consultation plan:
• improved incentives for enterprise training of low-skilled
workers, and of workers in micro-enterprises;
• introduction of childcare regulations and a fee subsidy scheme;
• an action plan to ‘Make Work Pay’;
• a social pact for economic development;
• a scheme to redeploy public-sector workers;
• reformation and extension of preventive and active
measures; and
• strengthening of capacity for employment policy definition,
co-ordination and evaluation.
The projects proposed for ESF funding cover a wide range of
issues. Most cover training initiatives for jobseekers, trainers,
workers in various industries (such as engineering, electronics
and construction), and targeted training for people with
disabilities. Other projects involve studies related to measures to
improve gender equality, incentives for the provision of
childcare services, and various training and employment
schemes. These projects are intended to supplement the
measures proposed by the government as well as helping in
attaining the general targets set for 2010.
Malta: Public-sector reforms 
A series of reforms are being introduced in the public sector in
Malta, with the aim of providing a more efficient and effective
service. High service costs and the rise in the fiscal deficit were
the prime motives behind these changes.The reforms involve the
introduction of new management practices within the public
sector in general (including public agencies and public majority
companies), and the redeployment of public-sector workers.
The White Paper on the Public Sector, drawn up in 2003, sets
out all the new provisions which will eventually be taken up in
the coming years. Among other reforms, the White Paper
proposes greater decentralisation of authority from the Public
Service Commission to department heads, and more results-
based accountability across government departments and
public agencies.
Meanwhile, the redeployment of public-sector workers is
intended to continue in the coming months. In 2003, a
government-owned company, Industrial Projects and Services
Limited, was set up to absorb workers who did not opt for early
retirement in the restructuring of the Maltese shipyards. This
year,an agreement was reached between the government and the
Malta Federation of Industry to retrain and employ these
workers within the private sector over a three-year transition
period. During this period, workers’ salaries will be shared
between government and the private sector. On termination of
the three-year period, the companies concerned will eventually
employ these workers.
This agreement will be extended to other public-sector workers
who are to be made redundant, namely those employed by the
Public Broadcasting Services, Malta Export Trade Corporation,
Malta Development Corporation, and the Institute for the
Promotion of Small Enterprises.
Targets for 2010 Situation Target 2010 EU target 
December 2003 2010 
Raising the overall
employment rate by
3 percentage points 53.7% 56.7% 70%
Raising the female
employment rate by
7 percentage points 33.7% 40.7% 60%
Raising the employment
rate of older workers by
2.4 percentage points  32.6% 35% 50%
Increase of 1.2 percentage
points in the business
start-up rate  6.8% 8% None
An increase of 17.5
percentage points in 
22 year olds with upper
secondary qualifications 47.5% 65% 85%
A reduction of 13.5
percentage points in
early school leavers’ rate 48.5% 35% <10%
Table 1: Targets referred to in the National Action PlanAutumn 2004 |  European Employment Observatory Review 17
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Austria: The Labour Market Reform
Act in brief
Austria’s new Labour Market Reform Act of 14 July 2004 will
further enhance flexibility in the country’s labour market. The
regulations contained in the Act take into consideration the
increased dynamism in the labour market brought about by
structural changes.
In addition to measures to boost placement efficiency and make
the provisions on reasonable entitlement more flexible, the Act
contains a number of interesting new rules. The main changes
are set out below in relation to the relevant laws. Appropriate
accompanying measures are also planned,in a bid to give people
further incentive to enter employment and to limit the unwanted
disadvantages involved for unemployed people.
The main points of the Labour Market Reform Act are:
• an individual assistance plan to be drafted by the
Employment Service for all jobseekers;
• examination of regional placement capabilities and timely
arrangement of vocational protection benefit (i.e.
individuals’right to be employed in the occupation for which
they have trained, in the context of wage protection); and
• further grading of penalties if individuals reject reasonable
employment.
Unemployment Insurance Act 
New rules on reasonable travelling time 
Current legislation stipulates only that if people are employed
outside the town in which they live, account must be taken of
any duty of care they may have. Accordingly, there has been
virtually no limit on the amount of time that an individual may
have to spend travelling to a new job.
From now on, reasonable travelling time from home to work
and back again will, as far as possible, be limited to a quarter
of the duration of the working day. Significantly longer
working hours will only be deemed reasonable “under special
circumstances”. For those threatened with long-term
unemployment, longer travelling time may be considered
reasonable.
But in any case, full-time workers should not spend more than
two hours each day travelling. Those working part-time should
not spend more than one and a half hours travelling, provided
that they work at least 20 hours a week.
Vocational protection benefit 
This benefit is currently limited to 100 days. A new individual
wage-protection benefit now comes into effect. Under the new
rules, during the first 120 days of entitlement to unemployment
benefit, the wage offered in an occupation other than that for
which an individual has trained, or for part-time employment,
may not be less than 80% of that person’s previous average
earnings. After the first 120 days, the wage may not be less than
75% of such earnings.
In the case of part-time work (during at least half of the
working hours less than 75% of normal working time), a 100%
wage-protection benefit will apply. Anyone supplying false
information regarding the number of part-time hours they work
in an attempt to claim wage-protection benefit will be penalised.
Simplification of rules on temporary employment 
The limit of 16 days’temporary employment in any one calendar
month will be abolished and the upper limit of net income will be
raised, thereby encouraging people to remain employed for
longer. If a job ends on a Saturday or a Sunday and the worker is
entitled to claim unemployment benefit, he or she may no longer
claim benefit in respect of said Saturday or Sunday.
Extension of rules on the allocation period – to include periods of
entitlement to a pension advance.
Improved protection for relatives providing care 
Protection is being improved by extending the period of
entitlement to unemployment benefit. For independent
contracts, there will also be compulsory issue of a statement
setting out the mutual rights and obligations arising from the
contract with respect to unemployment benefit, in the case of
care of relatives from care level 3 upwards.
Modernising the application process and assertion rules on
supporting early unemployment registration.
Bringing about equality between foreign and domestic pensions –
no entitlement to unemployment benefit or severance pay if an
individual is claiming a foreign pension, as is the case with
unemployment assistance.
Elimination of hardship cases for pension advances
Individuals with impaired health who have applied for pension
payments and are required to go into hospital will no longer lose
their payment at the end of the limited period during which they
may claim sickness benefit. Nor will they be required to apply in
person in future.In addition,stays abroad of up to three months
will be allowed without the need for costly and time-consuming
leniency proceedings, since such individuals are not available to
the labour market.
Stipulation of training leave
In future, a minimum number of hours will be stipulated for
continuing training. Only those following training for at least 16
hours a week will be entitled to claim a continuing training
allowance, and will thereby be able to improve their prospects in
the labour market.
Clarification that entitlement to severance pay ends no later
than the point at which an individual reaches statutory
retirement age.
Closing of the one-week gap in health-insurance protection –
this applies to unemployed individuals who, because of the four
week waiting period, do not claim unemployment benefit
straight away and are therefore not covered after the end of the
three week period of health insurance protection.
Equalising treatment of all unemployment insurance periods –
by abolishing the limited eligibility of the contribution periods
of prisoners who fulfil their duties in respect of work.18 Autumn 2004 |  European Employment Observatory Review
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Employment Service Act 
In addition to protection regulating the employment of
different groups and wage-protection benefit, a binding
assistance plan will be introduced. This plan must be drawn up
jointly by the Employment Service and the unemployed
individual. It should ensure that an individual’s new job enables
them to at least maintain their level of qualification and,
wherever possible, improve it. If no agreement can be reached,
the Employment Service is authorised to formulate the
assistance plan on its own. The new provisions do not
constitute a legal entitlement to training.
Labour Market Policy Funding Act 
As a general rule, employers are not required to pay
contributions towards unemployment benefit (bonus) for
employees aged 50 or over.To date,a further precondition for the
bonus has been that the individual concerned must not have been
employed by the same employer within the previous three years.
From now on, the following rules will apply. In contrast to the
previous rules, if a company hires an older employee who
previously worked for the company before reaching the age of
50, the bonus may still be paid – even if said worker was
employed by the company within the three years prior to turning
50. In all other cases, the three-year rule will continue to apply.
Federal Act on Bad-weather Compensation for
Workers in the Construction Industry 
There will be a non-discretionary increase in the number of bad-
weather hours (as per calculations based on data from the
Central Institute for Meteorology and Geodynamics) in
accordance with this Act, through the Construction Workers’
Vacation and Severance Pay Fund.
Amendments will be made to the wording of this Act to reflect
the Federal Ministries Act and the First Euro Legal Collateral
Law Act. Obsolete rules on overall payments will be removed.
General Civil Code 
It will be compulsory to issue a statement for independent
employees, setting out the mutual rights and obligations arising
from the contract.
Youth Training Consolidation Act 
The measures set out in this Act are extended and prolonged:
• courses will remain open to 2004 and 2005 school leavers;
• the course duration may be extended to a maximum of 12
months; and 
• courses may be arranged which prepare young people for the
final exam.
Poland: New labour market legislation 
The launch of two important new pieces of legislation – the
Employment Promotion and Labour Market Institutions Act,
and the Pre-retirement Benefits Act – is of key importance for
the development of labour market policy in Poland. Both Acts
came into force on 1 June 2004, with some articles of the Pre-
retirement Benefits Act coming into force on 1 August 2004.
Employment Promotion and Labour Market
Institutions Act 
This Act is a component of the pro-growth plan for 2002-4
(Business – Development – Labour II),adopted by the Council of
Ministers on 1 July 2003.It aims to create a comprehensive system
to stimulate employment and check unemployment growth.
The Act implements the provisions of the European
Employment Strategy, in particular its Employment Guidelines,
as well as the European Social Charter (ESC) and the Charter of
Basic Employee Rights. It also pursues the objectives of the
Lisbon summit agenda. This set the strategic goal for the
European Union (EU) to become the most competitive and
dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, which will
generate sustainable growth, create more and better jobs and
have better social cohesion.
Effective implementation of the Lisbon agenda calls for EU
Member States to develop three main and mutually
complementary objectives within their employment policies:full
employment, increasing the quality and productivity of work,
and social cohesion and inclusion. According to the Lisbon
agenda, the average employment rate should increase to 70% by
the year 2010. In Poland, the employment rate was 43.4% in the
first quarter of 2004, with 73.2% only being achieved by
university graduates. The increasing level of education within
Poland is evidenced here, and in particular the growing number
of people entering higher-level education.
The goals set out in the Lisbon agenda will be implemented
through active and preventive measures, in compliance with the
agenda’s guidelines, to ensure that unemployed and
economically inactive people are included within the labour
market and can actively compete there. Ensuring that
unemployed people receive the support of labour market
institutions is an important factor.
The Act also implements the requirements of the Conventions
of the International Labour Organisation, which were ratified
by Poland, in addition to the provisions of the European Social
Charter, which protects the basic social and economic rights of
nationals of the signatory states.Poland ratified the ESC in 1997
by implementing, among other things, such provisions as:
• striving to achieve full and stable employment;
• maintaining free employment services for all workers;
• supporting adequate vocational training, guidance and
retraining; and
• recognising the right of male and female employees to equal
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Basic provisions of the Act
The Act:
• sets out active and preventive measures for unemployed and
economically inactive people;
• identifies mechanisms to prevent discrimination in the labour
market and promote the employment of women, including
sanctions against those who limit the access of women to the
labour market (including within the employment services);
• assumes a growth in demand for work and the promotion of
vocational activity for older people;
• provides for the implementation of guidelines on promoting
flexibility, adaptability and mobility in the labour market
(including, for example, the Labour Fund refunding the costs
of travel to and accommodation at the place of work);
• provides for more severe sanctions for those employers who
employ people illegally;
• takes account of the existing institutions and arrangements
in the European labour market, including the EURES
(network of European public employment services) system;
• incorporates EU regulations on the free movement of people
and the co-ordination of social insurance systems for
unemployment benefits into Polish legislation; and
• provides for comprehensive changes in the operation of
labour market institutions and instruments.
In addition, to encourage unemployed people to actively seek
work, the Act provides for the option of combining work and
receipt of unemployment benefits. If someone who is eligible for
unemployment benefit takes up a part-time job and earns a
salary below the minimum pay, they are entitled to receive an
‘activation’allowance.
An important change incorporated in the Act is the transfer of
responsibility for payment of pre-retirement benefits and
decisions on eligibility for such benefits from the labour offices
to the Social Insurance Institution.
The Act supports co-operation and partnership working in
relation to the labour market. Consultation procedures are
already in place to support the active participation of social
partners in state interventions, along with measures relating to
the labour market.
The Act also supports progress towards the achievement of
uniform, consistent definitions regarding the operation of
employment services and other labour market institutions, as
well as uniformity of qualification requirements for staff of
public employment services.
Pre-retirement Benefits Act 
The solutions adopted in this Act are closely linked with the
regulations set out in the Employment Promotion and Labour
market Institutions Act, and the programme for employing
people aged over 50.
Pre-retirement benefits aim to benefit those who find themselves
in the most difficult situations. The existing policy of relaxing
the eligibility criteria in relation to age and length of
employment service led to the vocational de-activation of over
500,000 people.
The main aim of this new Act is to propose a series of activation
measures in the initial period after loss of a job. The activation
programmes are set out in the Employment Promotion and
Labour Market Institutions Act, and consist of organisational
and financial services for employers and directly interested
parties, geared towards securing employment in the first six
months after registration at a labour office. People becoming
eligible for pre-retirement benefits during this first six months
will have unemployed status and the entitlement to receive
unemployment benefit. If they do not access employment during
this six-month period,they will then be able to apply to the Social
Insurance Institution for the right to receive pre-retirement
benefit, provided that other specified conditions are satisfied.
The regulations set out in the new Act will stimulate
unemployed people with long service records to actively seek
work. At the same time, the transfer of benefit payments from
labour offices to the Social Insurance Institution will reduce
bureaucracy within the labour offices. It will also substantially
increase the involvement of labour offices in both employment
placement and vocational guidance activities.
Finland: Launch of the new Working-
life Development Programme ‘Tykes’
Development of the information society by means of equipment
and education alone is not enough to face the challenges of
globalisation. We need workplace communities that
continuously develop their operations. We also need workplace
communities in which education and knowledge are refined
through true co-operation and teamwork. In these workplaces,
new technology serves the accumulation of the entire workplace
community’s knowledge and know-how. The new Working-life
Development Programme ‘Tykes’ is intended to build Finnish
working life towards this goal, as Finland invests in knowledge,
but does not yet know how to make best use of it.
Tykes, which was launched at the start of 2004, supports the
development of work organisation through the co-operation
of management and personnel. The programme aims at
growth in productivity, into which is interwoven the
simultaneous improvement of employees’ development
potentialities, their scope to influence matters, well-being at
work, and workplace functionality. Tykes is based on positive
results from earlier working-life programmes (The Workplace
Development Programme ‘Tyke’, National Productivity
Programme, and Well Being at Work Programme).
Tykes’ goal for 2004-9 is to have as many as 1,000 workplace
development projects with 250,000 participants. Special
attention is given to small and medium-sized enterprises and
social and health services. Success in the global economy calls
for greater and greater productivity and efficiency. Maintenance
of welfare structures also requires higher productivity, because
the population is ageing and the labour force diminishing.
Sustainable growth in productivity and the economy can be
attained only through knowledge and innovations.
The total budget of the Tykes’ programme to be financed
through the state has been estimated at 87 million euro for 2004-
9. The aim is for workplaces to invest double this amount in the
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The programme supports researchers’ and consultants’ efforts
in the development projects. Development work is based on
management, staff and experts in the workplaces working
together as a team. In particular, Tykes aims to strengthen
developmental co-operation between enterprises and
educational research and design establishments. The research-
political goal of the Tykes programme is that the projects
become topics for doctoral dissertations and licentiate studies.
The aim is for Finland to become a leading player in the field of
working-life development.
The application process for projects began in February 2004.
Regional networks of contact people in the TE Centres and
Occupational Health and Safety Inspectorates are also being set
up for the programme.
At the launch of the Tykes programme, the results of researcher
Pekka Ylöstalo’s study on the prevalence of team-based
methods of operation in workplaces in Finland were published.
This study showed that team-based methods of operation are
more common in workplaces in Finland and Sweden than in
other European Union (EU) Member States on average.
Industry is ahead of the service sector in Finland,unlike in other
EU Member States.The Finnish data for the study was based on
management assessments of 316 private enterprises employing
at least ten people. The study also used a sample of 810
businesses from ten other EU countries as comparison material.
The study indicated that typical reasons why team-based
methods have not been of interest to all enterprises in Finland
include enterprises’ conscious choices of strategies, cultural
factors and the difficulty of measuring the benefits. However,
Finnish business leaders mentioned resistance from employees,
trade unions or middle management as an impediment to
change less frequently than did businesses in other EU
countries. Similarly, legislation and collective agreements were
more seldom considered as problems inhibiting the use of new
methods of operation in Finland.
The Ministry of Labour,other ministries and labour market and
entrepreneurs’ organisations are taking part in the Tykes
programme. More information on the programme can be found
at: www.tykes.fi 
Sweden: Better integration of
immigrants into the labour market 
Against the backdrop of a low employment rate among the
immigrant labour force, the government has emphasised that
continuous efforts are needed to accommodate general labour
market activities for all individuals, irrespective of ethnic or
cultural background. Co-operation between public
employment services, municipalities and the Swedish
Migration Board must be developed and improved,
particularly during the first weeks and months after an
immigrant’s arrival. The integration of immigrants must focus
on work and self-support.
In spring 2003, the government appointed a working group for
co-operation on labour market integration. The group’s tasks
were to investigate the private sector’s commitment to the
integration of immigrant workers, and to assess how public
and private partnership could be developed in this area. The
working group consisted of representatives from the Swedish
Enterprise Confederation and the government.
In April 2004, the working group delivered the results of its
investigations in: Open doors – lowered thresholds. The group
suggested a number of measures, including a new system of
‘trial traineeships’ for those with limited or no work
experience. The purpose is to provide individuals with closer
contact with Swedish working life, and to give unemployed
people the chance to demonstrate their skills and knowledge.
In response, the Swedish Enterprise Confederation pointed out
that hiring a worker with a degree and work experience from
another country involves a certain degree of risk. The working
group took the view that trial traineeships would reduce this
risk, since it gives employers a chance to identify the skills and
knowledge of immigrant workers without any long-term
commitment. The working group also suggested that the
Swedish Employers Confederation should actively promote
trial traineeships among its members in the private sector.
If the trial traineeship does not result in a job in the regular
labour market, the employer must provide the unemployed
person with a certificate on the extent and content of the trial
traineeship. Further investigation is needed as to the
possibilities for making an assessment of the skills and work
experience gained by immigrant workers at their place of work.
The government’s view is that the main direction of integration
policy should be to encourage self-supportive work. On the
other hand, it is vital that immigrants get a foothold in the
Swedish labour market. The trial traineeship could provide a
gateway into the Swedish labour market in support of this
process. In preparing the Budget Bill for 2005, the government
will return to parliament with a response to the working
group’s proposals.
Norway: Overall developments
Since the second quarter of 2003, there have been solid signs of
recovery in the Norwegian economy, though the recovery has
not yet resulted in significantly increased employment or lower
unemployment rates. It is expected that the recovery will
continue through 2004 and 2005, leading to increased
employment and reduced unemployment.
Recovery in the Norwegian economy
The growth rates identified in 2003 have continued, with new
figures showing that growth in the mainland economy has
continued to be high in the first part of 2004. Low interest rates,
high demand from the household sector and increased
investments and exports have pushed up the rates of growth. The
upswing is expected to continue through 2004 and 2005. With an
increased level of unemployment (up one percentage point since
the summer of 2001), and some decrease in the labour-force
participation rate, there are labour resources available to support
the economy. Money and wage inflation pressure is thus expected
to stay low despite increased growth rates.Autumn 2004 |  European Employment Observatory Review 21
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Continuing high labour market participation
rates 
Norway has a high labour market participation rate, although
the rate has decreased since 2002. According to the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) figures, 79.4% of the total population aged 15-64
were participating in the labour force in 2003. The comparable
figure for the European Union (EU) was 69.4%, and the
OECD average was 69.8%. The relatively high participation
rate in Norway is partly explained by a high proportion of
employment among women and older workers.
A fall of one percentage point in the participation rate and a
reduction of approximately 1% in the numbers of employed
people has been noted from the second quarter of 2002 to the
second quarter of 2003. In the second half of 2003 and so far
in 2004, the demand for labour and the unemployment rate
have been stable.
Rising unemployment has come to an end
From a level of 3.2% in 1998, the unemployment rate increased
to approximately 4.6% in the third quarter of 2003. Weak
demand for labour contributed to lowering the rates of flow
from unemployment to employment, resulting in a growing
proportion of long-term unemployed people. Joblessness
among immigrants has increased at the same rate as other
unemployment in the last few years. Today, one in six
unemployed people is an immigrant. The rate of unemployment
stopped rising in the third quarter of 2003 and has since been
stable. The economic forecasts indicate a decrease in
unemployment in the second half of 2004 and in 2005.
Declining activity in the manufacturing sector 
The manufacturing sector has experienced the highest loss of
activity and the sharpest decline in employment during the
recession. From the second quarter of 2002 to the second
quarter of 2004, employment in this sector decreased by about
10%, compared with an overall fall in employment of 1%.
Increased numbers of people on state benefits
Particularly challenging long-term trends in the Norwegian
labour market since the mid-1990s have included:
• an increased number of people receiving disability pension;
• an increased number of people on early retirement schemes;
and 
• increased sickness absence and increased numbers of people
receiving medical and vocational rehabilitation.
These trends have contributed to a lowering of the effective
labour supply and a constraint on public budgets. About 20% of
people of working age are on these state benefits.
EU enlargement and new regulations
Norway decided to make use of the possibility of a transitional
period in order to prevent possible negative consequences for
employment and welfare schemes after EU enlargement in May
2004. The focus has been to avoid ‘social dumping’. Migrant
workers from the new EU Member States (with the exception of
Cyprus and Malta) are required to obtain work permits before
starting work in Norway. Work permits will only be issued for
full-time employment at normal rates of pay and under normal
working conditions.
The government submitted a new proposal to parliament on
May 28 2004, as follow-up to a request from parliament for new
regulations. In accordance with this proposal, the Labour
Inspectorate and the Petroleum Safety Authority are to carry out
necessary inspections within companies to ensure compliance
with the terms of work permits. Any suspicions concerning
violations of the terms of work permits are to be reported to the
immigration authorities. The proposal also stipulates that the
Labour Inspectorate and Petroleum Safety Authority are to
oversee the enforcement of collective agreements declared
universally applicable by the Norwegian Tariff Board. Any non-
conformity is to be investigated by the police.
Employers in certain sectors may, by a regulation to be imposed
by the Ministry of Labour, issue ID cards to their employees if
this is considered necessary for health, safety and environmental
reasons. Building and construction companies will be the first to
be affected by this new regulation.Finally,the proposal contains
certain amendments concerning tax registration by Norwegian
firms buying services from abroad.
Parliament adopted the proposal in June 15, 2004, and the new
regulations came into force on 1 October, 2004.
Norway has ratified the International Labour Organisation’s
Convention Number 94 (the Labour Clauses (Public Contracts)
Convention). The Norwegian government is in the process of
implementing the convention through new guidelines for state
agency purchases.
An increased number of work permits has been issued so far in
2004 compared with 2003. By the end of July, the Norwegian
Immigration Authorities had given about 5,000 work
permissions.The increase was mainly in employees from the new
EU Member States.
2003 2004 2005
Gross domestic product
(excluding oil sector) 0.6 3.2 3.1
Private consumption 3.8 4.5 3.7
Investments -3.7 4.9 5.0
Exports 1.2 1.6 3.0
Employment -0.6 0.2 0.8
Unemployment (level, rate) 4.5 4.3 4.1
Inflation (trend) 1.1 0.75 2.25
Table 1: Main macro-economic figures for Norway
(Percentage change from previous year unless otherwise stated)
Source: Statistics Norway (2003) and White Book (forecast 2004 and 2005)22 Autumn 2004 |  European Employment Observatory Review
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Norway: New Ministry of Labour and
Social Affairs 
The Norwegian government has established a new Ministry of
Labour and Social Affairs, effective as of June 18, 2004. The new
ministry has been created as a first step in reforms to co-ordinate
the Public Employment Service, the National Insurance Service
and the Social Assistance Offices. The new Ministry has overall
responsibility for labour market policies, working environment
and safety, income insurance and social welfare. It was
established by merging relevant departments and units from
three different ministries: the former Ministry of Social Affairs,
the former Ministry of Labour and Government Administration
and the Ministry of Municipal and Regional Affairs.
Norway is facing challenges to secure the basis for continued
welfare. Strategies to reduce the strong growth in withdrawal
from work due to sickness absence, disability pension and early
retirement are some of the most urgent political priorities in the
social field. In addition, the govern¬ment is dealing with
important pension policy issues and strategies to promote social
inclusion and reduce poverty. Norway, like most Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development countries, is also
experiencing a significant ageing of its population.
One important measure to meet these challenges is better co-
ordination of employment and social policies and services.
Currently, administration of income security and employment
services in Norway is divided between three main public welfare
agencies: the National Insurance Service and the Public
Employment Service, which operate nationally, and the
municipal Social Assistance Offices. The present system has
been criticised for being fragmented and inaccessible to clients
who need to combine services from two or three agencies. It has
also been claimed that co-ordination of the different services has
been inefficient or lacking.
In August 2003, the government appointed an independent
committee with a mandate to consider different organisational
models for co-ordinating the three agencies, and to submit a
report by June 30, 2004. The government invited organisations
and interest groups to submit comments on the report by 1
November 2004 before deciding on a model and submitting a
proposal to parliament well before the general election in
September 2005.
There are three main goals for the reforms:
• increasing the number of people working and engaged in
other activities, and reducing the number of people
dependent on welfare benefits;
• developing a more user/client-oriented welfare system; and
• developing a more effective welfare system.
The committee has argued for the merging of work-related
measures into one agency.It has also argued for the need to shape
a slender organisation with unambiguous objectives, a limited
number of responsibilities, and a clear focus on the single
purpose of getting people back to work and reducing the number
of people on inactive benefits. For these reasons, the committee
has proposed replacing the existing National Insurance Service
and Public Employment Service with two new agencies:
• A centre for work and income that will cover all working-age
people who lack work or have other work-related problems,
whether these stem from health or social reasons. The main
objective of this agency will be getting people back to or into
work more efficiently.
• A separate agency for pensions and child/family-related
benefits and matters that are currently the responsibility of
the National Insurance Service. The committee’s argument
is that a separate agency will be better equipped to handle
the demanding tasks and challenges related to future
pension reform.
The committee has advocated maintaining municipalities’
responsibility for the social safety net for their inhabitants, and
has therefore not proposed any changes in the municipal Social
Assistance Offices. However, the need to develop a client/user
focus is one of the central reasons for the reform. Emphasis
will therefore be placed on a user-friendly system and easy
access to services, either by personal attendance or through
electronic gateways.
To ensure better co-ordination of national and municipal
services and a user-friendly system, the committee has
advocated the following measures:
1. To enhance motivation to seek work rather than receiving
social welfare, the government should consider a new
jobseeker’s allowance for active jobseekers who are not
eligible for unemployment benefit. The objective of such an
allowance would be to cover people without work or income
who would otherwise have to seek economic support from the
Social Assistance Offices.
2. A joint front-line service (one stop shop) based on co-
operation between the local offices of the proposed national
centre for work and income and the municipal Social
Assistance Offices. This front-line service would assist all
clients in need of active measures to obtain work or get back
to work, and related income support.
A reform of the three welfare agencies will be one of the
greatest organisational changes in the public sector in Norway
in recent years. At any one time, these agencies cater to half of
the population and are responsible for measures covering the
whole lifespan.
The reform will involve more than 16,000 person-years and total
budgets of more than 200 billion Norwegian kroner (24.3 billion
euro) – 13% of gross domestic product. Implementation of the
proposed reforms offers a great number of challenges,but on the
other hand the potential for improved services for clients/users
and reduced costs is considerable.
These goals cannot be reached by organisational changes
alone. Benefits, regulations, statutory rules and services must
also be designed to motivate those who are able to work to
return to or get into working life. These matters will be
addressed at a later stage.Autumn 2004 |  European Employment Observatory Review 23
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Bulgaria: Continued preparation for
participation in the European
Employment Strategy 
In 2004,Bulgaria continued its preparation for full participation
in the European Employment Strategy (EES). In this regard,
legislative changes have continued, along with improvements in
policy implementation and administrative capacity. Important
stages in preparation for Bulgaria’s accession to the European
Union (EU) have been the adoption of the national
Employment Strategy, and the first report on progress in
implementing the Joint Assessment of Employment Priorities
(JAP) on employment priorities in Bulgaria.
Employment Strategy 2003-2010
The Employment Strategy incorporates and supplements the
best practices of the employment policies applied during the
market-economy transition period. It establishes objectives,
priorities and activities that, when implemented, will comply
with the macro-economic framework adopted in the National
Development Plan.
The Employment Strategy is a more general strategic document
than a labour market strategy, since it is not restricted to the
functioning of the labour market. At the same time, it does not
cover all the issues regarding labour relations, freedoms and
protection for workers, ensuring health and safety at work,
social insurance and living standards.
The Employment Strategy defines the path for achieving the EES
goals in Bulgaria, namely: ensuring full employment, increasing
quality and productivity at work, strengthening social cohesion
and ensuring an inclusive labour market. In terms of Bulgarian
conditions, these goals imply a significant increase in
employment and a reduction in unemployment, as well as better
quality of work.To achieve this for a wider range of working-age
people means ensuring that there are appropriate and satisfying
jobs for workers (job content, income, working conditions) and
sufficient productivity for enterprises.
The Employment Strategy outlines the main challenges and
problems, including low levels of labour market participation,
high rates of unemployment, large numbers of discouraged
people, and significant regional variations. In addition, more
general challenges are expected to influence long term
development of the labour market. These include unfavourable
demographic trends, an ageing workforce, Bulgaria’s integration
into the EU, and the need for orientation towards a knowledge-
based society.
To overcome these challenges and problems, the main medium-
term objectives, from 2004-7, are increasing employment and
decreasing unemployment. The long-term objectives, to 2010,
are to increase the population’s labour-force participation and
potential. The Employment Strategy gives special attention to
the particular tasks needed to realise its goals and sub-goals.
Realisation of the Employment Strategy’s objectives requires
considerable financial resources. In their annual policy
planning, the relevant ministries, agencies and administration
services will include as a goal for implementation the priority
tasks set in the strategy, according to the fixed terms given.
Thus, resources from the state budget regarding maximum
defined expenditure will be used in the most effective way to
achieve the strategy’s objectives. In addition, resources from
various EU programmes and international sources will be used,
along with resources from employers, municipalities, local
donors and non-governmental organisations (NGOs).
To monitor implementation of the strategy’s goals, a database
will be created and annually updated. This database will contain
performance indicators that enable progress in implementing
the strategy’s objectives, sub-objectives and tasks to be tracked.
The indicators are divided into the following sub-groups:
population and social development, labour market, active
labour market policy, and educational system.
In 2007, an assessment of the implementation of the medium
term objectives will be conducted and the Employment Strategy
will be updated if necessary.
Progress in implementing the Joint Assessment
of Employment Priorities (JAP) 
In relation to the EU accession partnership, a priority for
Bulgaria was the preparation and endorsement of the Joint
Assessment of Employment Priorities. The report was signed
by the Commissioner for Employment and Social Affairs and
the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Labour and
Social Policy in October 2002.
In a short term action plan, a number of state institutions,
social partners and NGOs undertook activities to resolve the
challenges outlined in the JAP. As preparation for this process,
a seminar was held in February 2003 with representatives
from the EU and Bulgarian institutions. The seminar’s main
goal was to discuss achievement of stated priorities and
challenges in the employment field, and to initiate the
monitoring process.
In May 2004, a follow-up seminar was held. At this event, the
first report on Bulgaria’s progress in implementing the JAP
was formally presented. The progress report was developed by
the interdepartmental working group, which included experts
from all ministries, agencies and other institutions
participating in the JAP process and concerned with meeting
the challenges set out in it. The progress report was also
disseminated among the ministries and social partners in
Bulgaria, and sent to the EU, where it was well received.
The Bulgarian government sees implementation of the
priorities set out in the JAP as particularly important in the
process of preparing for full EU membership. The main
objective of the progress report is to present advances made in
implementing the labour market challenges outlined in the
JAP, and preparation for implementation of the EES.
The progress report goes through each priority identified in
the JAP in detail. The major spheres where progress has been
observed are as follows.
As a result of enhanced economic growth and the focus on
active labour market policy, the employment situation is
improving. The number of people employed is increasing
along with the employment rate. Unemployment is going
down significantly.24 Autumn 2004 |  European Employment Observatory Review
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During recent years, there has been considerable growth in the
financial resources spent by the government on active labour
market policy. This in turn allows for more unemployed people
to be included in the active programmes and measures. The
Employment Agency is being reformed to improve the quality
of services provided to the public and to optimise activities in
the Labour Office Directorate.
The  social insurance system and the employment system
continue to make concerted efforts towards encouraging
unemployed people and those who benefit from social
insurance to obtain employment.
Amendments and supplements to the Social Assistance Act and
its Implementing Regulations have introduced a differentiated
approach to providing assistance to various at risk groups,
depending on their specific characteristics and needs. This has
made it possible to raise the incomes of those with the lowest
incomes (e.g. lone parents and people with disabilities).
In developing the gender equality policy,efforts are being made to
set up a structure to track indicators of equal treatment and
report on the level achieved. The legal framework was set up
under the Protection from Discrimination Act, which is
instrumental in guaranteeing the constitutional right of equality.
As a result of legislative amendments in education as well as
methodological and organisational measures, the number of
children dropping out of schooling is decreasing. Measures
have been put in place to improve conditions for the integration
of minority ethnic groups and students with specific
educational needs.
Reform in vocational education and training is in progress. The
network of institutions is being rationalised. The admission of
students takes into account the occupational needs of the
labour market; the list is approved by the Minister for
Education and Science after co-ordination with the Minister
for Labour and Social Policy and the Minister for Regional
Development and Public Works. Educational standards for the
acquisition of a profession are being elaborated.
The regulation concerning wage formation in commercial
companies with more than 50% State shares which was adopted
in 2003, makes it possible for them to set their wage fund by
observing a strict fiscal discipline, depending on labour
productivity, by preventing any losses or overdue debt.
To reduce non-regulated employment, national employers’
organisations and trades unions have supported the government
in the introduction of a register of employment contracts, and a
minimum social insurance threshold by sector and by nine
categories of post. Following a proposal by employers’
organisations, the government agreed that the minimum
insurance wage per sector should be agreed between sectoral
organisations of employers and those of workers and employees.
An important element of the fiscal policy is the measures aimed
to gradually raise the tax threshold on incomes, and in parallel
with this reduce the tax rate on the lowest incomes.
Not all of the EU’s recommendations have been followed
through and/or implemented fully in the period between the
signing of the JAP in 2002 and the end of 2003 – for instance,
those referring to the level of employment, structural changes
in the economy,adequate development of the service sector and
agriculture, the wage negotiation system, and the replacement
of tripartite negotiations by bipartite ones. However, it should
be emphasised that the JAP challenges continue to be an
important instrument for development and reform in the
process of preparation for implementation of the EES.
Romania: Facilitating participation in
employment
Romania has adopted the European Employment Strategy
(EES), the main instrument for co-ordinating employment-
policy priorities at European Union  level, as the framework
for elaborating its National Action Plans for Employment
(NAPs). The first NAP (2002-3) was developed according to
the 2001 Employment Guidelines, whereas the second NAP
(2004-5) was developed in line with the revised EES and
Employment Guidelines adopted for 2003. The second NAP is
built on three inter-related strategic objectives: full
employment, increasing quality and productivity at work, and
strengthening social cohesion and inclusion. It takes into
account the ten Employment Guidelines.
The National Development Plan (NDP) 2004-6 is a strategic
document for human resource development in Romania.
Priority III of the plan envisages the objective of “increasing
employment levels and combating social exclusion”. This
objective contains three general measures: increasing the long-
term adaptability of the workforce, combating structural
unemployment, and actively combating social exclusion.
The approach used within the NDP synthesises the
conclusions of the Joint Assessment of Employment Priorities
(JAP). The same approach can be found in the 2004-5 NAP.
The main legislative instrument for implementing labour
market policy in Romania is Law 107/2004, which amends and
complements Law 76/2002 on the unemployment insurance
system and stimulation of employment. The new law creates
the basis for a high level of employment through ensuring the
adaptability of the workforce to labour market requirements,
active measures to stimulate employment, and measures to
encourage employers to hire jobseekers.
Active measures to stimulate employment include:information
and vocational counselling, job matching, vocational training,
counselling and assistance in starting up an independent
enterprise or business, and encouraging employers to hire
unemployed people, with the assistance of subsidies from the
Unemployment Insurance Budget. Subsidies are available for
disabled people, graduates, unemployed people aged over 45
and unemployed lone parents. Grants and credits are also
available to employers under favourable terms.
The following groups can also benefit from job matching and
vocational training services financed from the Unemployment
Insurance Budget:
• those working in rural areas who do not earn a monthly
income or earn an income lower than the level of
unemployment benefit;
• people seeking work after returning from parental leave or
after completing a period of military service;
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following the expiry of invalidity benefit;
• those in detention and prison who have up to nine months
left of their detention; and 
• foreign citizens or stateless people who have been employed
during the period of their domicile or residence in Romania.
In the context of the national strategic documents, the future
priorities of Romanian employment policies are as follows:
• Long term improvement of adaptability to the labour market,
promotion of lifelong learning and continuous vocational
training
This objective will be achieved through a range of measures,
including training and retraining of employees of state or
privately owned enterprises. The following measures will be
promoted: continuous vocational training programmes to
maximise the use of new production technologies in
economic sectors with the potential for high added value;
new information and communication technologies;
improvement of human resources management in the
context of industrial restructuring; counselling
programmes; activities to develop management skills in the
field of human resources; and the promotion of
entrepreneurship.
• Fighting ‘structural unemployment’, which has arisen as a
result of the economic restructuring process 
This will be achieved through preventive and active
measures targeted at young people, long term unemployed
people and those working in rural areas who do not earn a
monthly income or who earn an income which is lower than
unemployment benefit. Measures will include the
promotion of vocational training programmes according to
labour market demands, specialised information services
and career counselling, and entrepreneurship development
programmes.
• Promoting social cohesion and inclusion, particularly for
vulnerable groups 
Vulnerable groups include the Roma population, young
people leaving placement centres and other childcare
institutions, and disabled people. Priorities will include
preventing and combating social marginalisation, and
increasing access to active measures to integrate these
groups into the labour market. Promoting social inclusion
and equal opportunities will also support the process of
tackling discrimination in the labour market for vulnerable
groups.
In this respect, the employment policies promoted within
Romania’s national policy documents are in accord with
employment policy trends at EU level:
• increasing the adaptability of employees and enterprises;
• stimulating better quality job creation;
• combating undeclared labour;
• integrating unemployed people within the labour market;
and
• increasing social cohesion through combating all forms of
discrimination against those at risk of marginalisation in
the labour market.
Turkey: Developments in employment
policy
The Institution of Employment and Employees (IIBK) was
established in 1946 to carry out public employment services. The
IIBK’s function was to provide labour market mediation
services in finding jobs and employees.It functioned successfully
in this field, particularly in addressing the labour-force needs of
developing industries and monitoring the sectoral and
geographical activity of the workforce.
In the 1960s, the IIBK focused on sending employees abroad.
However, the demand for these employees ceased with the
stagnation and unemployment experienced during the oil crisis
of 1973. This situation led to a major decline for the IIBK. It
was not able to reorganise itself to provide services based on the
various needs of the labour market. As a result, the role of
public services in the labour market was gradually reduced.
Reform in employment services needed to be in tune with the
requirements of the labour market. The quality of services for
employers and employees needed to be improved, making use of
modern data-processing technologies and forging strong
partnerships involving all the relevant players in the labour
market (e.g. social partners, local authorities, social security
institutions, educational institutions).
The IIBK was restructured as the Turkish Employment
Organisation (İŞKUR) in 2003. The aim was to establish a
modern employment organisation providing high-quality
services to an increased labour force, implement both active and
passive labour market policies effectively, and analyse the
problem of unemployment in Turkey.
İŞKUR(Turkish Employment Organisation)
The innovations provided by the law establishing the
restructured Turkish Employment Organisation are as follows.
1. Four extra functions in addition to that of mediation
services for finding jobs and employees:
• assisting in the formulation of national employment policies,
preserving and improving employment, and preventing
unemployment;
• establishing and monitoring a database system for the labour
market, establishing an Advisory Board for the Labour
Market and co-ordinating its activities;
• implementing active labour market policies such as
improving the qualifications of the labour force, vocational
training, training at work, job and career counselling; and
• implementing passive labour market policies such as
unemployment insurance and compensation for dismissal.
2. Fundamental changes in organisational structure 
The law establishing İŞKUR ensured a working and
organisational model which is open to social dialogue and
participation. Three new boards include social partners at the
different administrative levels, especially organisations of both
employees and employers.26 Autumn 2004 |  European Employment Observatory Review
Overall Developments
A General Board was set up to assist in formulating national
employment policies and determining appropriate targets for
İŞKUR regarding these policies. The General Board comprises
79 members, including representatives from the public sector
and universities; 46 members are representatives of social
partners. The General Board meets every two years in
November, generally at the invitation of the Ministry of Labour
and Social Security.
The Unemployment Insurance Foundation and the Board of
Directors were combined. The Board of Directors was
restructured as the main administrative, decision-making,
competence and responsible body for İŞKUR. The Board of
Directors has six members: the General Director of İŞKUR (who
acts as the chair), and representatives from the Ministry of
Labour and Social Security, the Undersecretariat of the Treasury,
the Confederation of Workers, the Confederation of Employers,
and the Confederation of Tradesman and Craftsman.
In addition, Provincial Employment Boards were established,
with the governor as the chair and participation by
representatives from the public sector, social partners,
vocational/occupational organisations, universities and non-
governmental organisations. The Provincial Employment
Boards will improve local initiatives at regional level, and will
determine local employment and labour market policies. Thus
İŞKUR has the chance to improve and implement appropriate
policies for the differing labour markets in each province.
Provincial Employment Boards meet in September each year.
Reorganising the structure of İŞKUR gave an impetus to
decentralisation. An important change was made in İŞKUR ’s
local organisational structure, by abolishing Regional
Directorates and reorganising them as Provincial Directorates
in each province. It was also foreseen that, where necessary,
branch directorates will be established in towns that have a
population of more than 100,000, or more than 10,000 workers
registered with the Social Insurance Organisation.
3. Abrogation of the monopoly authority in the field 
of employment 
As a result of the new structure of İŞKUR, private employment
offices (PEOs) could be established. Private employment offices
can find jobs and employees (except for the public sector), on
condition that they receive permission or a licence from İŞKUR.
Founders of PEOs need to fulfil certain conditions, such as
possessing a university degree, not having a criminal record,
keeping financial documents, and employing experts.
Permission is given for three years and can be extended for three
years. If a PEO does not respect the provisions of the law, its
permission is not renewed or can be cancelled. The Board of
Directors of İŞKUR takes the decisions on giving permissions,
renewals and cancelling permissions.
Private employment offices cannot demand any benefits or fees
from workers; fees for employment activities can only be
charged to employers. PEOs cannot make contracts that include
clauses on employment without insurance, not being a member
of a trade union, or paying less than the minimum wage. İŞKUR
will inspect PEOs.
It is important for İŞKUR to operate effectively within this new
structure by strengthening its institutional capacity-building in
order to carry out its legally required duties. The support and
co-operation of all parties (national and local public and
private-sector representatives, social partners, international
organisations) are necessary to create an effective employment
organisation for the labour market.
Joint Assessment of Employment Priorities
(JAP)
The Ministry of Labour and Social Security and İŞKUR are
undertaking activities towards participating in the European
Employment Strategy (EES), in line with the procedures
followed by other candidate accession countries.The first step in
participating in the EES was to prepare an Employment
Background Report, which was sent to the European
Commission and was approved.
The second step, on the basis of the Employment Background
Report, is to prepare a Joint Assessment of Employment
Priorities (JAP), which will be accepted as a policy document.
Studies for the JAP began in February 2004.
The JAP has three parts.The first and second parts summarising
the current situation and labour market problems have been
prepared by Turkish academicians and experts from the
European Commission. When the responses of relevant parties
are received, these will be reflected in the report and will be
discussed in a seminar (planned for October). The third and
final part of the report will include policy proposals. These will
be developed based on the situational analysis contained in the
first and second parts of the JAP.Spring 2004 |  European Employment Observatory Review 27
Placement & Vocational Guidance
PLACEMENT AND
VOCATIONAL GUIDANCE
Spain: Reform of the Public
Employment Service 
The creation of the National Employment Institute in 1978
represented the first national employment service within Spain
that undertook the comprehensive tasks of acting as
intermediary in the labour market, stimulating job creation and
providing occupational training and unemployment insurance.
These public services were provided free of charge under a
statutory monopoly and with centralised management.
The National Employment Institute is currently being reformed
in accordance with a constitutional mandate. The aim of this
reform is the development and implementation of active
employment policies for the regions. The Spanish constitution
establishes a model for a decentralised state that confers a large
degree of political autonomy on the regions (autonomous
communities). The constitution also determines which powers
are to remain with central government and which may be
devolved to regional governments.
For employment policy, the state reserves the power to adopt
general legislation and approve general plans, while the regions
are granted the necessary powers for the practical provision of
services.There is only one proviso:the implementation of passive
employment measures (such as unemployment insurance) also
rests with the state, insofar as these measures affect the state’s
resources and the financial regime of the system.
This model, in which the regions have a fundamental role, has
to be harmonised with the administration of unemployment
insurance by the central administration, as well as with the
activities of a range of parties that play a role in the labour
market. These include private work-placement agencies,
temporary employment agencies and other organisations that
provide information and guidance services as well as job search
services.
General outline of the reform
The reform entails the creation of a new national employment
system, comprising the state employment service and the
regional public employment services. The process of
transferring powers from the central administration to the
regions means that each region can create its own public
employment service. To this end, a transfer of personnel and
equipment is taking place, including employment offices. The
administration of active employment policies is entrusted to
the regions.
The administration of unemployment insurance rests with the
central administration. Central government retains control of
collecting contributions to the unemployment fund and
disbursing benefit payments for unemployment. It also retains
the power to adopt legislation in this regard; such legislation is
uniform throughout all the regions.
The structuring of the new system must guarantee equal
treatment throughout Spain, and must conserve the principles
of a free public service, equality of opportunities, and workers’
professional and geographical mobility. To this end, the
following basic elements are required:
• a public service that is free of charge;
• an integrated labour market;
• a national budget, with regional distribution on the basis of
objective criteria;
• linking of active and passive policies;
• collaboration among the regional public employment
services;
• integrated administration of employment policy;
• activity programmes financed by central government which
are unified and general in nature;
• empowerment of the regions, insofar as they make use of
their own financial resources, to implement their own
programmes;
• retention of the one-stop shop principle;
• homogeneous criteria for setting in motion the Employment
Action Plan, which involves activities, priority groups and
monitoring;
• a single, centralised register of jobseekers, job offers and
employment contracts, which also indicates specific regional
information;
• national statistics and a national occupational observatory;
• integration of information systems;
• compatibility of the state’s computer system and those of the
regions, and the establishment of common data and
administrative processes for all the public employment
services; and 
• the participation of workers and employers in the public
employment services, in both bipartite and tripartite fashion.
The new Employment Law
A new Employment Law (published in December 2003) outlines
the constitutional powers of the state and the autonomous
regions, co-operation among the various government bodies,
participation by the major business organisations and trades
unions, and co-ordination between active and passive policies.
As indicated above, the new national employment system
comprises the National Public Employment Service and the
regional public employment services. The National Public
Employment Service is an autonomous institution of central
government, attached to the Ministry of Labour and Social
Affairs. Its assigned functions include analysis of the labour
market and, in collaboration with the regions and major
social partners, the design of the National Action Programme
for Employment.
The National Public Employment Service is also responsible for
managing programmes whose geographic boundaries exceed the
jurisdiction of a given region, as well as relocation programmes
for employees, programmes to integrate immigrant workers
(carried out in their countries of origin),and programmes aimed
at improving the employment rate. In addition, it is in charge of
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The regional Public Employment Services are responsible for
labour market mediation and active employment policies. Their
functions include:
• participating in the design of the National Public
Employment Service’s annual work programme plan;
• managing information programmes and measures,
occupational counselling and job-search services;
• promoting stable employment and work placements;
• developing continuing training programmes;
• promoting policies aimed at integrating people at risk of
social exclusion into the labour market;
• job creation and support for self-employment; and 
• facilitating employee relocation across the country.
In addition, and to guarantee seamless co-ordination, public
and private institutions and organisations are now required to
provide the National Public Employment Service and the
regional public employment services with any information that
may be requested. For its part, the National Public Employment
Service is to collaborate with the regions during the process of
transferring powers to the regions. This is to guarantee the co-
ordination of labour market mediation and insertion measures,
and in particular measures related to establishing eligibility for,
and the receipt of, unemployment benefits.
Lithuania: Electronic services for
public employment service customers 
The Lithuanian Labour Exchange (LLE) uses modern
information technologies to support the successful delivery of
services and the provision of information to its customers. In
particular, it is constantly expanding its electronic services,
which are provided to customers for free.
Lithuanian Labour Exchange information
system
Since 1995, the LLE’s information system has been developed to
conform to international standards and the requirements of the
Lithuanian information infrastructure. It is geared towards
effective, high-quality service provision to both employers and
jobseekers. The information system is based on a client/server
structure and uses the Windows NT operating network and SQL
databases within its management systems.
This modern information system has helped to computerise
staff functions in relation to serving employers and jobseekers.
The system consists of a global computer network which covers
all the local offices of the LLE. The software employed allows
users to exchange information with other information systems,
such as social insurance companies, banks and state registers, in
addition to being integrated into the information space of the
European Union.
With the help of this system, users can gain access to databases
of jobseekers and vacancies, which have been set up in the local
employment offices. The system also provides a variety of other
services oriented towards people who are looking for a job,
including vacancy search, the provision of benefits and training
benefits, and the application of active employment measures.
The system also caters for employers, who can address enquiries
about jobseekers to local employment services at any time.
In 2003, the system began to be modified as part of the LLE’s
entry into the EURES network of European public employment
services. From 2005 onwards, all vacancies registered at the LLE
will be announced on the internet, on the single EURES
platform database of vacancies. The vacancies will therefore be
accessible to the population of all European countries.
Self-service system for vocational information
Between 1997 and 2000, the LLE created and implemented a
self-service system for vocational information and guidance.
Self-service terminals were installed in the information and
consultation centres of every local employment office. To
improve the services available to jobseekers, self-service
terminals have also been established in busy public places and
premises. By 2004, more than 130 terminals were operational
across Lithuania, supporting access to vocational information
and guidance.
The terminals provide access to information about vacancies,
data on the labour market situation and other services,including
suggested programmes and employment schemes and advice on
how to look for a job. The terminals are connected via the
internet with the vacancy databases held by the LLE.
The vocational information and guidance system was created as
a result of co-operation between the German Ministry of
Labour and Social Affairs and the Lithuanian Ministry of
Social Security and Labour. Users of the system can access a
computer-based testing system which helps them to evaluate
their professional interests and decide on potential career paths.
The vocational information terminals contain descriptions of
300 professions and 100 video films about the day-to-day nature
of different professions.
The LLE’s website and the ‘Public Employment
Service on the Internet’
The LLE’s website (www.ldb.lt), created in 1997, is
continuously being renewed, with additional functions added
to it. The website contains general information about the
public employment services,advice for unemployed people and
information on the labour market situation, including labour
market trends and forecasts, and advice on the prospects for
acquiring a job in Lithuania and abroad. In 2004, a new
EURES web page called Lietuva (EURES Lithuania) was
created on the website to inform people about the free
movement of workers in Europe and about EURES activities.
A question and answers function allows customers to consult
interactively with LLE professionals. Each year about a
thousand people use this service.
In 2001, the Public Employment Service on the Internet was
created and put on the LLE’s website as an additional service
for employers and jobseekers. It is part of the LLE’s
information system, providing services to unemployed people,
information connections to the vacancy database, and
information on jobseekers. The information about vacancies
and jobseekers is introduced into the system automatically,
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The Public Employment Service on the Internet allows both
those who are already registered with the local employment
services (such as jobseekers and students) and those who are
not registered to fill in a registration form and make
themselves known to others. Vacancies registered at local
employment offices and other workplaces are registered
directly on the internet.
In 2003, the government awarded the Lithuanian Labour
Exchange with a special prize for the realisation of its internet
programme.
Electronic information channel 
In 2004, the LLE implemented a package of new electronic
services for its customers. The new system allows employers
and jobseekers to order information over the internet. When
customers make a request via the internet, the information
about a suitable employee or a vacancy is sent back to them
by e-mail.
An additional information service is provided by SMS or text
messaging to unemployed people who own a mobile telephone
and are registered at the local employment office. When a
vacancy is registered by the public employment services, an
automatic matching of suitable candidates takes place.
Matching is carried out according to desired profession,
education and work experience. The candidates are then sent an
SMS message informing them of the vacancy. These services
save customers’ time and shorten the job search process, while
also facilitating the recruitment of employees.
Malta: Manual for gender-sensitive
vocational guidance
In its efforts to promote gender-sensitive vocational guidance
and counselling, the Employment and Training Corporation in
Malta has published a manual on this topic. The manual has
been distributed among guidance and counselling
schoolteachers in order to help them to provide guidance that is
free from gender bias.
The manual covers a wide range of topics, including issues
such as:
• the different training and employment choices that students
make once they finish their studies;
• gender segregation at work and how men and women tend to
choose different occupations; and 
• problems related to the work-life balance and how these have
an impact on men and women’s career choices and their levels
of participation in family life.
Other topics covered by the manual include the social
integration of people with disabilities – including the differences
that exist between disabled men and women – as well as current
labour market legislation and how this impacts on male and
female levels of participation in the labour market.
The Netherlands: A comprehensive
approach to unemployment
In 2003, 83% of newly unemployed individuals received an offer
of work, training or work experience within a year. The
municipalities and the Institute for Employee Benefit Schemes
(UWV) are pursuing a so-called ‘comprehensive approach’ to
unemployment. The aim of this approach is that all newly
unemployed individuals will receive such an offer within 12
months. This strategy was set out in a study on the Evaluation of
the Comprehensive Approach 1999-2003, submitted by the
Secretary of State for Social Affairs and Employment to the lower
house of the Dutch parliament in June 2004. The evaluation was
conducted by the Foundation for Economic Research and the
Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies.
The percentage of newly unemployed individuals who found a
job or were offered work, training or work experience within a
year dropped from 84% in 2002 to 83% in 2003. This was still an
estimate, however, and definitive figures were due to be
published in September 2004. In addition, fewer people in 2003
found a job independently without the support of a
reintegration programme. The Secretary of State explained this
as being a result of the poor economic situation.
The evaluation would indicate that the Netherlands is being
more ambitious with its comprehensive approach to
unemployment than other countries. In the Netherlands,
individuals who are threatened with long term unemployment
are offered a reintegration programme immediately, while
people in the same situation in other countries have to wait
between three and six months. Also, in the Netherlands the term
‘support’refers solely to a reintegration programme rather than,
for example, mediation discussions.
The evaluation also suggests that the introduction of the
comprehensive approach to unemployment has, among other
things, led the Ministry to conclude concrete agreements with
the municipalities and the UWV on the number of reintegration
programmes to be implemented. The information provided by
institutions involved in reintegration policy has also improved.
Independent job coaches to help people back
into work
In February 2004, the Minister for Social Affairs and
Employment submitted a proposal to the lower house of the
Dutch parliament on the use of independent job coaches. The
proposal recommends that benefit recipients interested in
rejoining the workforce should be able to request assistance
from a job coach.
A job coach is an independent person who supports jobseekers
by providing them with the tools they need to take charge of
their own reintegration. Job coaches should help jobseekers to
create their own tailor-made programme. It is hoped that job
coaches will soon be available in 20 to 30 locations across the
Netherlands, and in 60 locations by January 2005.
A final decision on the actual reintegration programme to be
followed is taken by the municipality or the UWV. However, the
Minister has confirmed that people will be able to conclude an
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Job coaches will work from specially provided customer
service desks. Representatives of the UWV, the public
employment agencies (CWIs) and the municipalities should
also be available to provide assistance via these desks. The
customer service desks are located in CWI offices and shared
buildings housing the UWV, CWIs, companies and the
municipalities. Requesting assistance at the customer-service
desk is voluntary. The UWV, CWIs, Divosa (association of
social services managers) and the National Client Council are
drawing up further details on this proposal.
The Netherlands: Return to work for
people on benefit schemes
From mid July 2004, all clients of the Institute for Employee
Benefit Schemes (UWV) who are disabled or unemployed now
have the opportunity to develop their own reintegration
programme (IRO) with the UWV. This will increase the choice
on offer for jobseekers.
Until early this year, clients undertaking reintegration
programmes had to choose from companies with which the
UWV had concluded agreements. Sometimes, however, the
options available did not fully meet individuals’ needs and the
companies in question were not able to offer the expertise
required in order to help them. To address this problem, clients
may now follow their own personalised programme. Prior to the
introduction of the individual IRO, from 1 January 2004
onwards it was possible to apply to the UWV for such an
agreement. The UWV has so far received some 500 applications.
Jobseekers who opt to follow a self-created reintegration
programme enjoy the same rights and are subject to the same
obligations as those following a programme offered by the
UWV. Jobseekers opting for an IRO must draw up their own
individual programme for finding work (for example, securing a
placement or applying for a training course) and select a
company themselves. This process must be completed within the
same time frame as under a UWV-arranged agreement. The
organisation responsible for implementation of reintegration
policies takes the final decision on an individual’s IRO once it
has reviewed the application. A programme may last no longer
than two years.
In the same way as a UWV-arranged programme, the aim of an
individual IRO is for the jobseeker to find work for a period of
at least six months.To ensure that the jobseeker is successful and
that the money has been spent efficiently, the UWV concludes
individual IROs with the companies chosen by jobseekers.
Companies are reimbursed on the basis of services rendered.
Gearing social security organisations more
closely towards work
Organisations responsible for implementing social security
policies are increasingly gearing themselves towards mutual co-
operation and making greater efforts to build programmes
around individual jobseekers’ requirements. Their working
methods are gradually shifting towards an approach aimed
primarily at helping people to get back into employment.
This shift follows the introduction in 2002 of the
Implementation Structure for Work and Income Act, and a
period during which the organisations responsible for its
implementation spent a great deal of time and energy getting
their own structures in order and ensuring that benefits
continued to be paid. The Minister for Social Affairs and
Employment and the Secretary of State detailed this shift in a
letter of 19 May 2004 to the lower house of the Dutch
parliament at the time of the interim evaluation of the Act.
Under the terms of the Act, by 1 January 2006 a social security
system must have been introduced which promotes work over
benefits and is customer-oriented and efficient. The authorities
will verify that the organisations responsible for implementing
the Act remain on schedule.
The interim evaluation revealed that the organisations
responsible for implementing reintegration policies (UWV,
CWIs and the Social Insurance Bank – Sociale
Verzekeringsbank or SVB) made considerable progress in 2003
in providing services that were more customer-oriented. Greater
efforts were being made to involve the client in the process and
to devise tailor-made programmes and arrangements for clients.
For example, the UWV was operating 20 client advice points
while the launch of the website www.werk.nl helped CWIs to
significantly improve their digital services. However, jobseekers,
benefit recipients and employers were still not satisfied, hence
the interim evaluation. Over the next two years, considerable
efforts need to be made in order to boost customer satisfaction.
One particular area of concern is that there is still too little
grass-roots co-operation and networking among the
organisations responsible for implementing reintegration
policies. According to the Inspectorate for Work and Income,
this is resulting in increased costs and delays. Officials at the
Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment have recently
announced improvements in this area.
Sweden: Service routes to the
Employment Service and the range 
of services
The Swedish National Labour Market Board has undertaken
extensive development work in recent years, some of which is
now being put into effect. The objective of this work has been to
create a nationwide Employment Service, whose operations will
be characterised by uniformity, efficiency and legality. Efforts
have also been made to clarify the Board’s mandate and define
the services provided by the Employment Service, as well as
ensuring that these services are provided as economically as
possible and at a high level of quality.
One important aspect of this project has been the development
of a new model for interaction among the Employment Service’s
three service routes: the internet, Customer Service Division,
and local employment offices. This article provides an overview
of the service routes and the range of services that have now
been defined.Spring 2004 |  European Employment Observatory Review 31
Placement & Vocational Guidance
Service routes 
The objective of the three service routes (internet, Customer
Service Division and local employment offices) is to develop a
co-ordinated Employment Service in which these routes do not
compete with each other but co-operate and reinforce each
other. The overall objective is the effective use of the
Employment Service’s total resources.
The  internet route (www.ams.se) is accessible to everyone
around the clock. The Customer Service Division is being
expanded to cover the needs of the entire country and will be
accessible seven days a week. Local employment offices will
adapt their services to the individual needs of unemployed
people who need more assistance than can be provided via the
internet or Customer Service Division.
The Employment Service will continue to expand the services it
offers via the internet. Technical developments have created new
possibilities for assisting people in finding work and accessing
other government services.These developments also mean that the
public and the government now have higher expectations for
accessibility and service. One expression of this is the term ‘the 24-
hour office’. From autumn 2004, the Employment Service
registration form is available on the website (www.ams.se).Prior to
this,registration had to be done in person at an employment office.
The Employment Service is also developing and testing a new
way of constructing action plans that requires more active
involvement by those seeking work. If people are to take greater
responsibility for finding their own employment, they first need
a clear view of their situation. Devising an individual action
plan is the first step.
This development will allow greater scope for providing
unemployed people with professional help in finding work, if
they are seen to need such assistance. The process will begin
with a client completing a questionnaire found on the website
(www.ams.se), which will form the basis for the individual
action plan. This is the initial step in an interface where
dialogue can take place between the applicant and the
Employment Service via the internet. At a later stage, the
process can be supplemented with options such as clients
making return visits via the internet, to follow up on the
provisions of the action plan.
Currently, the Employment Service’s Customer Service Division
provides counselling, information and follow-up. Customer
service advisers do not take any formal decisions or conclude
any agreements that involve financial decisions for local
employment offices. In the future, the expanded Customer
Service Division will take over a large number of the telephone
calls which are currently received by local employment offices.
This should result in more scope for providing initial assistance
which is better adapted to the individual needs of both
employers and jobseekers. It should also give greater scope for
providing ongoing assistance. Examples of the benefits are:
• opportunities for improving the quality of initial contact
with applicants and determining their service needs;
• more time for introducing and explaining the services
available, so that clients can make maximum use of the
internet service at www.ams.se (such as the job-search
function), and the assistance provided by the Customer
Service Division; and 
• better services to employers and jobseekers who need more
assistance than can be provided through the internet.
The Customer Service Division already has experienced
employment officers who will continue to work for it. In
addition, 200 new officers have been recruited to this service
route. When fully expanded, the Customer Service Division will
operate by telephone from three locations.
Services provided by the Employment Service
The objective of development work in this area has been to
secure a consistent range of services across the Employment
Service. Implementation of the new system of uniform, well-
defined services began in the summer of 2004. Nine services are
provided in all – seven for jobseekers and two for employers.
There are two descriptions of each service: an internal one for
employment officers and an external one for clients.
The purpose of the external service descriptions for clients is to:
• describe the objective of the service and what it entails;
• define the division of roles and responsibilities between the
employer or jobseeker and the Employment Service; and 
• explain the principle of assistance for self-help.
The purpose of the internal descriptions for employment officers
is to ensure uniform, efficient performance that respects the
legal rights of individuals,and is supported by the monitoring of
outputs and results. By their nature, internal descriptions are
considerably more detailed and precise.
The following are the seven services offered to jobseekers:
• looking for work;
• improving your job application;
• guidance in looking for work;
• job training;
• setting up your own business;
• clarifying jobseekers’capacity to carry out work; and
• adjusting to a work situation.
The external descriptions of these services also tell jobseekers
that the employment office adjusts its services to the needs of the
local labour market and applicants’ personal qualifications.
They also explain what is meant by an individual action plan
and financial resources.
There are two services for employers looking for personnel:
• recruiting new personnel; and
• training before recruitment.
The external descriptions of these two services also include
information on preconditions, such as the following:
“You will preferably work independently in looking for new
employees. You can do this by making use of the service found
on the Employment Service website (www.ams.se). More
extensive services are reserved for employers who do not have
sufficient resources for recruiting or who are unable to recruit
using the support found on the Employment Service website. In
such cases, the Employment Service will make an agreement
with the employer on ways to meet their recruiting needs.”32 Spring 2004 |  European Employment Observatory Review
Placement & Vocational Guidance
Interaction between service routes and the
services provided
To decide which parts of the system should be used to support a
client, a step-by-step thought process is required. The
assessment should be based on charting the client’s needs and
formulating a plan of action:
• step 1: Can the service be provided via the internet? 
• step 2: Can the service be provided by the Customer Service
Division? 
• step 3: If the internet service or that provided by the
Customer Service Division is not sufficient, assistance can be
provided through the local employment office.
The service route used will depend on the particular case, and
several routes can be used in parallel for a client. One option
does not exclude another, but it is important to consider and
direct efforts so that the most efficient channel is used, and the
one requiring the least resources.Sometimes,for example,it may
be necessary to supplement the service available at www.ams.se
with efforts by the Customer Service Division or the local
employment office.
The Swedish Employment Service has only recently launched
these service routes and defined the services outlined above.So it
is too early to say how they will work out in practice.In addition,
considerable development work must still be carried out before
the full benefits of these innovations can be realised.
Bulgaria: Employment Agency
reforms 
The Bulgarian Employment Agency (EA) is an administrative
arm of the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy (MLSP) and is
responsible for implementing the government’s employment
policy. The agency’s functions are to:
• analyse labour market demand and supply and labour market
trends;
• register job vacancies and unemployed people;
• participate in implementing employment and training
programmes and measures directed towards jobless people
who find it hard to adapt to the labour market for various
reasons;
• support the MLSP’s activities concerning PHARE
programming; and 
• mediate in the field of employment for Bulgarian citizens
abroad and for foreigners in Bulgaria.
Structure of the Employment Agency
The EA has a three-tier structure: Central Management,
Regional Employment Services and local employment offices.
The Central Management headquarters are located in the
capital, Sofia. The second tier comprises nine directorates of
Regional Employment Services, each covering two to four
regions. The Regional Employment Services co-ordinate and
assist the activity of the 117 local employment offices, which
make up the third tier of the EA’s structure; and implement
employment policy at local level. The total number of EA staff
is currently 3,141. The EA also has an Executive Director’s
Council based on a tripartite principle of management by
national representative organisations of employers and trade
unions.
In the first half of 2004, the EA continued to effect the changes
started in 2003. These changes aim to transform the agency into
a modern organisation and to guarantee the successful
implementation of Bulgaria’s active employment policy. The
agency’s vision and activities are about creating an efficiently
operating organisation for labour market regulation at national
and regional levels, through its function as a public mediator.
The reform of the EA’s administrative structure, which began in
2003, aims to bring the agency’s services into line with
European standards. Shifting some of the administrative
functions from local employment offices to the Regional
Employment Services is part of this change. Administrative
capacity is being freed and redirected by this switch, increasing
the number of employees (approximately 500 people) who are
directly servicing customers.
A new operating model is being developed to improve the
quality of customer services. A process model of client-oriented
service is being introduced in local employment offices, which
will optimise activities within the offices. This ‘one-stop shop’
approach enables unemployed people’s needs to be addressed as
quickly as possible through support and active measures,
adapted to their individual circumstances.
The one-stop shop toolkit model is being piloted in three
employment offices, in the towns of Montana, Pazardjik and
Velingrad. Information and service centres have been built there
and the new system has begun operating. Another three offices,
in the towns of Pirdop, Kazanluk and Rhodopes, are starting to
work under this new model of customer service.
The introduction of the one-stop shop principle optimises the
management of the system, as well as its organisational
structure, since a large part of the staffing capacity is directed to
servicing clients through two main teams. The first team,
‘working with clients’, is equivalent to the front-line office. The
second, ‘programmes, measures, qualifications and contracts’,
corresponds to the ‘back office’. Through the introduction of
this front-line and back office system, the aim is to reach the
standards of the services provided by employment agencies in
the EU Member States.
The system will gradually be launched in other employment
offices. It is envisaged that staff training on the new customer-
service model will be started in another 50 offices by the end of
2004. Staff training, particularly at regional level, is important
for creating a culture that assists in the development of a
dynamic labour market.
An Information and Services Centre has been in operation in the
Employment Agency’s headquarters since October 2003. Based
on the one-stop shop principle, it is designed to provide services
to members of the public and to enterprises (legal persons). In
this centre, whose purpose is to give speedy and accurate
answers to questions, clients can receive information on all the
activities provided by the Employment Agency. In addition, the
centre offers specialised services on intergovernmental
agreements for working abroad.Spring 2004 |  European Employment Observatory Review 33
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The data show that during the first six months of 2004, the
Information and Services Centre – the front-line office of the
EA’s headquarters – was visited by 2,515 clients and registered
2,655 phone enquiries. A great many of the enquiries concerned
intergovernmental agreements and job vacancies across the
country, as well as the options for taking part in employment
programmes and measures. Over the same period, 962 written
complaints, requests and enquiries were submitted to the
agency. The data reveal considerable public interest in this new
possibility for providing services in a speedy, easy and
accessible way.
Within the process of developing an information society in
Bulgaria, the Employment Agency is successfully developing an
open, client-oriented information system for the labour market.
This system is constantly being developed and updated.
There has also been great interest in the Online Labour
Exchange, which enables employers to search for suitable staff
easily and free of charge without leaving their workplace. The
Online Labour Exchange contains databases of all jobseekers
registered with the local employment offices. Similarly,
jobseekers can find out about all job vacancies announced by
the local employment offices, as well as those published on the
Employment Agency’s website. They can also submit a ‘job
wanted’ announcement free of charge, as the Online Labour
Exchange guarantees protection of personal data.
To strengthen the EA’s administrative capacity, a development
plan was drawn up in March 2004 for the period 2004-7,and was
approved by the Minister of Labour and Social Policy in April.
The plan sets out practical capacity-building activities to be
undertaken, focusing on staffing, training and networks. Within
these three areas, it is envisaged that a total of 500 employees
will be trained, costing 423,370 leva (216,140 euro).34 Spring 2004 |  European Employment Observatory Review
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Malta: New enterprise schemes 
The newly established Malta Enterprise – the government
body responsible for the overall development of Malta’s
enterprise strategy – has launched three new schemes to help
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) to improve and
expand their products. These schemes are eventually intended
to assist SMEs in identifying the opportunities available to
them through Malta’s membership of the European Union,
and in upgrading their products and services to local and EU
quality standards.
One scheme targets companies operating in the food-processing
sector. It aims to help them to adopt and implement quality
systems and undertake product development. The scheme
targets micro-enterprises and SMEs, mainly in the areas of
traditional bakeries, processed fruit and vegetables, beef and
meat processing, pasta products, traditional Maltese products,
dairy products and wines. The assistance consists of a grant that
covers up to 60% of the pre-agreed expenditure on advisory
services, certification costs and implementation measures.
Another scheme will help SMEs to comply with EU directives
through development and certification of quality standards,
environmental management systems and health and safety
management systems. As with the scheme for the food-
processing sector, the compliance scheme covers up to 60% of
the pre-agreed expenditure on advisory services, certification
costs and implementation of measures. Special consideration
will be given to those enterprises that intend to take into account
the upgrading of their personnel.
The third scheme is specifically designed for tenants of
workshops situated in the Malta Crafts Village, to help them to
obtain bank loans to cover the purchase of new workshops.
These schemes will form part of Malta Enterprise’s other
programmes and facilities, which cover training measures, a
business incubation centre to help projects during their start-up
phase, export promotion activities and dissemination of EU
information.
Finland: Expansion of the business
start-up allowance system
A Finnish working group recently proposed expanding the
business start-up allowance system to apply to unemployed
people and those at risk of unemployment, those who are
switching from paid home-based work to starting up a business,
and students who have completed their studies. During the
initial stage of the system, any individual starting up in business
would receive 650 euros a month for the first six months and 500
euros a month during the next six months. The proposals of the
working group, which was appointed by the Minister of Labour,
were presented in Helsinki in March.
Finland needs business start-ups and entrepreneurs.
Entrepreneurs are especially vital in the service sector. The
government wants to see many more business start-ups than in
the past. In future, most companies will be set up without state
subsidies. The reform aims to enable as many people as possible
who want to become entrepreneurs to claim a start-up
allowance, provided there is a genuine need for support and the
business venture appears likely to be profitable. Expansion of
the start-up allowance system is part of the government’s
political programme for encouraging enterprise.
The effect of the start-up allowance system on the numbers of
unemployed people has been encouraging. According to recent
studies, 80% of companies receiving a start-up allowance are
still in business five years after their launch. This is equivalent to
53% of all businesses.
The high success rate can be explained by the business training
and consulting services offered by experts as part of the start-up
allowance. Those who give up usually do so as a result of
insufficient know-how. Decisions are taken on the basis of
consultation between the customer and the expert. If the
entrepreneur has to make a financial investment, they can apply
for a small-business loan, a loan for female entrepreneurs or a
micro-loan from Finnvera. The start-up allowance is primarily
designed to cover living costs.
The working group is proposing that the start-up grant should
be made available to all projects which it may realistically
benefit. The overall timescale of the grant would be 12 months,
with an interim assessment after six months. This assessment
would look at the progress of the business at that stage and its
future prospects.
Additional support 
Entrepreneurship training and consulting services are available
for anyone considering setting up in business. Part of the
consulting service involves a start-up review. The expert assesses
the chances of success of the proposed business and gives an
opinion to the Labour Office. These training and expert services
are provided by different organisations depending on the
geographical region.
Regional business services generally provide assistance for
business start-ups. Under the government’s programme for
encouraging enterprise, there will be 50 regional providers of
business services in different parts of the country. The final
decision on the start-up allowance is still made by the Labour
Office.
Minimising distortion of competition 
It is important that the businesses which are granted a start-up
allowance do not distort local competition. The effect of each
new enterprise on the local competitive situation is carefully
assessed. Enterprises which would distort the competition are
not granted a start-up allowance. One of the main starting
points of the proposed amendment to the start-up programme is
that the allowance would not support so-called ‘forced
enterprising’. This means that projects where the previous work
was paid on a salary basis and which would artificially be
transformed into enterprises will not receive start-up funding.Spring 2004 |  European Employment Observatory Review 35
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Increasing the number and range of start-ups
In the future, it is expected that business start-ups will
increasingly be seen in the nursing sector, other healthcare
services, the travel industry and business services.
At present, some 4,000 business start-ups are launched every
year, accounting for approximately 20% of all companies
established. The working group estimates that the proposed
amendment to the start-up system would boost this figure to
10,000, giving a combined annual employment potential of
over 20,000.
The underlying principle of the amendment is that the start-up
system will be expanded within the government’s budget
framework. Funding will be through national and European
Union Structural Funds. For the start-up allowance for
unemployed people and those threatened with unemployment,
the amendment will be implemented through subdivisions of
the Ministry of Labour.
Under the present procedure, business training, advice and
consulting support are also funded through subdivisions of the
Ministry of Trade and Industry and the Ministry of Education.
During 2004, the start-up system for those transferring from
paid work, home-based work and study to become
entrepreneurs will be funded via the entrepreneurship section of
the European Social Fund’s product-development project.
The start-up working group was led by the Ministry of Trade
and Industry, with members from the Ministry of Labour,
Finnvera and the advisory services for new business start-ups.
The group conducted extensive interviews with labour market
representatives and representative organisations as well as with
the local and regional government sectors. The proposed
expansion has received support during the consultation period,
and the timeframe for implementation has been shortened. The
proposal has required a change in the law. In practice, the new
system may be brought into operation between late autumn
2004 and early 2005.
Bulgaria: Work experience in public
administration for graduates
The processes of economic and social restructuring and the
transition from a centralised economy to a market-oriented one
have led to considerable decline in labour demand. Young
people (aged up to 29) are in a disadvantaged position in the
labour market. Unemployed young people aged up to 29 form
26.6% of all the unemployed people registered with the Public
Employment Service (PES). Of these, graduates comprise 6.9%.
The most frequent reasons for long term unemployment among
young people include lack of experience and length of service,
and lack of appropriate vocational competences. There is also a
considerable discrepancy and mismatch between the numbers
and suitability of vocational training of young people, and the
actual demand and requirements on the employers’side.
The development of young people’s potential, skills and abilities
is of paramount importance for the future progress of Bulgaria.
Young people are the country’s future labour force, which after
2007 must compete in the joint European labour market. The
Ministry of Labour and Social Policy is implementing a number
of active measures and programmes to ensure young people’s
access to the labour market and improve their employability.
The pilot phase of the programme employment in public
administration for young graduates started in 2002. The aim of
this programme is to increase young people’s employment
prospects by helping them to gain vocational competences and
work experience. The programme is intended to ease the
transition from education to the labour market.
The programme is aimed at unemployed graduates aged up to 29
years of age. It gives them the opportunity to start work in
public administration immediately after graduation. Thus they
have the chance to acquire the necessary work experience to
enter the labour market. The work placements are financed with
resources from the state budget for active employment policy,
and are made available according to the needs of all ministries,
agencies, municipalities and regional administrations in the
country.
The employer receives resources to pay the young person’s
wages, social security and bonuses, as well as their paid annual
leave. In accordance with the latest amendments to the
programme, employment is provided for nine months. The PES
organises and implements the application procedure, and
provides appropriate information to employers and young
people on the programme’s requirements and how to
participate. Employers select the young beneficiaries according
to selection criteria such as diploma grades, computer skills,
language skills and so on.
Regular monitoring and assessment of the programme’s
implementation is carried out, and reports are prepared on the
basis of the information collected. This provides the possibility
of correcting the scope and mechanisms of the programme and
adapting it to suit the conditions and needs of the labour
market.
In 2003, 880 young people were included in the programme, and
210 by mid 2004. Overall, at the end of July 2004, 909 people
were employed through the programme. The employment in
public administration for young graduates programme has
received wide publicity and support. As a result of
implementing this programme, long-term unemployment
among young people is expected to fall, their qualifications to
improve, and their prospects for future integration into the
labour market to be enhanced.36 Spring 2004 |  European Employment Observatory Review
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Cyprus: Human Resource Development
Authority’s Strategic Plan
This article summarises the Strategic Planning of the Cyprus
Human Resource Development Authority for the three-year
period 2004-2006, defining the strategic objectives and
directions of the HRDA, the targets of the existing and new
training schemes as well as the financial planning of the
organisation. Cyprus’s accession to the European Union on
1st May 2004 along with the concomitant potential for
utilising community funds from the European Social Fund
have provided the compass for the formulation of HRDA’s
strategy.
In formulating and specifying the strategic objectives for the
period 2004-2006, it was taken into account that it was
necessary to focus the efforts of HRDA’s services on issues of
immediate priority as well as of long-term significance. In
particular, through the strategic objectives for the period
2004-2006, the HRDA will seek to promote the following
activities:
• Development and effective operation of four New Training
Schemes, co-financed by the European Social Fund, each of
which aims to promote the training and employability of
Young School-leavers, the Unemployed, Economically
Inactive Women and the provision of Consultancy,
Guidance and Training Services to micro-enterprises
employing one to four persons, respectively.
• Promotion of the gradual establishment and operation of a
System of Vocational Qualifications in Cyprus, in
cooperation with the other competent agencies, on the basis
of relevant decisions of HRDA’s Board of Directors.
• Development and implementation of special actions with
the main aim of substantially increasing HRDA’s
effectiveness. These actions include the conducting of a
scrutiny exercise of the organisation’s operation methods,
including its computerisation, the development of a Code
of Good Operation Conduct, the assessment of the existing
Training Schemes and the gradual introduction of a system
of assessment and certification of training providers.
With the implementation of HRDA’s strategic objectives for
the period 2004-2006, it is expected that there will be a marked
improvement in the problems encountered in the labour
market, especially that of the long-standing quality
imbalances vis-à-vis the observed unemployment rates. It is
also expected that they will contribute to the efforts for
improving the productivity and competitiveness of enterprises
as well as to the further adjustment of the Cyprus economy to
the requirements of the Acquis Communautaire.
The Human Resource Development Authority of Cyprus is a
semi-public organisation, governed by a 13-member Board of
Directors of a tripartite character, and which comprises
representatives of the Government,Employers and Trade Unions.
HRDA’s mission is the creation of the necessary prerequisites for
the planned and systematic training and development of
Cyprus’ human resources, at all levels and in all sectors, for
meeting the economy’s needs, within the overall national socio-
economic policies.
The Strategic Goals of the Human Resource Development
Authority have been formulated on the basis of Cyprus’s
strategic goals as these are defined in the National Strategic
Development Plan for the period 2004-2006 and the Single
Planning Documents for Objective 3 (Human Resources) and
the Community Initiative EQUAL, the European Employment,
Education and Training Strategy,as well as the general and more
specific characteristics of the labour market.
HRDA’s strategic goals for the three-year period 2004- 2006 are:
• upgrading the country’s human resources through appropriate
training and development in order to increase their labour
mobility all throughout the European Union, and 
• strengthening the competitiveness of Cypriot enterprises
through better utilization of their human resources and
improvement of their adjustment to change.
In the framework of HRDA’s strategic goals, the following
strategic objectives have been set for the three-year period
2004-2006:
HRDA’s
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Strategic Objective 1: Participation in the implementation of the
Acquis Communautaire and utilisation of the possibilities
afforded by the Structural Fund/European Social Fund as well as
by other programmes and initiatives of the European Union.
Strategic Objective 2: Facilitation of the entrance and
integration/re-integration in the labour market of the human
resources, with emphasis on actions and measures for enriching
and adjusting the skills and knowledge of new entrants, the
unemployed and economically inactive women to the needs of
the labour market and of enterprises.
Strategic Objective 3: Participation in the formulation of a
national strategy for the promotion of lifelong learning and the
set up of coordination and follow-up mechanisms in cooperation
with other competent agencies and the social partners. In this
framework, to enable all people in employment to adjust their
skills and knowledge to the needs of their enterprises and of the
labour market by attending training programmes. At the same
time, the HRDA will continue to consider the perspective of
including the self-employed in its sphere of competence.
Strategic Objective 4: Provision of consultancy services to Small
and Medium sized Enterprises with the aim of improving their
mode of operation and efficiency and their competitiveness in
general through better development and utilisation of their
human resources as well as the solution of important restraining
problems they are faced with.
Strategic Objective 5: Adjustment of the training system to
today’s needs of the labour and the training markets with the
improvement of the quality and effectiveness of the training
provided. In particular, the HRDA will promote the review and
gradual introduction of the assessment and certification of
training providers as well as the utilisation of the possibilities
afforded by the information and communication technologies.
Strategic Objective 6: Assessment of the findings of a special
feasibility study, formulation of an integrated policy and
promotion of the gradual establishment and operation of a
System of Vocational Qualifications in Cyprus, in cooperation
with all other competent agencies, on the basis of relevant policy
decisions of HRDA’s Board of Directors.
Strategic Objective 7: Conducting research studies and surveys in
strategically important areas and issues regarding Cyprus’s
human resources, the assessment of its work and its effectiveness
in the formulation of the training and development strategy for
the country’s human resources.
Strategic Objective 8: Development and strengthening of
HRDA’s public relations and co-operation, mainly through the
promotion and information campaigns for the services offered by
the Authority, as well as the extension and strengthening of
international relations and co-operation,with emphasis on closer
contacts with the competent services and agencies of the
European Union and those of member-states.
Strategic Objective 9: Intensification of the effort for a
substantial increase of the effectiveness of HRDA’s services,
mainly through the conducting of a scrutiny exercise of the
organisation’s operation methods, the implementation of an
Information Strategy for the significant upgrading of the
Authority’s computerisation as well as the continuing and
focused training and development of its staff.
Objectives of the new schemes of the HRDA to
be co-financed by the European Social Fund
In the three year period 2004-2006, the HRDA will develop and
put in operation four new schemes, to be co-financed by the
European Social Fund. Each of these schemes aims to promote
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the training and employability of young school-leavers, the
unemployed, economically inactive women and the provision of
consultancy, guidance and training services to micro-enterprises
employing one to four persons, respectively.
• Scheme for the promotion of the training and employability of
young school-leavers: The aim is to effectively meet the
training needs of young school-leavers in order to facilitate
their smooth and effective entrance to the labour market
through the acquisition of specialised complementary skills
and knowledge.
• Scheme for the promotion of the training and employability of
unemployed: The aim is to effectively meet the training needs
of selected target groups of the unemployed in order to
improve their employability through the acquisition of
specialised complementary skills and knowledge.
• Scheme for the promotion of the training and employability of
economically inactive women: The aim is to effectively meet
the training needs of selected target groups of economically
inactive women in order to improve their employability and
to encourage them to enter the labour market through the
acquisition of specialised complementary skills and
knowledge.
• Scheme of consultative, guidance and training services for
micro-enterprises employing one to four persons: The aim is to
improve the operation, effectiveness and overall
competitiveness of Micro-enterprises employing one to four
persons, through the systematic diagnosis of the
weaknesses/problems they encounter and then the
training/development and fuller utilisation of their
owner/manager and their human resources.
HRDA’s Financial Planning 2004 – 2006 
In the three year period 2004-2006,it is estimated that the HRDA
will expend a total amount in the region of 41,658,000 euro
(24,010,000 CYP) for Human Resource Development purposes,
representing an increase of 82% compared to the three-year
period 2001-2003. This amount is distributed as follows:
• Existing Training Activities (72.1%) 
• Special Development Activities (12.1%) 
• New Schemes to be Co-financed by the ESF (15.8%) 
The total budgeted expenditure of the HRDA in the three-year
period 2004-2006 is anticipated to increase by 66%, compared to
the three-year period 2001-2003. The total budgeted income of
the HRDA for the same period is anticipated to increase by 29%.
Latvia: Acquisition of working skills
for vocational training students
The unemployment rate among 15-24 years-olds still remains
high and it was 18.5% in 2003, therefore it is important to take
action and to implement active labour market measures to
combat this problem.About 46% of the young unemployed have
no previous work experience. Starting in June 2004 and in order
to promote the professional orientation and further integration
of young people into the labour market, the State Employment
Agency (SEA) has implemented the pilot project ‘Acquisition of
working skills during the summer holidays for students from
secondary and secondary vocational schools’.
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The stakeholders involved in the project were students,
employers and the SEA. The SEA was acting as a negotiator
between the involved parties and was responsible for control, as
well as for building a database where all participants concerned
were to be registered.
Within the framework of the project, students from secondary
and secondary vocational schools aged 15-18 had the
opportunity to be employed for a month both in the private or
public sector during their summer holidays (June to August)
earning in excess of the minimum monthly wage 80 LVL
(approx. 120 euro). The project was partly subsidized by the
state budget (50% from minimum monthly wage), so state
funding made up part of the wages. Employers had to pay at
least half of the minimum monthly wage (approx. 60 euro) for
each student being employed in the enterprise or organization
within the framework of the pilot project. During the project,
every participating student was supervised by a Practice
manager. The wage of the Practice manager was also subsidized
by the state budget, making approx. 30 euro to 120 euro per
month depending on the number of students they were
responsible for. The total funding provided by the state for the
pilot project was 150,000 LVL (approx. 225,000 euro) from the
active labour market measure Measures for the promotion of
competitiveness, therefore a limited number of persons had the
opportunity to take part. The pilot project was implemented in
close cooperation with employers, who showed significant
interest to employ young persons; it was also the first time the
government financially supported employers who are willing to
employ students.
The number of applicants who wanted to be employed in the
summer and were registered (by August 1, 2004) at the SEA
offices as job seekers was 8410 (approx. 11.2% of the target
group – all students from secondary and secondary vocational
schools aged 15-18) but considering the limited funding only
3191 of them got a job (priority was given to students coming
from large families) for one month. The applicants had to take
part in job interviews that were taking place mainly in the SEA.
The students had to sign employment contracts and submit
other necessary documentation (tax books, health certificates
etc.). For some of the students, it was the first time they had to
respond to such formalities.
At the beginning of the project, contracts were signed with 448
employers (enterprises and organizations) throughout Latvia
and there were 3191 jobs offered. 1295 jobs were offered in Riga
(capital city of Latvia) and the Riga region, 573 in Kurzeme (in
the west of Latvia), 473 in Latgale (in the east of Latvia), 497 in
Vidzeme (northeast) and 353 in Zemgale (central Latvia). The
project end date was the 31 August, 2004.The employers who
offered the majority of the jobs were retailers, food factories and
farm enterprises, while some positions were also offered by a
children’s hospital. (See figure 1.)
The main objective of the project was to undertake a practical
preparation for students entering the labour market, to enable
them to acquire basic working skills and knowledge about
working conditions and the legal basis that the labour market is
operating on. The experience and skills gained within the
framework of the pilot project will be useful when it comes to
choosing an occupation and to entering the labour market.
The pilot project proved to be of interest for students as well as
for employers although in some rural areas there were not
enough jobs offered and students had to work half-time to
ensure that as many students as possible took part in the project.
Some of the employers were highly satisfied with the employed
students and asked them to continue the cooperation after the
pilot project was finished. There were also some cases where
employers were dissatisfied with students, but in most of these
cases students were brought to the job interviews by parents and
therefore their motivation to work in the summer holidays was
rather low.
The pilot project Acquirement of Working Skills During the
Summer Holidays for Students from Secondary and  Vocational
Schools can be evaluated as successful, but there is also room for
organisational improvements and the discussion concerning
needs and ways for setting special target groups, such as students
from large families, for example.
Malta: Training in specific sectors
The need for having human resources trained according to
labour market requirements has led to the provision of new
training programmes that are tied directly to recent labour
market developments. An example of this policy initiative is a
new training programme for young job seekers wishing to
embark on a career in the pharmaceutical industry.
The expansion and setting up of a number of pharmaceutical
companies in Malta during the past year, has led towards the
development of a training programme that targets young job
seekers who are ready to work in the pharmaceutical sector. The
Employment and Training Corporation (Malta’s Public
Employment Service) together with Malta Enterprise (Malta’s
public entity responsible for the country’s enterprise strategy),
and the chemistry department at the University of Malta have
launched a course for chemical technology operators. The
course is being organised in close collaboration with a number of
pharmaceutical companies who eventually intend to employ
those course participants who successfully complete the course.
At the end of the course participants will receive a certificate of
performance that will also enable them to continue their studies
in clinical chemistry at the Malta College of Arts Science and
Technology to HND (tertiary) level.
This initiative has also led to other similar training initiatives
organised at the University of Malta and the Malta College of
Arts Science and Technology.Initiatives include the launching of
a BTEC National Programme in applied laboratory and
industrial science, short courses for employees working as
chemical operators in the healthcare industry as well as training
in industrial pharmacy for undergraduate students. The BTEC
programme involves training to students in scientific principles,
laboratory organisation and scientific applications as required
by industry especially the pharmaceutical sector.40 Spring 2004 |  European Employment Observatory Review
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The Netherlands: More training
opportunities for the unemployed
There are many opportunities for individuals on unemployment
benefit to follow training courses. On 27 August 2004, Minister
of Social Affairs and Unemployment, Aart Jan De Geus, made
it possible for individuals to follow training courses with a
substantial element of practical training, without suspension of
their unemployment benefit. Unemployed individuals may also
follow an internal training course within a company. In specific
cases individuals may be allowed to follow training courses
lasting up to a maximum of two years (as opposed to one
currently). The only precondition is that the training be
necessary for the individual to return to work.
Minister De Geus has made a ministerial settlement to broaden
the rules on training for the unemployed. Under the new rules,
the UWV can provide more targeted support to individuals on
unemployment benefit to enable them to return to work more
quickly. Four such pilot schemes were conducted recently. They
demonstrated that more targeted support and greater flexibility
were required (the latter in the case of both the UWV and the
jobseeker).
Individuals may continue to receive unemployment benefit
whilst following a training course. Training does not affect
benefits in any way, so the fact that an individual is following a
training course does not provide a reason either to withdraw
benefit or to extend it. If the individual’s entitlement to
unemployment benefit expires during their training course, they
may complete their training. This rule is now in force and has
been backdated to 1 August 2004.Spring 2004 |  European Employment Observatory Review 41
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SPECIAL CATEGORIES
OF WORKERS
Belgium: Stimulating proactive job-
hunting
In Belgium, any individual without employment once they have
completed their studies or after losing their job is, in principle,
entitled to claim unemployment benefit. Throughout the period
of unemployment, unemployed individuals receiving
unemployment benefit must meet certain conditions; in
particular, they must not be unemployed through choice. This
means that an unemployed individual may not refuse any
suitable job offered to them and must agree to follow any
training course proposed. Unemployed individuals must also
remain available for work; they must actively engage in any
support activities, training, work experience or placements
offered by the public employment service (regional employment
offices, Employment and Training Information Centres
(FOREM), the Flemish Office for Employment and Vocational
Training (VDAB), the Brussels Regional Employment Office
(ORBEM/BGDA) and local employment offices) and must
actively try to find work themselves.
Insofar as individuals are not entitled to claim unemployment
benefit indefinitely in Belgium, it is normal practice for the
National Employment Office (ONEM/RVA) – the federal body
responsible for managing the unemployment benefit scheme – to
check at regular intervals that an unemployed individual is
indeed looking for work and therefore still meets the
requirements for entitlement to unemployment benefit.On 1 July
2004, a new system for monitoring unemployed individuals
entered into force, the primary aim being to actively monitor
such individuals and to support them in their efforts to
reintegrate into the labour market. At the same time, the Regions
and the Communities pledged to increase measures offering
tailor-made support to all unemployed individuals requesting it.
Monitoring Procedure
The efforts made by an unemployed individual to reintegrate
into the labour market are assessed during one-to-one
interviews with a specially trained ONEM representative
(facilitator) hired specifically for this purpose.
A completely unemployed individual (chômeur complet), i.e. an
individual whose employment contract has been terminated or
who works only a set number of part-time hours, is invited to an
initial interview with a facilitator after either 15 months of
unemployment (if aged under 25) or after 21 months (if aged 25
or above).
This initial interview is designed to assess the efforts made by the
unemployed individual to find work during the 12 months prior
to the interview. Their efforts are assessed in light of their
personal circumstances (age, level of training, social and family
situation,etc.) and the situation on the labour market in the sub-
region in which they live. If the individual is deemed to be
making sufficient efforts to find work, another interview is
scheduled for 16 months later.
However, if the individual is not considered to have made
sufficient efforts to find a job, he or she is offered an action plan
detailing practical steps such as contacting the relevant Regional
Employment Office, consulting job listings, applying for jobs
and so forth) over the next four months and is asked to commit
to taking the action required. A second interview is then
scheduled four months later to assess whether the individual has
followed their action plan. If they have, then a further interview
will be arranged 12 months later.
If the individual has failed to comply with the terms of their
action plan, he or she will incur a penalty. This penalty is
temporary and is limited to four months and entails either a
reduction in the amount of unemployment benefit the
individual may claim or complete suspension of the benefit. The
individual must also once again pledge to follow a new (more
intensive) action plan over the next four months and a third
interview will be arranged at the end of that four-month period.
If the individual has complied with the terms of the second
action plan, his or her full benefit entitlement will be restored
and a further interview will be arranged 12 months later. If the
individual has failed to stick to their second action plan, all
benefits will be suspended. However, if the individual is
receiving unemployment benefit as a head of household,a single
person, or as a co-habiting partner in a household with a low
income, this suspension will be preceded by a period of six
months during which the individual will continue to receive
benefit but at a reduced level.
At each stage of the process, the unemployed individual may be
accompanied by someone of his or her choice (at the first
interview) or by a lawyer or trade-union representative (during
the second and third interviews).
Unemployed individuals who have incurred a penalty may
lodge an appeal with the National Administrative Commis-
sion (Commission Administrative Nationale/Nationale
Administrative Commissie) and with the labour courts.
Entry in force
This new monitoring system entered into force on 1 July 2004.
To enable the Regions and the Communities to develop an
adequate range of support services whereby they can offer all
unemployed individuals support, training or work experience,
the system is being introduced gradually. The first phase (up to
June 2005) pertains only to unemployed individuals under the
age of 30. Subsequently, it will be extended to unemployed
individuals aged under 40 and to those aged under 50, from July
2005 and July 2006 respectively.42 Spring 2004 |  European Employment Observatory Review
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Belgium: First Job Agreement Scheme 
The First Job Agreement (CPE) scheme is designed to promote
access to the labour market for young people. To this end, some
employers are obliged to hire young people on a CPE. Since the
scheme was introduced in April 2000, countless changes have
been made to the rules governing CPEs. Following the National
Conference on Employment (concluded in October 2003), the
framework law of 22 December 2003 and the Royal Decree of 21
January 2004 once again amended the regulations, in a bid to
simplify their application.
Employers involved
For all employers in the private sector with a workforce of 50 or
more as of 30 June of the previous calendar year, 3% of their
staff must be young people hired on a CPE (calculated as full-
time equivalents) based on the total number of staff during the
second half of the previous year. For employers in the public
sector, including private employers in a non-market sector,
employing fewer than 50 workers as of 30 June of the previous
calendar year, 1.5% of their staff must be young people hired on
a CPE (calculated as full-time equivalents) based on the total
number of staff during the second half of the previous year.
Exemption from the requirement to hire young people under the
First Job Agreement scheme may be granted for specific reasons
(e.g. companies in difficulty, companies which have made
reasonable efforts to promote employment) and subject to
compliance with a special procedure.
Categories of recipients
Any individual aged under 26, who is a registered jobseeker at
the time they are hired by an employer may be considered for the
First Job Agreement scheme. Foreign young people or those
who are disabled count as two individuals for the purposes of
compliance with CPE regulations.
Types of CPE
A CPE may take three different forms:
•  ordinary employment contract (at least half-time work);
• part-time employment contract (at least half-time work)
combined with a training scheme; in all cases, an average of
240 hours per year must be spent on training;
•  apprenticeship contract (apprenticeship contract for
professions pursued by salaried workers, "middle-class"
apprenticeship contract (contrat d‘apprentissage des classes
moyennes), agreement on a course as part of training to
become a business manager, an integration agreement or any
other type of agreement or contract on training or insertion
determined by Royal Decree).
The CPE must be a written document. This document may take
the form of a contract of employment, apprenticeship, course or
insertion etc. in which it is stipulated in a special clause that the
contract (or agreement) is also a First Job Agreement. There is
therefore no need to draw up a separate written CPE.In principle,
the CPE will terminate at the same time as the employment
contract (if the latter is fixed-term), apprenticeship contract,
course contract or integration agreement and,in any case,no later
than the last day of the quarter during which the young person
reaches the age of 26. However, termination of the CPE does not
automatically terminate an employment contract (e.g. an open
ended contract);thus an individual will continue to perform his or
her job as determined by the parties but from the time the CPE
ends, the employer may no longer include the young person
concerned in their figures pertaining to their hiring obligations.
Reduction in contributions
Both public- and private-sector employers are entitled to
reduced contributions in respect of the target group of young
people regardless of their total number of employees. Clearly,
though, they must meet their CPE obligations.
Workers are divided into two categories:
– Category 1: young people up to 31 December of the year
during which they turned 18 (minors);
– Category 2: young people from 1 January of the year during
which they turned 19 until the end of the quarter in which
they turn 26.
For young people in Category 1 (minors), no further conditions
need be met in order to claim entitlement to reduced
contributions.
For young people in Category 2, a worker must have been a
registered jobseeker prior to being hired, must be bound by a
CPE and must be low-skilled (must hold no qualifications above
a certificate of lower-level secondary education).
Employers are granted a reduction of 1,000 euro per individual
per quarter for young people in Category 1 hired up to the
fourth quarter of the calendar year during which the worked
turned 18.
For Category 2 workers hired, employers receive a reduction of
1,000 euro per quarter for the first eight quarters after hiring the
worker and a reduction of 400 euro per quarter up to and
including the quarter during which the worker turns 26.
Monitoring and penalties
Employers who fail to comply with their CPE obligations will be
fined 75 euro per calendar day of non-compliance and per
worker concerned (i.e. young people not hired or workers
dismissed to compensate for hiring young people).
Belgium: The Experience Fund
In the near future, Belgium’s increasing ageing population,
which is leading to an excessively low level of participation
among older workers and early departure from the labour
market will have a significant impact on the state budget in the
form of extremely high pension costs. However, the experience
gained by this ageing population could continue to play a key
role in business and enterprise.
In an effort to alter the perception of these workers and their
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(Fonds de l‘expérience professionnelle/Het ervaringsfonds) is
offering companies a subsidy for measures they take to improve
conditions for workers aged 55 and over.
Employers involved
Subsidies from the fund will only be allocated to employers who
fall within the field of application of the law of 5 December
1968. In practice, this means that subsidies will only be allocated
in respect of measures designed to improve conditions for
contracted workers aged at least 55 and similar individuals.
Employers must also meet the following criteria:
• The company must not be bankrupt or in liquidation, must
not have been issued a legal winding-up arrangement and
must not be in the process of declaring itself bankrupt;
• The company must have met its social and tax-related
obligations for a period of two years prior to its application
for a subsidy;
• The company must pledge to actively implement measures
to adapt working conditions or its work-organisation
schedule vis-à-vis the workers in respect of whom the
measures have been taken;
• The company must pledge to continue to employ the workers
in respect of whom the measures have been taken for one year
under the working conditions or according to the work-
organisation schedule stipulated by the measure.
Conditions governing subsidies 
Two types of measure will be considered for subsidy:
• Work-organisation schedule and pertaining primarily to
safety at work, workers’ health, ergonomics or the psycho-
social burden associated with the work. These measures may
include, among others, specific modifications to working
time, adapting workstations, altering working processes or
even a decrease in salary as a result of a worker being
transferred to a post more suited to his or her capabilities;
• Studies conducted at the employer’s request, in particular by
the company’s prevention department, prior to the
introduction of measures altering working conditions or
modifying the work-organisation schedule. Such studies may
only be subsidised if the resulting findings are actually
applied in the company.
The above measures must also meet the following criteria:
• Measures must not be limited to implementing labour
regulations and legislation in force on well-being in the
workplace;
• The workers at whom the measures are aimed must be
involved either individually or as a group in drawing up and
implementing the measures;
• The company’s internal prevention department (service
interne pour la prevention et la protection au travail) and the
prevention committee (comité pour la prévention et la
protection au travail) must have approved the drawing up and
implementation of the measure taken;
• If the employer enlists or is forced to enlist the services of an
external prevention body, the latter must also approve the
drawing up and implementation of the measure taken.
A subsidy is granted mainly for measures meeting one or more
of the following criteria:
• A measure designed to avoid risks;
• An innovative measure;
• A measure which could also be applied in other companies.
Employers may only claim a subsidy if a Collective
Agreement has been concluded on the matter by a joint body
or within the company.
Subsidy amounts
If an employer takes measures designed to improve working
conditions or alter the work-organisation schedule, the subsidy
available is fixed at a certain percentage of that employer’s
spending and is capped depending on the size of the company
in question.
If an employer conducts studies to ascertain improvement inn
working conditions and the work-organisation schedule, the
subsidy available is fixed at 30% of the cost of the study, up to a
maximum of:
• 10,000 euro (for companies employing 20 workers or less);
• 8,000 euro (for companies employing between 20 and 49
workers);
• 6,000 euro (for companies employing between 50 and 199
workers);
• 4,000 euro (for companies employing at least 200 workers).
This amount is increased to 50% of costs if:
• the study pertains to actions which are clearly applicable and
which can be applied by other employers without any
substantial alterations;
• the author of the study agrees to the latter being distributed
and applied by other employers without payment of any
additional fee.
The ceiling is fixed as follows:
• 12,500 euro (for companies employing 20 workers or less);
• 10,000 euro (for companies employing between 20 and 49
workers);
• 7,500 euro (for companies employing between 50 and 199
workers);
• 5,000 euro (for companies employing at least 200 workers).
However, employers who claim subsidies both for the actual
measures they are introducing and for studies into those
Size of company (workers) Subsidy % Ceiling (€)
fewer than 20 80% 12,500
20-49 70% 10,000
50-199 60% 7,500
200 or more 50% 5,000
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measures may not receive a total subsidy of more than:
• 20,000 euro (for companies employing 20 workers or less);
• 16,000 euro (for companies employing between 20 and 49
workers);
• 12,000 euro (for companies employing between 50 and 199
workers);
• 8,000 euro (for companies employing at least 200 workers).
The subsidy may not be combined with any other benefit
which the employer may receive in respect of the same worker
and for the same purpose, except for a reduction in social-
security contributions.
Denmark: Knowledge centres for
refugees and immigrants
Refugees and immigrants possess many job-relevant skills.
Future integration policy will focus to a greater degree on the
qualifications and resources possessed by individuals that are
relevant to current manpower needs. For this purpose, five new
regional knowledge centres were established on 1 August 2004.
They are intended to ensure more professional assessment of
refugees’and immigrants’skills by the authorities. A total of 80
million DKK (10.8 million euro) has been allocated to set up the
five regional knowledge centres.
The knowledge centres are not intended to assume responsibility
for the integration efforts of municipalities and the AF (National
Employment Service), but rather to supplement and improve the
programs in use today.
The knowledge centres are intended to improve the way in which
skills have been assessed up till now, because it has proved
deficient and limited in many respects, and has not been
sufficiently adjusted to labour-market requirements.
The knowledge centres’primary functions will be those of help-
desk for municipalities and the AF, and point of contact for the
undertakings and educational institutions involved in the
assessment process.
Methods of assessing the skills of refugees and immigrants
vary greatly depending on the target groups involved. The
knowledge centres will therefore function primarily as
knowledge banks for municipalities and the AF. The centres
should ensure that there is an overview of the various
institutions and methods involved in assessing skills. In
addition, the centres will help municipalities and the AF make
agreements with enterprises and educational institutions
concerning the relevant assessment procedures.
The knowledge centres are intended to improve the organisation
of the skills assessment process through cooperation with
various actors in this area. Among other things, they will help
realise the following objectives:
• Better and more professional assessment of skills, which will
enable refugees and immigrants to move from passive
maintenance via welfare benefits to ordinary work.
• Assistance with and improvements in the quality of efforts by
municipalities and the AF to find the right opportunities for
refugees and immigrants, so that applicants can be presented
with suitable options early in the interview process.
• Improvements in the efforts of educational institutions to
supply the appropriate assessment procedures, as well as
ensuring that undertakings can utilise the assessment
information provided to them.
Among the knowledge centres’ other important
responsibilities are assistance in developing three instruments
for nationwide use:
• An electronic database of skills assessment methods that will
give the authorities easy access to the expertise and qualified
knowledge of the skills assessment options that are available
locally, along with information on programs that are effective
for different target groups.
• Each immigrant receiving welfare benefits should have a
certificate of competence that precisely describes his/her job-
relevant qualifications.
• Undertakings should have an operations chart/template, in
order to ensure that the skills assessment done in the
workplace is relevant and effective.
The National Labour Market Authority issued tenders for
establishing the five knowledge centres, and private and
public-sector suppliers have now been selected for each of
these five facilities.
Estonia: Enhancing employment
opportunities for people with
disabilities
From April 2003 to April 2004, a PHARE Twinning project on
disability employment was carried out in co-operation between
the governments of Estonia and the United Kingdom. As part
of the project, UK experts analysed the situation of disabled
people in the Estonian labour market1, made recommendations
to develop labour market and rehabilitation services and trained
a number of officials and employers to support disabled people
in their search of work. The training included case-management
skills and joint working between institutions, as well as specific
knowledge of workplace adaptation. As a result, 12 local
networks of all relevant institutions (labour market offices,
rehabilitation teams, social insurance departments, local
authorities, vocational training centres) were created to help
disabled people into work.
The potential employers were targeted with an extensive
awareness raising campaign, while a Good Practice Guide on
how to employ and work with disabled people was produced and
distributed. Over 400 people participated in the programme
(leaders, managers, employers) improving their understanding
of disability employment issues. More disabled people are
expected to be hired as a result. To raise the awareness of the
wider public (including disabled people themselves) about
disability employment and to provide a forum for sharing
views and to disseminate good practice, the website
www.pite.ee was established.
Disabled people are socially disadvantaged in a number of areas
of life, including employment. Even in the context of a general
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decline in labour market participation and rising unemployment
during the 1990s, the employment of disabled people has been
much more seriously affected. The number of people who were
inactive because of sickness or disability more than doubled
between 1991 and 2002. A survey of disabled people in Estonia
demonstrated, however, that the majority of disabled people
would be interested in taking up paid employment.
According to the 2002 Estonian Labour Force Survey (LFS)
201,300 people of working age (i.e. aged 15-64) have
longstanding health problems or disabilities. However, only
about half of them (96,500) are classified as disabled in terms of
the labour market as their disability or longstanding health
problems affect the type/amount of work they could do and/or
their ability to travel between home and work.
The 2002 LFS employment rate in Estonia for disabled people of
working age was 25%, as compared with an overall employment
rate of 62%. As in other EU countries, the relatively low
employment rate for disabled people is associated much more
strongly with low labour market participation (and the
‘discouraged worker‘ effect) than with high unemployment.
About 90% of the 71,300 disabled people without jobs
(potential target group of active labour market measures) are
economically inactive.
At the same time, the 2002 LFS provides strong evidence that
the individuals’employment prospects do not simply depend on
their medical condition but can differ depending on their
occupations, qualifications, experience and preferences. About
half the respondents with long standing disabilities or health
problems said these did not affect them at work. The
employment rate for this group of people was even slightly
higher than that for people without long standing disabilities or
health problems – 68.6% as compared with 65.5%.
It would also be wrong to imply that effective employment help
for people with disabilities is necessarily expensive. A wealth of
evidence from other countries clearly shows that the most cost
effective way of reintegrating disadvantaged people into the
labour market is by encouraging and helping them with their job
search efforts.
The joint networks that were established and trained in Estonia,
as part of the above mentioned PHAREproject has shown some
good results: during the course of training, 48 disabled people
became employed, and a further 34 were considered to be likely
to achieve work in the near future with the help of the new joint
networks. In addition, a Workplace Adaptation Programme for
disabled people was designed and staff training about its
implementation was delivered in the local employment offices.
On the basis of the same joint networks and trained specialists
(case-managers), the government is ready to pilot and
implement a Workplace Adaptation Programme through the
local employment offices.
The Employment Strategy approved by the Estonian
Government in May 2004, sets out some new policy actions to
enhance the integration of disabled people in the labour market
in the near future. New active labour market schemes for
disabled people will be piloted in 2004-2005 with the help of
ESF funds. From 2006, all disabled people looking for a job will
be able to apply for help under the Workplace Adaptation
Programme, which will aim to meet the applicant’s minimum
requirements to overcome disability related barriers to
employment in the shortest possible time. The individual
approach (case-management) and joint working techniques will
be applied when helping disabled people into work.
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Estonia: Activation of the long-term
unemployed 
According to the Labour Force Survey data there were 30,400
long-term unemployed in Estonia in 2003.The projects for long-
term unemployed people can be applied only for those who have
been registered at the employment offices for twelve months.
Hence, the state can only help a part of the long-term
unemployed, because not all of them register and some of them
give up the services of employment offices. For example, in
March 2004 there were just 8,104 long-term unemployed people
registered at employment offices which makes up just 26% of all
long-term unemployed.
Similar to other countries,Estonia also applies an individualised
approach and case management development for long-term
unemployed people. Since 2001, employment offices have
implemented special projects for the long-term unemployed. In
the frame of the state programme Increasing employment,
preventing long-term unemployment and exclusion of risk groups
from working life consultants were hired in all employment
offices for providing labour market services to the long-term
unemployed.
In parallel with employment of consultants, another project
“Reintegrating the long-term unemployed into the labour
market”coordinated by employment offices was also started in
2001. For every unemployed participating in the project an
individual action plan was compiled, individual or group
vocational guidance was applied and the unemployed were sent
to adaptation or labour market training. The aim of the group
guidance was to find out the need for additional consultation,
prepare the unemployed persons for job seeking and raise their
self-confidence. Adaptation training enabled the unemployed to
get information about the labour market situation and how to
start their job search. All in all the projects were successful. In
2001-2003, approx 1,100 long-term unemployed were
participating in these projects. Since 2004 it is also possible to
use ESF funds, making it possible to increase the number of
participants in the projects. In the following years, more
attention will be paid to preventive activities in order to shorten
the duration of unemployment through activation of the
unemployed and through prevention of long-term
unemployment.
Latvia: Measures for unemployed at
risk of social exclusion
In 2003, the State Employment Agency (SEA) developed active
employment measures according to the requirement of the
labour market, implemented new services and improved the
possibilities for the unemployed with disabilities to be integrated
into the labour market.
New measure for the unemployed and job seekers
offered by the SEA – Acquirement of Basic Skills
Demanded by the Labour Market
A new measure entitled Measures for the Promotion of
Competitiveness Implemented by Legal Persons for
unemployed and jobseekers was developed and initiated as a
pilot-project by the SEA within the framework of measures for
the promotion of competitiveness in December 2003.Within the
framework of the project, the unemployed have the opportunity
to acquire basic skills necessary for the labour market (national
and English language skills, computer skills, project
management skills etc). Training is based on a module type
scheme.1,808 unemployed and job seekers have been involved in
this measure to acquire basic working skills up to August 1,
2004. 14,150 unemployed persons and jobseekers will be able to
acquire basic skills necessary for the labour market within the
framework of the national project Training to Improve the
Competitiveness of the Unemployed and Job seekers that is
included in the national program Support for Active Labour
Market Measures co-financed by the European Social Fund.
Improvement of opportunities for persons with
disabilities in the Latvian labour market 
New measures initiated in 2003 in order to improve the
competitiveness of the unemployed with disabilities include:
1. Measures for Improving the Mobility of Unemployed Persons
with Disabilities: this new activity was initiated in order to
develop professional or social skills of the unemployed with
disabilities in 2003. Within the programs that promote the
acquisition of working skills for unemployed with disabilities
according to their profession, work experience and the
prospective profession, opportunities are given to acquire the
professional or social skills they miss and to get a document
certifying the skills acquired. 119 unemployed with disabilities
were involved in this measure in 2003. In classes that lasted 40
hours they acquired skills in accountancy, electrical safety,
labour protection, working with cash register, communication
with clients and other working skills.
2.Professional training:In 2003 the first time a competition took
place organising professional training, retraining and
improvement of the qualifications of unemployed people with
disabilities. 415 unemployed with disabilities started the training
courses within this measure. Within the framework of the
national program Support for Active Labour Market Measures
(co-financed by the European Social Fund) and its national
project Training for the Groups at Risk of Social Exclusion
there will be opportunities for improving professional
qualifications or for acquiring a profession for 6,520
unemployed persons at risk of social exclusion, including 1,100
unemployed persons with disabilities.
3. Subsidized active labour market measures for unemployed
persons with disabilities: In 2003 the State Employment Agency
in co-operation with 340 employers created 566 subsidised work
places for unemployed persons with disabilities. 138
unemployed with disabilities participated in the job practice for
young persons with disabilities or in subsidised work places for
unemployed with disabilities. These were individuals who have
acquired professional education or graduated from professional
training or retraining courses for unemployed persons or who
have acquired professional skills at the workplace (having
worked in the profession for at least 2 years). 471 unemployed
with disabilities who have not acquired professional education
or wished to change the acquired profession participated in the
measure Support for Unemployed with Disabilities to Acquire
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established or adjusted according to the types of functional
disorders of the unemployed disabled persons. Within the
framework of the measure, there were 261 work places
established or adjusted to the functional disorders of persons
with disabilities.
4. Social Enterprises for Employment of the Less Competitive
Unemployed:In 2003 unemployed with disabilities were involved
in the measure Social Enterprises for Employment of the Less
Competitive Unemployed and a tender was announced in order
to establish social enterprises in which the unemployed with
disabilities will be employed. Companies, which have worked
out business plans for establishing new enterprises or new
divisions at the existing enterprise, can apply for the
organization of social enterprises. The goal of the measure is to
employ the unemployed from disadvantaged groups (long-term
unemployed – persons who are registered within the SEA for
more than a year, pre-retirement age unemployed persons with
not more than five years remaining until retirement and
unemployed with disabilities) at appropriately created work
places. Thus the preconditions for acquiring working skills and
promoting competitiveness will be created. Within the
established social enterprises the unemployed with disabilities
are employed in professions such as carpenters, electronic
equipment mechanics and others. The work places are
established or adjusted accordingly to the type of the functional
disorders of disabled unemployed.
The Netherlands: General measures
for individuals at a disadvantage
It is important that general government measures to remove
obstacles in the labour market should be aimed primarily at
individuals who are at a disadvantage. Such measures may
include programmes combining work and care, or programmes
which provide individuals with additional training. A more
general approach focuses on the structure of the labour market
and aims to resolve difficulties for all parties concerned. The
government also emphasises that the various bodies
responsible for implementing general labour market policy
must take full account of people’s individual circumstances.
The Centres for Work and Income (CWIs) can use such an
‘individualised‘ approach to help young people with little work
experience to secure a placement to boost their chances of
finding a job.
The memorandum on future Dutch labour market policy
endorsed by the Council of Ministers on 23 April 2004 states
that if general and ‘individually focused‘ approaches do not
prove successful, the government will opt for separate measures
targeted at specific groups within society. Under this system,
separate measures may be implemented to tackle specific
difficulties faced by a particular group of individuals on the
labour market measures for specific groups of disadvantaged
individuals such as young people, older people and ethnic
minorities are, for example, a possibility.
Temporary measures may also be required as a stimulus for both
employers,relevant supporting bodies and the target group itself
and to help them overcome barriers towards either offering or
seeking work. Organisations such as Taskforce
Jeugdwerkloosheid (the Youth Unemployment Taskforce) and
the Committee for Participation by Women from Ethnic
Minorities (PaVEM) can help in this regard.
The government believes that separate policies for groups of
disadvantaged individuals should not become the norm since
such an approach can lead to stigmatisation and a fragmented
approach – after all, not all older people are disadvantaged, and
the barriers encountered to the labour market are not always
unique to a single group.
Cabinet abolishes tax-cuts for pre-pension schemes
and introduces new leave provisions 
In July 2004 the Dutch government decided to abolish fiscal
support for early retirement schemes. As a replacement the
government is introducing a Life Course Plan. Workers can
apply for tax cuts to save for unpaid leave, which they can use
during different phases of their career.
It is vital to increase participation in the labour market due to the
Netherlands’increasingly ageing population. This is necessary to
ensure a sustainable social security system. The government has
therefore decided to no longer stimulate early-retirement with
tax-cuts.Instead,they want to increase the possibilities for taking
leave during a worker’s entire career. The main aim is to share the
financial burdens and perks more fairly between generations and
to offer workers more freedom of choice.
The government and its social partners (trade unions and
employers organisations) held lengthy negotiations last year
about a new fiscal system for early retirement and the proposed
Life Course Plan. The parties agreed in autumn 2003 that they
would reach an accord in the spring of this year. At the same
time the social partners agreed to freeze salaries in 2004 and
2005. The parties eventually failed to reach agreement but the
government decided in July to implement reforms in any case.
The new measures are meant to go into effect on 1 January 2006.
The current fiscal provisions will still apply to the early-
retirement rights accrued before that date. A limited transitional
period will also be observed.
On 27 August, the government relaxed the transitional
arrangements for the abolition of tax incentives for early
retirement and an early retirement pension as of 1 January 2006.
Employees who are aged 57 or over on 1 January 2005 will
remain entitled to current tax benefits. The premiums for early
retirement and an early retirement pension, designed to pay
benefits for this group, will remain tax deductible. As from 1
January 2006, tax incentives will no longer be available on
contributions into an early retirement pension for employees
aged under 57 on 1 January 2005 and these individuals will be
required to pay tax on their premiums. Benefits will remain tax-
free. All entitlement to an early retirement pension already
accrued will remain unaltered. In addition, older employees
aged over 50 will be able to save more via the new Life Course
Plan due to come into force on 1 January 2006.
The Life Course Plan makes it possible for workers to save a
maximum of 12% of their annual income tax free. They can use
that balance to finance unpaid leave during their work career.
The provision can also be used to retire early. The maximum
amount a worker can save corresponds with 2.1 years of leave
with 70% of the last gross salary. If a worker goes on a leave-of-
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full balance upon returning to work. To enable older employees
to build up a substantial balance, individuals aged between 50
and 57 may build up their pension more quickly by contributing
up to maximum amount of 150% of their gross annual salary.
Dutch government assists municipalities in improving
the position of ethnic minority women
On 9 June 2004 the Dutch government concluded an
administrative agreement (covenant) with five municipalities to
improve the position of ethnic minority women. The move
concerns the improved integration and social participation of
such women. To this end, the municipalities will be able to make
use of a Participation Toolkit (Toolkit Participatie). They will
also be able to apply for subsidies.
The municipalities concerned are Amsterdam-Noord, Breda,
Groningen, Nijmegen and Zaanstad. The Ministry of Social
Affairs and Employment and the Ministry of Justice will jointly
bear the costs of this project. The project fits within the
emancipation and integration action plan, for which both
ministries share responsibility.
The Participation Toolkit offers municipalities a helping hand in
improving the position of ethnic minority women. The five
municipalities will test the toolkit for half a year. Thereafter,
other municipalities will also be able to make use of it.
To begin with,the toolkit will enable municipalities to determine
which group of ethnic minority women they wish to focus on the
most. By means of a questionnaire, they can synthesise
information which they already have available at the municipal
level according to relevant issues such as work and income,
safety and domestic violence.
The municipalities can subsequently determine which policy
instruments are already available locally, and which have to be
developed. They could, for instance, draw up a local integration
agenda which sets out policy over a four-year period.Within this
framework, they could, among other things, determine which
municipal institutions will receive subsidies and what their
respective duties are.
The toolkit can also help in acquiring insight into the means by
which the municipality can fund the activities. More ethnic
minority women could be helped into work, for instance, using
money from the Fund for Work and Income (FWI) available to
every municipality. With the aid of a ‘policy performance
indicator’ (beleidsprestatiemeter), the municipality can keep
track of results and adjust their policy if and when necessary.
Portugal: Integration of immigrants
Following the Decree-Law No. 251/2002 of 2 November,
whereby the Office of the High Commissioner for Immigration
and Ethnic Minorities (Alto-Comissariado para a Imigração e
Minorias Étnicas) was created as a body directly attached to
the Office of the Prime Minister, two National Support
Centres for Immigrants (Centros Nacionais de Apoio ao
Imigrante – CNAI) were set up in Lisbon and Oporto. These
aimed to provide an integrated response to the problems faced
by immigrants, promoting the latter’s participation and
integration in Portuguese society, particularly as regards
employment and vocational training.
The Joint Order No. 228/2004 of 13 April provides for the
establishment of a Unit for Inclusion in Active Life (Unidade
de Inserção na Vida Activa – UNIVA) in each of the two
above-mentioned CNAIs, given that active employment
policies aim to provide support services for vocational
guidance, the organisation of courses and vocational training
programmes and other activities intended to promote contact
with the labour market. The UNIVAs are responsible for
implementing the following tasks in cooperation with the
Employment and Vocational Training Institute (Instituto do
Emprego e Formação Profissional – IEFP):
• To provide support, information and vocational/career
guidance for immigrants, with the aim of integrating them
in working life and assisting them in identifying training
needs and suitable vocational/professional pathways;
• To help immigrant citizens to find employment, and to offer
ongoing support for their integration in working life;
• To encourage immigrant citizens to follow training
programmes and vocational training courses, and to
promote other forms of contact with the labour market;
• To collect and disseminate information on employment and
vocational training opportunities and to promote contacts
with business companies and other organisations in the world
of work;
• To provide information and support with regard to the
recognition of the vocational/professional qualifications of
immigrants, referring the latter, as appropriate, to the
Recognition of Qualifications Support Bureau (“Gabinete
de Apoio ao Reconhecimento de Habilitações”) or to the
IEFP when the relevant qualifications fall within the
competence of this body.
The above measures have significantly facilitated the inclusion
of immigrant workers in working life.
The Joint Order No. 453/2004 of 27 July, issued by the
Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Social Security and
Labour, provides for the development of training and
education courses. This measure aims to promote academic
achievement and prevent school failure, especially the
phenomenon of young people dropping out of school without
qualifications. The importance of this legislation becomes
apparent if we bear in mind the large number of young people
who currently drop out of school and are in transition to
employment, particularly those who join the labour market
prematurely with an inadequate level of education and/or
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Another recent development has been the extension of
compulsory education to a total of 12 years. As a result, there
is a need to provide additional training opportunities with the
aim of ensuring an ongoing training process, structured in
sequential levels or modules that enable students to resume
education/training for limited periods of time and gradually
acquire higher levels of qualification.
The courses that have now been developed are intended
primarily for young people aged 15 or over who are at risk of
school failure or who have already left education before
completing 12 years of schooling, as well as young people who
having completed 12 years of schooling, do not have a
vocational qualification and wish to gain one in order to enter
the world of work.
These courses, which include social and cultural education
components as well as scientific and technical training, lead to
qualifications at levels 1,2 and 3, providing equivalents to 6, 9
and 12 years of schooling.
The courses will be offered by the network of state schools and
by private and cooperative schools, vocational training schools
and teaching establishments managed directly or jointly by the
IEFP, as well as by other accredited institutions in cooperation
with community entities such as local authorities, companies
or employers’ organisations, other social partners and local or
regional associations.
A follow-up committee, including representatives of the
Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Social Security and
Labour, has been set up to support these measures.50 Spring 2004 |  European Employment Observatory Review
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SOCIAL PROTECTION
AND UNEMPLOYMENT
BENEFIT SYSTEMS
Lithuania: Unemployment insurance
as a means for reducing unemployment 
At the end of 2003 the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania
adopted a new Law on Social Insurance of Unemployment,
which will come into effect on 1 January 2005. The purpose of
this Law is the establishment of a financially stable and reliable
system of unemployment insurance to guarantee sufficient
subsistence income for individuals covered by this type of
insurance when they are deprived of their previous work, or seek
a new job according to the profession they have acquired, or are
acquiring. The reorganised system of unemployment insurance
should strengthen the validity of control over unemployment
benefits and improve motivation of the unemployed for active
job seeking. The new unemployment insurance system was
harmonised with the social insurance system applicable in the
country, as well as with active labour market policy measures
and system of social support. Unemployment is one of the most
serious social problems, therefore unemployment insurance is
one of the means to address this problem, first of all through
partial compensation of lost working income of the
unemployed, as well as providing them with a source of
subsistence until they find a job.
The Law on Social Insurance of Unemployment defines the
categories of individuals insured with compulsory social
insurance of unemployment, eliminating individuals who do not
earn income from labour relations. Compulsory insurance cover
will be provided to individuals who receive remuneration for
work  – work under employment contracts in enterprises,
institutions, organisations, or other organisational structures,
serve in elective office on the basis of membership in elective
bodies, are public servants, state politicians, soldiers, etc.
Entitlement to the unemployment benefit shall be acquired by
the insured enrolled with labour exchange as the unemployed
specified in the previous sentence, as well as those who have not
been offered a job by the labour exchange according to their
occupational skills and health condition,or active labour market
measures. Entitlement to the unemployment benefit shall be
conditional upon fulfilment of certain mandatory requirements.
That is, prior to enrolment with the territorial labour exchange,
the unemployed must have at least 18 months unemployment
insurance period during the period of the last 36 months,
dismissed from work on the initiative of the employer in the
manner established by laws without any fault of the unemployed
due to circumstances that are out of control of the unemployed,
and in case of bankruptcy of the employer. This provision of the
Law shall apply to servicemen who have completed the initial
period of the continuous mandatory military service or
alternative national defence service or who were dismissed from
such services after serving at least half of the established time. In
addition, the right to unemployment benefit shall be enjoyed by
the unemployed who have been granted a leave to take care of a
child aged from 1 to 3 years.
The new Law defines the right to receive the unemployment
social insurance benefit relating it with the implementation of
active labour market policy measures. The Law provides for
increasing the amount of unemployment insurance benefits and
relating them with the previously paid remuneration and for
reducing from 24 to 18 months the requirements for a three-year
mandatory service record in order to become entitled to receive
the unemployment insurance benefit. The new law extends the
duration of payment of the unemployment benefit. For
example, the unemployment benefit shall be paid for a period of
six months, when the service record is up to 25 years, for seven
months in case of a service record of 25-30 years, eight months
for a service record of 30-35 years, and nine months in case of a
service record of 35 years and over. In addition, and in
accordance with the new procedure, the payment of
unemployment benefit is envisaged only to those unemployed
who are going to participate in retraining, public works and
other projects offered by the labour exchange.
The methods for calculating the unemployment benefit have
been essentially modified. The unemployment benefit shall
comprise the fixed and the variable components. The fixed
component shall cover the state-supported income, whereas the
variable component shall be related with the previously insured
income of the unemployed. The variable component of the
benefit shall amount to 40% of the previous remuneration,
calculated during the past three years, however, the total amount
of the unemployment benefit may not exceed 70% of the insured
income.
With a view to encouraging the unemployed to be more active in
job seeking, the unemployment benefit payment conditions have
been amended, establishing that full amount of the
unemployment benefit shall be paid for the first three months,
and for the remaining fixed period of payment of the
unemployment benefit the fixed component of the
unemployment benefit and half of its variable component shall
be paid.
The changeover to the implementation of active labour market
policy measures and to maintaining the Lithuanian Labour
Exchange and the Lithuanian Labour Market Training Service
with the state budget funds is envisaged gradually during the
period of five years (starting from 2005). Unemployment
insurance funds will be used solely for the purpose of payment of
unemployment benefits. The Lithuanian Labour Exchange shall
manage allocation of unemployment benefits and their
payment. According to the estimates upon enactment of this
Law in 2005 the amount necessary for unemployment benefits
will stand at LTL 106,5 million (30.8 million euro).
The Law provides that financing of active labour market policy
measures will be gradually (from 1 January 2005 till 1 January
2010) transferred from the State Social Insurance Fund Budget
to the state budget.Autumn 2004 |  European Employment Observatory Review 51
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FIGHTING THE
IMMEASURABLE?
ADDRESSING THE
PHENOMENON OF
UNDECLARED WORK IN
THE EUROPEAN UNION
Introduction
This overview provides a summary of the national contributions
provided by the SYSDEM experts in the 25 Member States,
accession countries and Norway on the phenomenon of undeclared
work. In addition, it draws on information from the 1998
Commission Communication on Undeclared Work (COM (98) 219
final) and the study by Inregia AB and Regioplan BV completed in
2004 on behalf of the European Commission (Undeclared work in an
enlarged European Union, Piet Renooy, Steffan Ivarsson, Olga van
der Wusten-Gritsai and Emco Meijer,2004,see http://europa.eu.int/
comm/employment_social/employment_analysis/work/undecl_wor
k_final_en.pdf).
The article will look at the various definitions and interpretations
applied to the phenomenon of undeclared work. It will assess the
difficulties in measuring this phenomenon, which is by its very
nature unobserved, and describe the different methods used in an
attempt to quantify it, as well as their respective shortcomings.
Having gained an understanding of these methods, which make it
difficult to provide truly comparative data, existing estimates of the
size of the underground economy will be provided. Based on these
estimates, it is possible to provide an insight into the sectors and
types of activity where undeclared work is most prevalent and the
types of individuals most likely to be engaged in such activities.
The level of political priority given to measures seeking to address
undeclared work in different countries will be assessed and different
preventative and punitive approaches will be described with an
attempt to identify any good practice.
Finally, the article will seek to provide some conclusions on the
importance and impact of the phenomenon in the European Union
and beyond and the measures necessary to address it.
Definitions
A wide array of names have been used in different countries to
describe the phenomenon of the underground economy and
undeclared work, including the informal, hidden, parallel or
shadow economy, moonlighting etc. Despite different terminology,
the 29 national articles show widespread agreement with the
definition provided in the 1998 Commission Communication,which
defines undeclared work as any “productive activities that are lawful
as regards their nature,but are not declared to the public authorities,
taking into account the differences in their regulatory systems
between Member States”. Under this definition, criminal activities
and activities which do not have to be declared are excluded.
Although this definition is widely accepted, there are some national
differences in emphasis and other issues, which are argued should be
taken into consideration, but are not necessarily captured by this
definition (often depending on national political or policy
priorities). In Bulgaria, for example, the underground economy is
often taken to include illegal activity, which is also the prime focus
of public debate in this area.Large national studies in Cyprus on the
underground economy include three categories under this umbrella:
the informal sector (goods and services for own use and tips), the
“underground sector” (unregistered production units and under-
declaration of profits and activities) and the “illegal sector”(private
tutoring, private account medicine, gambling, prostitution and
smuggling etc.).In Greece the definition used in estimates of the size
of the underground sector includes all productive activity (even
unpaid), because of the level of work by family members,
particularly in the agricultural sector. The contribution from the
UK argues that the EU definition fails to capture instances where
activity is declared but employment status is misrepresented (for
example in the case of construction workers reporting themselves as
self-employed, but are always contracted to work for the same
employer – so called “bogus self employment”). The importance of
understanding national contexts and peculiarities is also
emphasised in the case of Germany which currently has 41 defined
professions where an advanced certificate of proficiency
(Meisterbrief) is required in order to practice and train staff. Any
activity carried out without this certificate is therefore considered to
be illegal, which makes up for a significant proportion of
undeclared work in Germany.
Having highlighted some of the national differences,it is nevertheless
possible to list the following activities as the mainstay of the
underground economy and undeclared work in the European Union:
• employers or self employed entrepreneurs who fail to declare all
or part of their activities and or fail to meet the national
requirements for making social insurance contributions. In many
of the new Member States and accession countries one has to
add to this the widespread phenomenon of paying ‘envelope
wages’ (official payment of minimum wages with additional
wages or benefits being paid as cash in hand in order to avoid tax
and social security obligations)
• the under-declaration of income by employees (often second or
multiple job holders)
• people who are officially ‘inactive’ or ‘unemployed’ but are
working while claiming benefits
• immigrants working illegally.
Participation in the underground economy is generally due to a
desire to increase earnings, to avoid taxation and social
contributions or to reduce costs.
The phenomenon of undeclared work has risen to increasing
prominence in recent years as it is seen to undermine the financing
and delivery of social protection and public services. The
curtailment of receipts from taxation and social insurance leads the
State either to cut public services and welfare provisions or to raise
taxes which causes a vicious cycle engendering further ‘incentives’to
seek to avoid taxation through undeclared work.
These concerns led to the inclusion of Guideline 9 in the 2003 multi-
annual Employment Guidelines. This Guideline, aimed at
transforming “undeclared work into regular employment” calls on
Member States to “develop and implement broad actions and
measures to eliminate undeclared work, which combine simplification
of the business environment, removing disincentives and providing
appropriate incentives in the tax and benefit systems, improved law
enforcement and the application of sanctions”. The Guideline also
calls on Member States to reinforce efforts to measure the size of the
underground economy and undeclared work.52 Autumn 2004 |  European Employment Observatory Review
Trends
The prevalence of undeclared work
Undeclared work is a phenomenon common to all Member States
of the European Union as well as the accession countries and
Norway. However, the size of the underground economy and
undeclared work differs significantly from country to country.
As a result of its very nature (not being observed or registered), the
prevalence and size of the undeclared economy is difficult to
estimate with any level of accuracy. The study by Inregia and
Regionplan (2004) distinguishes between indirect and direct forms
of measurement. Indirect measurements, applied in many countries
to provide an estimate of the prevalence of the phenomenon,
include the following:
• Monetary methods,such as the measurement of the ratio between
cash and demand deposits. These methods assume that most
transactions in the underground economy are carried out in cash,
which makes it difficult to distinguish between legal and illegal
activity. OECD experts, in compiling their handbook on
measuring the non-observed economy (OECD (2002) Handbook
for measurement of the non-observed economy), therefore
concluded that this kind of method is of limited use.
• Labour accounts method. This involves the comparison of labour
market data (i.e. gathered through the Labour Force Survey)
with data on labour market participation gathered from other
sources (i.e. from household surveys).
• Econometric modelling. Such models use certain indicators of an
undeclared part of the economy and a set of supposed
determinants and gather indications of its size through
modelling.
• Electricity consumption. These estimations compare the amount
of energy required in declared activities and compare them with
measurements of actual consumption. This method assumes and
most undeclared labour is energy intensive and these findings are
generally not perceived to provide a very accurate picture of the
size of the underground economy.
Direct measurements, which the Commission study argues are
preferred, are based on survey evidence. However, there are a
number of difficulties with such methods:
• Few such surveys have been carried out and time series are
generally not available
• Limited comparability
• Veracity of findings depend on quality of questionnaire and skill
of interviewers
• Potential of under-reporting due to disinclination to report
underground activity.
Bearing in mind these difficulties and the different methods applied
in different countries, it is clearly unwise to make any direct
comparisons. The table below gives an indication of the wide range
of results regarding the level of undeclared work per country
reached by using different methods by providing figures quoted in
the study by Renooy et al (2004) and the articles by the SYSDEM
correspondents1. When comparing the two it becomes clear that the
estimates provided by Renooy et al tend to be at the lower end of the
spectrum. In particular, studies utilising primarily monetary
methods generally yield significantly higher estimations of the size
of the underground economy.
When looking at the above table it is clear why most researchers
analysing the causes behind the prevalence of the underground
economy continue to distinguish between the EU15 and the new
Member States and candidate countries. While the incidence of
undeclared work as a percentage of GDP is generally below 6%
(with the exception of Greece, Spain and Italy) in the EU15, in the
new EU10 it is generally estimated to be between 10-20%. The
candidate countries show even higher percentages, generally
estimated between 20-30%.
Evidence suggests that the level of undeclared work is linked to the
a country’s economic and socio-political context. For example,
many of the new Member States are still in the process of
economic restructuring following their transition to market
economies. The evidence clearly shows that in countries where this
process has been linear and is advanced, the level of undeclared
activity is beginning to decline. In countries where this
development is at an earlier stage and the economy has faltered
such as Romania or Bulgaria, it is proving difficult to bring
emerging businesses and individuals out of the underground
economy as they lack the confidence in market trends to declare
their activities.
Of similar importance is the level of socio-political development,
for example in relation to the development of social insurance and
social benefit systems. In countries where these systems are
underdeveloped or there is little or no link between the individual
contributions and the level of benefits paid out, there is seen to be
little incentive to make the move to declared activity.
The attitude of governments and the importance attached to
combating underground activity is clearly also of significance, as
this is linked to the measures instituted to achieve this goal and the
level of resources allocated. A number of the SYSDEM articles
argue that in countries at a less advanced – or more precarious –
state in their economic development, governments may even be
turning a blind eye to such activities in the knowledge that
many individuals would not be able to survive economically
without engaging in such undeclared activity (i.e. Turkey or
Romania).
The study by Renooy et al (2004) argues that there are no general,
universal causes for the existence and development of the
underground economy. Instead, they argue that this is “brought
about by a complex interplay between various variables that varies
between countries”. Among the key reasons identified in this study
as well as in the contributions of the SYSDEM experts are:
• Perceived high tax burdens on businesses and labour
• Bureaucratic provisions surrounding the establishment of small
businesses
• Perceived labour market rigidities and the general organisation
of the labour market
• Lack of trust in and the quality of government and public
services (‘value for money’)
• Lack of a perceived threat of detection
• Cultural factors
Existing studies also provide an insight into the sectors and types of
activity where undeclared work is most prevalent.They can also give
some understanding of the individuals most likely to be engaged in
the underground economy.
On the whole, one of the sectors most affected is construction,
partly as a result of the use of illegal labour, the misdeclaration of
employment status and the complex nature of employment
relationships on sub-contracted arrangements prevalent in the
building industry. A high prevalence of undeclared work can also be
found in agriculture, the hotel and catering sector and in personal
and domestic services.Autumn 2004 |  European Employment Observatory Review 53
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Table 1: Undeclared work: estimated sizes according to different measurement methods and sources (% GDP)
Country  Estimated size (% of GDP)  Year  Sources/measurement methods
EU15
Austria 1.5% 1995 Statistics Austria, national accounts, ESA95, Combining data 
11% 2004 Monetary method, Schneider (2004)3
Belgium 3.4%  1995-99 National Bank of Belgium, national accounts, ESA; Combining and comparison 
of data sources1
21.5% 2003 Monetary method, Schneider3
Denmark 5.5%  2001 Rockwool Foundation, study No 10, questionnaire survey1
Finland 4.2% 1992 Finnish Ministry of Finance; Combining and comparison of data sources1
France 4-6.5% 1998 Rockwool Foundation, study No 5, questionnaire survey; statistical corrections,
4% of GDP , INSEE 19991
14.7% 1999 Monetary method, ACOSS3
Germany 6% 2001 Rockwool Foundation, study no 10, questionnaire survey1
16.8% 2000-03 Monetary method, Schneider (2004) 3
Greece 28.6% 2000 Monetary  method, Schneider  (2002)  3
Ireland 8% 2002 Monetary method, Dillon (2004)2
Italy 16-17% 1998/2001 ISTAT, Combining and comparing various statistical sources using indirect
estimation1
Luxembourg No data
The Netherlands 2% 1995 CBS, national accounts, Combining and comparison of data sources1
Portugal 5%  1996 Statistics Portugal, national accounts, Combining and comparison of data
sources1
22.5% 2001-02 Monetary method, Schneider (2002) 3
Spain 15-20% 1985 Spanish  government  estimate2
Sweden 3% 1997 Rockwool Foundation, study no 10, questionnaire survey1
United Kingdom 2% 2000 Rockwool Foundation, study no 10, questionnaire survey1
12.3% 2002-03 Monetary method, Schneider and Klinglmair, 20043
New Member States
Czech Republic 9-10% 1998 Renooy et al (2004)
Cyprus 4.2% 2003 Renooy et al (2004)
21% 1989-90 Monetary method, Schneider (2000) 3
Estonia 8-9% 2001 Renooy et al (2004)
Hungary 18% 1998 Renooy et al (2004)
15-20% 2000 Lackó3
Latvia 18% 2000 Renooy et al (2004)
Lithuania 15-19% 2003 Renooy et al (2004)
Malta 25% 1989 Briguglio (1989) 3
Poland 14% 2003 Renooy et al (2004)
26.3% 2003 Schneider (2004) 3
Slovakia 13-15% 2000 Renooy et al (2004)
16.3% 1998-99 Schneider (2002) 3
Slovenia 17% 2003 Renooy et al (2004)
Candidate Countries
Bulgaria 22-30% 2002/3 Renooy et al (2004) 
30.4% 1998-99 Monetary method, Schneider (2003) 3
Romania 21% 2000 Renooy et al (2004)
30% 2004 Direct observation and econometric modelling, Labour Research Institute (2004) 3
Turkey 18-30% 2003 Econometric modelling, Cetintas and Vergil3
Norway 13% 2002 Goldstein et al, survey method3
1 Where no second source is provided, Renooy at al and the SYSDEM experts have quoted the same source, in most cases, the SYSDEM articles quote a variety of
sources of data.
2 Data and sources as quoted in the report to the Commission by Renooy et al (2004)
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The types of individuals engaging in such work vary from country
to country, depending on the parameters for undeclared work and
the sectors most prevalent, but most significant in this category are
illegal immigrants, skilled workers (with second, undeclared jobs),
students and women providing personal and domestic services.
Measures aimed at combating undeclared work
Following the introduction of Guideline 9 in 2003, all Member
States have set out their policies to address the problem on
undeclared work in their National Action Plans for Employment
(NAPs). The majority of countries place strong emphasis on
measures aimed at simplifying rules and regulations to reduce the
administrative burden on employers (and new businesses and SMEs
in particular). A similar number also focus on increasing incentives
to work by seeking to improve the fit between tax and benefit
systems.Slightly fewer countries have instituted measures to address
labour market rigidities. Indeed in some new Member States
measures have been introduced to increase labour market
regulation, for example by making it compulsory to register the
conclusion of employment contracts and their severance. Most
countries have also sought to tighten controls by setting up new and
sometimes transnational enforcement bodies, strengthening old
ones or increasing penalties.
Relatively few countries have sought to use new measures to increase
formalisation in certain sectors particularly prone to undeclared
work, such as domestic services.
The focus of measures introduced to combat undeclared work
depends partly on the level of socio-economic development achieve
in the respective countries, but is also linked to the political
interpretation of the key causes underlying the phenomenon and
the societal manifestations of the problem. As a result, countries
such as Turkey, Romania or Bulgaria continue to focus their efforts
on seeking to boost economic development and attracting foreign
direct investment as a way of fighting the underground economy,
while others such as the Netherlands, Ireland, the UK and Austria
place most emphasis on stronger enforcement and sanctions.
The table below provides an overview of some of the key measures
taken in different Members States aimed at combating the problem
of undeclared work.
Good practice
One of the objectives of the European Commission study on
undeclared work was to highlight any good practice in the fight
against undeclared work, which could provide lessons for other
countries. Renooy et al (2004) highlights the following measures as
good practice in the fight against undeclared work (most of which
are also mentioned in the table above):
• Service Vouchers in Belgium
• Visible and predictable control mechanisms and information
campaigns in Sweden
• Cheque Emploi Service in France
• Mini jobs in Germany
• Committee for the Emergence of the Underground Economy in
Italy
While these are interesting examples, it is fair to say that on the
evidence presented in the national contributions by the SYSDEM
experts that such isolated measures can only be seen as good
practice within a wider co-ordinated policy framework aimed at
combating undeclared work which spans the whole gambit of policy
initiatives outlined above. With respect to the evaluation of the
measures highlighted by Renooy et at the French Cheque Emploi
Service has generally been considered as a success with 900,000
users since the creation of the scheme in 1996. An evaluation of the
Belgian Service Voucher Scheme by DeSutter (2000)3 edicated that
almost half of the jobs created through Local Employment
Agencies and Service Vouchers were previously clandestine. An
interim evaluation of the German system of Mini-jobs (carried out
by Schupp and Birkner in 2004) indicates that part of the increase in
mini-jobs can be attributed to the replacement of previously existing
employment. In addition, there has only been a minimal increase in
mini-jobs in household employment (Weinkopf, 2004)3.
On the whole it must be emphasised that, with the exception of
increased surveillance activities, many of the measures outlined in
Table 2 above have been insufficiently evaluated with regard to their
impact on the level of undeclared work.
Conclusions
In order to address the phenomenon of undeclared work
adequately, its size and causation must first be better understood.
Recent reports have gone some way towards achieving this, but the
significant divergence between estimates of its size generated by
different methods of calculation indicate that difficulties remain in
the proper understanding of the prevalence of the phenomenon in
the enlarged EU.
On a positive note, the data presented in the SYSDEM reports
available data appears to indicate that in the majority of countries,
there has,over recent years,been a downward trend in the size of the
underground economy. However, the phenomenon remains
sufficiently sizeable to be of concern, particularly in Southern
Europe and the new Member States and candidate countries.
While the scale of undeclared work is a concern, the causal factors
leading to such practices need to be better understood. The articles
from the SYSDEM experts give the impression that in some
countries, the measures prioritised by governments to address the
problem do not adequately address these aspects or sometimes
provide mixed messages.
What is clear from the evidence provided from the new Member
States and candidate countries is that among the key factors behind
the fight against undeclared work are the development of stable
economic growth, the introduction of a welfare systems providing
clear links between contributions and benefits, trust and confidence
in government and government institutions and a proper balance
between flexibility and security in labour market regulation. It is
upon such foundations that measures for the fine tuning of
incentives to work and the implementation of sanctions must be
built.
More research must be carried out to generate a better
understanding of the impact of different types of measures on the
level undeclared employment in order to address this phenomenon
effectively.
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Reduction of administrative burdens on businesses/private individuals  
Belgium  Crossroads Bank for Enterprises (KBO) and business one-stop-shops
To simplify the administrative obligations imposed upon self-employed workers, the KBO and business one-stop-shops have been
established. KBO attributes a unique identification number to every enterprise and every entrepreneur, and records the necessary
identification data. This unique number provides a link to all institutions thus simplifying administrative procedures. The shops enlist
new companies with KBO, fulfil all the necessary formalities and check other paperwork.
Bulgaria  The package of services offered by Labour Offices to people who are willing to start their own businesses has been extended. Free
advice, market research data, facilitation of the access to grants and training are offered. The mediating role of business incubators is
also intensified.
Estonia  Enterprise Estonia
To simplify the creation of businesses a governmental agency named Enterprise Estonia was founded in 2000 by the Ministry of
Economic Affairs. It is one of the largest institutions within the national support system of entrepreneurship in Estonia. Together with
17 business advisory centres and a one-stop internet site they form a business support network that provides information on the
start-up of enterprises, including consultation, strategic analyses and assistance in contacting foreign investors. It also provides start-
up grants to small-an-medium size enterprises to encourage formal economic activities.
E-Tax Board
To reduce the administrative costs of taxes, in 2000 the Estonian Tax Board introduced the e-Tax Board that enables tax-payers (both
enterprises and individuals) to fill-in and file tax returns and to receive information on their tax liabilities and account balances on-line.
Take up of this has been high.
France  Establishment of Centres for Business Formalities
A one-stop-shop for start-up companies.
Germany  Law promoting ownership of small businesses and improving business financing
This law entered into force in 2003 and is aimed at reducing the red tape for new business start-ups.
Greece  Guarantee Fund Facility Scheme for Small Enterprises (TEMPME)
This institution, set up in 2002, covers one half of the guarantees small enterprises need in order to get bank loans.
Italy  Prestito d’onore (cheap credit)
This measure allowed for the creation of numerous small firms through a simplification of the procedures for setting up a new
company and for obtaining financing.
Lithuania  Lithuania developed multiple policies to support the creation of small to medium businesses. For example, small enterprises (not
more than 10 employees) have the opportunity to apply at a lower rate of profit tax when their taxable income does not exceed €144
800, taxable profit is levied at a 13% instead of 15%.
Slovak Republic  Act on Business Register (2003) & Act on Trade Register (1991)
These Acts, which came into force in 2004 significantly simplify and speed up the process of new business registration, entering
changes and deleting records in the registrations. Insufficiently defined rules in the past led to intentional obstructions and gave rise to
widespread corruption.
United Kingdom  “Starting up a business” campaign
Includes a streamlined procedure for registering with the Inland Revenue, and improved guidance for new businesses on tax,
National Insurance Contributions (NICs) and VAT, a guidance video, direct support from IR Business Support teams and a helpline.
International co-operation  
Bulgaria  Bulgaria signed agreements for official employment with the governments of Germany, Czech republic, Portugal and Spain. All these
agreements aim to reduce undeclared work of Bulgarians abroad.
France  Because of the development of trans-national fraud, the French authorities has increasingly been focused on developing European
co-operation and on bilateral agreements signed with Germany (May 2001), Italy, Spain (2002) and Belgium (2003). More recently,
contacts have been made with Poland, Czech republic and Slovak Republic.
Netherlands  The UWV (Social Insurance Agency) has an export team that investigates disability benefit claimants living abroad.
The Dutch municipalities have an agreement with Morocco that allows them to investigate Social Insurance and Welfare recipients
living in Morocco .
Increased incentives to work in the formal economy  
Cyprus  The tax brackets for individuals have been altered in recent years. The 2004 changes in the tax rate have reduced the marginal tax
rate, reducing the incentive to under-report declared work.
Norway  Tax reform 2004
Table 2: Measures taken aimed at combating undeclared work
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Presented by the government in March 2004 aims to reduce marginal tax rates on labour incomes.The reform has passed Parliament
in Jun. Reduced marginal tax rates will decrease the profitability of not declaring extra work.
Slovak Republic  Act on Social Insurance (2003)
Established greater link between contributions and pensions, thus encouraging work in the formal economy.
Slovak Republic  New Income Tax Act
Abolished progressive taxation of individuals, removed tax bands ranging from 10 to 38% and decreased the corporate tax rate of
25%.
Spain  Reduction of income tax (1999 and 2000)
Reduction of the tax burden increased incentives to work in the formal economy.
Sweden  1998 Pension system reform
This reform reinforced the relationship between declared work and pension payments. In the new system all declared income
throughout a person’s working life impacts on the pension paid upon retirement. In the previous system this was only the case for the
best 15 years of income. This system makes it more costly for an individual to operate outside the system.
United Kingdom  Working Tax Credits & Child Tax Credit
Special tax credit for low-income people who meet certain requirements and file a tax return
Introduction (and extension) of linking rules
Which enables claimants starting work to return to their same benefit rates and terms automatically if the jobs fails within a certain
period.
Run-ons
For example the Job Grant (an automatic payment to jobseekers aged 25+, covering the transition period between leaving benefit and
starting work) or an extension of housing benefit for those moving into work.
Subsidies and tax reductions (particularly for sectors with high level of undeclared work)  
Bulgaria  From social benefits to employment programme
Started in 2003 for a period of 3 years. It provided employment to 117 000 working age people who previously received benefits. The
programme provides funds that cover the minimal remuneration and insurance, thus removing the incentives for undeclared work
without labour contracts.
Companies investing in high unemployment areas are entitled to a tax exemption. This measure will stimulate higher investors’
interest in these areas.
Belgium  Local Employment Agencies and Service Vouchers
Were first established in 1987 and functioned as agencies that drew together the supply of labour of long-term unemployed and the
demand for household services, policing tasks and seasonal work in the agricultural sector. A worker was allowed to keep earnings as
extra cash alongside the allowance. Service vouchers were introduced as a follow-up to the local employment agencies. The net price
of a voucher equals the market price for an hour undeclared work. The remainder is subsidised. Hitherto, the Belgian Government
has certified 652 firms that function as middlemen between workers and households. These companies first hire someone with small
and flexible contracts, but are obliged to offer a hiring contract of unlimited duration for a least a half-time job after a number of
months.
Denmark  Home-service scheme
Was already introduced in 1994 and implies a wage subsidy that is being paid to households that buy household services (cleaning,
gardening, etc.) from private firms. The subsidy was about 50% of total costs. The purpose was to stimulate both the demand for
(unskilled) labour and to reduce the amount of undeclared paid household work.
The scheme has been gradually tightened in recent years. The subsidy has been lowered and the range of eligible services has been
reduced to cover mainly cleaning services. From 2004, the type of household entitled to use the scheme has also been restricted to
old-age pensioners and persons receiving disability pensions. The reasons behind these changes are the significant lowering of
overall unemployment since the mid-1990s and the fact that the scheme has mostly been used by high-income families. In addition,
there was the impression that the scheme had only minor effects on the size of the black economy as a whole.
Finland  In 2003, the tax deduction for household service work was increased to 1,100 eruo per year (from 900 euro in 2002). This deduction
can be made for household work, care work, and repairs and renovations on a home or leisure dwelling. A household can deduct
either the social security contributions on the household worker’s pay or 40% of the wages paid if services are bought from a
company.
France  Service employment cheque scheme
The establishment of this cheque made it easier for private individuals to hire staff for domestic chores (housework, childcare, and
gardening) by reducing the administrative burden.
Reduction of VAT rate (2000-2005)
This experiment has been set up on the basis of a proposition of the European Commission. It is applied in the building sector
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(renovation and repair work relating to private residences completed more than 2 years ago) and personal services (including
cleaning and personal care). A debate is going on whether reduced VAT rates should also be applied to the hotel and catering sector.
Germany  Mini-jobs
On 1 April 2003, the rules on marginal part-time employment were amended to increase the incentives for both employers and
employees by reducing fiscal charges and by making activities in the home tax-deductible.
Ich AG (my business)
A monthly subsidy is granted to an unemployed person to set up a business. If the attempt to set up a business fails, the person
concerned is entitled to unemployment benefit. This can be claimed again before the end of the 3-year subsidised period.
Netherlands  Arrangement of Cleaning  Services for Private Persons
Cleaning companies can hire unemployed people who are interested in cleaning work for private households. This company pays
their salary, and receives a subsidy from the government. Originally this arrangement only focused on long-term unemployed, but has
become less rigid now by focusing also on unemployed for a minimum of 6 months (instead of 1 year).
Sweden  ROT tax deduction proposal
The tax deduction applies to those who build or repair their dwelling between 15 April 2004 and 30 June 2005.30% of the labour costs
are tax deductable.
Increased regulation of the labour market  
Bulgaria  The introduction of the requirement for the registration of all labour contracts upon their termination or modification at the National
Insurance Institute.
Bulgaria The  introduction of limitations for the access to health services for people who have not been paying their social insurance
contributions, are expected to further enhance the registration of the activity of the self-insured.
Czech Republic The Czech Ministry of Finance initiated several measures in 1995. An example is the obligation for even petty traders to use cash-
registers to reduce their unrecorded incomes.
Germany  Law (2002)
In the construction sector, the main contractor was made liable for the social security contributions of sub-contractors directly
contracted by him. In addition, restrictions have been placed on advertising of clandestine employment. Not only telecommunications
service providers (as before), but also newspaper, must pass on customer’s names to the authorities.
Romania  A new labour code was introduced in 2003. Fixed-term and part-time contracts have been properly recognised and regulated, and the
concept of temporary work has also been recognized.
United Kingdom  Regulation on registration with the Inland revenue
From January 2001 anyone becoming self-employed/ eligible to pay Class 2 National Insurance Contributions is required to register
with the IR within 3 months (reduced from 6).
Addressing labour market rigidities  
Belgium  Social security contributions and taxes are being lowered. Seasonal and occasional employment has been administratively simplified
and made flexible in the catering, horticultural and agricultural sectors.
Germany  Reform of the Crafts Trades Code
Making it easier for new craft businesses to be set up and reducing undeclared work in “simple” occupations through the employment
of persons with no master craftsman’s qualification in admissible trades.
Romania  The Romanian government reduced employer’s social security contributions by three percentage points in 2004 against 2003 levels
after a first reduction of contributions in 2003. The tax burden on labour is consequently now eight percentage points lower than its
2002 level.
Slovak Republic  Amended Labour Code (2001)
Has improved the flexibility of employment relations, mainly through giving both parties the right to more flexibly conclude and
terminate an employment relationship and by deregulating working time. The law also abolished a special type of temporary work
contract (work activity agreement) which was suspected of being abused for undeclared activities.
Spain  The legislation on governing temporary employment agencies (1994)
Put an end to the monopoly of the Spanish Employment Institute as a mediator in the labour market between employers and workers.
Tightening up sanctions  
Germany  Law (2002)
Maximum penalty for illegal employment of aliens, regarded as particularly harmful for society, was increased from 250000 eruo to
500000 euro.
United Kingdom  A statutory offence of knowingly failing to meet basic tax obligations
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This has been set up under Section 144 of the Finance Act 2000 to ease the prosecution of tax offenders by allowing cases to be tried
in a magistrate’s court.
Two strikes scheme
The Social Security Act (2001) introduced this new scheme with effect from April 2002. Benefits can be removed for 13 weeks from
those caught fraudulently claiming benefits twice within 3-year period.
Increased surveillance  
Austria  Anti-black economy action day
This was held on 22 June 2004 as part of which an army of inspection teams was deployed across the whole of Austria involving a
total of 875 officials from the tax authority, the KIAB and the tax investigation office.
France  The number of workplace inspections has increased by a factor of 3.3 in 10 years.
United Kingdom  Social Security Fraud Act (2001)
Provides government officials with new powers to investigate and punish benefit fraud. Officials can use information from private
organisation, including banks, insurance companies and utility companies, when they have reasonable grounds to do so.
Improvement of fraud detection system  
Belgium  Crossroads Bank for Social Security (KSZ)
Was established in 1991 in combination with a social identity card (SIS) which was handed out to every Belgian citizen in 1999. It
enables inspection agencies to check immediately and easy whether a person combines a social security benefit with a normal
salary.
Estonia  Information letters
In 2004, the Estonian Tax board chose the strategy of sending information letters to enterprises that had formal labour costs
remarkably lower that the average of similar enterprises in the same field and asking them to check their data on taxes and make
appropriate corrections. Otherwise there would be an audit by the Board. The three sectors receiving most of the letters were
construction, hotels and catering, and car sales and repair.
Netherlands  Training of personnel to detect fraud
The UWV (Agency responsible for social insurance) trained its personnel to make them more aware of suspicious practises. To make
check ups for fraud more efficient, the UWV developed a risk model for unemployment benefit recipients and disability recipients.
These models feature a number of criteria that generate an expected higher propensity to commit fraud. Based on these criteria, a
search is done in UWV’s client database.
Slovak Republic  Work identification card
This ID will be issued by the Social Insurance Agency to every employed and registered unemployed by end of 2006. The card will
contain precise data on employment, payment of social security contributions, whether the person is registered as unemployed
and/or receiving social assistance. People will be obliged upon request to present the card to inspectors.
United Kingdom  More Frequent Attendance Regime (MFA)
Because the JSA required claimants to interact frequently with officials through a regular timetable of appointments, it was easy for
fraudsters to arrange undeclared work lives around them. Consequently, in 2001, the More Frequent Attendance Regime (MFA) was
introduced, requiring those suspected of fraud to attend extra advisory meetings arranged at unpredictable times, to disrupt any
routine undeclared working activity.
New or stronger enforcement bodies  
Austria  Auditing bodies
The Audit Office for the Illegal Employment of Foreign Nationals (KIAB) has been operating within the Federal Ministry of Finances
since 1 July 2002 and is part of the customs administration. On the basis of the Austrian Employment of Foreign Nationals Law
(AusIBG) and the 2003 Budget Implementation Law (BBG) just under 200 agencies have been set up to carry out inspections in
businesses and on building sites. Particular focus is put on firms operating in the building trade, restaurant and hotel trade and the
haulage business.
Belgium  Federal board for the fight against illegal work and social fraud
A federal board for the fight against illegal work and social fraud has been set up. It focuses on promoting the exchange of information
between government services, provide policy recommendations, etc.
Bulgaria  Bulgaria is still in its pilot stage to set up an institution responsible for the collection of taxes and social insurance: the NTICA (the
project is partially financed through a lone from the World Bank). It is planned that the NTICA will start operating in January 2005.
Estonia In  2001, the Tax Board, the Labour Inspectorate, the Labour Market Board, and the Police Board reached an agreement to start
exchanging information on tax frauds, violations of labour laws, and to organise joint operations to pursue the offenders.
Tax Board Investigation Centre
In December 2000 the Parliament amended the Code of Criminal Procedure and Surveillance Act to grant the Tax board the rights of
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pre-trial investigation and surveillance. As a result, in 2001 the Tax Board Investigation Centre was established. Previously, the
investigation of tax frauds was divided between two different authorities (Tax Board and Police Board), but the co-operation did no
yield satisfactory results.
Lithuania  Co-ordination group
In 2002 this central co-ordination group was set up for the analysis of origination and control of illegal work within the State Labour
Inspectorate.
Netherlands  In the Netherlands, municipalities are responsible for the execution of the welfare benefit schemes. Large municipalities have their
own fraud detection teams and smaller municipalities generally arrange joint detection teams with other municipalities.
Slovak Republic  Act on illicit work and illicit employment
This Act will nominate the labour inspectorates as the competent authority to carry out surveillance over illicit work and illicit
employment. The most important changes in these laws concern improvements in the mutual co-operation of competent bodies in
combating illicit work, the setting of penalties for illicit work and the introduction of work identification cards.
United Kingdom  Joint Shadow Economy Teams (JoSETs)
In 2001, 20 JoSETs were established with staff from several branches of government, including HM Customs and Excise, Inland
Revenue, Jobcentre Plus and Department of Work and Pensions officers, to tackle colluding employers involved in complex fraud and
tax evasion cases.
Operation Gangmaster
Tackles fraud in the agricultural sector.
Tax amnesties  
Cyprus  There is the intention,within the current budget deficit reduction measures,to declare a tax amnesty so that individuals involved would
be able to buy their way into legality. This is expected to generate additional revenue of 95.5 million euro between 2004-07.
Ireland  In 1988 the Irish government introduced a tax amnesty. It brought in 635 million euro in back taxes where only 40 million euro had
been expected. Some years later, in 1993, the Irish Government announced another tax amnesty to try and bring those who were still
not paying enough into the tax net.
United Kingdom  In April 2003, the UK government announced a 6-month amnesty fro VAT registrations. Businesses were able to register without the
normal late penalties (of 15%) until September, after which the government planned a strong crackdown.
Awareness raising campaigns  
Belgium  Undeclared work, a steep bill
This slogan was spread in 2001 in an information campaign via handouts, advertisements in newspapers and on radio stations.
Denmark  The Danish tax authorities have launched information campaigns which, among other things, inform pupils in school about the tax
system and the problems and risks related to undeclared work.
Estonia  In Spring 2004,the Estonian Tax board launched an information campaign informing workers in the underground economy of the lack
of protection they receive.
Germany  Legal, illegal, nicht egal
Posters and newspaper advertisements in 2002 and extensive information on the internet.
Lithuania  Large scale media announcements
Large regional publications (about 70 announcements)  were focused on informing people about a relevant help-line, and identifying
the damage caused by illegal work and consequent liability. Some units of the SLI (State Labour Inspectorate) published information on
court actions issued against employers and penalties imposed by courts.
Slovak Republic  The National Labour Inspectorate recently issued an informative brochure which aims to draw the attention of employers and
employees to the negative consequences of undeclared work.
Sweden  2000 Campaign
Joint campaign by the tax authorities and the recently founded Economic Crime Authority (Ekobrottsmyndigheten) with the
involvement of trade unions and branch organisations are involved. The focus was mainly put on the construction sector. In 2004, the
tax authorities declared particular focus would be placed on restaurants, taxis, cleaning firms, hairdressers and haulage companies.
As young people are generally more tolerant to undeclared work, the Swedish authorities have targeted them through both
information campaigns and tax control. Examples are an Internet Café at Sweden’s’ largest rock festival (Hulstved), cinema
advertisements on the useful social purposes for which tax income is utilised.
United Kingdom  Stop or shop
Included advertisements encouraging people to stop or shop. These prominent advertisements were accompanied by a benefit fraud
hotline, and a dedicated website.
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Introduction
In Belgium the definition of undeclared work used by the European
Commission is generally accepted. “Undeclared work means any
paid activities that are lawful as regards their nature but not
declared to the public authorities,bearing in mind that differences in
the regulatory system of Member States must be taken into
account” (Commission, 1998). Criminal activities (e.g. trading
drugs, stolen goods and gambling) are not considered part of
undeclared work in Belgium.
However, a further distinction is hardly ever made. The fact that
some authors distinguish productive but unpaid activities (e.g.
performed by women) in their definition reflects the fine-tuning that
is achievable (Renooy, 2004; OECD, 2002). This sophisticated level
has never been reached in Belgium. There are as many definitions as
there are authors. A number of recent seminal studies by Pacolet
(1995, 2001, 2003) deal with the conceptual issue at length. Also, the
National Accounts have authentically elaborated on definitions and
estimations of undeclared work in an attempt to compose
exhaustive accounts of the Belgian economy. Both cases integrate
undeclared work in the framework of “social fraud”or the “shadow
economy”. Notwithstanding its importance, this technical
discussion has received very little attention in the public debate.This
also appeared to be the case with the broadly-based discussion that
preceded the endorsement of the Government’s strategy for
preventing/fighting undeclared work. The Verhofstadt Cabinet
approved a new strategy paper at its Gembloux meeting of January
2004 (hereafter called the “Gembloux Paper”), which outlines the
new approach but does not provide a proper definition of
undeclared work.
The public debate in Belgium has concentrated on the forms and
malignant consequences of undeclared work.
Regarding the forms of undeclared work,the debate concentrates on
illegal residents who are not allowed to work, but forced to work by
human traders. Individuals who receive some type of allowance
(unemployment benefit, for example) and who participate in the
unofficial labour market are also targeted. The phantom self-
employed face a lot of criticisms too – mainly from politicians. But
the shadow labour market can assume many more shapes.
Individuals taking a second but unreported job (“after normal
hours”) do not feature in the public debate, and yet, according to
some scholars, this type of informal work is responsible for the
majority of undeclared work.
As to the consequences  of undeclared work for the economy,
especially over the last couple of years, public opinion has strongly
criticised undeclared work because it further affects the already
weakening financial base of the welfare state. Undeclared workers
are not contributing to the social security system and might, on top
of that, frequently be receiving benefits. Undeclared work also
weakens the bargaining conditions on the labour market as
undeclared workers forego their (social security) rights.
Additionally, it is often mentioned that illicit workers cause security
problems because they ignore safety regulations. Undeclared work
weakens the unions, puts heavy pressure on productivity and will
eventually entail wage cuts. Public opinion also agrees that
undeclared work allows businesses with low productivity to
continue competing by not declaring profits. In debates it is often
mentioned that undeclared work endangers enterprises that do play
by the rules,and,more importantly,that it forces the Government to
impose higher taxes.
In the public debate, undeclared work is in most cases considered to
be part of a larger problem of fraud and corruption, and not seen as
an isolated issue. There seems to be a consensus though that a
preventive as well as a repressive policy should be implemented. In a
report on the future of Belgium’s economic welfare, McKinsey
(2004) voices the opinion of many Belgians and demands a zero
tolerance policy. A stronger control of undeclared work and a zero
tolerance policy can, in their opinion, be achieved by less red tape
and taxes, more control on the shop floor, but also by a better
integration of existing administrative databases.
Prevalence of undeclared work in Belgium
Measuring the immeasurable?
Given its very nature, undeclared work is difficult to quantify. For
obvious reasons, individuals engaged in clandestine employment do
not wish to be identified. The incidence of undeclared work can
therefore only be estimated.Information on the size and structure of
informal work collected through reliable methods is sparse – in
Belgium, as elsewhere.
Some government inspection agencies sporadically publish figures
regarding the number of controls and irregularities. Apparently,
most agencies do not consider it their task to study and assemble
statistics on undeclared work (Pacolet, 2003). For example, the
“Inspection Social Laws”ascertained violations of the Undeclared
Work Bill in about 40% of the companies it inspected. This figure
groups all the irregularities and should not be regarded as an
estimate of undeclared work in Belgium (Pirenne, 2003). Pacolet
(2001) gathered data from all labour inspection agencies and
concluded that social contribution fraud amounted to 6% of
contributions in the 1990s.
The shadow economy can be measured directly or indirectly
(Schneider, 2004; Kazemier, 2003). Direct methods are generally
preferred by experts (OECD, 2002) and consist of sample surveys or
fiscal auditing. Neither has yet been used in Belgium (with the
notable but dated exception of Ginsburgh, 1987). The problem with
surveys is the fear of getting incorrect answers – although Renooy
(2004) claims that this can be remedied by special statistical and
interviewing techniques. In the case of fiscal auditing, critics argue
that tax payers selected for tax audits are not randomly chosen but
are picked according to the likelihood of fraud.
The shadow economy has also been estimated indirectly by means
of monetary transactions, electricity consumption and labour
accounts1. The resulting approximations fluctuate depending on the
definition used by the author. Recently, the National Accounts and
monetary macro- economic models have been applied most
frequently.
In the Belgian National Accounts,added value is calculated for each
branch of industry as the difference between output and
Belgium
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intermediary consumption. The data originate from annual
accounts, VAT statistics or fiscal data. Some aggregates are,
however, adjusted in view of conceptual differences between the
sources.One of these adjustments deals with undeclared work.Each
branch turnover is supplemented with an estimated percentage.
Output and intermediary consumption are then estimated for each
branch of industry for every product registered in the Supply and
Use Tables (INR, 1998; Pacolet, 2003). First estimated in 1997, this
resulted in an estimate for undeclared work of 3% to 4% of GDP. In
2002, the correction for undeclared work amounted to 9,283 million
euro or 3.6%.
This method obviously has advantages as well as disadvantages
(Blades, 2002), but has been well received by institutions such as the
OECD (2002). Although its strength lies in the fact that it results
from the combination of a large number of sources, it should not be
forgotten that the System of National Accounts has not been
conceived for the purpose of estimating the shadow economy. For
instance, the estimate excludes undeclared work in agriculture and
for domestic personnel because the data for the agricultural sector
delivered to the national accountants already include adjustments
for undeclared work. In the case of households with employees, an
average hourly wage is applied to an estimate of the number of
hours worked – which implies an adjustment for undeclared work
(INR, 1998). Although the national accountants strongly stress the
rudimentary character of this estimate, it is quoted widely as the
official Belgian estimate. The recent report on undeclared work to
the Commission (Renooy, 2004), even puts the estimate forward
without mentioning any constraints.
An additional estimate by the National Bank deals with the number
of people working exclusively in the shadow economy. In the fourth
quarter of 2002 the informal workforce numbered 9,259 people.
This tentative figure was calculated by means of the adjustments
made for undeclared work in the National Accounts and is therefore
subject to the same limitations. A further important restriction is
that it excludes people who combine a formal and an informal job –
the majority in other words.
Schneider estimates the shadow economy by means of monetary
macro-economic models. He combines a currency demand method
with a dynamic multiple-indicators, multiple-causes model. He
considers multiple causes and effects of the shadow economy and
uses factor analysis to approximate the hidden economy as an
unobserved variable over time. Schneider basically estimates the
model in order to get an index of the hidden output of a country,
and then estimates a separate cash demand model in order to obtain
a benchmark for converting this index into percentage units.
According to this method, Belgium’s shadow economy accounts for
21.5% of the “official” GDP in 2002/2003. In the international
context, Belgium’s shadow economy has the fifth largest share of
GDP of all OECD countries (Schneider, 2004). In spite of the fact
that “shadow economy” and “undeclared work” do not overlap
completely, the large discrepancy between the estimates raises
concern. Many authors have closely scrutinised Schneider’s
approach and have often concluded it is of very limited use,
primarily because it is based on modelling assumptions that cannot
be justified (OECD, 2002; Blades, 2002). In spite of strong criticism,
the Gembloux Paper and the McKinsey Report also refer to
Schneider’s estimates and are silent on the National Accounts.
In other words, it is difficult to commit to one estimate. Combining
a host of studies, Bruyninckx (1998) asserted that the number of
undeclared workers in Belgium ranged between 420,000 and
560,000 full-time equivalents or 12-16% of GDP. This
approximation is perhaps the most realistic.
Sectors and population groups likely to be engaged in
undeclared work
Undeclared work usually occurs in sectors with deregulated and
local economic structures, mercurial demand, labour-intensive
production and low profits. Sectors where labour costs are the most
important factor of competition are particularly affected.
Undeclared work is present in the following sectors in Belgium2:
construction (17%), meat processing (13%), old clothes business
(14%), households (11%), Chinese restaurants (7%) and other
catering, agriculture and horticulture (5%), transport, retail trade,
clothing manufacture, gas stations and carwashes. The Belgian
construction sector has probably undertaken the most in order to
prevent/fight undeclared work by signing co-operation treaties with
the Labour Ministry. Here the inspection agencies agree to
undertake inspections outside usual business hours and the sector
agrees to organise information campaigns. Like in the construction
sector, Social Partners are also privileged allies in the Government’s
fight against undeclared work in other sectors (passenger transport,
cleaning, etc.) where similar agreements have been concluded. The
leading role of the construction sector is further illustrated by the
reorganisation of overtime arrangements (De Tijd, 30-04-2004).
Regarding  population groups, in Belgium a typical undeclared
worker is young and male (as in other north-western European
countries – Perelman 1988). In contrast to southern Europe, women
participate less in undeclared work and are usually active in
catering, education or cleaning. They have an undeclared job for
reasons of economic necessity rather than for having some cash on
the side. However, there are very few figures to support this theory.
Only the case of illegal immigrants (meaning subjects of non-EU
countries residing illegally in the EU) is well-documented. Although
the number of controls decreased in 2003, more illegally employed
foreigners were discovered.
Determinants of undeclared work 
Undeclared work can be explained by the complex interplay
between different factors. Most authors consider taxes and social
security contributions to be the main cause of the shadow economy.
Although heavily contested, the case of Belgium confirms this
causal link between (perceived) high labour costs and undeclared
work (Schneider, 2004).
Red tape provides a second incentive for undeclared work. Laws,
regulations and requirements produce a rigid labour market where
undeclared work is explained as a reaction to labour market
imperfections (shortage, inflexibility or high cost of labour).
Thirdly, some contemporary socio-economic factors (sub-
contracting, outsourcing, relocation to low-wage countries) and
structures (number of Small and Medium Enterprises) explain
undeclared work in Belgium. Additionally, economic refugees are
attracted to “wealthy” countries like Belgium, often ending up
undertaking underground activities.
Fourthly, experts point to the poor quantity and quality of public
goods and services that might lead to a vicious cycle of escalating
taxes and increasing undeclared work. Although this has not been
the case in Belgium, gaps in some public provisions (day care, etc.)
did encourage undeclared work just as much as unclear control
mechanisms did. In Belgium, strong social networks combined with
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a high extent of informality further induced undeclared work.
Finally, “tax morality” or the degree to which citizens trust their
Government has to be mentioned. While a certain level of
undeclared work is deeply rooted in European culture (Mateman,
2001), evading taxes has been a “national sport” in Belgium since
Independence.
Measures to combat undeclared work
Since the 1970s the Belgian Government has developed policies of
avoiding/fighting undeclared work (Deneve, 1993). A coherent
package of measures has been assembled in recent years. In 1993
undeclared work was first put high on the political agenda:
Parliament voted an Illegal Employment and Undeclared Work Bill.
The Social Partners convened a round-table conference on
undeclared work in 1996 based on a joint paper by the Labour and
the Justice Minister. In 1999 the Labour Minister devoted a
memorandum to her vision on fighting illegal employment (Maeter,
2003). Many of her proposals were reiterated in the Gembloux
Paper and the strategic note from the State Secretary for the
Modernisation of Finances and the Fight against Fiscal Fraud.
Both documents consider all policy measures as part of a wider
strategy to promote employment and fight fraud.
Creation of environment favourable to declaration of
economic activity
In Belgium a number of initiatives have been taken in order to
remove incentives for undeclared work. In order to simplify the
administrative obligations imposed upon self-employed workers, a
Crossroads Bank for Enterprises (KBO) and business one-stop
shops have been established. KBO attributes a unique identification
number to every enterprise and every entrepreneur, and records the
necessary identification data. This unique number provides a link to
all institutions. It simplifies many administrative procedures and
facilitates a faster and more efficient exchange of information
between Government and entrepreneur. The Shops enlist new
companies with KBO, fulfil all the necessary formalities, and check
other paperwork. About ten private non-profit organisations have
been recognised by the Government, and operate 200 Shops
throughout the kingdom. Waiting times and administrative delays
have been cut accordingly. A new Electronic Single Starter
Notification (DEUS) eliminates further time-consuming formalities
for start-ups. As an add-on to the Shops, the Flemish Government
founded a counselling Agency for Entrepreneurship. Once
registered, a company can communicate electronically with the
Government and declare its employment electronically
(DIMONA). The immediate declaration of who is working when
for a company has been compulsory since 1998.Controls are further
sharpened by the establishment of a Crossroads Bank for Social
Security (KSZ) in 1991 and by the Social Identity Card (SIS), which
was handed out to every Belgian in 1999. This enables inspection
agencies to check immediately whether a person combines a social
security benefit with a normal salary.
Incentives to declare work
The Government has undertaken two types of initiatives in order to
provide incentives to declare work.Firstly,it has facilitated access to
the formal labour market for typical undeclared household work by
means of Local Employment Agencies (PWA) and service vouchers.
Secondly, it reduced social security contributions and taxes so as to
make undeclared work unattractive.
The PWAs, first established in 1987, functioned as agencies that
drew together the supply of labour of long-term unemployed and
the demand for household services, policing tasks and seasonal
work in the agricultural sector.A worker was allowed to keep his/her
earnings as extra cash alongside his/her allowance. In practice,
mainly 35-45 year-old women were active in the PWA scheme. In
June 1999, a total of 120,904 unemployed were registered at a PWA,
working on average 30 hours a week. The PWA system has had its
critics as well as its supporters.Because almost half of the PWA jobs
were formerly clandestine, PWAs obviously helped to fight
undeclared work (De Sutter, 2000). The system was, however,
criticised for “imprisoning”beneficiaries in the scheme. Nowadays
just over 4% of the former PWA employees hold a regular job,
whereas 22% are unemployed (WAV Arbeidsmarktflits 45).
Service vouchers were introduced as a follow-up on PWAs, and
should generate 25,000 new jobs by 2007. Introduced in March
2003, the system has been modified a number of times. It aims at
fighting undeclared work, financing the social security system, and
responding to the demand for reasonably priced household services
(such as housecleaning, preparing meals, etc.). The net price of a
voucher equals the market price for an hour’s work in the
underground economy. The remainder is subsidised. Hitherto, the
Government has certified 652 firms that function as middlemen
between workers and households. These companies first hire
someone with small and flexible contracts but are obliged to offer a
hiring contract of unlimited duration for at least a half-time job
after a number of months. A recent Government enquiry states that
companies conclude unlimited contracts faster than they are obliged
to and that two-thirds of the voucher jobs are (at least) half-time
(FOD, 2004). Since the system was implemented, 6,773 employees
and 65,709 households have used over 3 million vouchers (mainly in
Flanders). In June 2004 this translated into 5,462 jobs. Although the
service vouchers earn a lot of credit internationally (Renooy, 2004),
the unions and some scholars remain sceptical about their
effectiveness but it is perhaps too early to judge this.
Secondly, social security contributions and taxes are being lowered
with the intent of inducing people to declare work. Seasonal and
occasional employment has been administratively simplified and
made flexible in the catering, horticultural and agricultural sectors.
On top of that, lower social contributions have to be paid. Workers
hired via “temp”agencies also enjoy lower social contributions. The
social contributions of student jobs and the status of artists were
attuned along the same lines.
Enforcement and surveillance 
The Government wants to monitor the reinforcement of laws and
procedures centrally and impose a global vision. This vision is not
isolated but goes hand in hand with a policy of controlling and
counselling the unemployed. Enforcement and surveillance of the
Belgian social security system is spread over two ministries and a
dozen semi-governmental institutions. Each of these has its own
inspection agency, reinforcing the laws they are responsible for. In
all, a complex system of up to eighty inspection agencies has come
into being over time (De Tijd, 24-11-2003). The various agencies
only work together occasionally, which implies inefficient exchanges
and data analysis. Although Pacolet (2003) summarises some
figures on the number, time-span etc., of the investigations, he
admits that the effectiveness of policy initiatives cannot be assessed
properly (this is a European trend; Mateman, 2001).
A “Federal Board for the Fight against Illegal Work and Social
Fraud” aims to solve this lack of co-ordination. The Board is also
supposed to work out a global vision on fraud control and put an
end to a failing national enforcement policy. It aims to facilitate and64 Autumn 2004 |  European Employment Observatory Review
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improve anticipative enforcement, provide policy recommendations
and promote the exchange of information between government
services. The Board counts representatives from all relevant
institutions. A “Federal Co-ordination Committee” has also been
created as a permanently-manned bureau to the Board. In practice,
the Committee will guide the inspection agencies in the fight against
undeclared work. In light of the founding of the Board, the
Government has decided to extend the number of inspectors of the
four main agencies by eighty. Moreover, the techniques of
inspection have to improve by means of strategic risk analysis and
data gathering. This should uncover fraud cases but also yield
preventive measures or recommendations for changing laws.
Following a successful pilot in March 2003, a data warehouse
project of the four largest inspection agencies called OASIS
(Organisation Anti-fraude des Services d’Inspections), will be fully
implemented. Once completely operational, welfare recipients will
be monitored more closely because OASIS will facilitate targeted
reinforcement actions by means of “fraud indicators”. In the years
to come OASIS and MERI (Mensenhandel en Risicosectoren), a
knowledge database for trade in humans and illegal employment,
will be integrated in the common electronic platform of the four
largest agencies that is currently under construction. The
management of the agencies will, moreover, be enhanced by means
of a registry of (current) investigations.
Transnational co-operation
Belgium is involved in little transnational co-operation in the field of
undeclared work. The Co-ordination Committee is supposed to
function as an international liaison office in the fight against
undeclared work. Up to now, an agreement that specifically targets
illegal employment has been signed with France. A cross-border
taskforce has also been put in place (Maeter, 2003).
Awareness raising
In 2001 the Labour Minister launched an information campaign
directly targeting undeclared work. The slogan “undeclared work: a
steep bill”was spread via hand-outs, advertisements in newspapers
and on radio stations. Nowadays, awareness of the issue is only
raised indirectly (e.g. as a side effect of the promotion of service
vouchers). Recently, however, the Cabinet itself has decided to
communicate its Gembloux Paper more clearly to the population. It
also encourages inspection agencies to publish the results of their
controls so as to deter (potential) perpetrators. Internet websites
and other information campaigns also raise confidence in
Government initiatives (like KBO). Some associations (such as the
construction sector federation) also raise awareness of the problem
with their members.
Other measures
The Gembloux Paper lists a number of outdated labour laws,
regulations, and concepts that have been or will be simplified,
harmonised or plainly updated. Since this point was put on the
political agenda in the mid-1990s, progress has been piecemeal. The
social penal code is still in the process of being reorganised: a
commission has been active on this since 2001. Special correctional
courts are (to be) established. Currently, there is agreement that
cases of heavy social fraud will be met with penal actions. Small
violations will, however, be handled by newly established chambers
in civil or administrative courts and settled quickly by applying
(heavy) fines.
Conclusion
This review proves that undeclared work not only ranks high on the
political agenda, but is also treated accordingly. Estimates of
undeclared work range from 3% to 22% of Belgium’s GDP
depending on the author and the definition. The most realistic
estimate is 12-16% of GDP with the number of undeclared workers
ranging between 420,000 and 560,000. The phenomenon usually
occurs in sectors with deregulated and local economic structures,
mercurial demand, labour-intensive production and low profits
(construction,catering,etc.).The typical undeclared Belgian worker
is young and male.
The determinants of undeclared work in Belgium are: high taxes, a
rigid labour market, several current socio-economic factors, the
state of some public goods and services, and low tax morality. The
Government fights/prevents undeclared work by means of
establishing an environment friendly to the declaration of economic
activity (Crossroads Bank for Enterprises, One-Stop Shops, Single
Starter Notification, etc.); by introducing Local Employment
Agencies and service vouchers in order to white-wash classical
undeclared work, by centralising and stepping up enforcement and
surveillance (including proper data management and exchange),
and by thoroughly reforming the judicial system.
Reginald Loyen
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Czech Republic
Introduction
Undeclared work became an issue for public debate in the Czech
Republic in the late Eighties and early Nineties and has grown
increasingly topical over recent years. The national understanding
of the concept of undeclared work has always been very close to the
definition proposed by the European Commission: “productive
activities that are lawful as regards to their nature, but are not
declared to the public authorities, taking into account the
differences in the regulatory system between Member States”
(Renooy 2004: 8).
Early attempts to define and measure undeclared economic
activities (Fassmann 1988, Zelinka 1989, Hanzl et al. 1989) were
stimulated by the fact that these activities represented a crucial
component of command economies – not only as a supply of
necessary services (for example when building and repairing
houses), but also as a solution for the failures of the formal
economy.
In 1991, a task group was established at the Federal (Czech and
Slovak) Statistical Office in order to examine the possibilities for the
measurement of undeclared economic activities. The aim was to use
a broad definition which went wider than the simple measurement
of “undeclared activities” (in the sense of the EC definition). The
statisticians aimed to identify declared but not statistically recorded
activities on the one hand, and illegal/criminal activities on the
other. The method used corresponded to a large extent with
Eurostat’s exhaustive research methodology which has since been
adopted in the Czech Republic (Ondru 2001).
In addition to studies by international experts, several independent
economists from the Czech Republic have contributed to developing
an understanding of the concept of undeclared work. Their studies
incorporated both the “ILO approach”, which emphasises non-
compliance with legal obligations associated with labour contracts,
and the “World Bank approach”, which emphasises undeclared
Value Added Tax and other tax evasion. In 1998, the Czech
Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs initiated a study by Strecková
and Fassmann on “Institutional Possibilities to Minimise the
Influence of the Shadow Economy on the Labour Market” which
summarises the existing knowledge held by public officials’ on this
problem (Strecková et al. 1999). Recently, a comprehensive study on
undeclared work in the Czech Republic was published (Fassmann
2002, 2003), together with another pioneering study on tax evasion
based on a direct measurement method (Hanousek and Pulda
2002).
Because of these efforts and due to the rich historic experience held
by the public (undeclared work originated under the former regime
and was further increased during the transition to a market
economy), it is not surprising that public officials and politicians
have a good understanding of the concept of undeclared work in all
its contents and forms (compare Strecková et al. 1999). However,
measuring the scope of undeclared work has been a difficult exercise
due to a recent restructuring of the statistical monitoring system in
the Czech Republic and the cancellation of several earlier
monitoring tools. Another difficulty is the general opposition of the
public and new entrepreneurs to sharing personal data on income
and related issues.
At the beginning of the transformation to the market economy in
the Czech Republic, when undeclared work was proliferating, the
political elites and public officials did not pay much attention to the
problem of undeclared work. Such “political neglect” could be
considered to be an expression of the liberal approach to
marketisation which occurred within the Czech Republic (the “Wild
East”hypothesis). The high degree of tolerance towards undeclared
work activities originated under communism, as well as in
assumptions about the possible positive impacts of undeclared
work, i.e. the “accumulation of capital” and the provision of a
“survival strategy” (compare discussion in Kleer 1994, Fassmann
2002 and 2003, Renooy et al. 2004). An exception to this rule,
however, was the involvement of unemployed people in undeclared
work – this has historically been criticised by both public officials
and the media, mainly because the misuse or fraud of social benefits
by the unemployed has been considered to be an economic as well as
a moral problem.
In the second half of the Nineties, things started to change, as
politicians and public officials learnt from the negative experiences
of privatisation and marketisation. Important economic losses
within the national budget due to “tunnelling” practices and the
importing of undeclared goods caused them to revise their policy.
At the same time, the left-wing parties (the Social Democrats and
the Communists) emphasised the problem of undeclared work in
their political campaigns. Politicians recognised the close link66 Autumn 2004 |  European Employment Observatory Review
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between undeclared economic and illegal/criminal activities and
corruption, and the issue of undeclared work entered the political
debate. The focus was mainly on tax evasion, but this was not the
only topic. While unemployment was very low in the Czech
Republic until 1998, it reached 10% in 1999 and illegal work by
foreign workers (mainly from the Ukraine) became a “hot” topic.
Following the reform of public finances in 2002, the effectiveness of
tax collection and the general elimination of undeclared activities
have become Government priorities. Both these issues are strongly
emphasised in the Governmental Declaration of August 2002. It
will be important that these declarations and commitments are
translated into actions, however.
Prevalence of undeclared work in the economy
The scope of undeclared work
As it is increasingly difficult to measure undeclared work, it is
perhaps not surprising that the existing estimates on the scope of
undeclared work are ambiguous and vary according to the
methodology used.Given the existing evidence and studies,it can be
concluded that the scope of undeclared work in the Czech Republic
is probably between 10% and 15% of GDP. This is lower than most
post-communist countries, and also some South European
countries. However, it is still much higher than in the other EU
countries.
The structure of activities and participating
population groups
In general, the identified structure of undeclared activities
corresponds well with findings from other EU countries (Renooy
2004). Ondru (2001: 253) estimated the value-added by undeclared
work in various economic sectors in 1997 as follows: 23% in
agriculture, 22% in construction, 21% in hotels, restaurants and
transport, 17% in finance and services for the business sector, while
only 7.1% in industry and 3.8% in other services (the average was
7.4%).
Self-employed and employed people are more likely than the
unemployed (inactive) to have undeclared income. As regards the
forms of undeclared work, public officials and experts interviewed
by Strecková et al. (1999) ranked them as follows:
1. Tax evasion: 70% (103 of the 147 experts interviewed) of
respondents ranked this in first place with 20% placing it in
second place;
2. Profits from undeclared (non-approved) activities: 27% of
respondents ranked this in first place, 55% in second place, and
26% in third place;
3. Illegal employment of foreigners (mainly from the Ukraine): This
was mainly emphasised by experts in large cities. In total, 7% of
experts ranked this in first place, 16% in second, with the
remainder placing it in third to fifth place (between 20 and 26%);
4. Illegal labour contracts:A majority of the experts put this in third
place (25%), fourth (36%) or fifth place (19%). Experts from
districts with a high level of unemployment proved to be more
tolerant of this form;
5. Undeclared second-job incomes of employed people: The experts
ranked this third, fourth and fifth, with the fifth place being most
frequent at 31%).
It is interesting that a considerable percentage of the respondents
(45%) considered that large enterprises/companies are most likely to
engage in undeclared activities (a further 15% ranked these in
second place). Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs) are
also considered to be more frequently involved: 30% of the experts
ranked SMEs first while 26% ranked them second. Efforts to
increase profits and survive under increasing competition were
identified as the main motives for undeclared activities/work.
In a different study, Hanousek and Pulda (2002: 11) analysed the
gender structure of the 25% of their sample of 1,062 respondents
who admitted engagement in undeclared work. They found that
there were more men (67%) than women (33%). However, the age
structure and family status of the men and women participating in
undeclared work corresponded quite well with the structure of the
overall sample. With regards to education and labour market status,
all categories are to some extent engaged in undeclared work, with a
higher incidence among entrepreneurs and unemployed persons.
In 2002, only 62% of the people registered at their local PES had
declared themselves unemployed according to the ILO definition
(Labour Force Surveys findings). This is seen by Sirovátka et al.
(2003) to be a signal of undeclared work among the unemployed1.
Sirovátka et al. analysed the gap between unemployed persons who
are formally registered at employment offices and those who
declared themselves unemployed for a series of different groups
within society. The percentage difference between those registered
for work and those declared unemployed is most striking in the case
of men (46%) compared to women (29%). The gap was 40% for
unemployed persons over 40 years, around 50% for unskilled
unemployed people and people with lower secondary education,
over 50% for persons unemployed for less than 6 months and over
40% for unemployed persons living in districts with a high level of
unemployment. From this research, we may conclude that
undeclared employment of unemployed persons (which represents a
minor fraction of undeclared work) particularly concerns men with
a lower level of education who live in districts with a higher level of
unemployment.
The determining factors 
Renooy et al. (2004) distinguish three types of factors that influence
the emergence of undeclared work: socio-economic/market factors
(e.g. current socio-economic trends and the structure of national
Table 1: The structure of undeclared work in the Czech
Republic by labour market status of participants (in %)
Full time job 60 55
Part time job 3 4
Entrepreneur (no employees) 6 12
Entrepreneur (with employees) 2 4
Pensioner working 2 2
Pensioner not working 11 4
Unemployed 6 10
Student 6 6
Wife working in household 3 2
Source: Hanousek and Pulda 2002, adapted
Total sample
(1,062 = 100%)
Engaged in informal
sector  (267 = 100%)
1 More people register at employment offices than declare themselves unemployed. A substantial part of them are probably active in undeclared employment, at least
on occasions, but register themselves with employment offices in order to gain entitlements to benefits and/or social security rights.Autumn 2004 |  European Employment Observatory Review 67
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economy), institutional factors (e.g. the complex of legal and
administrative regulations) and societal factors (e.g. cultural
traditions and relations between the individual, society and the
State).
The relevance of each of these determining factors may be
characterised as follows:
Socio-economic factors:
The boom of undeclared work during the first years of the
transformation of the economy after 1989 was associated with the
transition to the marketisation and liberalisation of the economy,
combined with an economic recession, a lack of relevant legislation
and an insufficient administrative capacity within the public sector
to deal with the issue. The second recession in 1997-1998 produced
further stimuli for undeclared activities, contributing to a wave of
bankruptcies in large companies, and an increase in unemployment.
Economic performance improved after 1999 and the GDP growth
has been between 2-3% in the last four years. Direct foreign
investments have considerably increased – up to 12% of GDP in
2002. The overall economic environment is becoming more stable.
On the other hand,the recession in 1997-1998 brought about at least
a temporary increase in undeclared work due to increasing
unemployment and a worsening competitive position for large
companies combined with a lack of financial resources for
modernisation.
A further impetus towards undeclared employment has come from
certain long-term market rigidities: the level of social contributions
is high in the Czech Republic, representing 47.5% of wages (35% is
paid by the employer). The corporate tax was set at 31% until 2004.
There are no tax exemptions for low-paid workers. A survey by
Sirovátka et al. (2003) shows that the high level of social security
and taxation is perceived as a strong barrier to employment.
Unemployment benefits are not high in the Czech Republic (the
replacement rate is 50% for the first three months and 40% for the
subsequent three months) but the level of social assistance is
relatively significant: the replacement rate for a family of four (two
adults and two children) or for a single parent with two children is
close to 100% for a person earning two-thirds of the average wage.
This level is comparable with countries with the highest replacement
rates for long-term benefit recipients, such as Sweden and Denmark
(see OECD 2002). On top of this, because of a lack of obligation for
unemployed people to actively seek employment, benefit
entitlements are easy to gain and retain, even for long-term
unemployed persons.
Institutional factors:
The legal and institutional environment is improving in the Czech
Republic. In combination with the standardisation of the economic
environment and growing foreign investments, these changes would
seem to have a positive impact on the scope of undeclared work.
Nonetheless, as Hanousek and Pulda (2002: 14) show, the
probability of being caught and prosecuted on the grounds of
participation in undeclared work is still not higher than 44% on
average: 20% amongst frequent participants and 30% amongst
occasional participants.
Societal factors:
Some observers maintain that cultural factors remain influential
and contribute to the high degree of tolerance of undeclared work,
possibly giving rise to opposition towards governmental actions
which aim to reduce undeclared work (Renooy 2004). Similarly,
Strecková et al. (1999) found a high degree of tolerance of
unemployed persons’ undeclared employment in districts with a
high level of unemployment.
Hanousek and Pulda (2002) confirmed the importance of attitudes
towards undeclared work with their finding that only 3% of
frequent participants and a mere 10% of occasional participants felt
that their family and/or friends disagreed with them participating in
undeclared work.
The impacts of undeclared work on the economy and
society
We can distinguish direct and indirect economic impacts from
undeclared work. Assuming that the scope of undeclared work is
10% of GDP or slightly higher and, given the current corporate tax
rate (28% in 2004), the direct loss for the Government budget
revenues may be about 2.5-3% of GDP2. The indirect social effects
are also profound: undeclared work undermines general discipline
in paying taxes and increases propensity to contravene legal norms
related to employment and entrepreneurship.At the same time,trust
in the capacity of public administration bodies is decreasing and
their legitimacy is at stake.
Some public officials admit that there is also a partial positive
impact of undeclared work on employment possibilities and
entrepreneurship, and that it becomes a form of survival strategy in
times of recession, and in regions most affected by structural
change.This may be a valid argument,if you take into consideration
the insufficient scope of effective labour market policies. On the
other hand, the illegal employment of foreign workers seems to
mitigate, at least partially, against the assumed positive effects in
terms of the creation of employment for Czech nationals.
Measures taken to combat undeclared work
In the Nineties, the Czech Government did not pay much attention
to the problem of undeclared work and a laissez-faire policy was
implemented from 1997. However, economic recession and
emerging pressures on the government budget necessitated a more
systematic approach towards economic criminality and tax evasion.
Table 2: To what extent certain factors represent a barrier
to hiring new employees (in %)
Market insecurity 44 26 30
The level of social security 
contributions 42 18 40
The level of taxation 37 22 41
Competition 30 22 48
Unemployment insurance 20 25 55
Minimum wages 18 16 66
Modernisation 17 26 57
Labour code requirements 16 24 60
Trade unions and its power 2 10 88
Source: Sirovátka et al. 2003, sample of 1,000 employers
To a large
extent
To some
extent
To a small
extent
2 This equals about a half of the Government budget deficit.68 Autumn 2004 |  European Employment Observatory Review
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An increasing unemployment rate gave rise to public, media and
government concerns about the problem of illegal foreign workers.
In 2000, an inter-ministerial commission was established, headed by
the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, in order to coordinate
policies to combat the illegal employment of foreigners. Since 2002,
a public finance reform has been under way, aiming towards the
reduction of public finance deficits. It has brought an integrated
package of public policies, including some policies that aim to
reduce the extent of undeclared work.
The Government Declaration as of August 2002 (Programové 2002)
and the Coalition Agreement (Koali˘ cní 2002) of the ruling political
parties embraced the government’s obligation to combat the illegal
employment of foreign labourers. A new administrative body – the
Inspectorate of Labour – was also established in order to oversee
employment issues more efficiently (Labour Code, collective
agreements, employment conditions etc.). In addition, active
measures to promote employment were to be strengthened.
Consequently, the National Employment Action Plans for years
2002 and 2003 (Národní 2002, 2003) included obligations to
undertake more effective actions to combat the illegal employment
of foreign workers and to co-ordinate adequate measures at the
national and regional levels. More support was to be given to SMEs,
and measures to reduce taxation on labour were to be suggested.
The main emphasis was laid on legal and administrative
arrangements to reduce tax evasion and to improve the discipline of
taxpayers, in order to combat undeclared activities. Another stream
of actions aimed to transform undeclared employment into more
formalised activities and to dismantle some labour market rigidities.
All these new policies are at the stage of initiation at the time of
writing this paper.A co-ordinated and fully integrated approach has
not been negotiated and implemented as yet.
Establishment of a legal and administrative
environment favourable to declaring a person’s
economic activities through simplifying procedures
and reducing costs and constraints
The legal framework for private enterprise is liberal in the Czech
Republic compared to the EU countries. It was only in the late
Nineties that the granting of trade licences in certain specified areas
was made conditional on the achievement of qualifications and
several years’ practice in the field. On the other hand, the required
administrative and bureaucratic procedures often lead to delays in
registering new licences. Further, formal procedures are rather
fragmented and access to capital/loans is very difficult. Under the
framework of the public finance reform, an inter-ministerial
commission was established (composed of representatives of the
Ministry of Industry and Trade, Ministry of Internal Affairs and
the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs) in order to design and
co-ordinate measures to support SMEs. Among other things, it was
decided to elaborate measures to reduce the administrative burden
for SMEs and to propose a concentration of procedures in 2004
where would-be entrepreneurs were registered and licensed by only
one well-functioning administrative body.
Strengthening incentives and eliminating
disincentives to declaring work in both the demand
and supply side of the economy
Since 2002, attention has been focused on improving the general
economic conditions for free enterprise: primarily by means of
reducing the corporate tax from 31% in 2003 to 28% in 2004, and
further down to 26% by 2005 and 24% by 2006. In May, 2004, the
VAT level was harmonised with EU norms: the upper level
decreased from 22% to 19% but the lower level increased from 5% to
19% in the case of several goods/services. This arrangement is
perceived as threatening for hotels and restaurants where the level of
VAT used to be 5% and has been heavily criticised by the sector’s
entrepreneurs. It is worth noting that this is a sector with a high
share of undeclared work.
No measures have so far been taken forward to reduce social
security contributions (at least for low-paid workers) and the
problem of high labour costs remains unresolved3.Also,a minimum
tax has been imposed on “small entrepreneurs” (self-employed
persons) equalling half the average wage4. Their tax base has been
increased from 35% to 40% of the difference between revenues and
expenditures and will be further increased to 50% in 2006.
Accordingly, their social security contributions are to be calculated
from the base of half the average wage instead of from the
subsistence minimum base (which effectively doubles them)5. This
last measure should not only improve government budget revenues
but should also halt the widespread practice of subcontracting
labour by firms and entrepreneurs who thus evade standard labour
contracts.
Designing adequate employer policies
Several programmes to support SMEs have been implemented since
2002 through the Ministry of Industry and Trade, with the help of
special regional agencies. These include supporting access to capital
and counselling programmes for new entrepreneurs. Loans for
unemployed persons who start their own business (amounting to
about 2,300 euro) and business training programmes are also
available, in compliance with the Employment Act.
The new Employment Act, which comes into effect in the second
half of 2004, will make it possible to grant unemployed people who
start their own business with a contribution amounting to a half of
the subsistence minimum (about 70 euro monthly) over a period of
six months6.
Reducing the risk of unemployment and poverty
traps by eliminating undesirable interactions between
tax and benefit systems
Several measures suggested in the National Employment Plan 2003
have been incorporated into the new Employment Act, new
Subsistence Minimum Act and new State Support Act proposals.
The level of subsistence minimum for larger households will
decrease (taking into account the economies of scale) and the
replacement rate of benefits to wages will thus also decrease. On the
other hand, it is now possible to maintain entitlement to parental
benefits regardless of a person’s level of earnings, and earn up to a
half of the minimum wage without losing entitlements to
unemployment benefit.
3 This is despite the fact that the measure was suggested in the National Action Plan for Employment 2002.
4 The problem was that most self-employed persons reported losses rather than profits.
5 The problem was that their contributions into the social security fund were too low – they approximated a third of contributions paid by employees with a
comparable level of income on the average.
6 It must be noted that wage subsidies may be paid by PES to SMEs who hire an unemployed person.Autumn 2004 |  European Employment Observatory Review 69
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Secondly, unemployment and social assistance benefits will be
subject to stricter conditions: participation in temporary work
(public works programmes), fulfilment of the tasks of individual
action plans and training programmes and due co-operation with a
local employment office will be required if a person is to keep their
entitlements to social assistance benefits. The responsibility for
payments of all social benefits will be passed to local employment
offices – a measure intended to increase pressure on the employment
offices to perform.
Strengthening surveillance, with active support from
social partners and application of adequate sanctions
where appropriate
Considering that financial losses associated with tax evasions
represent a prevailing part of undeclared work and have such a
negative impact on the economy and society, measures to combat
undeclared activities formed the very centre of government policy in
this area, especially within the framework of the public finance
reform.
The Czech Ministry of Finance initiated several measures that were
expected to come into effect through the legislative procedure in
January 1995:
• Trading alcohol and cigarettes in open market places was to be
forbidden (to reduce tax evasions in the area of indirect
taxation);
• Even petty traders would be obliged to use cash-registers (to
reduce their unrecorded incomes);
• In July 1994, the Finance Police were established in order to
monitor and combat illegal and undeclared economic activities;
• Direct cash payments exceeding the amount of CZK 500,000
(about 13,000 euro) were to be forbidden (to halt the misuse of
cash payment for the purpose of evading taxation duties);
• An introduction of property tax declarations was proposed to be
implemented from January 1995 onwards (to monitor differences
between individuals’ wealth and declared incomes, thus
preventing tax evasion and criminal activities); this proposal has
been a matter for intensive political debate – so far it has not
gained the support of the majority of Members of Parliament
owing to the opposition of right-wing parties.
Strengthening transnational co-operation between
authorities in individual Member States
Only a modest transnational co-operation has so far been
established with regards to the issue of undeclared work. The
Foreign and Customs Police co-operate with relevant partners on
combating illegal immigration and illegal foreign labour. Similarly,
the police, and especially the newly-established Finance Police, are
learning how to co-operate effectively with partners from other EU
countries to combat tax evasion and illegal activities.
Moreover, other specific activities that have recently emerged
include a pilot project implemented by the Ministry of Labour and
Social Affairs to regulate foreign labour immigration7. Since 2002,
this has provided the grounds for initiating co-operation with
several ministerial bodies within the former post-communist block.
Similar co-operation has in recent years been established with other
EU countries under the framework of bilateral agreements on work
permits for a limited number of workers.
Raising social awareness of the costs of undeclared
work
In spite of the increasing attention paid to the issue of undeclared
work (mainly in the field of tax evasion and illegal foreign labour),
little effort has been invested in influencing public attitudes and
behaviour. For example, no information campaign has been carried
out so far. Further, the necessity to define and promote “ethical
norms” for the activities of public officials in this field has been
neglected. This issue, however, would seem to deserve more
attention in the future, since a low level of trust in relation to
governmental actions in this area, and poor legal awareness on the
part of the public about undeclared work represent a clear barrier to
the effective implementation of relevant policies. Unless attitudes
are changed, this could provide a basis for the flourishing of
undeclared activities in the future.
Apart from neglecting cultural dimensions, policies also seem to be
lacking an “integrated approach”, as was suggested by Renooy and
Mateman (2001). At the very least, measures adopted in relation to
financial and fiscal issues need to be better integrated with measures
adopted in the field of employment.
At present, no evaluations are available of the effectiveness of
measures designed to combat undeclared work and convert
undeclared labour into more formalised working practices. Most of
the measures are only just being initiated. It could be argued that it
is the improving economic environment that has recently
contributed to the decrease in undeclared activities. On the other
hand, it is possible that the Government’s efforts and measures have
influenced economic actors by force of their “symbolic authority”.
The main impact of the measures will only be visible in the future.
Considering the strength of determining factors in this area,
especially socio-cultural ones, it is likely that the issue will require
both a long-term effort and an integrated multi-dimensional
approach to be successful.
Conclusions
The extent of undeclared work within the Czech economy is fairly
average; the Czech Republic finds itself in between other post-
communist countries and southern European countries where there
is a considerable degree of undeclared work, and other EU
countries where undeclared work is only a minor issue. In the Czech
Republic, undeclared work is concentrated in “traditional”sectors
such as hotels, restaurants and construction. Nonetheless, financial
and business services are also increasingly becoming affected by
undeclared activities. Tax evasion by SMEs and large enterprises
represents the most common undeclared activity. Undeclared
employment of foreigners and domestic workers is less widespread,
yet must not be neglected. It is more often men (of varying age,
education and labour market status) than women who participate in
undeclared work.
It could be argued that the lack of a consistent and stable economic
and legal environment and adequate monitoring and administrative
capacity within public bodies contributes to the spread of
undeclared work. On the other hand, the overall economic
environment and performance of the economy, as well as the
administrative capacity of the State, are continuously improving
and the share of foreign capital in the economy is on the increase.
The Czech Government has initiated the process of formulating and
implementing policies aimed at combating undeclared work – both
in the form of “financial fraud” and “undeclared labour”. On the
7 The project aims at a selection of a limited number of skilled foreign workers.70 Autumn 2004 |  European Employment Observatory Review
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other hand, a high level of tolerance of the general public towards
undeclared work represents a specific barrier to governmental
efforts. The effectiveness of the proposed measures to tackle
undeclared work will only be visible in the future.
Tomás ˘ Sirovátka
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Introduction
The concept of undeclared work – usually referred to as “black
work”in Denmark – is generally defined in a similar manner to the
concepts applied in the Communications from the Commission (cf.
also Renooy et al, 2004). Thus the Danish tax authorities define
black work as non-registered productive activities that are not
reported and taxed according to existing legislation. The crucial
element in the concept is that the productive activities are positioned
in the black economy because they are not reported to the tax
authorities, although they are liable for income tax, VAT or other
taxes. In other respects the activities do not violate the law. If
unreported activities are performed by immigrants without a work
permit, they fall into the category of illegal work.
As will be further discussed in this article, the black economy in
Denmark has been rather intensely studied over recent decades. The
main concepts applied in this research have been1:
• The shadow economy consists of both unreported productive
economic activities (the black economy as presented above) and
tax evasion involving other sources of income (e.g. interest
received) or illegitimate tax deductions. Apart from the element
of tax evasion, the activities are non-criminal.
• The black economy can, furthermore, be divided into the black
economy in the narrow sense and normal tax evasion. In the
former case, both the seller and the buyer of goods or a service is
aware of the fact that the transaction involves tax evasion, and
split the savings between them. In the latter case, only the seller
takes advantage from not reporting the transaction, while the
buyer is unaware of the illegal character of the activity.
• Finally, the concept of do-it-yourself-work, for example work
around the home carried out by family members or neighbours,
is similar to “black work”in the sense that it is not reported to the
authorities, but differs by being legal, because such activities are
normally untaxed.
In the remainder of this article the terms black work and black
economy will refer to the black economy in the narrow sense: non-
criminal productive activities that involve some form of tax evasion
known to both seller and buyer. These terms are used
interchangeably with the term undeclared work.
Based on theoretical considerations,one could imagine that the high
level of income taxation and a VAT rate of 25% would act as a
strong stimulus to the creation of a large black economy in
Denmark (Gravesen, 2003). However, the empirical information
presented in this article indicates that, by international comparison,
the black economy in Denmark is rather small and mostly takes the
form of extra activities performed by persons already employed in
the “white”sector.
There can be several reasons for this. One is the way in which the
Danish labour market and economy in general is tightly monitored
by the use of personal identification numbers, the registration and
reporting of most sources of income, and well-developed
administrative procedures for controlling the work environment,
product quality, etc. Furthermore, flexible rules for dismissal of
ordinary employees and the absence of any significant payroll taxes
create few incentives for employers to hire workers without
reporting to the authorities.
Therefore, the question of black work is not generally an issue high
on the Danish political agenda. In recent years, however, some
attention has been given to the illegal work performed by
immigrants without work permits – a debate which has been
stimulated by the enlargement of the European Union and the fear
of large-scale immigration from the new Member States. Also, to an
increasing degree, attention is being paid to the fact that black or
illegal work seems to be concentrated in certain sectors like hotels
and restaurants, which has encouraged special action to be taken in
these areas. Finally, the inclusion of the new guideline on the
transformation of undeclared work into regular employment in the
European Employment Strategy (EES) has led to an increased focus
on the subject.
Prevalence of undeclared work in the economy
The main source of information about the size of the black
economy in Denmark is found in a series of surveys conducted by an
independent research unit, which is funded by the Rockwool
Foundation in co-operation with Statistics Denmark and has been
running since the mid-1990s (most recently documented in
Pedersen, 2003). Table 1 presents the main results.
Table 1: Black work in Denmark 1994-2001
1994 1998 2001
Share of the adult population that 
performs black work, (%) 30.6 23.7 20.3
Average undeclared hours worked per 
week per black worker 2.92 3.47 5.2
Average undeclared hours per week 
for the population as a whole  0.89 0.82 1.2
Source: Pedersen (1998, 2003)
As shown in Table 1, in 1994 almost one-third of the adult
population reported that they had conducted black work. By 2001
the share had fallen to 20%. On the other hand, the weekly number
of “black” hours worked had increased from about three hours to
more than five hours. As a result, the total volume of black work
had increased from an average of 0.89 hours per week per adult to
1.2 hours per adult for the population as a whole.
Undeclared work within different groups and sectors
There are significant differences between the extent of black work
for different groups as shown in Figure 1.
While in 2001 an average of 20.3% of the adult population reported
that they had conducted some form of black work,the share was much
higher for men (29.4%) than for women (11.5%). Younger age groups
tend to participate more intensely in the black economy. Within
occupational groups, unskilled and skilled workers are frequently
working black hours,closely followed by the self-employed.
Denmark
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In terms of sectors, black work is most common in construction,
where almost 25% of the hours worked are undeclared according to
the survey in 2001. Within agriculture, hotels and restaurants, one
finds shares of black working hours from 10 to 15%. In sectors like
the manufacturing industry, transport and other service sectors,
black work seems to play only a minor role.
An interesting observation from the research is that only about 10%
of unemployed persons report to have worked black hours.This is in
line with previous studies and runs against the assumption that
unemployed people will exploit opportunities to perform
undeclared work and receive unemployment benefits at the same
time to a large degree. However, the unemployed also partly lose the
access to potential customers, who are normally contacted during
standard working hours, and also have no opportunity to borrow
tools and other equipment from their regular employerf’. Finally,
one could assume that the risk of under-reporting in the surveys is
larger for unemployed people, because by doing undeclared work
they violate both the tax laws and the eligibility criteria for receiving
unemployment benefits.
The question of ethnicity and undeclared work is not covered by the
surveys of the research unit of the Rockwool Foundation. Available
case studies and media reports indicate that the informal economy
can play a significant role among some groups of immigrants, but
no systematic data are available (e.g. Rezaei, 2003).
Combing the information about the background characteristics for
persons performing undeclared work, one can thus characterise the
typical person who is active in the black economy as a younger
skilled or unskilled male, who probably holds a full-time job in the
construction sector.
Wages in the black sector
On average, in 2001 wages in the black economy were DKK 117 or
15.7 euro per hour, and were higher for men (DKK 121) than for
women (DKK 104). A Danish study has taken a closer look at the
wages earned in the black economy (Pedersen & Smith,1998).When
correcting for a number of background factors like age, education
and occupation, there is a wage gap of 17% between the hourly
wages of men and women doing undeclared work. This wage gap is
in line with recent estimates of the wage difference between men and
women in the white economy of about 10% (Deding & Wong,2004).
The highest hourly wages in the black economy are found to be paid
to self-employed and salaried workers.
The size of the black economy
Based on the available surveys, one can estimate the overall size and
development of the black sector in the Danish economy,as shown in
Figure 2.
Figure 2: Extent of black activities in Denmark,
1994-2001. Proportion of GDP 
Source: Pedersen, 2003, p. 123   
In Figure 2, the size of the black economy is measured by the
number of undeclared hours in relation to number of “white”
(declared) hours worked in the economy. It is thus assumed that
productivity in the black sector is similar to that of the white sector.
By this measure, the black economy in Denmark amounts to about
3% of GDP and has risen in recent years. If one instead assumed
that the productivity of the black economy is reflected in its lower
wage level and sets the value of its output accordingly,one finds that
the Danish black economy amounted to about 1.8% of GDP in
2001.
The Research Unit of the Rockwool Foundation has also initiated
comparative surveys in four other European countries using the
same methodology as in the Danish survey. The resulting estimates
for the proportion of the black economy are shown in Figure 3,
which uses the same measure for the relative size of the black
economy as Figure 2.
Based on the surveys, the black economy in all of the five countries
seems to be of a minor level, although there is some variation from
1.2% of GDP in the UK to 4.1% of GDP in Germany. As is further
discussed by Pedersen (2003, pp. 111-119), there could be a number
of possible explanations for this divergence in the estimated size of
the black economy. One suggested factor is linked to purely
institutional differences, for example, a number of activities that
would be taxable in Scandinavia are not taxable in the UK and this
is probably an important reason for the much lower estimate for this
country. One may add that Renooy et al (2004, p. 107) report the
level of undeclared work in Denmark to constitute 5.5% of GDP.
However, this figure includes both black work in the narrow sense
and normal tax evasion.
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As an alternative to the estimates of the black economy based on
surveys, one can attempt to estimate its size by means of monetary
methods,which are based on the assumption that the black economy
(or, rather, the shadow economy) is characterised by using only cash
and not other means of payments in order to hide the transactions
from the authorities. A number of estimates based on various
versions of this indirect method have been put forward for the
Danish shadow economy. They vary from less than 2% to 18% of
GDP. As discussed by Pedersen (2003, pp. 27-31), these estimates
are based on a number of critical assumptions and also seem to be
very sensitive to the specific data sources and estimation techniques
applied.
Attitudes towards undeclared work
Finally, concerning the potential prevalence of undeclared work,
the surveys can provide estimates of the willingness of the
population to carry out black activities and the perceived risks of
doing so. Here one finds that 45.7% of those respondents who had
not reported that they had performed undeclared work, express the
view that they would not rule out the idea in the future Added to the
20.3% of the adult population who have actually been working in
the black sector, one finds that 56.6% of the Danish population will
not refrain from doing undeclared work if the opportunity is there.
The figure for Norway and Sweden is 50.6% and 42.2% respectively.
For Germany and the United Kingdom the corresponding figures
are 25.5 and 34.4%.
With regards to the risk factor, 13.9% of the adult population in
Denmark estimates the risk of discovery and subsequent tax fines to
be high. This is the same level as in Norway and Sweden – and
considerably lower than in Germany and the UK. Thus, compared
with the data on the share of the black economy in Figure 3, there
seems to be no simple correlation with either the share of the
population willing to be active in the black economy or the
perceived risk of being caught in the act.
Measures taken to combat undeclared work
Supported by the statistical information in the previous section, the
common conception is that the black economy in Denmark is of a
manageable size and has a magnitude similar to that of other
Scandinavian countries. This, of course, does not preclude the fact
that undeclared work is conceived as a problem and should be
confronted by political action (Mogensen & Pedersen, 1998).
Firstly, undeclared work limits the tax base and therefore implies a
higher level of taxation, which may again stimulate the growth of
the black economy. A risk of enforcing a vicious circle is thus
present. Also, a large black economy may undermine the general
legitimacy of the tax system and develop into more systematic fraud
in some sectors such as restaurants, hotels and cleaning services. A
large black sector may distort the interpretation of official statistical
data, for instance concerning the level of unemployment or
economic growth. Finally, a growing black sector may also lead to
misinterpretations of data concerning the distribution of incomes.
This may all result in misguided economic policies.
On the other hand, one can also identify positive aspects of the
black economy. For example, some productive activities may be
performed which would not be realised otherwise. In this case, extra
income is generated, which will also stimulate activities in the white
sector of the economy. One may also think of black activities as
natural expressions of well-functioning social networks, where
friends help each other without having tax evasion as the key
motive.
However, from a more general societal point of view, there is little
doubt that a black economy which grows outside the area of minor
favours among friends or a few occasional extra hours of work by a
young workman poses a serious challenge to the sustainability of
the welfare state. As a reflection of this, Danish governments have
over the years launched a number of initiatives to limit the extent of
undeclared work.
The Home-service Scheme
The “Home-service Scheme” was introduced in 1994 (described in
Renooy et al, 2004, pp. 172-3). The scheme implies that a wage
subsidy is paid to households that buy household services (cleaning,
gardening, etc.) from private firms. The subsidy was about 50% of
the total costs. The purpose of the scheme was both to stimulate the
demand for (unskilled) labour and to reduce the amount of
undeclared paid household work.
The scheme was evaluated in 2001 (Erhvervsfremme Styrelsen,
2001). The main effects were viewed as positive. According to the
evaluation, the scheme had generated employment for about 5,000
persons (equivalent to 3,500 full-time persons). One out of 10
households were users of the scheme. About two-thirds of the
services supplied were cleaning and the remainder were gardening
work. A special survey was conducted to assess the effects of the
scheme on do-it-yourself work (DIY) and black work. The main
results were:
• The main effect of the scheme was to reduce DIY activities.
About three-quarters of the users reported that they would
previously have done the work themselves.
• About a quarter of the users responded that they had previously
had some form of external help to do the tasks that were now
performed by persons working under the scheme. About half of
this group had now overlooked black work in favour of white
services provided under the scheme.
• It was estimated that the scheme had reduced the total volume of
Figure 3: Extent of black activities in five European
countries. Proportion of GDP
Source: Pedersen, 2003, p. 105 
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black cleaning services by 5-10%, while it had only a minor effect
on the volume of black gardening services.
The scheme has been gradually tightened in recent years. The
subsidy has been lowered and the range of eligible services has been
reduced to cover mainly cleaning services. From 2004, the type of
household entitled to use the scheme has also been restricted to old-
age pensioners and persons receiving disability pensions. The
Government’s main reasons for these changes in policy have been
the significant lowering of overall unemployment since the mid-
1990s and the fact that the scheme has mostly been used by high-
income families. Also, there was an impression that the scheme had
only minor effects on the size of the black economy as a whole.
The present strategy to combat the black
economy
While the home-service scheme has been gradually rolled back as
one of the main pillars of the strategy to combat the black economy,
other instruments are now being emphasised as part of the
Government’s policies in this area. Also, the new guideline on the
transformation of undeclared work into regular employment in the
European Employment Strategy (EES) has probably caused an
increased political focus on the subject.The present strategy is based
on the following main elements (cf. also the Danish NAP of 2003):
• It is the Government’s intention to further ease the administrative
costs of establishing and running private firms,which should lower
the incentives to operate in the black economy. A number of laws
and regulations have been aborted or loosened,for instance when
it comes to the ceiling for registering for VAT payments. Also a
number of tax laws have been revised with the aim of improving
the legal rights of entrepreneurs.
• When it comes to the intensification of incentives and removing of
disincentives to declare work, the Government has taken several
initiatives. As part of the reform called “More people into
employment”, changes have been implemented in 2003 and 2004
to increase the incentives for ordinary employment, which has
also lead to a reduction in the volume of undeclared work. Thus
a ceiling was set from January 2004 for the total amount of cash
benefits that social clients can receive. Also, married recipients of
cash benefits can now keep a higher share of an earned income
before deductions are made in the cash benefits of the spouse.
Furthermore, as part of the tax reform that is being implemented
in 2004, marginal tax rates are being reduced and a special tax
deduction of earned income is to be introduced. This should
further reduce the incentives to work in the black economy.
• With regards to the strengthening of surveillance and the
application of appropriate sanctions, the tax authorities have
intensified their control of the sectors where undeclared and
illegal work is most widespread. This includes on-the-spot
inspections of hotels and restaurants in a specific geographic
area, often conducted in co-operation with the Directorate of
Labour and the police, who control for abuse of unemployment
benefits and for the employment of illegal workers. Also, some of
the laws concerning various forms of indirect taxation have been
amended in order to strengthen the surveillance by the
authorities.
• As a further step to reduce undeclared work, the tax authorities
have launched information campaigns which, among others,
informs pupils in schools about the tax system and the problems
and risks related to black work.
• Methods for estimating the size and structure of the black
economy are being developed. An estimate of black activities is
now included in the official figures for the national accounts and
more detailed information is collected by Statistics Denmark in
co-operation with the research unit of the Rockwool
Foundation. Furthermore, in Autumn 2003 the Government
announced its intentions to establish a special “think tank” to
monitor and analyse the development of the black economy and
put forward ideas for new policies.
Finally, one should mention that a special set of regulations were
put into force in Spring 2004 in order to cope with the challenges
stemming from the enlargement of the European Union. Workers
from the new Member States will be allowed to look for work in
Denmark for a period of up to six months, provided that they can
support themselves. If they find a job within that period, a residence
and work permit will be issued on the condition that the authorities
(the Danish Immigration Service) find that the job in question has
pay and work conditions according to Danish general agreements or
at a similar level. The aim is thus to ensure that immigrants get
genuine jobs that allow them to support themselves and their
families. A special effort will be made to survey and monitor the
developments in the labour market after enlargement. The results
from these activities will determine how the regulations should
develop during the transition period of seven years, until the
workers from the new Member States fully enjoy the same status as
those from the present Member States.
Conclusion
It is generally believed that the volume of undeclared work in
Denmark amounts to only a minor part of the market economy.
Furthermore,undeclared work mainly takes the form of extra hours
performed by workers already having a full time job, for example in
the construction industry. A high prevalence of undeclared work is
found in the hotel and restaurant sector, where it is frequently
combined with illegal work or abuse of unemployment benefits. In
general, however, the widespread use of administrative registers and
controls involving the use of personal identification numbers and a
strict registration of private firms makes it difficult to develop a
large-scale black economy in the Danish case.
This situation is reflected in the policies applied towards undeclared
work, where the focus is on targeted inspections by the tax
authorities and the Directorate of Labour. Also, the reduction of
incentives to perform undeclared work has been an argument for the
lowering of marginal tax rates as part of recent tax reforms. In
general, however, it is difficult to portray the question of undeclared
work as a very hot issue on the Danish political agenda.
Per Kongshøj Madsen
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Introduction
This study focuses on productive activities that are legal in principle
but which are not declared to the authorities. In the debate in
Germany various terms are used to describe these activities, the
most common being Schwarzarbeit (clandestine employment),
Schattenwirtschaft (underground economy) and informelle Arbeit
(informal employment). These terms have arisen out of a variety of
contexts and denote a variety of forms of undeclared employment.
“Clandestine employment” is usually understood as covering
productive employment that is potentially subject to tax and
compulsory insurance contributions, but on which no tax or social
security contributions are paid. The “underground economy”
includes clandestine employment, but also many other undeclared
activities, such as income from interest or from criminal activities,
neighbourly assistance or the non-monetary exchange of goods and
services. The underground economy also includes non-declarable
activities (see Figure 1). Like “clandestine employment”, the term
“informal employment” relates to the activities of individuals but,
depending on how the term is understood, it may also cover
housework and voluntary or civic activities of various kinds.
Figure 1:
Delimination of
Underground
Economy
Source: Min. of Economic
Affairs, Württemberg, 200076 Autumn 2004 |  European Employment Observatory Review
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Strictly speaking, clandestine employment and the underground
economy constitute economic activities. They involve the
production of goods or services and are thus productive, even if the
contribution they make to the gross national product is often not
fully measured or, as with DIY, is not measured at all. In the debates
on informal employment in particular, there is a call for the concept
of productivity to be extended. Firstly, it is pointed out that DIY in
the home produces utility value that raises the standard of living.
Moreover, some authors also ascribe productive functions to civic
commitment. The aim of extending the concept of productivity in
this way is, above all, to help to improve society’s recognition of
voluntary work.
In order to understand the extent and the main elements of the
underground economy and clandestine employment in Germany,
three particular features of the German labour market must be
taken into account:
• In the case of 41 craft trades, under the German Crafts Trades
Code, only skilled workers with a master craftsman’s
qualification in these trades are entitled to practise them.If other
persons – either with no such qualification or with a comparable
qualification in a different occupation – practise such an
occupation, the income may be declared but the activity is
unauthorised. Combating of unauthorised practising of a trade
plays a substantial part in German legislation on illegal
employment.
• Compared with other countries, Germany has only very limited
day-nursery provision for children under three. Moreover, the
fact that in Germany it is customary for children to attend school
only for half the day means that mothers face restricted
employment opportunities. Since in recent years there has been a
considerable increase in the tendency for women to work in paid
employment, owing to these framework conditions there has
been an increasing demand from households with children for
private household services. Owing to the lack of professional
provision on the market, these services are provided in the main
by paid workers in the household concerned. As a rule, these
activities are not declared, since the German system of splitting
taxes between spouses and of derived health and pensions
insurance schemes for married women, who usually carry out
these activities, offers no incentive to legalise their activity.
• As a result of opening up of borders to Eastern Europe and the
implementation of freedom to provide services within the EU,
many workers have been posted to the German construction
industry in particular.In the wake of legal posting,illegal posting
has also increased (Bosch 2004, Bosch/Worthmann/ Zühlke-
Robinet 2000). This illegal posting is obviously operated, to a
great extent, by criminal organisations. This has led to a drastic
increase in the already high level of clandestine employment in
the construction industry.
While infringement of the Crafts Trades Code has traditionally
constituted one of the main areas of clandestine employment, there
has been a particular increase in clandestine employment in the
home and via the posting of workers in the past few years.
These three particular features of the German labour market also
play a part in the measures adopted to combat clandestine
employment. In the Law of 23 July 2004 intensifying the combating
of clandestine employment and associated tax evasion, the
legislator summarised for the first time in a single legal definition,
the definitions of unauthorised clandestine employment that had
hitherto been scattered among various laws (see box below). At the
same time, a distinction was made between clandestine employment
and permitted informal activities. It is made clear in § 1.3 of the Law
that activities performed on behalf of relatives or spouses/partners,
as favours,by way of neighbourly assistance,and by way of self-help
are not deemed to constitute clandestine employment if there is no
profit motive. Minimal remuneration for such activities is tolerated.
Level and nature of clandestine employment
and the underground economy in Germany 
No official figures are available on the level of clandestine
employment and the underground economy in Germany. The
Federal Statistical Office includes underground economic activities
in calculating the gross domestic product since, under the
production concept of the European system of national accounts,
they should be recorded. Various assessment methods are used in an
attempt to determine a GDP that is as complete as possible. For
example, the volume of construction is determined on the basis of
the materials used, or legally prohibited production (e.g. drug
production) is calculated on the basis of the quantities of drugs
seized and estimated domestic consumption (Federal Statistical
Office 2003). In the opinion of the Federal Statistical Office,
however, the underground economy cannot be accurately calculated
from the total of the various “under-recording supplements”since,
in addition to non-payment of tax and insurance contributions,
there are also other reasons for the under-recording, such as gaps in
the statistical system or statistical cut-off boundaries (Federal
Statistical Office 2002).
A number of researchers have used different methods in an attempt
to identify the level of the underground economy in Germany. On
behalf of the Rockwool Foundation, Pedersen (2003) carried out a
survey in a number of countries, using identical questions.
According to this, in 2001 a total of 10.4% of respondents in
Germany aged between 18 and 74 undertook clandestine
employment. Hours worked in clandestine employment represented
4.1% of total hours worked. If wages in the black economy are
taken as the basis, they constitute 1.3% of GDP, and if wages in the
formal sector are taken as the basis, the percentage rises to 4.1%
(Figure 2). Since the productivity of clandestine employment is
Definition of clandestine employment in § 1.2 
of the Law combating clandestine employment
A person who works or provides services or causes work to be done or
services to be provided while, at the same time,
1. not fulfilling his obligation to declare, pay contributions or keep
records and accounts under social security law ensuing from the
provision of work and services as employer, entrepreneur or self-
employed person subject to compulsory insurance,
2. not fulfilling, as a taxpayer, his fiscal obligations ensuing from the
provision of work or services,
3. not fulfilling, as a recipient of social security benefits, his obligations
to notify the organisation providing the benefits ensuing from the
provision of work or services,
4. not fulfilling, as a provider of work or services, his ensuing obligation
to register the commencement of self-employment in a regular
trade (§ 14 of the Crafts Trades Code), or not acquiring the
necessary licence for an itinerant trade (§ 55 of the Crafts Trades
Code),
5. as a provider of work or services, exercising a craft subject to
authorisation as a regular trade without being registered in the
Register of Craftsmen (§ 1 of the Crafts Trades Code),
shall be deemed to be in clandestine employment.Autumn 2004 |  European Employment Observatory Review 77
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lower than that of the formal economy, owing to the lower
capitalisation and also, to some extent, the lower skills level, the
percentage of clandestine employment as measured by Pedersen lies
somewhere between these two percentages. However, Pedersen
points out that he did not measure all clandestine employment,since
it is probable that not all respondents answered honestly. This
supports an assumption that the true levels are higher. On the other
hand, he stresses that in the northern European countries and
Germany the level of clandestine employment is lower than is
frequently assumed, and is substantially below the level in the
Mediterranean countries.
Figure 2: Clandestine Employment in 2001
Schneider (2003) arrives at much higher percentages, since he looks
at not only clandestine employment, but also the entire
underground economy, which also includes other forms of tax
evasion and criminal activities. Unlike Pedersen, he does not ask
directly about activities in the underground economy,but adopts the
cash approach, i.e. an indirect survey method. His starting point is
that, generally speaking, in the underground economy wages are
paid in cash, which means that DIY and neighbourly assistance
involving no monetary payment are excluded. When the amount of
cash in circulation in a national economy exceeds a level deemed to
be “normal”, this shows the extent of the underground economy.
According to this method, the proportion of the underground
economy in GDP in Germany was 16.8% in 2002 and 2003
(Schneider, quoting IG Metall, 2004), while in 1975 it was only
5.75% and in 1989/1990 it was 12.8% (Schneider 2003). This
calculation method involves many uncertainties, such as
determining a starting year with a normal level or taking account of
the rate of circulation of money, which is why experts advise against
using this method (Renooy et al. 2004). What is troubling about
Schneider’s calculations (e.g. in Schneider, Volkert, Caspar 2002) is
that the details of the calculation method (e.g. determination of the
normal level) are not laid bare and hence also cannot be checked. It
can be assumed that the proportion of the underground economy in
GDP lies somewhere between the levels identified by Pedersen and
Schneider.
Figure 3: Average Annual Level of Underground Economy,
2002/2003
The OECD compared actual social security contributions with
theoretical liability, taking as a basis specific national average
contributions and taking account of exemptions, differing
contribution levels, and contribution thresholds. Moreover, public-
service employees were excluded from the calculation, since civil
servants do not have to pay contributions. In Germany, actual
contributions in 2000 were equivalent to 90% of the contributions
theoretically payable (OECD 2004: 248). This still means that 10% of
potential obligations to pay contributions were not met. Even if we
allow for the possibility of measuring errors (owing to
underestimation of the number of mini-jobs or failure to take
adequate account of the contribution threshold), social insurance
schemes are suffering substantial losses. This is a meaningful figure for
Germany, since social security contributions are compulsory, and
supplementary insurance schemes are private. On the other hand, it is
difficult to make comparisons with other countries, since in some
countries voluntary contributions can be paid. Frequent use is also
made of this option (in the USA,for example,for pensions,healthcare
and nursing care).Consequently,in considering actual contributions,a
distinction can no longer be drawn between compulsory and voluntary
contributions. Nevertheless, according to the OECD’s figures, in an
international comparison, the level of honesty vis-à-vis contributions
appears to be relatively high in Germany.
According to Schneider, clandestine employment is concentrated in
the construction sector. However, he appears to underestimate the
proportions of undeclared activities in nursing, the care sector, and
childcare. This becomes apparent when we compare Schneider’s
figures with the main areas of activity in a survey of second jobs
carried out by the Institute for Employment Research (IAB) in 1984
(Table 1). More recent figures, for the year 2000, were obtained on
the basis of the socio-economic panel (SOEP) for the utilisation of
domestic help. According to these figures, 4,349 million households
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across Germany employed domestic help, representing 11.3% of all
households. A total of 2.9 million households stated that this
involved regular employment, and 1.4 million that they employed
domestic help from time to time (Schupp 2002). Domestic help is
utilised by high-income households in particular, although it is also
utilised by the lower income classes. Here, older persons, often also
in need of care, in one- or two-person households in particular, are
likely to be involved.It is worth noting the high discrepancy between
the number of households that pay for domestic help, at least
occasionally, and the small number of workers in households
subject to compulsory social security contributions, which has been
around 40,000 for many years (Weinkopf 2004). This discrepancy
indicates a high level of clandestine employment in this area.
In the course of the past 15 years, there has been a marked increase
in the extent of illegal working in the construction industry as a
result of the posting of workers from non-EU Member States.
Workers can be posted to Germany from the other Member States
in the EU of 15 in the context of freedom to provide services.
Workers from the new Member States and other countries such as
Serbia-Montenegro and Turkey have access to the German
construction market within the framework of quota agreements.
Since the early 1990s, there has been a marked increase in the
number of legally posted workers, although the figure has fallen
slightly since 1997 owing to the poor economic climate in the
construction industry and, possibly, also the shift to illegal working
(Table 2).
Posting of workers paved the way for an increase in illegal working.
Many of these legally posted workers are not remunerated in
accordance with German regulations (Bosch/Zühlke-Robinet 2000
and 2003). A minimum wage was set for them on the basis of the
Law on the posting of workers (Table 3), but this is often
circumvented. Moreover, it is estimated that for every legally posted
employee, another, illegally posted, worker comes in. As a specimen
calculation demonstrates, this has led to German workers being
ousted from large construction sites in particular, for example in
Berlin (Bosch/Zühlke-Robinet 2000).
In order to combat clandestine employment effectively, one has to
understand its various forms and their causes.The German research
shows a lack of adequate understanding of the situation. The best-
known researchers, Schneider (Schneider, Volkert, Caspar 2002)
and Ernste (2003), see the main causes as lying in taxation rates that
are too high, over-regulation of the economy, false incentives in the
transfer system (taking too much account of income from
employment with the unemployed and recipients of welfare
benefits), reductions in working hours that offer more scope for
clandestine employment, and decreasing honesty among taxpayers.
Their core message is that clandestine employment is a warning sign
that society is going off course.Any action taken should concentrate
Table 1:Structure of clandestine employment and
second jobs
Percentages in the total figures for the relevant branches of
economic activity
Construction, crafts 38 49
Commercial and industrial 
enterprises (automotive,
machinery, etc.) 17 –
Hotel and restaurant industry 17 5
Cleaning, domestic help 15 11
Nursing, care, teaching,
childcare – 19
Entertainment and leisure 
industry 13 –
Agriculture – 11
Other – 6
Source: IG METALL, 2004, p. 15
Prof. Schneider’s
calculations
(2002)
IAB survey of
second jobs
(1984)
Table 2: Posted workers and German employees 1992-2002 (annual averages, in 1000s)
1992 103 13 116 1,301 989 10.5
1993 70 20 90 1,343 1,016 8.1
1994 31 106 137 1,405 1,057 11.5
1995 29 132 161 1,411 1,046 13.3
1996 23 165 188 1,311 950 16.5
1997 16 165 181 1,221 869 17.2
1998 19 150 169 1,156 815 17.2
1999 19 139 158 1,110 783 16.8
2000 17 121 138 1,050 736 15.8
2001 16 111 127 954 662 16.1
2002 15 103 118 870 603 16.4
* Estimates by the Hauptverband der Deutschen Bauindustrie (umbrella association of the German construction industry), annual averages.
** Including commuters.
*** Data from the Federal Statistical Office, annual averages; 2002, estimates by the Hauptverband der Deutschen Bauindustrie.
Source: Hauptverband der Deutschen Bauindustrie 2002: 24.
Posted workers*
from Central
and Eastern
Europe**
from the
European
Union
Total
Employees in the building
trades subject to
compulsory social security
contributions (total)***
Employees in the building
trades subject to compulsory
social security contributions
(blue-collar)***
Percentage of posted
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workers in the building
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on correcting this and not on combating symptoms, something that
is in any case ineffective. Other writers go so far as to play down the
underground economy as being “a bulwark against too much state
interventionism and fossilised structures” (Schäfer et al. 2004),
without distinguishing between organised criminality and
occasional clandestine employment. Schäfer et al. (2004) even go so
far as to describe the underground economy overall as improving
the wellbeing of poorer citizens in particular because of the lower
prices, which is hardly true of the drug trade, large-scale tax evasion
and similar activities. Such analyses of the causes are problematical
in a number of respects:
• Firstly, they are on shaky ground as regards methodology. In its
2004 report on employment, the OECD comes to the conclusion
that that there is no connection between taxation rates and the
underground economy (OECD 2004: 254 and also Friedman et
al. 2001). High taxation rates can just as easily be associated with
a high level of honesty among taxpayers,and lower taxation rates
can just as easily be associated with a very low level of honesty
among taxpayers.
• Secondly,in some cases only by regulation can rules for economic
behaviour be established that reduce the incentives to behave
illegally (e.g. laying down of minimum wages for posted
workers). Deregulation and under-regulation are just as likely to
cause the underground economy to expand as over-regulation.
Regulations must therefore be considered on a case-by-case basis.
• Thirdly, large-scale organised criminality, particularly with
regard to cross-border posting of workers, and the particular
causes of clandestine employment in household services are
completely omitted.
• Fourthly, the reasons for the inefficiency of the supervisory
system are not addressed, since the researchers start by assuming
that it cannot be made more efficient. However, there are
definitely tools that can combat clandestine employment
effectively.
Incentives for clandestine employment would only disappear if
there were no more regulations and taxes. Since this is both
unthinkable and undesirable in a complex society, the sweeping
views on deregulation in the discourse on clandestine employment
need to be replaced by a sophisticated debate on the causes of
clandestine employment and suitable tools for combating it.
Combating illegal employment and clandestine
employment 
The large number of different forms of clandestine employment
shows that it is not easy to stop. In the past few years many new
measures combating clandestine employment have been adopted in
Germany,, some of them attempting to reduce the incentives for
clandestine employment and others endeavouring to control it
better and to punish it more severely.
Reducing the incentives for clandestine employment
The reform of the Crafts Trades Code, the promotion of Ich-AGs (a
new, subsidised way of setting up in business) and the new rules on
mini- and midi-jobs and, in particular, on mini-jobs in households,
are aimed at reducing the incentives for clandestine employment.
They constitute initiatives designed to legalise clandestine
employment in the context of the Crafts Trades Code and
household services, which is particularly prevalent in Germany.
Reform of the Crafts Trades Code
The amending statute on the crafts trades law (the Third Law
amending the Crafts Trades Code and other statutory regulations
on crafts trades) entered into force on 1 January 2004, incorporating
the following amendments:
• The compulsory master craftsman’s qualification is limited to 41
craft trades with obligatory admission requirements instead of
94. The other 53 craft trades are no longer subject to obligatory
admission requirements. Under the version of the Crafts Trades
Code previously in force,a master craftsman’s qualification was a
prerequisite for establishing or taking over a craft business in
these 53 trades. This rule now applies only to dangerous and
training-intensive fields. The craft trades that are now no longer
subject to obligatory admission requirements include tilers,
composition floor layers, and tank and apparatus constructors.
However, the master craftsman’s qualification can be obtained in
these trades on a voluntary basis. It then becomes a quality seal
for the business and its employees. Time spent as a journeyman is
no longer a prerequisite for admission to the voluntary master
craftsman examination.
• With only a few exceptions, experienced journeymen can also
work for themselves in craft trades with obligatory admission
Table 3:Minimum wage levels in West and East Germany, 1997-2004
Date concluded  Generally binding via  Duration       West  East  West  East 
2.9.1996 Coll. bargaining committee 1.1.1997-31.8.1997 17.00 15.64 ––
17.7.1997 Coll. bargaining committee 1.9.1997-31.8.1999 16.00 15.14 ––
26.5.1999 Statutory order 1.9.1999-31.8.2000 18.50 16.28 ––
2.6.2000 Statutory order 1.9.2000-31.8.2001 18.87 16.60 ––
1.9.2001-31.8.2002 19.17 16.87 ––
4.7.2002 Statutory order 1.9.2002-31.8.2003 10.12 8.75 ––
1.9.2003-31.8.2004 10.36 8.95 12.47 10.01
* Minimum wage in DM up to August 2002, in euro as from September 2002.
Source: 1996: Hauptverband der Deutschen Bauindustrie 1997: 464-466; 1997, 1999: Hauptverband der Deutschen Bauindustrie 1999: 48-54; 2000-2004: IG Bauen-Agrar-
Umwelt 2000: 5; Bundesgesetzblatt (Federal Law Gazette) Part I, various references, compiled by author.
for skilled labour (occ.
group III)
for unskilled labour 
(occ. group VII 2) 
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requirements, provided they can prove that they have been
practising their trade for six years, four of them in a supervisory
position. The exceptions include chimney sweeps, opticians,
hearing aid dispensers, orthopaedic technicians, orthopaedic
shoemakers and dental technicians.
• Engineers, university graduates and state-examined technicians
can be admitted to a craft trade.
• The proprietor principle, under which a craft business should be
conducted by only one master craftsman, has been abolished.
Enterprises practising a craft trade subject to obligatory
admission requirements may practise such a trade provided that
a master craftsman has been appointed works manager.
• Occupations that can be learned within two to three months are
not subject to a compulsory master craftsman’s qualification.
Occupations categorised as “simple”represent a suitable path to
self-employment, e.g. for the establishment of an Ich-AG.
This amending statute is aimed, firstly, at increasing the rate of
establishment of new craft businesses and, secondly, at reducing
clandestine employment, above all in “simple”occupations and via
the employment of persons with no master craftsman’s qualification
in admissible trades. Critics of the reform fear that the quality of
supply will worsen, the rate of innovation will decrease, and there
will be a reduction in training and continuing training owing to the
establishment of mini-enterprises.There has been a marked increase
in the rate of establishment of new businesses in some of the trades
no longer subject to obligatory admission requirements, such as
tiling. We cannot yet definitively answer the question of whether the
reform has succeeded in creating more long-term jobs and not just
simply short-lived mini-enterprises that are not very innovative and
abstain from training, and in curbing clandestine employment.
ICH-AGs
Within the framework of the Hartz reforms, since 1 January 2003
subsidies from unemployment insurance have been available to
support the establishment of what are known as Ich-AGs. The
monthly subsidy granted to unemployed persons setting up in business
is 600 euro in the first year, 360 euro in the second year and 240 euro in
the third year.While they are in receipt of this subsidy,those setting up
in business are subject to compulsory statutory pensions insurance
and may also pay into statutory health, nursing care and accident
insurance schemes. If the attempt to set up in business fails and the
person concerned is entitled to unemployment benefit, this can be
claimed again before the end of the three-year subsidised period.
In the first year of this scheme (2003), 93,000 persons established an
Ich-AG. In August 2004, there were 157,000 small businesses of this
kind. To date, across Germany one Ich-AG in six has withdrawn
from the scheme. The reasons for this may be as follows:
1. The business concept has failed;
2. The person setting up in business has found a job as an
employee;
3. The Ich-AG makes an annual profit of more than 25,000 euro
and therefore receives no further subsidy; and 
4. The Ich-AG did not take up its work, since the person concerned
only wanted to receive the subsidy and never intended to become
self-employed.
The Gesellschaft für innovative Beschäftigung (G.i.B. – Association
for innovative employment) and the Institut für Mittelstands-
forschung (Institute for research into small and medium-sized
business) (2004) investigated Ich-AGs on behalf of the Ministries of
Labour and Economic Affairs. By July 2004, a total of 29,566 Ich-
AGs had been founded in North Rhine-Westphalia. Of these, some
20% subsequently withdrew from the subsidised scheme. In some
cases, the founders of Ich-AGs have found a permanent job again as
a result of their self-employed activity, or they are earning more
than 25,000 euro a year and are accordingly no longer eligible for
support. In other cases, they fail owing to bad planning. The
authors of the study have therefore suggested that there should be
compulsory consultation before an Ich-AG is founded.
Owing to many instances of abuse, in September 2004 the Federal
Government decided to make support for an Ich-AG dependent on a
“workability”certificate, which can be issued by Chambers of Trade
and Industry, specialist associations or banks. These institutions
have the task of examining a plan with the business concept, the
capital required and the financing, as well as a forecast of turnover
and profitability. Experts had already called for such a plan back in
2002, but at the time the suggestion was rejected on the grounds of
unnecessary bureaucratic effort.
Promotion of small businesses
The Law promoting ownership of small businesses and improving
business financing (Kleinunternehmerförderungsgesetz – KFG) also
entered into force in 2003. It is aimed at dismantling the red tape
involved in founding a business and at improving the financing
conditions for small and medium-sized enterprises.For example,the
thresholds for the requirement to keep accounts (simplified
determination of profits) have been raised as follows:
• Turnover threshold 350,000 euro (previously 260,000 euro) 
• Economic value threshold 25,000 euro (previously 20,500 euro) 
• Profit threshold 30,000 euro (previously 25,000 euro) 
Under the simplification rule, the small businessman may deduct
half his business income as being business expenditure. Taxpayers
covered by the rule need only record their business income,
including their withdrawals, and are released from any obligation to
keep further tax records.
Businessmen who do not exceed the income threshold may utilise
these rules permanently. Owing to the rules on small businessmen in
the VAT legislation,there is also no obligation to pay VAT.However,
businessmen may opt at any time to adopt a different form of
determination of profits (calculating the excess of receipts over
expenditure/preparing balance sheets).
Mini-jobs – up to 400 euro
On 1 April 2003, the rules on marginal part-time employment were
amended by the Second Law on modern labour-market services as
follows:
• The earnings threshold for mini-jobs has been raised to 400 euro.
The previous threshold of 15 hours’ work a week, which could
not be exceeded, has lapsed.
• For these mini-jobs, the employer pays flat-rate fiscal charges of
25% (12% statutory pensions insurance, 11% statutory health
insurance and 2% tax).
• In the case of mini-jobs in the home, the fiscal charge is only 12%
(5% each for pensions and health insurance and 2% tax).
Furthermore, the costs of domestic help are partially tax-
deductible. Such costs can be directly deducted from tax due as
follows:
• • Where a flat rate of 12% is paid, 10% of costs up to a
maximum of 510 euro per year.
• • In an employment relationship involving compulsory
payment of social security contributions, 12% of costs up to a
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• • Where home-related services are used, e.g. industrial
housekeeping agencies, 20% of the costs up to a maximum of
600 euro per year can be deducted.
• • One marginal part-time job can be taken up alongside a main
occupation subject to compulsory social security
contributions without the former being aggregated with the
latter and becoming subject to compulsory contributions.
• • Introduction of a sliding-scale zone for earnings of between
400.01 euro and 800 euro, in which the employer’s
contribution increases linearly from 4% to the standard
employer’s contribution, while at the same time there is full
entitlement to social security benefits as from 400.01 euro.
This Law was aimed at increasing the incentives for both employers
and employees by reducing fiscal charges and by making activities in
the home tax-deductible, and at legalising clandestine employment.
Since the Law was amended, there has been a substantial increase in
the number of registered mini-jobs. It is likely that the majority of
the 6.4 million mini-jobs first identified by the federal miners’social
insurance fund in June had already existed previously as part-time
jobs on the margins of the labour market. As at 30 June 2004, some
7.6 million people were working in marginal part-time jobs (Mini-
Job Zentrale 2004). The number of mini-jobs in private households
rose from 27,817 in June 2003 to 67,401 in June 2004.
In an interim report on the reform, the DIW (German Institute of
economic research) concludes that part of the recorded increase can
be traced back to the effects of replacing previous employment
(Schupp/Birkner 2004). Disappointingly, despite the substantial
amount of tax deductibility, there has been only a minimal increase
in mini-jobs in private households (Weinkopf 2004). The majority
of employment in private households still takes the form of
clandestine employment. The main reason will be that, firstly, many
of those doing such work have social security cover through their
spouses and, secondly, that some of them have a number of these
mini-jobs, which means that they will become fully subject to
compulsory social security contributions if they declare them.
Controlling and punishing clandestine employment
In the past, responsibility for combating clandestine employment in
Germany was divided among many different authorities (tax office,
social services office, authorities responsible for aliens, customs
administration, social insurance schemes, police, Federal Labour
Agency, etc.). Not only were there ambiguities in the division of
competences among the various institutions, but the exchange of
data and information was also inadequate, so that clandestine
employment often went undetected.Moreover,the authorities relied
almost entirely on controlling clandestine employment after the
event and not enough on preventing it from occurring.
In the past few years, the following legislation has provided a new
basis for combating illegal employment:
• Law of 1.8.2002 facilitating the combating of illegal and
clandestine employment:
• • In the construction sector, which is particularly strongly
affected by illegal employment,the main contractor was made
liable for the social security contributions of sub-contractors
directly contracted by him. However, this does not include
liability for the social security contributions of sub-
contractors contracted in turn by the first sub-contractor.
• • Co-operation among the authorities was improved, including
data exchange. For example, the customs administration or
the police can call up data on the issuing of a work permit
directly from the Federal Agency.
• • The scope for fines and penalties was extended. For example,
the maximum penalty for illegal employment of aliens,
regarded as being particularly harmful for society, was
increased from 250,000 to 500,000 euro.
• • Companies that contravene the provisions of the Law may be
excluded from public contracts for up to three years
(previously two years).
• • Restrictions have been placed on advertising of clandestine
employment. Not only telecommunications service providers
(as before), but also newspapers, must pass on customers’
names to the authorities.
• • If taxes and social security contributions have not been paid
against illegal employment, the wages paid are regarded as net
wages subject to contributions and taxes. This avoids the
previous disputes as to whether the wages were net or gross.
• Law of 2.9.2001 on road haulage – this Law was designed to
curb the employment of workers from non-EU Member States
with no work permits, by means of the following amendments:
• • Only drivers with an officially certified work permit may be
employed.
• • The transport company’s customer is also bound by this
obligation.
• • The scope for penalties in the event of infringement was
increased.
This Law speeded up agreement on a corresponding regulation at
European level (Regulation 484/2002 of 1.3.2002).
• Law of 6.9.2001 curbing illegal employment in the construction
industry:
• • At the heart of this Law is the liability of the prime
contractor. The contractor must withhold 15% of the sub-
contractor’s invoice and pay it over to the tax office,to combat
tax evasion.
• Amendment on 1.1.1999 of the 1996 Law on the posting of
workers (AEntG), under which minimum wages can be agreed
for non-German contractors, by:
• • Improving the provisions on co-operation among the
supervisory authorities.
• • Increasing the scope for penalties in the event of infringement.
• • Introducing liability on the part of the general contractor
irrespective of fault in the event that a sub-contractor does
not pay the minimum wage stipulated under the AEntG or
does not pay over contributions to the construction industry’s
holiday fund.
• Law as of 1.8.2004 intensifying the combating of clandestine
employment and associated tax evasion, including the following
new provisions:
• • Precise definition of the concept of clandestine employment
(see box in Section 1).
• • Improvement of implementation of supervision by bringing
together statutory provisions that were previously divided
among a number of laws, and an increase in the rights of the
customs administration to inspect work and service contracts.
• • Obligation for the contractor to submit invoices for work and
services rendered and, in the context of a property, also for
private households, including long-term retention of the
invoices. Hitherto private households were not obliged to
require and retain invoices. Infringement of the obligation to
submit invoices is punishable with a fine of up to 5000 euro,
and infringement of the obligation to retain the invoices with
a fine of up to 500 euro. Previously it was difficult to identify
clandestine employment since no invoices had to be issued.82 Autumn 2004 |  European Employment Observatory Review
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• • In future, in the event of accidents in companies providing
work and services illegally, it is to be possible for the accident
insurance funds to assert a remedy over them.
• At international level, in 1999 on Germany’s initiative the EU
adopted the following code of conduct: Code of Conduct for
improved co-operation between authorities of the Member
States concerning the combating of transnational social security
benefit and contribution fraud and undeclared work, and
concerning the transnational hiring-out of workers (OJ C 125
06.05.1999 p. 1). On the basis of this Code of Conduct, an
agreement was concluded with France on co-operation in these
areas (German Bundestag  2003). In conjunction with these
amendments to the legislation, more staff were taken on to
combat illegal employment, particularly at the customs
administration. In addition, a central office with 50 employees
was established in Cologne to co-ordinate the work of the
principal customs offices on combating illegal employment. A
number of publicity campaigns were designed to draw the
attention of employers and employees to the fact that illegal
employment and benefit fraud are wrong, and to the harm they
cause. These included posters and newspaper advertisements in
2002 under the motto “legal, illegal, nicht egal”(legal, illegal, it’s
not all the same) and extensive information on the Internet,
at www.arbeitsamt.de/illegal and www.zoll-stoppt-
schwarzarbeit.de.
Two other Federal Government initiatives for a law on compliance
with standard wage rates and the introduction of a corruption
register failed in 2002 owing to opposition in the Bundesrat, where
the CDU/CSU and FDP opposition are in the majority:
• Under the draft law on compliance with standard wage rates, in
future public bodies were to be able to award construction
contracts only to companies that paid their employees the
standard wage rate applicable at the construction location. The
same was to apply to local public transport. In the Government’s
view, the massive deployment of low-paid workers in the
construction sector leads to substantial distortion of
competition,so that many jobs are put at risk,especially in SMEs
bound by collectively agreed wage rates. A similar trend is to be
feared in local public transport (ÖPNV), owing to imminent
deregulation at European level. Companies in breach of the law
were to be subject to contractual penalties. The contract could
also be terminated or the company could be excluded from public
contracts.
• Companies found guilty of serious offences were to be kept on a
“register of unreliable companies” for up to three years. Such
offences included, for example, bribery, breach of trust,
prohibited price agreements, illegal exports, illegal employment,
clandestine employment and infringement of the rule on
compliance with standard wage rates. In this way it was to be
possible to exclude these companies from the award of public
contracts. The register would also have included companies that
had attempted to obtain public contracts by means of bribery. In
turn, public contract-placing authorities were to check whether
any candidates for a contract worth more than 50,000 euro were
included in the blacklist.Individual Länder such as North Rhine-
Westphalia are currently considering introducing their own
corruption registers.
The opposition regarded the law on compliance with standard wage
rates as an attack on collective bargaining autonomy and freedom
to provide services, and believed that the corruption register ran the
risk of punishing the whole company for the misdemeanours of one
of its parts.
Conclusions
The underground economy in Germany is believed to have grown,
particularly owing to transnational illegal employment, changing
household structures (higher demand for services because of
increasing employment rates among women) and sustained
unemployment. To date, the research on clandestine employment in
Germany, particularly that carried out by neoclassical economists,
has been too sweeping in attributing the growth in the underground
economy to taxation levels and the large amount of regulation,
without making an adequate distinction between organised
criminality and the clandestine employment of the man in the street.
Much of the research on the underground economy has been
exploited by those concerned with popularising programmes of
deregulation and tax reduction. This inadequate analysis of the
causes has long impeded effective combating of the various forms of
clandestine and illegal employment. Only in the past few years have
many measures been adopted in an attempt to reduce the incentives
for clandestine employment and to combat it more effectively.
Overall, the various laws have tightened up the previous diversity of
competences and facilitated data exchange. The customs
administration has acquired key functions in the combating of
illegal employment and its staffing has been increased. It is not yet
possible to assess how effective the many new initiatives have been.
The liability of general contractors and that of the prime contractor
for the social security contributions of sub-contractors represent
measures to prevent clandestine employment at the source.
However, general-contractor liability has been devalued as a result
of generous allocation of certificates of exemption. Liability for
social security contributions has lost much of its effectiveness by
being limited to the first sub-contractor. These “design faults” in
preventive action and the opposition’s refusal to approve a
corruption register and laws on compliance with standard wage
rates show that Germany has still failed to achieve a broad social
consensus on effective combating of clandestine and illegal
employment.
Gerard Bosch
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Estonia
Introduction
This paper examines the prevalence of undeclared work and
measures taken to combat it in Estonia. The mere fact that this kind
of employment is hidden/not registered means that it is very hard to
assess the size and nature of the phenomenon. Moreover, since the
definitions and measurement methods used to describe undeclared
work differ across countries, it is even more difficult to get
comparable estimates internationally.
In the current article, the Commission definition is used. According
to the definition “any productive activities that are lawful as regards
to their nature, but are not declared to the public authorities, taking
into account the differences in the regulatory system between
Member States” are regarded as undeclared work (European
Commission 1998).
The calculations of the Statistical Office of Estonia (ESA) on the
size and structure of the informal economy are based on the
Commission Decision on Exhaustiveness of 22 February 1994.
However, the core definition of informal employment (see the
definitions by OECD 2004, p.236) is predominantly used while
talking about undeclared work in Estonia. Where in broad terms
this means that the focus has been on wholly undeclared work (both
the employment status and earnings are concealed), under-declared
work (where employers pay taxes only on the minimum wage,
paying the remaining salary “under the table”) and tax evasion on
the earnings of the self-employed.
Undeclared work has major consequences on the labour market and
economic development. The main concerns raised by the informal
economy in Estonia include: tax evasion resulting in lower tax
revenues which in turn exert pressure to raise tax rates; weak social
protection of the workers as non-reported or under-reported
earnings can lead to low social security, and unfair competition
between enterprises in the formal and informal sector which may
reduce the competitiveness of the private sector.Therefore,informal
employment can slow down economic development.84 Autumn 2004 |  European Employment Observatory Review
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Prevalence of undeclared work in the economy
To assess the size and nature of undeclared work in Estonia, the
calculations of the Estonian Statistical Office are used as mentioned
previously. In addition, survey data on “envelope wages” by
Estonian Institute of Economic Research is incorporated to the
analyses.
The share of the informal economy in GDP during 1997-2001 has
decreased to around 7-8% (see Table 1). This is slightly higher
compared to the EU’s where the respective share is around or below
5% of GDP with the exception of Italy and Greece. In comparison
with the new EU members, Estonia (together with the Czech
Republic and Slovakia) belong to the group of countries where the
share of undeclared economy is lowest (around 8-13% of GDP)
(Renooy et al 2004).
Similarly, the share of undeclared employment in total employment
decreased during 1997-2001 from the level of 8.0% to 6.1%. (Purju
et al 2004)
The economic activities with the highest share of employment in the
informal economy in 2001 were (Purju et al 2004, authors’
calculations):
• Community, social and personal service activities (21%);
• Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles, motorcycles
and personal and household goods (16%);
• Real estate, renting and business activities (13%);
• Agriculture, hunting and forestry (9%).
The share of males and females engaged in undeclared work is
equal. However, there are clear differences in economic activity
which reflect the overall gender composition of sectors. Males
dominate in agriculture, hunting and forestry and construction,
while females are mostly concentrated in health and social work,
hotels and restaurants and education. (Purju et al 2004) 
In addition to the calculations by ESA, the Estonian Institute of
Economic Research carries out annual population surveys on the
hidden economy in Estonia. According to the 2003 surveys, about
16% of people claimed that they sometimes or regularly receive
undeclared wages or so-called “envelope wages” (see Table 2).
However, the share of those people has declined over the last years.
Looking at people’s attitudes towards envelope wages, it becomes
evident that the share of people who disapprove of undeclared
payments increased from 57% in 2000 to 89% in 2003. The most
important reasons of disapproval are (Estonian Institute of
Economic Research 2004):
• missing health insurance;
• lower future pension;
• being unfair with respect to other taxpayers and enterprises;
• being illegal;
• leading to lack of public finances which constrain the supply of
public services;
• leading to difficulties with obtaining loan from bank;
• leading to insufficient financing of the social sector.
This shows that public attitudes towards undeclared work have in
general become less tolerant during recent years.
The reasons behind the declining share of undeclared work are
manyfold. The general economic development and steady transition
to a market economy, together with the development of the legal
system and increased legitimacy of central government, are
important factors behind this development.
Another explanation is the tight integration of the Estonian
economy with Western markets and a high volume of foreign direct
investment. Most of the foreign companies prefer formal
employment. (Purju et al 2004).
The third group of explanations relate to the social security system.
The reforms of the social security system where the benefits depend
increasingly on personal contributions have increased the incentives
to declare employment and earnings. In 1997, the Government
reformed the pension system, in 2002 the unemployment insurance
system came into force and in 2004 the new parental benefits scheme
was launched.
The reasons often quoted behind the large informal economy in
CEE countries are related to general social norms and attitudes
inherited from the socialist system. Corruption, widespread
infringement of norms, negative attitudes towards the role of the
State and not seeing the linkage between taxes paid and social
services received are mentioned among others (see e.g. OECD 2004,
Purju et al 2004, Renooy et al 2004).
Despite the fact that the share of undeclared work has been
declining in recent years it still remains on relatively high levels
compared to the more advanced EU countries. The main causes for
that include tax evasion and relatively lenient public attitudes
towards the phenomenon. Furthermore, according to Purju et al
(2004) cross border trade in North-East Estonia (close to the
Russian border) could be the source of informal income.
Measures taken to combat undeclared work
The Estonian labour market and tax authorities give high priority to
combating undeclared labour as a part of the informal economy.
The focus has been on both encouraging formal work by keeping
taxes low, relating social insurance benefits to individual
contributions and increasing sanctions and controls. An important
part of the policy to combat undeclared work has been the creation
of relatively simple regulations for businesses and avoiding over-
regulation in the labour market to ensure its flexibility and efficient
Table 2: Share of employees receiving “envelope wages”,
% of responders
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Receives regularly 8 5 8 7 7
Receives sometimes 11 9 8 6 9
Never receives 81 86 84 87 84
Total 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Estonian Institute of Economic Research “Varimajandus Eestis”, Tallinn
2004
Table 1: Share of informal economy in Estonian GDP ,%
Year At market prices, % At basic prices, %
1997 10.4 12.0
1998 8.8 10.0
1999 8.7 9.7
2000 7.9 8.9
2001 7.4 8.3
Source: Purju et al 2004Autumn 2004 |  European Employment Observatory Review 85
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functioning. The main elements of the policy such as employment
protection legislations, business regulations, tax measures, social
security system and sanctions are briefly analysed in this report.
Employment protection and minimum wage
Employment protection legislation is considered one of the main
reasons behind undeclared work (see OECD (2004), p. 255). When
Estonia established various forms of employment protection
legislation in the 1990s it chose legislation similar to continental
European countries, so that, by the end of the 1990s, regulations
broadly resembled those found in the EU countries.
Currently the employment relations in Estonia are regulated by the
Employment Contracts Act. According to the Labour Inspectorate
the most common violation of the Employment Contract Act in
2003 was the absence of written employment contracts (Labour
Inspectorate 2004). Employment contracts may also be concluded
orally if the term of the contract is less than two weeks. However, it
has been argued by the Estonian Labour Inspectorate that oral
contracts have encouraged undeclared work, because it makes
workplace inspectors harder to detect de facto longer-term
employment contracts (Narusk 2004).
According to labour force survey data only 2.3% of the employed
worked on the basis of an oral agreement in 2003. The share was
higher for males (3.4%) and in rural areas (4.1%). The number of
people working with an oral contract has decreased from 3.8% in
2000. (Statistical Office of Estonia 2004).
Similarly to other CEE countries (see for example OECD 2004, p.
256 for Lithuania), many employers pay taxes only on the minimum
wage in Estonia. Annual minimum wage increases negotiated by
trade unions, have been justified by the need to reduce “envelope
wages”, among other motives. During 1996-2003, the ratio of the
minimum wage to the national average wage increased from 22.8%
to 32.1%. Furthermore, in 2001 the social partners concluded a
long-term wage agreement, according to which the minimum wage
will increase to 41% of the average wage in 2008. However,
according to Rõõm (2003) the increases in the minimum wage in the
second half of the 1990s “had a negative effect on the employment
of workers directly influenced by it, e.g. workers whose wages in the
period prior to the increase of the minimum wage fell between the
old and the new level of the minimum wage”. Therefore, the impact
of increasing the minimum wage on undeclared labour is
ambiguous: on the one hand tax revenues could be maximised, but
on the other, this may exclude some workers from formal
employment.
Business regulation and red tape
One of the aims of economic policy has been to simplify the
creation of businesses..To reduce the costs related to red tape (i.e.all
kind of administration of Government paperwork, tax
administration, registration of employment contracts, requirements
of obtaining licences, etc.) and to promote the creation of new
enterprises, a governmental agency named Enterprise Estonia was
founded in 2000 by the Ministry of Economic Affairs. Enterprise
Estonia is one of the largest institutions within the national support
system for entrepreneurship in Estonia. Together with 17 business
advisory centres and a one-stop internet site they form a business
support network that provides information on the start-up of
enterprises, including consultation, strategic analyses and assistance
in contacting foreign investors. Enterprise Estonia also provides
start-up grants to small-and-medium size enterprises to encourage
formal economic activities.
Small-scale business start-up grants for unemployed people are also
provided by a programme of the Estonian Labour Market Board.
However, only a very small number of unemployed have
participated in the programme. The grants have been relatively low
(about four times the average net wage in Estonia),so their effect has
been moderate.
To reduce red tape, the Estonian Government has also emphasised
the introduction of modern information technology into
communications between governmental agencies and the private
sector. For example, to reduce the administrative costs of taxes, in
2000 the Estonian Tax Board introduced the e-Tax Board that
enables tax-payers (both enterprises and individuals) to fill-in and
file tax returns and to receive information on their tax liabilities and
account balances on-line. This has proved very successful as
taxpayers have no added cost for using electronic services. In 2004,
for example, more personal tax income returns were submitted
electronically than on paper. The same is true for VAT returns and
social tax returns. (Estonian Tax Board 2004).
Tax measures
Despite the fact that, in general, the tax burden on the economy is
low in Estonia compared to EU countries, surveys indicate that
among the main reasons for undeclared or under-declared work are
high labour taxes (Estonian Institute of Economic Research 2004).
The share of total taxes (including social security contributions) was
35.2% of GDP in 2002, placing Estonia 19th among the EU 25
countries (Eurostat and DG Taxation and Customs 2004, p. 239).
The low general tax level is, however, mainly due to low corporate
income taxes; taxes on labour (income tax and social insurance tax)
are considerably higher.
The Estonian tax system is a simple proportional tax system. Since
1994 Estonia has had a single personal income tax rate at the level of
26%. Payroll taxes are also proportional: 33% social insurance tax
(comprised of 20% for pension insurance and 13% for health
insurance), and unemployment insurance payments (0.5%
employers’contribution and 1.0% employees’contribution in 2004).
Unlike some EU countries, there is no provision for lower
contribution rates to be applied at low earnings levels. Neither is
there an upper ceiling for social insurance contributions. Despite
income tax exemptions, which make the average tax lower for low-
income employees, taxes and the so-called tax wedge are still
considered relatively high for low-skilled workers and discouraging
employment (Rõõm 2003).
To reduce labour costs and to encourage employment, it has been
foreseen that the tax exemption will rise to EEK 2000 (128 euro) per
month and the personal income tax rate will decrease to 20% by
2007.
Social security system
In addition to tax cuts that should encourage formal employment,
the social security system has been reformed so that social benefits
are more related to personal contributions and hence give incentives
to be employed formally. In recent years, there have been changes in
the pension system, unemployment benefits “scheme, and parental
benefits” scheme. In all cases personal contributions to the system
now have a major role in determining the size of the benefits.
Since 1997, the Estonian Government has been reforming the
pension system by introducing a three-pillar pension scheme:pillar I
– compulsory State-managed PAYG pension scheme; pillar II –
compulsory privately managed funded pension scheme; pillar III –
voluntary private pension schemes. Also, since 1996 pensioners have86 Autumn 2004 |  European Employment Observatory Review
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been able to simultaneously receive old-age pension and work which
has reduced the motivation for undeclared work and together with
increases in retirement age have increased employment rates in the
age group 55-64. Since 1999, individual contributions of social tax
payments (also for employed pensioners) have influenced future
pensions under the first pillar. In 2002, pillar II started functioning,
in which contributions depend fully on personal social tax
payments.
The introduction of personalised social tax accounts and pension
schemes is one reason behind increased regular employment and
higher growth of formal wages in general.
There were also changes in the Estonian unemployment
compensation system, where personal contributions started to
determine the size and duration of future benefits. In 1991-2002 the
unemployment compensation system consisted only of flat rate
unemployment assistance benefits for 180-270 days, which
depended only on having had formal employment of 180 days
during the previous year. In 2002 compulsory unemployment
insurance system was introduced and the payment of benefits
started in 2003. In this new system, the size of the benefits depends
on the contributions to the system which are proportional to the
formal wages.
Formal employment status is required to be covered by health
insurance, (except in certain cases that were considered of equal
status to an insured person). To encourage employment the range of
people entitled to health insurance was restricted in 2002. Until then
a spouse dependent upon an insured person was considered equal to
an insured person, but since October 2002 only a spouse with up to
five years left until attaining pension age and dependent upon
aninsured person is considered equally insured.
In addition,there has been a shift towards the increased relationship
between personal contributions and benefits also in the family
benefits system. In 2004 a new type of parental benefits1 was
introduced where a parent receives her/his average wages for 365
days. The size of the benefit depends on personal social tax during
the calendar year prior to the child’s birth. For those who have not
worked minimum benefits are guaranteed and there is an upper limit
to benefits. Although the system was not designed to tackle
undeclared work, it should still have a diminishing impact of
undeclared labour by fertile-aged women.
Subsistence benefits and poverty trap
Subsistence benefits are the last-resort social benefits in Estonia.
They are means tested and the duration is not limited. Subsistence
benefits are paid to persons whose monthly income, after paying for
fixed expenses for dwelling, remains below the subsistence line.
Since November 1997 the subsistence line for the first household
member has been EEK 500 (32 euro) per month, for other
household members it has been EEK 400 (26 euro) since 1999.
Although this is relatively low, subsistence benefits create 100%
marginal tax rate, reducing incentives for low-income earners in
certain type of families (depending on family structure and housing
costs) to be formally employed (see for instance Kuddo et al 2002, p.
46).
Although quantitative estimates are missing, interviews with social
workers and officials from local employment offices suggest that
undeclared work has been common among beneficiaries of
unemployment assistance or subsistence benefits (Kuddo et al 2002,
pp 78-79).
Sanctions and control
Combating undeclared work has been one of the major tasks of the
Estonian Tax and Custom Board2 together with the Police Board,
the Labour Market Board, and the Labour Inspectorate. The major
focus of attack has been the ascertainment of the payers
(employers) of concealed salaries. It means that the focus of the
authorities has been regular employment and not temporary work
by self-employed person for baby-sitting, housing, etc.
Fighting against concealed salaries became more systematic from
the beginning of 1999 when administration of social tax collection
was given to the authority of the Tax Office. In subsequent years,
combating concealed salaries has been one of the Tax Board’s
priorities.
In December 2000 the Parliament amended the “Code of Criminal
Procedure and Surveillance Act”to grant the Tax Board the rights
of pre-trial investigation and surveillance. As a result, in 2001 the
Tax Fraud Investigation Centre was established. Previously the
investigation of tax frauds was divided between two different
authorities – the Tax Board and the Police Board, but the co-
operation did not yield satisfactory results. The most important
activities of the centre were the detection of VAT fraud and
concealed salary payments (Estonian Tax Board, 2002).
At the end of 2001 the Tax Board, the Labour Inspectorate, the
Labour Market Board, and the Police Board reached an agreement
to start exchanging information on tax frauds, violations of labour
laws, and to organise joint operations to pursue the offenders. When
carrying out workplace inspections aimed at the detection of
concealed salary payment and ascertainment of illegal labour, the
Labour Inspectorate verifies the existence of valid employment
contracts, the police assist in identifying persons, and the Tax Board
checks the accounting documents.
In the Tax Board’s estimation, the controls have had a positive
influence on the decrease in the percentage of the payers of
“envelope salaries”. This viewpoint has been seconded by several
analysts who see the actions of the tax administration as one of the
driving forces behind the fact that the average salaries in some
industries rocketed. The Minister of Finance has also pointed out
the diminishing relative importance of the concealed salary
payments as one reason for the over-receipt of State budget revenue
in 2002. (Estonian Tax Board, 2002)
In Spring 2004, the Estonian Tax Board chose a new strategy of
combating concealed salaries by sending informative letters to
enterprises that had formal labour costs remarkably lower than the
average of similar enterprises in the same field and asking them to
check their data on taxes and make appropriate corrections.
Otherwise there would be an audit by the Board. Three sectors
receiving most of the letters were construction, hotels and catering,
and car sales and repair. The method has proved to be very cost-
effective as first experiences have shown that about a quarter of the
enterprises receiving these letters improved their tax-reporting
immediately. (Äripäev 25.05.2004)
In Estonia every person has an identity number,which allows for the
extensive linking of databases from social security institutions, the
Tax Board, health insurance etc. Data exchange between relevant
institutions should reduce to a minimum the possibility of receiving
social benefits (e.g. unemployment insurance) and work formally at
the same time. However, audits by the State Audit Office (2003,
2004) have revealed that data exchange between labour market
1 Vanemahüvitis (in Estonian)
2 Since 1 January 2004 the merger of the Estonian Tax Board and of the Customs Board took place and the formal name of the merged institution is now the Estonian
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institutions and tax authorities, for example, does not work in
practice and it has discovered cases where persons have
simultaneously received unemployment benefits and worked.
Information campaigns, social norms
To raise both individual and social awareness of the costs of
undeclared work and unpaid taxes, the authorities have initiated
several media campaigns to inform both employers and employees
of the risks and disadvantages of undeclared work and informal
labour relations.
At the end of 2003 the Ministry of Social Affairs started an
advertising campaign called “Do not be cheated, conclude an
employment contract”3 to promote official and written employment
contracts. The campaign is targeted both at employees and
employers. The campaign introduced the mutual benefit of a formal
contract, which gives security for the future to both parties. The
campaign ended with a major conference on labour market issues.
In Spring 2004, the Estonian Tax Board encouraged all employees
receiving undeclared payments to inform the tax authorities of
these,because the employee does not get sickness benefits,severance
payments, holiday pays, or unemployment insurance benefits on
undeclared payments; also, future pensions and the possibility of
getting a loan from banks depends on formal income.
Conclusions
The share of undeclared labour in Estonia has decreased in recent
years and is currently around 7-8% of GDP according to the
calculations of the Statistics Office of Estonia. Undeclared work in
Estonia can be mainly found in the community, social and personal
services, wholesale and retail trade and repair. As compared to the
new Member States of the EU, the level of undeclared labour in
Estonia is one of the lowest. However, it still remains relatively high
compared to the original Member States. The main reasons for
undeclared work in Estonia include tax evasion and general social
norms inherited from the socialist system.
One of the dominant forms of undeclared work in Estonia is under-
declared work or the so-called phenomenon of “envelope wages”.
According to the survey data, about 16% of the people claimed that
they sometimes or regularly received undeclared wages in 2003.
However, the share of the people receiving envelope wages has
decreased in recent years according to the survey. Also, public
attitudes towards undeclared work have become less acceptable.
The decreasing share of undeclared work in Estonia can be
explained by the general economic development accompanied by
the improvement of the legal system and increased legitimacy of the
central government. Furthermore, high levels of foreign direct
investments have supported this trend.
To reduce the share of undeclared work, the Government actions
have focused on wide ranges of policy areas. These include the
creation of a competitive economic environment through simple
employment protection and business regulations. Empirical
analyses suggest that the strictness of the employment protection
legislation in Estonia is at the average level of the older EU Member
States, while the administrative regulations affecting firms’ entry,
exit and labour adjustments are relatively easy.
The other aspect of the policy mix has been encouraging formal
employment by keeping taxes low. However, this is mainly achieved
by low corporate income taxes. Taxes on labour are on the average
level of the EU but the tax wedge for low skilled workers in Estonia
is considered relatively high. According to the surveys, high labour
taxes are the main reason for envelope wages in Estonia.
The reforms of the social security system have given additional
incentives for formal employment. lasting recent years the pension
system has been reformed and the new unemployment insurance
system and parental benefit scheme were launched. In all these
systems,personal contributions have a major role in determining the
size of the benefits.
Fighting against envelope wages has been at the centre of the
control activities. To increase the effectiveness of these activities,
various administrative reforms have been carried out and control
activities have been intensified. There are no evaluations available
on the possible effects of these activities,but the analysts believe that
intensified controls have reduced the envelope wages.
To raise the individual and social awareness of the costs of
undeclared work, several media campaigns have been carried out.
However, it seems that the campaigns have been focusing mainly on
individual benefits of formal work rather than social responsibility.
In general, one would expect that the overall economic development
of the country will work towards reducing undeclared work and the
composition of it. It is likely that the share of envelope wages will
decrease and the work in households such as cleaning, babysitting,
small-scale construction work, etc., will increase.
Reelika Leetmaa and Andres Võrk
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Greece
Introduction
Undeclared work can be understood in various ways. The 1998
Commission Communication on undeclared work defined the latter
as “any paid activities that are lawful as regards their nature but not
declared to the public authorities, taking into account differences in
the regulatory system between Member States”. A somewhat
broader definition has been adopted by a recently completed study
on undeclared work in an enlarged Union1. According to this
definition, undeclared work is to be understood as productive
activities (rather than paid ones), lawful but not declared to the
public authorities. In practice, the difference between the two
definitions relates to informal employment and its treatment as a
component of undeclared work. Informal employment comprises
not only employment in the informal sector of the economy, but
also informal jobs in the formal sector, where there is no clear
employer-employee relationship (e.g. unpaid family workers). For
reasons explained below, this broader definition of undeclared work
is more relevant in the case of Greece, and is thus adopted in this
report.
Before proceeding with the examination of evidence on undeclared
work, it would be useful to briefly describe the Greek employment
structure, as this structure has implications both for opportunities
for undeclared work and for the volume of undeclared work
performed. According to the latest statistics (Labour Force Survey,
2003 Q4), the self-employed (together with employers) make up
approximately 31.9% of total employment (estimated at 4076.5
persons), with family workers accounting for a further 8.6% of the
total. Employees (i.e. wage and salary earners) complete the picture
with a share of 59.5% of total employment. This employment
structure is in stark contrast with the situation prevailing in other
EU countries (southern Member States included), where wage
employment is the dominant form of employment, making up for
more than 80% of total employment and where the self-employed
and family workers, in particular, occupy much smaller shares. To a
large extent, the large share of self-employment and family workers
in Greece is the cause (and also the outcome) of a large agricultural
sector which is based on very small holdings and family-based
production.
Another feature differentiating Greece from the other EU countries
is the massive influx of immigrants throughout the nineties. Up
until the 80s, Greece exhibited unusual ethnic homogeneity, as the
majority of the population was born in Greece and was Greek
Orthodox. This situation has been radically altered in recent years.
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the political and
economic instability in the Balkans, large numbers of economic
immigrants have chosen Greece as a destination country. The inflow
of immigrants was massive during the first half of the Nineties and
quite substantial during later years. Today it is believed that
immigrants account for at least 10% of the total population and for
about 15% of the total working-age population2.
The large-scale inflow of immigrants has implications for
undeclared work. Being illegal, immigrants had no other option but
to look for jobs in the informal sector of the economy. Immigrants
benefited from a large informal sector, which was already in
existence prior to their arrival, and this informal sector has
expanded and has continued growing, at least up to the beginning of
the decade.
The undeclared work performed by immigrants (legal and illegal)
has attracted a lot of attention in recent years. This type of
employment is commonly referred to as “illegal” employment
(illegal in the sense that there are no contractual arrangements,
1 Renooy P., Ivarsson S., van der Wusten-Gritsai O., Meijer R. (2004), “Undeclared Work in an Enlarged Union”, Report for DG EMPL.
2 The subject of immigrants has been relatively well researched in Greece. See Cavounidis (1999), Cavounidis (2002), Petraki Kottis (1999), Tzortzopoulou (2002).Autumn 2004 |  European Employment Observatory Review 89
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payment of social security contributions, etc.), and often as “black”
employment. The latter term is used mainly by the press and the
media. Greece is currently modernising its immigration policy and,
as part of this process, immigrants are being regularised and given
incentives to work in the formal economy. Combating undeclared
work performed by immigrants, has raised public concern on the
future employment prospects of certain native groups competing
with immigrants in the labour market and thus on the future
development of the unemployment rate in the formal sector of the
economy.
Prevalence of undeclared work in the economy 
Quantitative estimates on the volume and structure of undeclared
employment are non-existent in the case of Greece3. Hence, this
section relies on indirect evidence in order to establish an impression
of the size and the characteristics of those engaged in undeclared
work.
Indirect evidence on undeclared employment can be provided, first
and foremost, by estimates of the size of the informal economy.
Such estimates have been recently provided for a large number of
countries around the globe including Greece, by Schneider (2002).
According to this piece of information, Greece exhibits the highest
level of informal economy, expressed as a share of GNP, among the
OECD-West European countries examined (28.6% of GNP in
1999/2000). This proportion of GNP includes unreported income
from the production of legal goods and services, either from
monetary or barter transactions. It includes therefore all economic
activities which would be taxable had they been reported to the State
(tax) authorities. Following Greece, high levels of informal activities
are reported for Italy (27.0%), Belgium (23.2%), Spain (22.6%) and
lastly for Portugal (22.6%). Expressed in income terms, the informal
economy in Greece is estimated at 329.2 billion USD (251.9 billion
euro), with a corresponding informal economy per capita GNP at
USD 3,420.60 (2,618 euro).
Schneider also provides estimates on the evolution of the informal
economy during the last decade or so. According to this data set, the
informal economy sector grew during the first half of the Nineties in
Greece (from 22.6% in 1989/90, to 24.9% during 1991/92 and from
there on to 28.6% during 1994/95), while it has remained relatively
stable since then and until the beginning of the current decade. In
conclusion, Greece appears to exhibit the highest share of informal
economy among a number of West European countries.Further,the
informal economy sector seems to have grown considerably during
the early nineties, a finding that may well be associated with the
influx of immigrants mentioned in the introduction.
Turning to undeclared employment, a definition of the term
relevant for Greece would include both paid and non-paid
employment activities4. This is both because the informal sector
provides the necessary ground for undeclared work to flourish and
because there is high mobility and substitution between undeclared
paid employment and undeclared non-paid employment, to the
degree that separating these two sectors would not be intellectually
defendable.
As direct estimates of undeclared employment (paid and unpaid)
are not available, the next best thing in order to obtain a picture on
the size and structure of undeclared employment is to provide
evidence on sectors of economic activity classified according to the
status of those employed. As a rule of thumb, undeclared
employment is bound to be higher in activities with a high incidence
of family workers, self-employed and immigrants. Conversely,
undeclared employment is taken to be inversely correlated with
wage employment.
Table 1 presents the latest information on sectoral employment by
economic position (status) of the employed population. Starting
with family workers (typically the wife and children of the
household head), these represent a respectable segment of those in
employment (351,600 persons or 8.6% of the total). Their absolute
majority (192,800 persons or 54.8% of the total) is active in
agricultural employment.A large number of family workers are also
found in distributive trades, tourism, manufacturing activities and
construction.
The self-employed (without any employees) comprise a much more
sizeable portion of the total employed population (1 million
persons, 24.6% of the total). Two sectors appear to be particularly
important for this category of the labour force: agriculture and
distributive trades. Taken together, 612,100 self-employed persons,
or 61% of the total, are to be found in these two sectors. Self-
employment, however, appears to be more dispersed than family
work. Hence, the self-employed are numerous in manufacturing
activities, business and financial services, construction, transport
and communication and, lastly, in tourism.
The combined incidence of self-employment and family work is
particularly severe in farming, where 88.7% of those engaged are
either self-employed or family workers. It is also important in
distributive trades (41.3%), in business and financial services (34%)
and in tourism (31%). Lastly, lower but substantial shares
combining self-employed and family workers (around or above 20%
of the total) are to be found in transport and communication, in
construction and in manufacturing activities.
Regarding immigrants, the principal source for assessing migratory
trends is currently the latest Population Census (2001), conducted
by the National Statistical Service of Greece. According to the
Census results, non-Greek nationals were just under 800,000 at the
beginning of the decade, or 7.3% of the total population. It is
believed, however, that the Census has underestimated the total
number of immigrants and that their real number is close to, or
above one million persons (roughly 10% of the population). Of all
non-Greek nationals, 54.2% stated employment as the main reason
for immigration.
Information on the labour market situation of immigrants is
collected by the Labour Force Survey, which distinguishes between
EU and non-EU nationals. According to this set of data, in 2002,
non-EU nationals exhibited employment rates significantly higher
than those for EU nationals (68.4% in relation to 56.3%). During
the same year, non-EU nationals residing in Greece suffered less
from unemployment than EU nationals (9.6% in relation to 9.9%).
During the last ten years or so, employment rates for non-EU
nationals appear to have grown faster than those for the EU
nationals. The employment rate for non-EU nationals has risen
from 55.3% in 1992 to 68.4% in 2002 whereas, during the same time
period,the equivalent rate for EU nationals increased from 53.6% to
just 56.3%. In addition, unemployment appears to be falling among
non-EU nationals (from 14.2% in 1992 to 9.6% in 2002).In contrast,
the unemployment rate for EU nationals rose from 8.0% in 1992 to
9.9% in 2002. On the basis of these estimates, one would conclude
3 One exception relates to second job holding. According to Eurostat and to information drawn from the 2002 LFS, only 3.1% of those in employment held a second
job in Greece, compared to 3.5% for EU-15.
4 Activities such as work provided within the household by women are of course excluded from having to be reported to the authorities.90 Autumn 2004 |  European Employment Observatory Review
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that immigrants have been integrated into the labour market
successfully.
Although immigrants are not homogenous as a group, employment
is concentrated in three sectors: agriculture, construction and
personal services. It is estimated that seven out of ten immigrants
work in one of these sectors. Of the immigrants in employment,
17.5% work in agriculture, as opposed to 14.1% of natives working
in this sector. Almost one quarter of all employed immigrants are
employed in construction (compared to just 6.9% of natives),
whereas more than one quarter (27.6%) in miscellaneous, mostly
personal, services. In agriculture, the arrival of immigrants
coincided with the long-term decline in agricultural production and
the unwillingness of young farmers to work for low wages under
difficult conditions.Immigrants have helped to revitalise production
by being willing to work for wage rates the farmers could afford and
by substituting for family workers and other groups of seasonal
workers, such as Roma workers. In construction also, rather than
causing displacement effects, the immigrants are thought to have
contributed to the expansion of the sector, favoured by the large
public infrastructure projects, financed by the Structural Funds
and, more recently, by the projects for the preparation of the
Olympic Games. Finally, it is thought that by providing domestic
help, immigrants have indirectly contributed to increasing the
labour force participation rates of native Greek women.
In trying to account for undeclared work, two explanatory factors
of major importance have been identified in academic literature: the
institutional and regulatory conditions of the economy and the
existence of a “culture”for activity in the informal economy.
The institutional and regulatory set of factors relate to the level of
tax burden on labour, to the level of social security contributions, to
regulations concerning overheads and, finally, to regulations
concerning the so-called new and flexible forms of work. As regards
the taxes and social security contribution levels, the bigger the
difference between the total cost of labour and the disposable
earnings, the greater the incentive to work in the informal sector of
the economy. Thus a high level of tax and social security
contributions may act as a stimulus for the labour supply in the
untaxed sector of the economy.
Schneider (2002) has compared the overall tax and social security
contributions level with the size of the informal economy in a
number of OECD countries for the year 1996. In trying to provide
an explanation for differences in the size of the informal economies
in these countries, Schneider did in fact find a certain degree of
correlation between the two variables, in the sense that the countries
with high overall tax and social security burden often exhibited high
levels of informal economy. Thus Greece, the country with the
highest share of informal economy among those examined (28.5%
of GNP),was found to exhibit one of the highest burdens of tax and
social security (calculated as the sum of average direct tax rate,
Value Added Tax rate and social security contributions): 72.3%,
lower only to that of Sweden (78.6%), Belgium (76%) and
marginally to that of Italy (72.9%). The rate of social security
contributions, calculated on the basis of the annual gross earnings
of an average income earner in particular, was found to be the
highest among the countries under examination (43.3%), with the
exception of France (44%). On the basis of these findings, there is
little doubt that the high non-wage cost in Greece stands among the
factors accounting for the presence of undeclared work.
Regulatory burdens are thought to constitute another influential
factor for the prevalence of undeclared work.In general,regulations
increase labour costs with the end result to drive individuals and
firms into the informal economy, where these costs can be avoided.
Although there are no studies to substantiate it, Greece must be one
of the more regulated economies in the EU. The Employment
Protection Legislation (EPL) in particular appears to be among the
Table 1: Employed population, by economic sector and economic position, 2003 Q4, in thousands of persons
Agriculture, horticulture and forestry  658.6 42.4 391.6 31.8 192.8
Fisheries 13 0.8 7.7 3.1 1.4
Mining 11.7 0.1 0.3 11.3 0
Manufacturing 535.8 46.3 73.1 389.3 27.1
Electricity, gas and water 38.1 0.2 0.1 37.7 0.1
Construction 333 40.1 56.5 226.5 9.9
Wholesale and retail trade 712.3 74.8 220.5 342.9 74
Hotels and restaurants 266.9 36.6 51.2 147.4 31.6
Transport, storage and communications 244.2 7.8 51.8 180.2 4.4
Financial services 102.7 1.8 8.6 91.7 0.5
Business services and real estate 227.8 25.9 72.8 124.3 4.8
Public administration 299.6 0.5 0.9 298.3 0
Education 264.9 7.1 13.3 243.5 0.9
Health and social work 172.5 3.9 24.6 143.5 0.4
Other services 140.5 7.1 28 101.7 3.6
Employment in private households 54.6 0.3 2.2 52 0
Ex-territ. Organisations and bodies 0.4 0 0 0.4 0
Total 4,076.60 295.9 1,003.10 2,425.90 351.6
Source: National Statistical Service of Greece, Labour Force Survey
Total
Employers 
(self-employed with
employees)
Self-employed 
(with no other
employees)
Employees 
(wage and salary
earners)
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strictest in the EU and this may have something to do with the large
share of self-employment as well as with the size of the informal
sector (OECD,1999).Again,however,there are no empirical studies
to verify or dismiss these claims.
A decrease of the tax and social security contribution burdens as
well as a decrease in the intensity of certain regulations (such as
licence requirements, for example) may help decrease the level of
undeclared work, but it is unlikely that the latter will cease to exist.
This is because a “culture”of informal economy can be said to exist
in Greece. Against such a background, administrative regulations
can only have a limited impact. People often view undeclared
employment as something legitimate, and this might perhaps
explain why sanctions against employers employing illegal
immigrants are never enforced, despite the fact that they are
envisaged by legislation.
With respect to the impact of undeclared work upon individuals
and upon production, productivity and competition, very little is
known. One notable exception, however, concerns the impact of
undeclared work upon revenue losses from social contributions.
Public finances suffer from the non-declaration of work and the
curtailment of receipts is in its turn reflected upon the level of
services the State offers. In this frame, Tatsos (2001) has, among
others, attempted to estimate the level of revenue losses from the
non-declaration of the work performed by indigenous Greeks as
well as from non-regularised immigrants (i.e. immigrants having
applied unsuccessfully for permit) for the year 1997. According to
findings, the loss for IKA, the largest of the Social Insurance Funds,
amounted to almost 30% of the total receipts for the same year. It
should be mentioned that this is an underestimate of the total loss in
revenue, as the total number of illegal immigrants far exceeded
those that applied for residence permits.
Measures taken to combat undeclared work 
With respect to efforts to reduce undeclared work, Greece has taken
a number of measures in the last few years on a variety of policy
areas. Some of these measures, such as the procedures for
regularising undocumented immigrants, have had a real impact on
undeclared work.
As regards the business environment, Greece scores rather poorly in
the field of entrepreneurship, in relation to the number of
procedures to start a business (16 in relation to OECD average 7),
duration in days (45 compared to 30), cost as % of GNI per capita
(69,6 compared to 10,2) and minimum capital required, as % of
GNI per capita (145.3 compared to 61.2). Greece also scores poorly
in relation to flexibility in hiring and firing workers. The flexibility
of hiring index is estimated at 78 in Greece (compared to the OECD
average of 49), while the flexibility of firing index, is at 43 (OECD
average 28)5.
Given that public sentiment towards entrepreneurship is strong in
Greece (for cultural reasons, among others), there is a “window of
opportunity” here for transforming traditional self-employment
and undeclared work into business activity.In this respect,a new law
of 2001 went some way to simplifying the registration and licensing
procedures for new businesses. During 2002 also, a new law
envisaged the creation of a Guarantee Fund Facility Scheme for
Small Enterprises (TEMPME). This organisation is to cover one
half of the guarantees small enterprises need in order to get bank
loans. The continued simplification of the administrative and
regulatory environment and especially the easing-up of restrictions
on working hours, can strengthen incentives to transform
undeclared work to declared work.
Apart from improving the climate for entrepreneurship, the
lowering of the tax rates and the lowering of the high social security
contributions paid on labour incomes can also have a positive effect
on formal employment.
With respect to the tax system, 2003 has seen the implementation of
a second wave of tax reform, which abolished a large number of
reductions, exemptions and allowances (while simplifying the
remaining ones) and lowered the personal income tax (through
increased tax-free allowances).
Social security contributions remain high in Greece in relation to
European averages, accounting in 2001 for more than 34% of total
gross labour cost, excluding supplementary contributions for
hazardous work (OECD, 2002). Further, the contribution rates
increased during the nineties by 4 percentage points, compared with
a rise of 2.1 percentage points in the EU.
The Government introduced legislation in 2000 (law 2874/2000, in
effect since April 2001),envisaging a 2 percentage point reduction of
the employers’ social security contributions for low-wage workers
(defined as those whose monthly wages do not exceed 587 euro).It is
estimated that the reduction amounts to a 1.6% cut in total labour
costs for those workers. In addition, the government is subsidising
minimum-wage earners’own social security contributions by paying
the part going to the pension account of IKA (6.7% of gross pay).
More recently (2003), the Government introduced a new package of
labour market measures, aiming to increase employment by
reducing non-wage costs for jobless women with children, as well as
for unemployed youths and people over 55 years. Thus, women
working as farmers are exempt from the payment of social security
contributions for one year after the birth of their second child and
employers who hire unemployed youth (up to 25 years of age) or
unemployed aged 55 and over are to be granted a reduction of 50%
of the employer’s insurance contribution. The 2003 labour market
package attempted also to improve the employment opportunities
for the registered unemployed by subsidising the firms that hire such
workers with an amount equivalent to the unemployment benefit.
The cumulative impact of the above measures, as well as of a
number of other measures, mentioned in the NAP 2003 (such as the
modernisation of the key organisations IKA, which is a social
insurance institute; OAED, the Greek Public Employment Service;
and the Labour Inspectorate), is certain to be positive, yet limited.
The effective combating of undeclared work would require more
far-reaching changes in the field of non-wage labour costs and
possibly in the field of employment protection legislation. It is
understood, however, that further cuts in the rate of social security
contributions are prevented by the severe revenue losses incurred
because of the existence of a large undeclared work sector, which is
a vicious circle.
But if recent changes in the institutional and regulatory framework
are modest and of limited impact on undeclared work, the
modernisation of immigration policy can be said to have a real
impact upon the issue.
Greece was the last of the southern European countries to
implement a regularisation programme for undocumented
immigrants (Cavounidis, 2002). The first regularisation programme
took place in 1998 enabling workers without papers to obtain a
temporary residence permit (“white card”), followed by a “green
5 See: http:/rru.worldbank.org/doingbusiness/92 Autumn 2004 |  European Employment Observatory Review
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card”, i.e. a temporary permit valid for up to 5 years. By April 1999,
out of the 369,000 immigrants that applied for the white card,
211,500 submitted the documentation necessary to apply for the
green card6.
Following a new Bill in 2001, the responsibility for economic
immigrants (exercised until then by the Ministry of Public Order)
was transferred to the Ministry of the Interior. The new law
contains provisions for the integration into society of both
foreigners and returning Greek ethnic migrants. Following this, a
second regularisation programme started in June 2001, whereby all
undocumented immigrants were invited to visit one of the 1,300
bureaus specifically set up for this purpose by the local authorities,
and apply for a temporary (six month) residence permit. In order to
apply for the permit, immigrants were asked to submit a variety of
documents which involved substantial costs to gather.It is estimated
that 377,000 persons applied for the residence permit, but the
outcome is unclear (Tzortzopoulou, 2002). As the required
documentation involved a substantial cost, it is likely that many
undocumented immigrants were not in a position to meet it,
implying that this new regularisation programme (extended to 2004)
once more failed to register the whole of the immigrant population.
Although the number of immigrants involved in the two
regularisation programmes and the drop-out rates are far from clear,
it is estimated that, thanks to these two programmes, roughly half of
the illegal immigrants residing in Greece were regularised and given
incentives to work in the formal market.
Conclusions
This report has been exploratory, in the sense that the subject of
undeclared work has not as yet been analysed in detail in Greece.
But the material reviewed enabled a number of observations to
emerge.
There seems to be a large informal sector in Greece, comprising
both paid and unpaid employment with a high degree of
substitution between the two. According to indirect evidence, the
income generated in the informal sector approximates 30% of GNP.
The existence of this informal sector is associated (both as a cause
and as an outcome) with the structure of economic activity in
Greece and more specifically with the large share of self-
employment and family work. Production in many activities is
organised along the lines of very small units, usually managed and
run by members of the same family. Although there is some
evidence that this traditional undeclared work in the informal sector
is contracting, it is still noticeable in tourism (restaurants and
hotels), petty trade, construction, transport, traditional
manufacture and, above all, in agriculture, where it constitutes the
majority of employment. Even if it is currently impossible to
estimate the number of persons engaged in this type of employment,
there is little doubt that their number runs to several hundred
thousand.
This informal sector has been utilised by immigrants who entered
Greece in large numbers during the Nineties searching for a better
future. Especially during the early years of the Nineties, by being
illegal, immigrants had no other option than to look for and find
jobs in the informal sector.Thus the informal sector grew in size and
with it, of course, the numbers engaged in undeclared work
increased substantially. Although immigrants are far from
homogenous as a group, their presence is particularly noticeable in
agriculture, construction and home services.
The tax and regulatory environment, and especially the high non-
wage costs, appear to be among the factors explaining the
prevalence of undeclared work in Greece.It is estimated that the loss
from the non-declaration of labour incomes amounts to almost 30%
of total receipts.
In the policy field, Greece has taken measures to modernise its
immigration policy, including two major regularisation exercises.
Although the results of these programmes have not yet been
analysed and evaluated, there is evidence that they were only
partially successful and that they have failed to register the whole of
the immigrant population. Hence, it is believed that at least half of
the total immigrant population (estimated at around 1 million
persons) is still undocumented and working illegally. It should be
noted that this is only a conservative estimate of the size of
undeclared work, as an unspecified number of regularised
immigrants may still be working illegally.
Dimitris Karantinos
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Introduction
Following a growing interest in tackling the underground economy,
both the European Union and the Spanish Government have
financed a number of research projects on this topic in the last decade.
The first task in this type of research is always to define the concept in
order to limit the field of study and,secondly,a methodology needs to
be devised to quantify the underground economy and to highlight its
main causes, effects, types and scope. Finally, recommendations can
be made regarding policy measures to address the problem.
However, to quantify the underground economy is not an easy task
since, by its very nature, such activities are not easily identifiable in
existing statistics. There are no official data sources and every
approach to this phenomenon must essentially be indirect, based on
signs of its existence and not on the real object of analysis. To make
things more difficult, there is no widely agreed definition of what
constitutes undeclared work and different terms are used (such as
the “black”, irregular, undeclared, clandestine, hidden or unofficial
economy) which do not necessarily refer to the same types of
economic activities.
This paper deals with undeclared work. All workers in the
undeclared economy do undeclared work but the opposite is not
true. Some workers in legally declared activities may not declare the
work they do for various reasons,mainly to avoid taxes,red tape and
social security costs. There is also the inverse phenomenon:
undeclared unemployment. Some inactive or unemployed
individuals declare that they work in activities that enjoy special
benefits or subsidies. For example, some people declare that they
work in agriculture in order to benefit from subsidies when they
cease production a few years later. These two types of irregularities
can cancel each other out and sometimes it may look as though
there are no problems in some sectors or at the aggregate level
because positive and negative figures are being summed up.
This article considers “undeclared work”to be any “paid activities
that are lawful as regards their nature but not declared to the public
authorities, bearing in mind that differences in the regulatory system of
Member States must be taken into account”following the definition
used in the 1998 Commission Communication on undeclared work.
This definition fits the one used by the Spanish Government
perfectly, which states that undeclared work are those paid activities
that are not declared to the fiscal authorities. The definition used by
the Spanish Government stresses the fiscal opacity of undeclared
work, and also emphasises the point that undeclared work has a cost
to the public purse resulting from losses in tax or social security
revenue it would otherwise collect from these workers.
However, societal interest in undeclared work also results from
other reasons relating to the fact that undeclared workers are
usually ill-paid, have low quality jobs and do not benefit from the
social protection system as regular workers do. This often means
they face poor health and safety conditions, do not benefit from
social security or dismissal protection and do not receive the
training regularly employed workers would receive. This makes
competition among firms unfair and results in greater risks of
accidents at work and work related illnesses. Some experts think it is
the natural response of developed countries to competition from
firms located in countries with lower levels of labour standards;
others tend to blame the high cost of the welfare state and some
others consider it just another free-riding problem. Therefore, we
need to study the causes of this phenomenon, establish its typology
and quantify it to design policy measures to combat it.
The rest of the report is structured as follows: the next section deals
with the prevalence of undeclared work in Spain where available
figures attempting to quantify the importance of undeclared work
in the Spanish economy will be presented, as well as the sectors
where it is most prevalent and the types of individuals most likely to
be involved in undeclared work.Furthermore,the report will look at
policy measures taken to combat the underground economy and,
finally, draw some conclusions on the nature and scope of the
phenomenon and the policy measures necessary to address it.
The prevalence of undeclared work in Spain
Figures regarding the level of undeclared work in the Spanish
economy vary depending on the source and method used to estimate
it. In 1985 the Spanish Government estimated that undeclared work
amounted to 15-20% of GDP and that many unemployment
beneficiaries and illegal immigrants were involved in such activities.
Since then, this figure appears to have diminished and today
undeclared work amounts roughly to 15% of employment in Spain.
Since not all economic sectors are equally labour intensive,
undeclared work as a proportion of employment is usually greater
than the undeclared economy as a proportion of GDP.
Even though figures of undeclared work must always be taken with
a hint of caution, a comparison between the Survey of the
Economically Active Population and work declared to the National
Employment Service may shed some light on the distribution of
undeclared work in the economy. This data comes from official
sources and in that sense it may be regarded as the best data
available but it measures many different facts and figures and,as any
with other data measuring a hidden phenomenon, should be
handled with care. Around 15% of the total active population, three
million workers, do not declare their work and most of these people,
almost two million, work in the services sector, just over half a
million in industry and almost a hundred thousand in construction.
Paradoxically, in the agriculture sector the reverse may be true:
many people declare they work in agriculture to have access to some
form of public subsidies or pensions. Considering both phenomena,
undeclared workers are distributed as follows (figure 1).
Most undeclared work can thus be found in the service sector.
Domestic services, trade (whether wholesale or retail) and education
are the sectors within services with more undeclared workers.
Undeclared work is usually used by small firms or private individuals.
However, a different approach may shed some new light. Instead of
considering how many, or what proportion of undeclared workers
can be found in a given sector, it may be useful to analyse what
proportion of total workers in a given sector do not declare the work
they do.In the first case we calculate how many of the total number of
undeclared workers work in certain sectors, and then compare it to
the total number of workers in each sector. For example, if 5,000
workers from a total of 10,000 undeclared workers in the overall
economy are working in the domestic service sector then domestic
service can be deemed very relevant when talking about undeclared
work. However, if there are 2 million workers in domestic service
those 5,000 are relatively unimportant.Figure 2 shows the proportion
of undeclared work in the sectors where it is most concentrated.
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Illegal immigrants
This section will assess the kind of workers found in the so-called
irregular labour market. Many studies carried out in Spain by
different institutions conclude that the undeclared economy is the
main entrance gate to the Spanish labour market for immigrants.
Here, they are mainly concentrated in domestic services, agriculture
and building and construction. A cross-referencing of the figures
from the “Insertion in the Labour Market Survey1” and INEM
registered employment shows that 29% of immigrants do
undeclared work, almost double the figure for undeclared work
Figure 1: Distribution of undeclared work among sectors
Services 66%
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Industry
20%
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12%
Education 14%
Domestic services 7%
Source: Economic Active Population Survey (INE) and INEM
1 The date of this survey is 1996 – therefore it may have lost some informative power with respect to the actual situation.
Figure 2: Proportion of undeclared work in different sectors
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found among Spanish nationals. Since they face many
administrative barriers to be able to work on a regular basis, this
proportion seems too low and must be considered as a “minimum”.
If we consider what the characteristics of immigrant workers are
which push them into the irregular labour market we find the
following evidence:
The t-student ratio test (a statistical measure of one variable against
another) tells us that, in this case, if a value is greater than 2 we have
a significant explanation of undeclared work. The relative
probability figures show that, for example, the probability that
someone aged 26-35 does not declare the work they do is 83.4%
greater than the probability of a person aged 18-26 perfoming
undeclared work. .
According to these figures, young workers under 25 and those over
55 are less likely to work in the underground economy.Also,workers
who found their first job in industry have 15 times more chance of
working in the regular market than those who found their first job in
the services sector. This variable may be explained by the fact that
workers need to be more skilled to work in industry than in services
and this gives them more negotiating power. Also, industrial firms
tend to be more unionised and be of a bigger size than those in the
rest of the economy. Speaking Spanish is another factor that
increases the possibility of finding a job in the regular labour
market. Immigrants from Eastern Europe find it almost seven times
harder to find a job in the regular market than immigrants of Asian
origin. Immigrants from Latin America have the least difficulty in
finding employment. Finally, as the undeclared labour market is
generally an entry gate into employment, the likelihood of
obtaining regular employment increases with the length of time
spent in the country.
The undeclared economy
Whenever we study undeclared work it is natural to relate it to the size
of the “undeclared” economy. Many different ways to measure the
undeclared economy have been used and, among them, is the
comparison between the money flowing around in the economy and
GDP growth.If the quantity of money grows faster than the declared
economy it is assumed that the difference comes from growth in the
undeclared economy.Following this methodology Campillo et al.give
the figures for the undeclared economy as shown in Figure 3.
Since the size of the undeclared economy is smaller than that of
undeclared work, we may conclude that the latter is concentrated in
those economic sectors which are labour intensive2.
Table 1: The probability of different groups undertaking
undeclared work
Variable Relative Probability T-Student
Male 0.8374 0.97
Age 26-35 years old 1.8339 *2.72
Age 36-45 years old  3.1866 *4.35
Age 46-55 years old 2.1246 *2.5
Age 56-65 years old 0.2338 *-2.97
Industry 15.3968 *4.71
Agriculture 0.6666 1.28
Construction 1.2099 0.63
European 0.1434 *-5.1
Latin American 0.4634 *-2.74
Years living in Spain 1.1189 *2.61
Understands Spanish 2.7384 *2.64
Reference group = age 18-25 years old
Asterisks denote significant figures
Source: Survey for Labour Insertion
2 However, there is so much variation between the figures provided by different authors these conclusions must be addressed with caution. For instance, Moltó states
that the size of the hidden economy was around 1.8% in 1980 while Lafuente considered it to be around 22% in the same year.
Figure 3: The undeclared economy (per cent)
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Measures to combat undeclared work
Once we have analysed the size of the “unofficial labour market”in
Spain and what the main characteristics of undeclared workers are,
we can assess the measures which have been used to combat
undeclared work. Some recent measures may be very favourable to
the emergence of undeclared work (that is, the shift of a part of the
economy that was previously undeclared to becoming declared in a
given year) even if they were not implemented for that purpose.
Among them is the reduction in income tax (1999 and 2000), as the
motivation to perform undeclared work to avoid taxes is lessened,
and presumably the undeclared economy will shrink.
However, stronger effects were expected from measures targeted
specifically to combat undeclared work or to boost employment.
Among them were:
• The legalisation on governing temporary employment agencies
(1994).
• A reduction in Social Security costs for new contracts (1997).
• New types of part-time contracts (1999)
The first of the three measures put an end to the monopoly of the
Spanish Employment Institute as a mediator in the labour market
between employers and workers.Shortly after its introduction,when
the Government decided to lower Social Security costs, employment
grew faster than GDP and, considering a negative productivity
shock is unlikely to have been the cause, this is most likely due to the
regularisation of previously undeclared work.
Figure 4 shows that GDP traditionally grew faster than employment
but from 1994 onwards this tendency inverted and from then on it
was employment that grew at a faster pace.
This anomaly in the rates of growth of production and employment
took place both in the construction sector and in services. In both
cases it was after 1998 and we may conclude that the 1997 reform
had the effect of bringing some undeclared labour into the regular
labour market.
Control measures
Surveillance and tougher inspection services have, on the other
hand, proved to perform poorly. Appropriate inspection services
and the corresponding sanctions, however, are related to fairness
and social justice not only because undeclared activities do not
compete fairly with firms that fulfil their legal duties but also, and
above all, justice and appropriate protection for the victims of
undeclared work implies sanctions to those who organise or benefit
from clandestine labour, sometimes putting their lives in peril.
Campillo et al. interviewed a group of experts and asked them to
score some measures (from 0 to 4 according to their effectiveness)
they could utilise to combat undeclared work, and obtained the
results shown in Figure 6.
There is still a long way to go in increasing coordination among
public agencies. Sharing information among different
administrative bodies could be very helpful in spotting undeclared
work. The remaining measures point to the strong relationship
between all aspects of tax compliance and undeclared work. A
policy mix consisting of making it easier for tax payers to fulfil their
legal duties and reinforcing sanctions seems appropriate to fight
undeclared work. Also, campaigns to change public opinion would
be helpful.
Conclusions
Undeclared work is difficult to detect and to quantify. There are
huge differences between the different studies regarding its size and
the sectors where it is located. However, a better knowledge of this
phenomenon seems necessary to fight it effectively. Some recent
measures have proved highly effective but their potential seems
somehow exhausted seven years later.
José Antonio Poncela Blanco
Figure 4: Employment and GDP
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Figure 5: Employment and Gross Value Added in construction and in the service sector
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Figure 6: Effectiveness of Policy Measures
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Within French legislation, undeclared work comes under the
heading of illegal work, which covers:
• the notion of concealed working, defined as follows: “the person
who carries on an economic activity without having declared his
business is guilty of concealed working, as is the employer who
conceals all or some of his employees either for all or part of the
hours of work actually performed by them.”Since the law of 11
March 1997 was passed, this notion of concealed working has
replaced that of clandestine working,so as to avoid,in particular,
confusion between employees concealed by their employers and
foreign nationals in breach of immigration laws (without
residence or work permits);
• and commerce in, or the direct or indirect employment of, a
foreign national without authorisation to work; the hiring-out of
illicit labour; violation of the rules governing temporary work;
paid job-placement; multiple job-holding and benefit fraud.
The legal definition of concealed working,which corresponds to the
notion of undeclared employment as defined by the European
Commission, specifies the two forms of fraud that are to be
penalised: the concealment of economic activities and the
concealment of employees. There is concealment of activity when
the company “has not requested registration in the trade or
commerce register when this is obligatory, or has not made the
necessary declarations to the social security bodies or tax
authorities (article L 324-10 of the Labour Code). There is
concealment of salaried employment when the employer
“deliberately omits carrying out one of the formalities laid down in
articles L 143-3 and L 320 of the Labour Code”, that is, fails to
make a declaration to the URSSAF1 prior to engaging the employee
or fails to issue a payslip to the employee. Lastly, entering a number
of hours lower than the hours actually worked on the payslip also
constitutes concealment of salaried work. Among recorded
instances of illegal working, concealed working is the commonest
offence (77.6% in 2002).
The scale of undeclared work in the national
economy
By its very nature, the underground economy is a phenomenon that
is difficult to quantify. This is why various methods (based on
investigation, fiscal auditing, national accounting, demand for
money, demand for electricity and volume of transactions) have
been developed so that the scale of the problem can be estimated.
Assessments by the national statistical office, INSEE, dating from
1989 were based on the so-called “national accounting” method
and, solely in respect of undeclared legal forms of economic
activity, showed a black economy equivalent to 4-4.5% of GNP. In
1995, estimates based on adjustments for tax fraud and illegal
working showed the impact of the black economy as being also of
the order of 4% of GNP (which would represent a loss for the state
coffers in 2002 of 55 billion euro). According to an analysis carried
out by the Statistics and Planning Directorate of ACOSS2, the
demand-for-money approach frequently used to evaluate the
underground economy shows that in 1999 it represented (all
activities included) 14.7% of GNP.3
For France, estimates made in 20004 produced an assessment that
between “6 and 12% of persons aged 20-69 [had] worked on the
black market in 1998.”In 2003, ACOSS evaluated the phenomenon
of under-declaration of social security contribution liabilities: “a
first, rough calculation obtained by applying the rate of adjustment
of contributions reviewed to the total of social security
contributions due, comes to somewhere in the region of 4 billion
euro. Undeclared contributions would, therefore, represent
something like 2% of total contributions owed by the companies
registered with URSSAF”, a calculation which, according to
ACOSS, underestimates the degree of evasion by leaving certain
factors out of account.
Evaluation of the scale of concealed working on
the basis of reported violations
Though not much different now from ten years ago (5,873 in 2002,
5,200 in 1992), the numbers of violations reported by the
Interdepartmental Delegation in the battle against illegal working
have nonetheless varied greatly over this period: the introduction of
the procedure of prior declaration of employment in 1994 explains
the virtual doubling of recorded breaches between 1994 and 1998.
Since then, the figures have fallen, as a result of the greater
sophistication of the offences and the difficulties of identifying
them, as described by the last DILTI Assessment (presented as part
of the National Plan for Combating Illegal Working in June 2004)
which identifies three major characteristics in the development of
illegal working in France:
France
1 The URSSAFs are the bodies responsible for collecting social insurance contributions in France.
2 Central Agency for Social Security Organisations (Agence centrale des organismes de Sécurité sociale). ACOSS is the national fund of the Collection branch,
comprising 103 URSSAFs in mainland France and 4 General Social Security Funds in the overseas departments.
3 ACOSS STAT ÉTUDE no. 8, L’évaluation de l’économie souterraine : un recensement des études, September 2003.
4 By Schneider and Enste.
Table 1: Typology of offences recorded in 2002 in
descending order
Type of offence Incidence in %
Concealment of employees 50.7%
Concealment of activity 24.7%
Employment of foreign nationals 
without work permits 10%
Other 8.5%
Illicit hiring-out of labour or trafficking in labour 2.4%
Concealment of hours 2.2%
Benefit fraud including defrauding Assedic* 1%
Multiple job-holding 0.2%
False sub-contracting 0.2%
* Assedic is theFrench unemployment insurance agency.
Source: DILTI – figures presented to the National Commission on Illegal Working,
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• An increase in abuses of employment status: the use of
placement agreements to conceal real work or to bring in young
foreign nationals; abuse of voluntary work arrangements or the
wrongful declaration of an employee as self-employed. Young
people coming from the vocational education sector are
particularly vulnerable to such abuses.
• Use of “bogus or dummy companies,” making it impossible to
bring the employer to account: this involves a multi-layered
outsourcing of labour from a large number of companies, a
practice that makes it possible to erect a legal screen behind
which employers seeking to evade their social obligations can
hide.
• A new type of “transnational”economic and social delinquency
by the temporary posting of workers as part of service provision
across Europe or internationally: false offshoring, which enables
a French company to use the services of a (French or foreign)
worker while evading national fiscal and social legislation,under-
declaration of obligatory prior formalities on the part of foreign
companies wishing to operate in France. According to the
DILTI, this seems to represent some 30-50,000 jobs a year in
France on postings of the order of 4-5 months in unattractive
occupations with difficult working conditions and low pay
(welders, waiters, lorry-drivers, carpenters, etc.).
The sectors most affected by illegal working are the services
excluding the commercial sector and hotels and catering, followed
by building and public works, commercial and hotels and catering,
which together represent almost 80% of violations. The remaining
20% are spread over agriculture, transport, and the garment and
other industries. Over the last ten years, appreciable changes have
occurred, with a considerable reduction in the building and public
works sector. This is now no longer the leading sector for illegal
working, whereas the hotels and catering, commercial, and
transport sectors have seen their share increase. Among the service
industries, it should be noted that the broadcasting, cinema and
stage sector is particularly affected by concealed working,
particularly by the total lack of declaration, or the under-
declaration, of periods of activity, as a result of which the
unemployment insurance scheme pays out benefits that are not
properly due.
In agriculture, the most frequent breach of the law is concealed or
partially declared work. The employees concerned are often foreign
nationals from outside the community who do not have permission
to work in France, or illicit seasonal workers who have remained on
French soil improperly after being brought in legally for the
preceding season. The seasonal activities of arboriculture, vine-
growing, market-gardening, oyster farming, forestry and, to a lesser
extent,the maintenance of parks and gardens and rural tourism,are
the most affected by the new illicit practices. This form of illegal
working is, however, tending to diminish while other forms have
grown, most notably with recourse to – French or foreign – service
companies whose mode of operation tends to involve the illicit
hiring of labour. In the hotels and catering sector, the practice of
concealed working – the concealment of activity and the
concealment of employees – is very widespread. But the use of false
sub-contracting, in parallel with the outsourcing of certain tasks
such as cleaning, is increasingly frequent, as is the fraudulent use of
trainees or the development of transnational fraud. Lastly, new
sectors – particularly security and computer services – are now
affected by concealed working practices.
In 1992, URSSAF, which has the power exclusively to deal with
breaches of the rules on concealed working, made contribution
adjustments for illegal working totalling 33 million euro, 31.3
million of which related to contributions due on employed workers
and 1.6 million to contributions owed by employers and the self-
employed. Over the last five years, the average amount of
adjustments stands at 32 million euro; the provisional assessment
for 2003 shows a marked rise in adjustments, the total exceeding 41
million euro. This is a significant result by comparison with the
preceding years and is due to an increase in monitoring activity.
The type of organisation brought to bear
against undeclared working
In France the law of 11 March 1997 represented a significant
advance in this field. Not only did it reinforce the resources brought
to bear, but also clarified the offence of concealed working and
began an interdepartmental campaign which, on the one hand,
grouped together all the institutional actors concerned (labour
inspectors, police, gendarmerie, tax and customs authorities, the
judicial system,and also the social services) and,on the other,all the
social partners – and did so at both national and local level.This law
provides the foundation for the current organisational structure of
the campaign, which is built around the following bodies:
• At the national level, an Interdepartmental Committee on Illegal
Working, which brings together all the ministers concerned, a
National Commission on Illegal Working, made up of all the
heads of the central administrative directorates and of the bodies
responsible for collecting social contributions, which is tasked
with laying down guidelines, both in terms of prevention and
repression, in association with other partners, such as the
representatives of elected local politicians, of consular chambers
or of the national professional organisations of employers and
employees, who are invited to participate on it, and the
Interdepartmental Delegation on Illegal Working (DILTI), which
provides a secretariat for the National Commission on Illegal
Working and co-ordinates the action of the relevant services and
bodies.
• At the local level, on the one hand, the Département Commissions
on Illegal Working, chaired by the Prefect, which elaborate local
prevention programmes on the basis of national guidelines and
bring together all the local actors, the representatives of the
public authorities, such as professional organisations and
consular chambers, and on the other, the Operational
Committees (COLTI) onwhich,in each department,the different
accredited monitoring bodies are represented, and which assure
inter-departmental co-ordination of action.
Table 2: Violations by sector
1992 1995 1997 2001
Agriculture 7.7% 8.4% 7% 7.2%
Construction and Public Works 31.4% 25.5% 24% 19.1%
Hotels and Catering 13 .2% 14.7% 15% 18.6%
Commercial 16.2% 20.3% 21% 18.4%
Transport 3.4% 4 .6% 6.3% 7.9%
Garment sector 4.5% 3.1% 4% 5.1%
Other services 19.1% 19.7% 19.7% 20.6%
Other industries 4.3% 3.6% 3% 3.2%
Source: DILTI – figures presented to the National Commission on Illegal Working –
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Measures taken to combat undeclared working
Apart from the fiscal policies brought to bear (reduction of the VAT
rate, tax credits etc.), the measures aimed at combating concealed
working have two strands to them, the one preventive, the other
repressive.In terms of taxation,France has chosen to take part in the
experiment proposed by the European Commission on the
reduction of the VAT rate, by applying this reduction from 2000 to
2005 to two sectors of activity: the building sector (renovation and
repair work relating to private residences completed more than two
years ago) and personal services (including window-cleaning and
cleaning in respect of private dwellings and personal care services).
An assessment carried out by the Government in October 20025
made very positive findings in this connection. These were more
optimistic than assessments at the European level, where the
Commission takes the view that most of the results remain as yet
hypothetical and have not succeeded in demonstrating a possible
causal relation between a lowering of the VAT rate and a reduction
in the underground economy.
In respect of domestic services, the report estimates the increased
turnover linked to the lowering of VAT in 2000-2001 at 130 million
euro. The measure is also said to have created 3,000 jobs, this figure
corresponding essentially to a re-direction of concealed work into
enterprises. It is in the building sector that the effects seem most
significant. The assessment concludes that the lowering of the VAT
rate proper has brought about an increased turnover of 1.3-1.5
billion euro and has enabled 40-46,000 jobs to be created. As for the
reduction in the underground economy, the report estimates that
around one third of the increased turnover related to the lowering of
VAT comes from the redirection of concealed working. This amounts
to around 0.5 billion euro per year. Among the professional
organisations, in 2002 the Confederation of Craftsmen and Small
Building Companies (CAPEB) had an independent firm carry out a
study on the impact of the measure, which found that some 34,000
jobs had been created directly and a further 20,500 indirectly.
The possibility of applying reduced rates of VAT to hotels and
catering, a sector where there is also considerable concealed
working, is a point that has recurred regularly in recent months in
national debate, with a strong consensus on the part of the present
Government and the professional organisations that the measure
should be applied as soon as possible, particularly as it seems likely
to create a number of jobs estimated at 40,000 over 18 months and
120,000 over two to three years, according to the partners, though
these are estimates which some economists and experts feel are
overstated. Though the cost to the national budget is estimated by
the Union of Hotel Trades and Industries (UMIH) at 1.8 billion
euro (the Ministry of the Economy and Finance say 3.3 billion), this
will rapidly be compensated for, according to this body, by “the
additional tax receipts produced by the creation of new jobs, the
increased turnover, the increased investment, the reduction of
concealed working and the stabilisation of the market (traditional
restaurants then being put on the same footing as take-aways and
fast-food outlets).” While awaiting the possible application of a
5.5% VAT rate to restaurants, the Government has significantly
alleviated social contributions for restaurant owners, in keeping
with commitments made to them, and these may be contributing at
the present time to reducing the phenomenon of concealed working.
So far as prevention is concerned, the policies brought to bear are
based mainly on the simplification of administrative formalities that
was initiated with the Service Employment Cheque Scheme and, in
the agricultural sector, with the Simplified Agricultural
Employment Document. The establishment of the Service
Employment Cheque in 1996 enabled private individuals employing
a person in the home (for housework, childcare, gardening, etc.) to
simplify the administrative formalities very greatly (and did the
same for agricultural employers with seasonal labour) with a
significant impact on concealed working: “in the year following its
creation, 140,000 employers used the system” and it has been an
undeniable success since then (900,000 users today). This policy was
extended with the establishment of Centres for Business Formalities
(a kind of one-stop-shop for start-up companies) and is currently
being further extended with the introduction of the Non-profit
Organisation Employment Cheque (Chèque emploi associatif)6 or
the Enterprise Employment Document (Titre Emploi Entreprise),
which will come into use gradually and in different sectors during
2004 in the hotels and catering, building and public works and
commercial sectors, among others.
Also in the area of prevention,the law combating exclusion that was
reinforced in 2001 by the programme for combating exclusion,
which allowed recipients of the Minimum Integration Income
(RMI) to draw benefits and income concurrently and in full, has
reduced the “unemployment trap” phenomenon and played an
indirect role in the battle against concealed working,7 as did the
introduction in 2001 of the employment premium, by helping to
stimulate the re-entry of low-income households into economic
activity. Recently, the introduction of a national plan for combating
recruitment difficulties has played a part in the battle against
concealed working, as it is recognised that the recruitment
difficulties encountered in certain sectors encourage clandestine
immigration and undeclared working.
Policies of a repressive type revolve mainly around workplace checks
and the application of sanctions. Over the years, we have seen
increased monitoring by the public services and the other bodies
responsible: the URSSAF, for example, are supposed to devote 10%
of their activity to workplace checks, a level they have gradually
managed to attain (the number of such actions has risen by a factor
of 3.3 in 10 years). As far as sanctions are concerned, new decrees
and laws relating to the co-ordination and intensification of the
campaign against illegal working have considerably widened the
areas of employers’ responsibility. Concealed working exposes its
perpetrator to sanctions of a penal,administrative or civil character.
Penal sanctions are targeted both at physical persons (a maximum
fine of 45,000 euro and three years’imprisonment) and legal entities
(maximum fine of 225,000 euro and an operating ban).Two types of
administrative sanctions may be applied: on the one hand, refusal to
grant public-employment or vocational-training aid and, on the
other, denial of the right to tender for a public procurement
contract. Lastly, the civil sanctions for concealed working laid down
in the Labour Code involve the indemnisation of the employee who
is the victim of the offence, for which certain third parties are held
jointly and severally liable – mainly the beneficiary of the work
performed (the client or contractor).8 Agreements signed at the
national level between the DILTI and the professional organisations
(most notably in the Building and Public Works sector) are often
constructed around two types of policy, preventive on the one hand
and repressive on the other. Lastly, with the development of
5 Rapport de la France à la Commission relatif à l’évaluation des baisses ciblées de TVA sur certains services à forte intensité de main d’œuvre.
6 Measures simplifying the recruitment, wages-management and social contribution declaration formalities of non-profit organisations employing more than the
equivalent of three full-time employees in any one year.
7 It may, in fact, be more comfortable for a recipient of RMI to work in the black economy to complement his allowance than take the risk of re-entering the labour
market on the basis of a temporary contract, which is generally what is on offer.Autumn 2004 |  European Employment Observatory Review 101
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transnational fraud and the difficulty the French authorities have
had in controlling it, the campaign against undeclared working has
also been based on a gradually developing European co-operation
and on bilateral agreements signed with Germany (May 2001), Italy
and Spain (2002) and Belgium (2003). More recently, there have
been contacts between the DILTI and some of the new Member
States (Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia).
Conclusion
Though the administrative organisation put in place to combat
concealed working seems relatively well-conceived, it is, in practice,
subject to many more vagaries than are immediately apparent: the
National Committee on Illegal Work has met on very few occasions
since it was created (barely three times in seven years); the same
applies in the case of the National Commission and the
Département Commissions, half of which meet scarcely once a year.
The same observation applies to the COLTI.As long ago as 1999,an
assessment of the role of the URSSAFs and the Agricultural
Mutual Welfare Funds in the battle against concealed working9
noted the lack of co-ordination between the actors responsible for
combating illegal work at the local level and between the local level
and the national. This report identified weaknesses in the
implementation of the repressive strand of the policy. The DILTI
for its part argues that the system lacks resources – particularly
human resources to carry out the monitoring.
In the last few months, however, there have been several signs that
the French Government has given new impetus to the battle against
concealed working: for example, the establishment in October 2003
of a structured plan of action in the broadcasting, cinema and stage
sector, following the re-negotiation of the special regime of
unemployment insurance for the sporadically-employed
entertainment workers, and the first national meeting of the
secretaries of the COLTIs. But, most importantly, in June 2004 the
First National Plan for Combating Illegal Working for the year
2004-05 was presented by the National Committee. “A relentless
war has been declared. We shall be absolutely uncompromising on
this, as national cohesion is at stake,” asserted the Minister of
Labour at the press conference.This plan10is structured around four
sectors of activity that have been identified as priorities (live and
recorded entertainment, agriculture, building and public works,
hotels and catering) and around three lines of action: increasing the
resources for labour inspections; extending co-operation between
monitoring agents and the bodies managing public aid; and
discontinuing all public aid (and not just employment and training
aid) to companies found to be in breach. The repressive strand is
thus coming to assume a major presence in national politics. It
should be complemented by an intensification of monitoring
among job-seekers – both those who come under the general
unemployment insurance scheme and those who come under the
scheme for sporadically-employed entertainment workers. It may
simply be regretted that this national plan for combating illegal
work is not based on an evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses
of the arrangements that have been implemented up to now and that
it is not accompanied by quantitative objectives and monitoring
indicators enabling it to be properly steered and evaluated, since
these features would have increased its effectiveness.
Sandrine Gineste
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Introduction1
Undeclared work is defined as any paid activities that are lawful as
regards their nature but not declared to the public authorities. It
excludes criminal activities as well as work that does not have to be
declared. This definition fits in well with how the concept is
interpreted in Ireland. However, there are no published estimates of
the number of people engaging in undeclared work because such
work is mainly done by people already in employment and they
actively try to conceal some part of their activities from the
attention of the tax authorities and official statisticians. In recent
years there has been an increase in illegal immigration to Ireland
and many illegal immigrants have been involved in undeclared work.
However, there are no estimates yet of how many illegal immigrants
are working in the Irish labour market. Most undeclared paid work
involves tax evasion of one sort or another. Consequently, attempts
to measure the size of the hidden economy in Ireland have focused
on indirect methods of identifying the financial flows on which no
tax is paid rather than on estimating the number of workers
involved.
Prevalence of undeclared work
Within the last ten years there have been three studies that have
attempted to estimate the size of the hidden economy in Ireland.
Two were done by Fagan (1994 and 1997) and the other by Dillon
(2004). These studies provide estimates from the mid-1960s up to
2002. Fagan’s concept of the hidden economy is adapted from work
done by Smith (1986) on the shadow economy in Britain.
The relationship between the formal economy and the shadow
economy is shown in Table 1. Total economic activity comprises the
formal economy and the shadow economy. The formal economy
consists of market and non-market activities, both of which enter
into official estimates of GDP. The shadow economy consists of the
hidden economy and the non-market shadow economy; the latter is
excluded from the measurement of GDP by convention. Fagan’s
estimates of the size of the hidden economy include criminal
activities and activities which result in tax evasion. Consequently,
they include a component, crime production, which is excluded
from the definition above. This is unavoidable as the monetary
approach used by Fagan operates at the level of the economy as a
whole and does not allow a distinction to be made between
undeclared income and criminal activity.
Fagan’s monetary approach is adapted from the work of Tanzi
(1983) and others. It uses currency holdings to estimate the size of
the hidden economy. It relies on the idea that cash is the main
medium used for transactions that people wish to conceal from the
tax authorities. Hence, an increase in transactions in the hidden
economy will result in a greater increase in the demand for cash than
can be accounted for by the increase in transactions in the official
economy. Using the standard relation between income and money
via the velocity of circulation, the monetary approach argues that if
an estimate of the monetary holdings of participants in the hidden
economy were available, it would be possible to estimate their total
income by assuming that the velocity of circulation is the same for
them as for participants in the regular economy. Fagan therefore
devised an equation in which currency holdings relative to the stock
of money (currency plus current account deposits) held by the
public are determined by income (GNP), the interest rate on long-
term government bonds, the tax burden (total tax revenue/GNP)
and a time trend.
Fagan (1997) assumes that in a given base year the size of the hidden
economy was negligible and that currency holdings by hidden
economy participants thereafter are a function of the difference
between the tax burden in the base year and the current year.
Applying this method to Irish data for the period 1963 to 1995
suggests that the hidden economy grew from 0.5% of GNP in 1964
to nearly 11% in 1995. Fagan’s earlier estimates of the size of the
hidden economy are lower than his later estimates by 2-3 percentage
points of GNP due to modification of the estimating equation and
some instability of the parameter estimates. The difference between
earlier and later estimates based on the same method underlines the
uncertainty surrounding estimates of a significant part of national
economic activity that is largely concealed from view.
Ireland
1 We are grateful to Aidan Dillion of the Revenue Commissioners, Colm McDermott of the Department of Social and Family Affairs, Mick Lucey of the Central
Statistics Office, Aebhric McGibney of the Irish Business and Employers Confederation, and Fergus Whelan of the Irish Congress of Trade Unions for providing
information which helped us to write this report. However, the authors alone are responsible for the contents of the report.
Table 1: The Shadow Economy, the Formal Economy and the Hidden Economy
Formal Economy Shadow Economy
Non-Market Economy  Market  Activity Hidden Economy Non-Market Shadow Economy 
Imputed items  Government
spending
Goods and services
included in official GDP
Tax evasion Crime
Production
Household
economy 
Voluntary work 
Measured GDP Activities that should be
included in GDP but which are
hidden 
Activities excluded from GDP by
convention 
Total economic activityAutumn 2004 |  European Employment Observatory Review 103
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Fagan’s estimates have been updated to 2002 by Dillon (2004) using
an equation from Fagan’s earlier study (Fagan, 1994). Dillon
concludes that the size of the hidden economy fell by about one
percentage point between 1990 and 1995 largely due to a reduction
in the tax burden from 32% of GNP in 1990 to 30% in 1995.
Although there were significant reductions in income tax rates
thereafter the overall tax burden remained fairly constant at around
29% of GNP as indirect tax rates increased to maintain revenue.
Consequently, the size of the hidden economy did not change very
much during the era of the Celtic Tiger2. Dillon estimates that it
amounted to about 8% of GNP in 2002.
On the basis of Fagan’s earlier and later estimates and Dillon’s
updating of Fagan’s earlier estimates, it appears that the value of
undeclared income in Ireland in 2002 lay between 8 and 11% of
GNP. In monetary terms, therefore, the size of the hidden economy
in 2002 is estimated to lie between 8 and 11 billion euro. The
percentage estimates put Ireland in the same group as the United
States (which has a low tax burden), Japan, Austria and Switzerland
according to currency demand estimates that were made for these
countries in the mid-1990s.
It is difficult to translate these estimates of undeclared income into
estimates of the number of undeclared workers. In the early 1990s
the Revenue Commissioners compared the number of self-
employed workers shown by the Census of Population with the
number of income tax returns submitted by the self-employed. The
comparison was made at the NACE sector level. Whilst no estimate
of the number of undeclared workers was published, the
comparison showed that the sectors in which they were most likely
to be concentrated were construction and distribution. More
recently a study by the Immigrant Council of Ireland (2003, p. 43)
noted that there were illegal immigrants working in Ireland, but that
“it is impossible to put a figure on their numbers in the absence of
any studies.”
Preventative measures
Tax amnesties and voluntary disclosure schemes
In the 1960s the Pay As You Earn (PAYE) system of taxation was
introduced for employees but not for the self-employed. Employees’
income was reported to the revenue authorities by the employer
while direct assessment continued to be used by the tax authorities
for the self-employed. This meant that there was wide scope for the
self-employed to avoid paying tax, but not for employees. There
were suggestions, almost from the inception of the PAYE system,
that the self-employed were not paying their fair share of tax. This
case was made by trade unions representing industrial workers and
individual taxpayers who argued regularly in the media that self-
employed farmers in particular were not paying enough tax. In the
early 1980s the trade union movement organised a series of public
demonstrations to protest at the unfairness of the tax system. The
Government eventually introduced a tax amnesty in January 1988.
This amnesty brought in 635 million euro in back taxes where only
40 million euro had been expected. Some years later, in 1993, the
Government announced another tax amnesty to try and bring those
who were still not paying enough into the tax net.
Despite these amnesties, tales of widespread tax evasion continued
to surface in the media in the late 1990s, particularly in relation to
many Irish residents allegedly avoiding payment of deposit interest
retention tax (DIRT) on their bank deposits. It was alleged that
some financial institutions colluded in tax evasion by accepting at
face value statements by customers who were living in Ireland that
they were legally resident outside the country. In 2001 the Revenue
Commissioners offered a voluntary disclosure scheme to holders of
bogus non-resident bank accounts to bring undeclared bank
deposits into the tax net. Under the scheme, interest and penalties
were capped at 100% of the tax due. The number of bogus non-
resident accounts was higher than expected: 8,500 compared with
6,500 estimated by the Revenue Commissioners. Most individuals
who availed themselves of the voluntary disclosure scheme held two
bogus accounts.
Subsequently, there was a detailed probe into bogus non-resident
accounts. This resulted in the Revenue Offshore Assets Group
announcing in early 2004 its intention to conduct a comprehensive
investigation into accounts and investments held outside the State
by Irish residents. Holders of undisclosed accounts or investments
were invited to notify the Group of their intention to make a
“qualifying disclosure”.
The benefits of making a “qualifying disclosure” in the context of
the proposed investigation are substantial mitigation of penalties
(10% of the tax unpaid as compared to 100%), the Revenue
Commissioners agreement not to publish names in the Tax
Defaulters List and their agreement not to prosecute for tax evasion.
The Revenue Commissioners’ annual report published in June 2004
documents that the revenue outcome of this scheme is 500 million
euro to date.
Tribunals of inquiry into tax evasion
The amounts yielded by the two tax amnesties showed that tax
evasion was widespread among certain groups of tax payers. When
this information was combined with other information which came
to light during the mid-1990s about alleged corrupt payments to
politicians and involvement of financial institutions in tax evasion,
a number of inquiries were set up to look into the nature and extent
of tax evasion. Table 2 shows the commencement date for each
tribunal set up since 1997 together with an estimate of how much
tax has been recovered to date partly as a consequence of the
relevant tribunal.
The Moriarty Tribunal arose out of the report of an earlier Tribunal
of Inquiry (Dunnes Payments) (1997) into irregular payments to
some members of the Houses of the Oireachtas (Parliament). The
Tribunal was requested to examine the independence of the Revenue
Commissioners and whether the Revenue Commissioners “availed
fully, properly and in a timely manner in exercising the powers
available to them” in collecting tax. In addition, it conducted
inquiries into deposits made by Ansbacher (Cayman) Ltd., to
ascertain whether any payments were made to politicians from these
deposits and, if so, from where the money was obtained. To date the
revenue yield attributable to the Moriarty Tribunal amounts to 6.3
million euro in back taxes and penalties.
The McCracken Tribunal was the first to uncover what became
known as “the Ansbacher accounts”. This led to the discovery of
evidence suggesting that numerous revenue offences were
committed by some leading politicians and business people in the
last thirty years who were taking advantage of a system “whereby
Irish depositors could have their money offshore, with no record of
their deposits in Ireland.”Inspectors were appointed to investigate
2 This is a punning reference to the longer-established term tiger economy, which has been used for about fifteen years to describe the more successful small Asian
economies. The Republic of Ireland has benefited greatly from membership of the European Union. As a result, Ireland claims to have been the fastest-growing
economy in Europe over the past decade, admittedly from a low base.104 Autumn 2004 |  European Employment Observatory Review
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and report on the affairs of Ansbacher (Cayman) Limited in 1999.
The inspectors published their report in 2002.
The Ansbacher Report (2002) concluded that the affairs of
Ansbacher were conducted with intent to defraud a creditor of
some of the bank’s clients – that is, the Revenue Commissioners. In
addition,a Special Project Team within the Revenue Commissioners
began investigating the Ansbacher accounts in October 1999. To
date, 42 million euro has been collected by way of settlement. Table
2 shows the accumulated yield from the special investigations that
have been carried out since 1997. The bogus non-resident accounts
and offshore assets programmes between them brought in almost
95% of the total yield of about 2 billion euro. Most of these
accounts were held by the self-employed.
The scale of tax evasion revealed by the tax amnesties has resulted in
a much higher political profile being given to the ways in which the
legal and administrative arrangements for tax collection are
working. The complexity of the steps taken to avoid declaring
taxable income, revealed by the various tribunals of inquiry, have
led to considerable strengthening of the Revenue Commissioners’
powers to investigate compliance with tax law. The use of amnesties
and mild penalties for tax evaders willing to make voluntary
disclosure of their financial affairs has brought many individuals
and businesses into the tax net who might otherwise have continued
to conceal their economic activity. It is quite possible that the
amnesties and tribunals have also changed the climate of public
opinion from one in which people turned a blind eye to non-
payment of taxes to one in which there is far more public support for
heavy penalties, including prison sentences, for tax evasion.
Strengthening incentives and removing disincentives
to declaring work
Callan and Nolan (1997) used micro simulation models to compare
replacement rates in Ireland and the UK, using consistent
definitions. They found that a higher proportion of the unwaged –
whether unemployed or unoccupied – in Ireland faced replacement
rates above 60%. Tax and social welfare polices in Ireland have since
become more focused on improving the incentive to work.
The Programme for Government adopted by the Coalition
Government in 1997 included a commitment to reducing the
standard and higher marginal rates of tax. This has resulted in a
reduction in the standard rate from 26% on the first 12,573 euro in
1997 to 20% on the first 28,000 euro in 2004 and in the higher rate
from 48% on the remainder in 1997 to 42% on the remainder in
2004. These reductions in the standard and higher rates of tax are
believed to have improved tax compliance and the motivation to
work.
The Department of Social and Family Affairs is responsible for the
development and administration of a number of social welfare
benefit schemes. Some of these schemes were criticised by
economists and employers in the past on the grounds that the level
and qualifying conditions for unemployment, sickness and other
benefits act as a disincentive to work by creating unemployment and
poverty traps. The need to structure benefits in ways that would
avoid creating welfare dependency has been addressed by the
Department in a series of measures designed to make work pay.
Introduction of disregards and tapers
The official disregarding of earnings and tapered withdrawal of
benefits are mechanisms used to develop social security
programmes in ways that are responsive to the needs of the
unemployed and other disadvantaged groups while simultaneously
providing opportunities to assist people to become less welfare
dependent. Many measures are used to make social security benefit
schemes more employment friendly by removing disincentives to
taking up employment for people returning to work, these include:
• One Parent Family Payment weekly earnings disregards ranging
from 100% of the first 146.50 euro to 50% of earnings from
146.51 euro to 293 euro;
• Unemployment Assistance disregard of 40% of net earnings
from part-time work;
• Retention of Rent/Mortgage Interest Supplement and other
secondary benefits on a tapered basis in certain circumstances;
• Tapered withdrawal of adult and child benefit as earnings from
employment increase.
Gradual (tapered) withdrawal of social security payments and other
benefits helps to ease the transition from welfare to work. While the
financial savings of individual measures are difficult to quantify,
these initiatives are designed to ensure that there is no sudden loss of
social security benefits that might influence the decision to take up,
or return to, employment.
Table 2: Yield from Special Investigations of Tax Evasion Since 1997
Date  Revenue
Established  Official Name  Popular Name   Yield € million 
1997  Tribunal of Inquiry (into irregular payments to politicians and offshore accounts)  Moriarty Tribunal  6.3
1997  Tribunal of Inquiry into Certain Planning Matters and Payments  Flood/Mahon Tribunal  18.7
1998  Parliamentary Inquiry into DIRT  DIRT inquiry (1999) (bogus 
non-resident accounts)  749.0 
1998  High Court Inspectors Inquiry into National Irish Bank Clerical Medical 
Insurance Scheme  NIB Inquiry  50.4
1999  High Court Inspectors Inquiry into Ansbacher (Cayman) Ltd. The Ansbacher Accounts
(2002) 42.0
2001 Revenue  Commissioners’ Voluntary Disclosure Scheme  – 500.0
2003 Revenue  Commissioners’ Offshore Assets Investigation  – 651.0 
Note: Some of these tribunals are still sitting so their reports have not yet been published.
Source: Annual Report of the Revenue Commissioners for the year ending December 2003; Irish Times, 17 June 2004, “Revenue Nets 650 million euro from Offshore Accounts”;
Irish Independent, 17 June 2004, “ Tide Turns on Tax Dodgers and Brings in Bounty”; Irish Times, 20 November 2001, “£1 billion Collected in Amnesties Over 13 Years”.Autumn 2004 |  European Employment Observatory Review 105
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Active labour market programmes
Back to Work scheme 
The Back to Work scheme was introduced in 1993 to encourage
long-term unemployed people to take up opportunities for
employment or self-employment. It allows for retention of a
reducing portion of the social security payment over a number of
years, whilst retaining secondary benefits for the period. Employees
can retain welfare payments over a period of three years at rates of
75%, 50% and 25% respectively. The self-employed can retain
welfare payments over a period of four years at rates which decline
in steps of 25% from 100% to 25%. The Back to Work scheme is
implemented on a flexible, non-statutory basis and it has been
developed and extended to other disadvantaged groups, e.g. people
with disabilities and lone parents.
There are approximately 5,600 participants in the employees strand
with approximately 8,000 in the self-employed strand. In September
2002, a survey was carried out among 1,000 randomly selected
former Back to Work participants who had completed the
programme between 1997 and 1999. This survey showed that nearly
90% of cases were no longer receiving social security benefits and
that 80% of cases did not return to claiming benefits after
completing the programme.
Back to Education scheme
The Back to Education Allowance scheme facilitates the long-term
unemployed and other disadvantaged groups in gaining access to
second chance education, at either secondary or tertiary level, by
payment of a weekly allowance. The objective here is to raise
education and skill levels among the long-term unemployed and
other disadvantaged groups to meet the requirements of the modern
labour market. There were 7,648 participants on the Back to
Education Allowance scheme in the 2003/2004 academic year.
Income support for low income families
Family income supplement (FIS) is designed to provide cash
support for those employees with families who are on low earnings.
This preserves the incentive to remain in employment in
circumstances where the employee might only be marginally better
off than if he or she were claiming other social welfare payments.
FIS is paid on a weekly basis over a period of 52 weeks, taking into
account a family’s net earnings and the number of children under
age 18 or aged between 18 and 22 years and in full-time education.
FIS is payable to qualifying families at a rate of 60% of the
difference between the weekly income (net of tax and PRSI) and the
income limit for that family size which ranges from 407 euro for one
child to 584 euro for eight or more children.
Significant progress has been made by the authorities in eliminating
unemployment and poverty traps through the earnings disregards
and benefit tapers, Back to Work and income support schemes. A
criticism that has been made of one aspect of the Back to Work
schemes is that the income threshold for the retention of secondary
benefits has not kept pace with increases in earnings.
Improving surveillance of those who benefit from
undeclared work and improving protection for victims
of undeclared work
Following the tax amnesties and inquiries into offshore accounts,
documented above, the Revenue Commissioners were given
increased powers of surveillance including the power to access
information, previously denied to them, relating to classification of
individuals in banks and other financial institutions. One of the
groups for which these powers have been used are holders of non-
resident bank accounts. Almost all of the tax that has been
recovered is attributable to offshore accounts held by the self-
employed.
In addition, the Revenue Commissioners have received increased
powers to levy severe penalties on non-compliant taxpayers;in some
cases the penalties have amounted to two-thirds or more of the final
tax bill. These powers are now being used extensively. As part of the
social partnership process, the Revenue Commissioners established
a Revenue Partnership (2001) group, consisting of management and
staff, to consider measures that might be taken to identify those in
the hidden economy and to bring them into the tax net. This group
said that it “does not consider that there are a significant number of
taxable persons outside the net.” (See Revenue Partnership, p. 27).
However, it identified a number of high risk sectors where
individuals could avoid paying tax on their undeclared earnings
because most of the transactions are made in cash. These sectors
include bars and restaurants, private transport, and retailing of
tobacco and alcohol. A number of measures, including risk profile
analysis and simplified administrative procedures to facilitate
compliance, were recommended to tackle non-payment of tax in
these sectors.
Strengthening international co-operation to combat
undeclared work
The preventative measures taken to bring non-compliant tax payers
into the tax system showed that one feature of tax evasion in Ireland
was the deposit of funds in so-called non-resident accounts in Irish
banks or in foreign banks, whose activities are outside the
jurisdiction of the Irish authorities. The discovery of relatively large
numbers of people involved in hiding their financial assets resulted
in increased co-operation between the revenue authorities in Ireland
and their counterparts in foreign jurisdictions. According to the
Annual Report of the Revenue Commissioners for 2003, this co-
operation has increased the likelihood of individuals being caught
who try to hide their money by depositing it in domestic non-
resident accounts or in offshore banks. Instruments such as the
Mutual Assistance Directive 77/799/EEC and Regulation 218/92,
which facilitate the exchange of information and joint action with
other tax administrations, are kept under review to see if there are
other actions that can be taken to strengthen international co-
operation between different tax authorities.
Raising social awareness of the costs of undeclared
work
The Government established a working group in the early 1990s,
under a partnership agreement with employers and trade unions, to
make recommendations about how to reduce the size of the
informal economy with particular reference to the construction
sector. The construction sector was identified as a problem because
of the use of sub-contractors on building projects by the main
contractors who, often, did not register their businesses for tax
purposes. The working group recommended the introduction of
tax-compliance certificates for all contractors, and also for firms in
other sectors. This requirement has resulted in some success in
reducing the problem of undeclared income in not only
construction but many other sectors in the economy.
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Italy
Introduction
Undeclared work and the hidden economy has been a constant
feature of the Italian economic system. The phenomenon is not
confined to the weaker economic areas,being spread throughout the
national territory. The issue takes on a particular importance in
these less developed areas, namely in the south, because these areas
display the highest rates of unemployment and the lowest rates of
economic activity. This observation is reinforced by the fact that, in
the present phase, the largest share of informal work is found in
economic sectors producing the lowest value-added: agriculture and
construction. These are key sectors of activity for many regions of
southern Italy, and have always been characterised by precarious
contracts and seasonal work, and the low-skilled services (personal
services, tourism and, more generally, commerce). Undeclared work
is present, but to a lower degree, also in the manufacturing sector
and in craft production.
The National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT) is responsible for
providing official estimates, at national level, according to a
definition of “undeclared work” that coincides with productive
activities that are not observable, but which fall within the confines
of the national system of accounting. The latter comprises all the
productive activities that contribute to the creation of goods or
services satisfying human needs, regardless of whether they are
directly or indirectly “visible”to official bodies.
In addition to regular forms of work, this system also embraces
activities that are classified, by international bodies, as illegitimate,
informal or hidden. Illegitimate work includes productive activities
that are carried out by persons who are not authorised. Informal
work, by contrast, comprises productive activities that are carried
out primarily by productive units with a low level of organisation,
little or no co-ordination of production factors and work
relationships based on family or personal relationships. Finally,
productive activities that are not directly observable, due to either
technical difficulties in detecting them, or to firms’attempt to avoid
tax and social contribution burdens, are referred to as “hidden”.
In this sense, it is possible to distinguish between activities that are
statistically hidden, which occurs when firms are not detected due to
a lack of information, and activities that are economically hidden,
due to the underlying attempt to avoid paying taxes and social
contributions, to circumvent contractual minimum wages, working
hours, safety standards and so on. The Italian system is
characterised by the relevance of productive activities that are
hidden from both the tax-collector and the social insurance
institutions.
The approach followed by ISTAT in estimating the overall entity of
this sector enables us to calculate the number of labour units by
category (regular, irregular, non-resident irregular foreign workers
and multiple jobs), by comparing different data sources and by
using indirect estimation methods. The basic assumption is that
“each source,if appropriately standardised (in terms of time period,
classification, population of reference), can be linked with others,
enabling us to identify quantitative differences to which it is possible
to attach an economic meaning. The procedure of integration and
comparison enables, above all, the inclusion of statistically hidden
firms within the category of regular work and to isolate only the
component of undeclared work that is attributable to economically-
hidden firms”(ISTAT, 2002, p. 9).
In this way, undeclared work may be defined as that which is carried
out without respecting the prevailing tax norms, and which is
therefore not directly visible within companies, institutions and
administrative data sources.The following work roles fall within this
category: (a) continuous; (b) occasional, carried out by persons who
declare themselves to be inactive, e.g. students, housewives or
pensioners; (c) foreigners who are not resident and irregular; (d)
persons with more than one job, not declared to the tax-collector.Autumn 2004 |  European Employment Observatory Review 107
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Undeclared work and policies of intervention at
institutional level
The relevance of the hidden economy in Italy, at policy level,
depends on various factors. One of these factors is believed to be the
relationship, in certain areas and sectors, between the undeclared
economy and criminal organisations which invest part of their
income from illicit activities in non-declared economic activities.
The presence of companies which operate completely in the black
economy or which employ a large number of undeclared employees
also represents a factor distorting competition with respect to firms
respecting the prevailing laws.This unfair competition has effects on
the dynamics of the labour market itself, both because it depresses
the labour supply, especially in areas of high unemployment, and
because it generates a generalised reduction in wage levels, reducing
the contractual power of employees and the respect of legal
provisions in relation to work, hours, professional grade, health and
safety, etc.
In Italy, conversion of undeclared work into regular forms of
economic activity has had an increasing importance in public
debate. The issue is relevant to companies operating in a regular
fashion; to trade unions, who are unable to defend the employees
directly involved, except via individual negotiations; and to the
State, unable to account for a share of the national wealth, which
avoids taxation and thus subtracts a significant amount of resources
from the public budget.
Nevertheless, as a result of growing interest in economic policy
interventions, a commission, known as the “National Committee
for the Emergence of Undeclared Work”(article 78 of law number
448/98), was created in 1999 under the auspices of the Presidency of
the Council of Ministers (Department of Economic Affairs) and it
was later transferred to the Ministry of Labour. The Committee,
comprised of an extensive network of “tutors”(experts in the sector
of the emergence of undeclared work and the promotion of
company development), was founded with the aim of encouraging
the “emergence”of undeclared work.
The tutors, in addition to assisting the activities of the local
commissions, are involved in sustaining small firms, promoting, for
example, forms of alliance between companies. This involvement is
also linked with research activities that do not follow any set
methodologies, but seek to explore specific contexts via targeted
investigations, helping social and economic actors to understand
phenomena that were previously unknown to them, placing
established preconceptions in discussion (Meldolesi, 2000).
Undeclared work: methods of measurement and
distribution of the phenomenon according to
economic activity
At the moment, the only available estimates of the number of
undeclared work units are provided by ISTAT and by SVIMEZ (the
association for development of industry in the Mezzogiorno region),
and are derived from national accounts. The Labour Force Sample
Survey – periodical investigation carried out by ISTAT, every three
months up to last year and subsequently on a weekly basis – does not
aim to detect the share of undeclared work. Other information
provided by institutes such as INPS (National Institute of Social
Assistance), INAIL (National Institute for Workplace Accidents)
and the Ministry of Labour, essentially refer to their own internal
checks; these latter data will be discussed later on in this section.
The estimates supplied by ISTAT relate both to the extent of
undeclared work and to the economic value of the hidden economy.
The first estimate is based primarily on a comparison between the
three-monthly measurement of the labour force (family survey) and
the questions addressed to firms, although this does not permit the
identification of second jobs and the work of non-resident foreign
workers. In order to resolve these difficulties, ISTAT estimates the
number of multiple jobs via a comparison with other sources of
information and by drawing on the data on the work situation of
foreigners, provided by specific research carried out by the Ministry
of Internal Affairs (Calzaroni, 2000 and ISTAT, 1999). Starting
from these estimates of undeclared work, the value of the hidden
economy may be calculated by attributing to undeclared workers the
same productivity as that of those who have regular contracts and,
by correcting company accounts, by attributing to self-employed
workers an income that is almost equal to that of employees
(Pascarella, Pisani, 2000).
As shown in Table 1, between 1992 and 1999, irregular labour units
increased in absolute terms across all forms of occupation, but
above all amongst foreign workers.
The adoption of a new system of national accounts by ISTAT in
2001 (SEC951, substituting SEC79) led to a revision of the estimates
of the extent of undeclared work. In 2001, undeclared work units
represented 15% of all occupations at national level (up from 14.5%
in 1995), equal to roughly 3.5 million work units, with variable rates
of undeclared work in the South and in the North, at 23% and 12%
respectively (equal to 1.5 and 2 million undeclared work units),
confirming the strong dualism characterising the Italian labour
market.
Table 1 : Undeclared labour units by type of occupation, 1992, 1996, 1999
Year Irregular workers Multiple jobs Foreigners Total
Absolute values
1992 1,995,800 746,300 395,700 3,137,800
1996 1,966,600 787,400 533,800 3,287,800
1999 2,076,400 844,000 566,000 3,486,400
Composition %
1992 63.6 23.8 12.6 100.0
1996 59.8 23.9 16.2 100.0
1999 59.6 24.2 16.2 100.0
Source: ISTAT (1999).
1 The estimates previously provided by ISTAT relied on a concept of the hidden economy that included the three components of the “invisible”economy, namely the
statistically hidden, the economically hidden and the informal sector. In the revision carried out using SEC95, these three components are estimated independently
and only the economically hidden component is treated as the irregular dimension of work.108 Autumn 2004 |  European Employment Observatory Review
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This estimated increase involved all sectors, with the exception of
construction, which in the case of the Mezzogiorno region is in
decline, from 29.3% in 1995 to 27.5% in 2001. This variation is
essentially attributable to fiscal provisions relating to the renovation
of houses, which favour the regularisation of construction firms,
although in other regions of the Centre-North there was an increase
of 0.7% in the same period (Table 2).
In 2001, the percentage of undeclared work in the Mezzogiorno,
represented by “irregular workers in the narrow sense”(i.e. workers
who were not declared to the tax-collector as well as resident foreign
nationals) was equal to 78%, which implies that only 22% were
involved in irregular second jobs, as compared with 45% in the
Centre-North regions. This reveals, once again, the chronic
weakness of labour demand in the South, and the poor quality of
employment opportunities, the latter being the result of many
contextual factors: the reduced efficacy of labour market policies;
an excessive incidence of small firms, concentrated in traditional
manufacturing sectors; the lesser efficiency of public
administration, etc. But the weakness of economic development
that structurally distinguish the southern regions and the
inadequate demand for labour, strongly contribute to creating the
conditions for the development of firms remaining at the margins of
the labour market and relying on irregular workers in order to
survive.
The irregularity rate is highest amongst employees, generally in
those sectors with lowest value-added, such as the wooden product
industry and the furniture sector (16%), construction work (22%),
hotels and shops (25%), various real estate and company services
(28%), social and personal services (22%). Amongst the self-
employed, the highest rates of undeclared work are observed in
private instruction teaching (57%) and the health and social services
(26%).
Other information that is relevant for our analysis relates to the
foreign workers who are present within Italy but lack work permits.
These individuals accounted, in 2001, for roughly one sixth of the
total number of irregular workers. It is thought, however, that the
last immigration amnesty (“sanatoria”) that occurred in 2002,
enabled roughly 700,000 immigrants without work permits to
regularise their situation.
In 1998, the share of GDP that can be linked with the hidden
economy oscillated between 14.7% and 15.4%, with the tertiary
Table 2: Rate of undeclared work by economic sector and region
Sector Mezzogiorno Centre-North Italy
1995 1999 2001 1995 1999 2001 1995 1999 2001
Agriculture 34.8 38.4 40.0 21.0 22.6 24.0 27.9 30.4 32.0
Industry 19.7 19.4 19.5 5.4 5.1 5.3 8.3 8.0 8.2
Industry 
(excluding construction) 14.7 14.5 15.0 4.1 3.9 3.8 5.9 5.7 5.7
Construction 29.3 28.8 27.5 10.7 10.3 11.4 16.5 15.9 16.4
Services 18.2 21.2 21.5 14.9 15.1 14.4 15.9 16.9 16.5
Total 20.7 22.6 23.0 12.1 12.2 11.9 14.5 15.1 15.0
Source: SVIMEZ (2002).
Figure 1: Undeclared workers by sector, 1995 and 2001 (absolute values, in thousands)
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sector generating the greatest value-added within the irregular
economy, at 75%. In fact, 2.5 million undeclared workers, out of a
total of 3.5 million workers, are employed within this sector (Figure
1).
The services sector, besides accounting for more than two thirds of
the undeclared work units, also had, between 1995 and 1999, the
highest rate of growth in the number of undeclared workers, as
compared with the overall number of labour units, displaying an
even higher figure for the southern regions (Table 3).
The impact of the services sector, when calculating the number of
irregular labour units, depends not only on the fact that it is the only
sector where there have been increases in the number of jobs (above
all in the form of self-employment), but also on the highly
fragmented commercial structure and, as in other countries, the
growing presence of small commercial activities of foreign origin in
the large urban areas.
The most recent estimates provided by the European Commission,
for Italy, indicate that the share of GDP subtracted from the regular
economy, between 1998 and 2001, was equal to 16-17%, one of the
highest percentages observed in the EU, with the exception of
countries such as Greece, Latvia and Hungary, in contrast with the
much lower rates, around 2%, observed in Austria and the UK.
Undeclared work is a product of various factors, which the
European Commission lists as the rigidity of the labour market, the
influence of the tax burden and the lack of trust in the functioning
of the State. Yet, in the Italian case, the introduction of greater
labour market flexibility has not produced a significant reduction in
undeclared work.
A factor specific to Italy is the distinct distribution of the
irregularity phenomenon at geographical level. The differentials
between the rates of undeclared work depend on differential
sectoral specialisation (in the southern regions the most exposed
sectors – agriculture, construction and low-skilled services) and the
varying tendency of local labour markets to use irregular workers.
In the regions of the South, the incidence of undeclared work is
particularly high in agriculture. In 2001, 40% of labour units were
irregular, with above-average rates in Calabria, Sicily and Campania
(Table 4).
Other data that shed light on the phenomenon of undeclared work
relate to the checks carried out in 2000, in various sectors, by the
Ministry of Labour, by INPS and INAIL. A total of 234,428
companies and self-employed individuals were inspected
throughout Italy, 127,990 of whom were completely hidden or
irregular (CNEL, 2001).
These inspections show that, in general, one third of the companies
have some irregularity, rising to a higher level amongst agricultural
and industrial companies, especially those which are small in size;
lower rates of irregularity are found amongst artisans. The overall
picture of different forms of irregularity resulting from the public
inspections carried out in 2000 reveals the prevalence of non-
registered workers, those who are paid in cash “under the counter”
(fuori busta) and foreigners (Table 5).
Table 3: Index numbers for irregular labour units (LUs), by economic activity 1995-1999 (Base 1995 = 100)
Geographical area Total Agriculture Industry Industry Construction Total services
(excluding construction)
Irregular Total Irregular Total Irregular Total Irregular Total Irregular Total Irregular Total
LUs LUs LUs LUs LUs LUs LUs LUs LUs LUs LUs LUs
South 111.2 101.6 91.8 83.2 98.4 100.5 100.1 101.4 96.9 98.7 123.1 105.5
Italy 106.9 102.6 92.1 84.5 96.7 100.4 96.5 100.3 96.9 100.7 112.4 105.7
Source: ISTAT (2001)
Table 4: Rate of irregularity by region, 2001
Region Agriculture Industry Services Total
Industry (less construction) Construction Total
Abruzzo 29.7 4.5 16.3 8.0 16.0 14.4
Molise 28.7 15.0 17.8 16.0 17.0 17.7
Campania 40.5 16.8 26.5 19.9 25.4 25.3
Puglia 40.1 10.3 25.3 16.8 18.7 21.1
Basilicata 32.2 14.8 19.0 18.2 19.4 20.7
Calabria 47.6 29.8 40.0 34.7 23.8 29.5
Sicilia 40.8 20.2 33.0 25.6 21.5 24.2
Sardegna 26.0 10.6 23.0 25.9 20.6 20.2
South 40.0 15.0 27.5 19.5 21.5 23.0
Centre-North 24.0 3.8 11.4 5.3 14.4 11.9
Italy 32.0 5.7 16.4 8.2 16.5 15.0
Source: SVIMEZ (2002)INPS has supplied information on the duration of the periods of
irregularity and the age of the workers concerned, on the basis of
research carried out in 2000. There appears to be a tendency on the
part of those interviewed (80% of the total) to declare, perhaps in
agreement with their employers, a period of irregularity of less than
one year. The age composition of undeclared workers confirms the
greater incidence of people under 30 years of age, who account for
more than half of the total.
Policies to tackle undeclared work
Despite the fact that the theme of the irregular economy is receiving
greater government attention, the measures that have been adopted
up to now have not produced appreciable surfacing results. At the
end of the 1990s, some results were obtained using the so-called
“Realignment contracts” in the agricultural sector, a measure that
was geared towards a gradual regularisation of workers, with the
aim of avoiding both a penalisation of the firms concerned and the
immediate equalisation of the wages of the workers involved to the
levels set by national contracts. This experience, which developed
with the involvement of the union organisations and employers, had
varying and uneven levels of success across Italy, which explains
why it was not repeated.
The weakness of measures to combat the hidden economy is
confirmed by the recent experience of Law 383 (2001), which
introduced a system of fiscal incentives and attenuation of sanctions
with the aim of favouring an automatic or progressive surfacing of
companies. At the end of February 2003 (the final deadline set by
the Government) only 2,000 firms had presented “Emergence
Plans” to the organism responsible at local level (CLES), covering
just 4,000 workers. This was clearly a failure, demonstrating that it is
not sufficient to intervene in terms of labour costs and fiscal benefits
only in a once-and for-all fashion.
More effective measures were instituted by national and regional
laws which promoted the creation of new firms using formulations
such as the prestito d’onore (cheap credit), an experience which was
pursued at the end of the 1990s and which permitted the creation of
numerous small firms through a simplification of the procedures for
setting up a new company and for obtaining financing.
A reform of the labour market is currently under way in Italy. It
began with Law 30 (2003), with the aim of increasing employment
levels and encouraging the surfacing of undeclared work, for
example by providing for the regularisation of small parcels of
“auxiliary work”. In reality, this law covers a rather extensive range
of forms of work which have notably increased contractual
flexibility. There is a risk of generating an even greater
precariousness within the labour market, above all in the absence of
a safety-net of social assistance capable of sustaining unemployed
individuals. ISTAT has recently stated that the tendency towards
greater flexibility in terms of hours, the duration of work and new
forms of contract do not appear to have checked the growth of the
hidden economy, as the growth in regular work has been lower than
that in undeclared work, which expanded continually between 1992
and 2000. Although the reform of the labour market was approved
(despite the opposition of the largest trade union in Italy), the
unions’ opposition to the proposal to reduce taxes for new
employees (taking account of the fact that many consider the high
cost of labour to be an important source of irregularity) led to its
abandonment.
Once Law 383 (2001) expired, in June 2003 the Ministry of Labour
and the Committee for the Emergence of Irregular Work created
sectoral discussion tables on undeclared work, in order to plan
mechanisms to provide incentives for companies to encourage them
to respect labour laws and to reduce the unfair competition of
irregular firms. Another aim is to generate consensus around the
need to construct surfacing policies by adopting a bilateral
approach during the design phase and the “certification” of fair
behaviour by companies and workers. To this end, sectoral
discussion tables have been organised for construction, agriculture,
tourism, commerce and artisan activities. Building on this
experience, the practice of “common warnings”was initiated and in
construction work (December 2003) this led to the adoption of the
following provisions: (a) a single document testifying to the
regularity of a firm; (b) fiscal relief on tax payments of 41%; (c)
incentives of 11.5% in relation to contributions; (d) removal of
certain additional payments fixed by collective contracts; (e)
contribution reductions for the Cassa Integrazione Ordinaria (short-
term working allowances to employees belonging to firms
experiencing economic difficulties); (f) communication of
recruitment decisions; (g) security in the workplace.
In recent years, there has been an increase in the number of
inspections by the bodies in charge, with the aim of more effectively
contrasting undeclared work via preventive actions, information
and the creation of a new culture of legality. Despite this action, the
need is felt for the permanent training of inspectors, who are still
insufficient in number (Italy has the lowest number of inspectors in
Europe).
As stated in one of the last reports on the hidden economy
published by CNEL, “inspections cannot be occasional and
sporadic, but must be widespread and perceived by public opinion
as an integral part of the overall strategy of emergence of
undeclared work, geared towards the diffusion of a culture of
Table 5: Outline of the irregularities detected by public
controls in Italy in 2000
Forms of irregularity Absolute values %
Total number of workers 
(and % of irregularities detected) 2,066,399 (5.4)
Workers not registered on 
company books 49,120 43.6
Other cases 29,432 26.1
Workers paid in cash 
(“fuori busta”) 20,688 18.4
Foreigners 9,276 8.2
Minors 1,576 1.4
Pseudo-artisans 645 0.6
Pensioners 541 0.5
Students 397 0.4
Workers receiving unemployment 
assistance (CIG) 454 0.4
Workers receiving unemployment 
assistance 256 0.2
Workers on sick or injury leave 77 0.1
Multiple jobs 100 0.1
Total number of irregular workers 112,562 100.0
Source: Ministry of Labour and Social Policy, “Vigilanza ordinaria”, 2000.
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legality, both in the field of the appropriate management of work
relationships, and in those relating to the prevention of accidents
and to safety in the workplace” (CNEL, 2001, p. 52). The recent
reform of inspection services was nevertheless oriented towards the
attribution of a conciliatory function to the bodies of control, thus
weakening their sanctioning powers.
Conclusions
The picture drawn in the previous sections has shown the diversity
of instruments used to tackle the irregular economy in Italy, and
reasons why actions must remain multiple in type and approach.
These interventions must lead to:a relaunching and improvement of
inspection services (without attenuating their role in sanctioning); a
reform of the legal procedures relating to tax evasion (especially
avoidance of sanctions and provisions); a modernisation of the
prevailing legislation and incentives, for example, by promoting
alliances between firms, credit policy and the obligation of
acquiring tax certification from firms situated at the peak of the
production network; and tools for assisting firms with their
“bureaucratic” responsibilities, such as the experience of the
CUORE centres that were promoted within the National
Committee for the Emergence of Undeclared Work.
A comprehensive strategy for integrated services and policies is
required, with the involvement of the various actors (employers’
associations, trade unions, local authorities, etc.) and with the aim
of encouraging the emergence and upgrading of those firms and
workers who are currently “irregular”. It is necessary to create
special funds, such as those for the emergence and consolidation of
surfaced firms, and to spread and promote a “culture of legality”by
reinforcing inspections.
Specific actions for targeted firms and workers are also required,
with the aim of improving social insurance provisions, and of
fostering the respect of environmental and health and safety
legislation. The reform and strengthening of sectoral studies is also
important, in order to facilitate a more transparent relationship
between public administration and companies, but also to achieve a
better understanding of the local context and to facilitate the work
of the inspectors. New laws need to be promoted in relation to
contracts, services, construction work, sub-contracting and
agriculture. Finally, clearer and more streamlined forms of
documentation of foreign workers are required, following a policy
whereby integration is pursued not only within the workplace, but
also more generally, for example by maintaining a permanent
possibility for regularisation and the conversion of temporary
permits.
Davide Bubbico and Giuseppe Ciccarone
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Cyprus
Introduction
In 1998, the European Commission issued the Communication of
the Commission on Undeclared Work (Brussels, COM (1998),
launching a debate on the causes of undeclared work and on ways to
combat it. The European Parliament followed up with the Report on
the Commission Communication on Undeclared Work (Brussels,
Committee on Employment and Social Affairs, A5 – 0220/2000),
urging the Commission to review measures taken by Member States
and to take further action. The Commission funded a study by
Mateman and Renooy (2001), called Undeclared Labour in Europe,
which reported on a number of aspects of this issue for seven
Member States (France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain,
Sweden and the United Kingdom).Another recent study was that of
Renooy et al (2004), which, however, contained little information on
the Republic of Cyprus (Cyprus). The present article addresses
similar issues for Cyprus.
The definition of undeclared work adopted in the Communication of
the Commission on Undeclared Work and in the other studies
mentioned above encompasses “ … any paid activities that are
lawful as regards their nature but not declared to the public
authorities, bearing in mind that differences in the regulatory
systems of Member States must be taken into account”. Thus the
first point to be addressed is how the issue of undeclared work is
viewed locally.
In a recent study carried out by AKEL (2003), the country’s largest
political party, the shadow economy, or “para-economy” as it is
termed in Cyprus, is defined to consist of three general classes of
activities:
a) The “informal”sector, including production of goods and services
for own use, including home repairs and construction, sport
fishing and hunting, as well as “tips”for services offered. In both
1997 and 2000,this was estimated to amount to 2.3% of GDP;112 Autumn 2004 |  European Employment Observatory Review
Trends
b) The “underground”sector including production units which are
not registered, production units which are registered but which
under-report, and self-employed individuals who under-report.
This,in both 1997 and 2000,was estimated to amount to 2.4% of
GDP; and 
c) The  “illegal” sector (private tutoring by teachers, private
account medicine by Government-employed doctors, gambling,
prostitution, copyright violations such as illegal copying of
books and music, cigarette smuggling and drug trafficking)
whose size is thought to have increased as a proportion of GDP
from 3.6% in 1997 to 4.5% in 2000. The study concludes that the
total size of the para-economy was approximately 8.3% in 1997
and 9.2% in 2000.
The definitions in the AKEL study (2003), as described above, are
not entirely in line with the approach adopted by the Commission,
which refers to “lawful”and “paid”activities that are not declared.
The AKEL study’s “informal” sector includes many activities that
are not paid and should, therefore, be excluded from the present
definition of undeclared work. Only “tips”come under the category
of “paid activities that are lawful”. The activities in the
“underground” sector can be viewed as undeclared work. Finally,
AKEL’s (2003) “illegal” sector contains private tutoring and
medical services which are not in fact illegal even though they may
violate the employment terms of the individuals involved. There is
no explicit mention of work by illegal immigrants, though it may be
captured thematically in the various categories discussed – e.g. in
“underground”construction work. In this article, the Commission’s
definition of undeclared work will be used, namely, the definition
used here will include “tips”(from AKEL category [a]), the whole of
the “underground” sector (from AKEL category [b] and private
tutoring and medical services (from AKEL category [c]).
It is worth noting that the task of combating undeclared work has
not been given very high priority in light of the country’s other
problems. The accession process, the long process of negotiation of
UN plans for the island, the fallout from the rejection by the Greek
Cypriots of the Fifth Annan Plan, the subsequent efforts to contain
the damage from this rejection, and the attempts to deal with the
burgeoning Government deficit, all limit the energy and thought
that can and have been given to the problem of undeclared work.
In general, there is no political appetite for dealing with the
“informal” sector. Activities in the “underground” sector are
certainly frowned upon but it is often taken for granted that few self-
employed individuals will pay income tax. Similar tolerance is
displayed for “illegal” private tutoring and medical services. It is
only the remaining illegal activities in category (c) that attract the ire
of the authorities. However, this is directed at essentially criminal
activities and does not amount to a concerted attempt to curb the
phenomenon of undeclared work as defined by the Commission.
Perhaps,the only systematic attempt to deal with undeclared work is
directed against work by illegal immigrants. Increasingly, illegal
immigrants are rounded up and deported.Recently,some employers
of illegal immigrants have also been charged. There are serious
attempts to deal with illegal entry into Cyprus. This entry occurs
through the Turkish area in the north and the illegal crossing of the
green line separating the Turkish and Greek sides of Nicosia,
through illegal disembarkation at beaches, and through legal entry
at ports and airports (as tourists or students, for example) followed
by subsequent disappearance into the community. There is no
attempt to prevent slum landlords from offering shelter to illegal
workers.
It has to be said that,in this regard,Cyprus faces a difficult problem.
It is the easternmost end of the EU and closest to the “hot spots”of
the Middle East, Iran, Iraq, and other sources of illegal immigrants
such as Pakistan and Bangladesh.It is an island with a coastline that
cannot be fully patrolled due to the Turkish occupation of the north
part of the island. The green line does not always stop individuals
who enter the north in one way or another.Finally,the phenomenon
of fraudulent asylum seeking is challenging both the existing
procedures and the resources available to deal with it. United
Nations officials co-operate with local authorities to improve the
system but often express frustration with the progress achieved.
The prevalence of undeclared work in the
economy
Individuals who engage in undeclared work in Cyprus include:those
among the self-employed who do not report some or all of the
transactions in which they are engaged; illegal immigrants who are
employed; paid workers (including teachers, doctors and other
public servants) who hold second jobs that are not declared; retirees
and students who are gainfully employed but who do not declare
these activities; and those receiving unemployment benefit and
social security who hold jobs. Though no hard evidence is available,
it is likely that the categories above are in descending order of
importance, with the self-employed and illegal immigrants being the
most important categories and individuals who participate in the
labour market while drawing some kind of benefit the least
important. These categories are now examined in more detail.
The incidence of self-employment in Cyprus is higher than in some
of the larger Member States but lower than in Greece and much
lower than in Turkey. The sizable rate of self-employment for
Cyprus means that, if there is any tendency to under-report income
for tax-avoidance purposes, then the amount of undeclared work
would be sizable. Self-employment does not only include tradesmen
(electricians, plumbers, painters, construction and repair people)
but also professionals such as lawyers, doctors and other service
providers.
It is perhaps not surprising that,of the 2004 projected revenues from
direct taxation, 30% will come from income tax for paid workers but
only 1.75% will come from the self-employed (Polites, May 30,
2004).
Illegal immigrants are estimated to be of the order of 40,000 people,
or just over 10% of the gainfully employed. They are likely to be
distributed among the various sectors of employment in roughly the
same proportion as the legal foreign workers. If so, the most
important concentrations would be found in home services,
construction, in the food and restaurant sectors, in the hospitality
business, in retail trade and in other services. If one were to assume
that they are employed at CYP 300 (521 euro) per month, an amount
that is probably an underestimate, then their annual earnings would
constitute approximately 2.4% of GDP. Another way to estimate the
proportion of GDP due to illegal work is to take standard estimates
of the share of labour in GDP (say 66%) and multiply it by the
proportion of illegal workers to the gainfully employed (10%). The
result gives a figure in the order of 6.6% of GDP.
A number of individuals are engaged in dual job holding. Some of
them are public servants who, generally, work from 7.30 a.m. to 2.30
p.m., leaving most afternoons free for self-employment, income
from which may not be reported. Another category is high-school
teachers, many of whom run evening private tutoring businesses.
Doctors employed in the public sector are also engaged in private
medical practice.Autumn 2004 |  European Employment Observatory Review 113
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The activities of teachers and doctors contravene their terms of
employment and create serious moral hazard problems. That is, the
system provides clear incentives to both teachers and doctors to
under-perform during regular hours in order to boost their private
businesses (the moral hazard problem). The resulting time wasting
and inefficiency means that the cost of this undeclared work is not
only the loss of tax revenue on undeclared incomes but, more
importantly, they have detrimental effects on the national education
and medical care systems. If unscrupulous individuals are involved,
pupils may be left under-taught and patients under-treated. At the
least, these forces may be at work, to a greater or lesser extent,
throughout the chain of supply for these critical services. These
mechanisms may also have distributional effects if the poor are
under-provided. Another subtle cost of private tutoring by teachers
is the cynicism that it engenders among the young if they come to
believe that moral hazard processes are at work, even though the
possible loss of idealism and the implications of this are hard to
quantify.
The size of private tutoring and parallel private medical services’
activities (excluding the effects of moral hazard) was estimated by
AKEL (2003) to be approximately CYP 27 million (47 million euro)
in 2000.Most of this was due to private tutoring rather than medical
services and works out at about 0.5% of GDP. The quantitative
significance of the moral hazard problem can be put into
perspective if it is supposed that a fraction of the relevant
expenditures do not in fact result in the production of the services
for which they were made. Thus, a fraction of the expenditures on
public schooling may be going to waste.
To the extent that they carry on working,retirees are likely to be self-
employed and they may under-declare their income. There were also
some abuses of the unemployment insurance scheme until recent
corrections to the system were made. Previously, individuals were
apparently able to refuse work, continue to collect benefits while
undertaking some form of self-employment, in parallel. However,
such abuses are rare and pale relative to the under-reporting that is
estimated to be done by the self-employed and the work carried out
by illegal immigrants. One noteworthy category that is currently
being targeted in attempts to reduce the budget deficit is public
sector employees who, retiring at 60, are able to collect
unemployment insurance for six months. There may well be cases of
individuals collecting social assistance while being engaged in
gainful employment. These cases are likely to be small in number
and not comparable in importance to those noted earlier.
As noted earlier, the AKEL (2003) study summed the total size of
the  “para-economy” to 9.2% of GDP in 2000. Using the
Commission’s definition of undeclared work, described earlier in
this article, an overall estimate for undeclared work based on the
AKEL (2003) breakdowns would be of the order of 3.5-4%. The
figure of 9.2% based on the AKEL (2003) para-economy definition
is broadly in line with the estimate made by Georgiou and Syrichas
(1994), of 8.8% of GNP during the 1980s. They relied on the Tanzi
method which uses the demand for currency as a proxy for
“underground” activity and so their methodology is broadly
consistent with the definitions in AKEL (2003). On the other hand,
the estimate of 21% of GDP for 1989-90 reported by Schneider
(2000) may be too high. Given the growth in the number of illegal
immigrants in recent years, there is no doubt that the importance of
undeclared work has increased substantially and may now be
approaching 10% of GDP. This would make the broader para-
economy as large as 15% of GDP and closer to Schneider’s (2000)
figure. A figure mentioned for Cyprus by Renooy et al (2004) was
actually taken from a website of the self-proclaimed Turkish
Republic of Northern Cyprus and cannot be considered credible.
Measures taken to combat undeclared work
Until fairly recently, undeclared work did not trouble the national
psyche. It was virtually taken for granted that self-employed
individuals would not pay income taxes. Indeed, the problem may
go deeper than that because many personal expenses (e.g. personal
use of a company car) are probably treated as a company expense,
thereby reducing possible revenues from the taxation of profits.
Profit management, that is the use of company before-tax earnings
for the benefit of senior management is possibly not effectively
monitored.
The incentives for the self-employed to under-report are related to
the tax system, the penalties for fraudulent reporting, and
inadequate reinforcement efforts on behalf of the authorities. The
tax brackets for individuals have been altered substantially in recent
years. In the 2002 tax year, income up to CYP 9,000 (15,600 euro)
was tax exempt. Between CYP 9,001-12,000, the marginal rate was
30% and above CYP 12,000 (20,500 euro) it jumped to 40%. These
were fairly high rates, particularly given the size of the publicly
provided services in Cyprus.
In 2004, the marginal tax rate became zero for taxable income up to
CYP 10,000, 20% between CYP 10,001-15,000, 25% between
15,001-20,000 and 30% above CYP 20,000 (34,200 euro). The
income tax schedule in 2002 imposed a stiff marginal tax rate on
income above CYP 9,000 but the 2004 changes reduced the marginal
tax rate on incomes between CYP 12,001 and 15,000 (20,500 euro
and 25,700 euro) significantly, thus reducing the incentive to under-
report.
On the other hand, the VAT rate increased to 15% from
substantially lower levels in recent years. It was also extended, on 1
May 2004, to a number of goods that were formerly either not taxed
or taxed at lower rates. These increases are likely to work in the
opposite direction, increasing the tendency for undeclared work.
In addition to tax rates, it is important that the tax system be
effectively run, if undeclared work is to be kept at low levels. The
penalties for fraudulent declarations and the extent to which
monitoring and spot checks are done appear modest. Authorities
are still processing tax declarations for 2001, thereby failing to
convey a sense of urgency.
The use of illegal immigrants is widespread, given that their number
is estimated to be over 10% of the gainfully employed. Many
employers are complicit and many landlords make accommodation
available to illegal immigrants. Clearly, illegal immigrants are a
source of cheaper foreign labour than can be obtained legally. The
differential arises because, due to their weak bargaining position,
illegal immigrants may be hired at lower gross wages (in any case,
they are not likely to be earning enough to be taxed) and because
employers and employees avoid paying social security contributions
for them. This is fixed at 6.3% of insurable earnings for each side of
the market – the Government contributes an additional 4% (total of
16.6%). Incidentally, in the public sector, the employer/Government
contributes 9.4% while the employee pays 3.2% (total of 12.6%) but
the Government hopes to shift 3.1 percentage points to public
servants as a cost-cutting measure. Thus, the root cause of illegal
work is the fact that it is cheaper for employers to employ illegal
workers. The “cost” of employing illegal workers can be increased
through tighter enforcement of the regulations.
There are some indications that the Government is clamping down
on the employment of illegal workers. Raids on workplaces are
increasing and employers are being prosecuted. However, the
mindset needs to change more broadly on all these issues, a point114 Autumn 2004 |  European Employment Observatory Review
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also raised by Mateman and Renooy (2001) for the EU.
There is the intention, within current budget deficit reduction
measures, to declare a tax “amnesty” so that individuals involved
would be able to buy their way into legality. The hoped-for revenue
would be substantial, if it is in line with the CYP 55 million (95.5
million euro), as estimated by Polites (2004) for the period 2004-
2007. This is about 20% of the additional revenue that the
Government plans to raise through its deficit reduction campaign.
Nevertheless, the incentives offered may encourage non-compliance
in the future. In general, insufficient thought has been given to the
incentives built into the tax system for compliance. This is true both
in a static sense and in terms of what policies such as a tax amnesty
might involve for compliance in the future.
There have been no real attempts to educate the public on the
problems involved in undeclared work. Efforts to reduce illegal
employment are hampered by the societal mindset and the amount
of resources that relevant ministries can devote to dealing with this
issue. Since what efforts have been made so far to reduce undeclared
work are both recent and modest, there have been no attempts made
to evaluate the effectiveness of policies such as the recent income tax
reductions, in discouraging undeclared work.
Conclusions
Based on the little evidence available, it can be said that the extent of
undeclared work in Cyprus is probably in the region of 10% of GDP
and that it has been increasing recently due to the increasing
importance of legal work carried out by illegal immigrants. Other
important types of undeclared work involve under-reporting in the
large self-employed sector, some of which involves groups such as
teachers and doctors employed in the public sector, which should
not be running parallel private businesses. In addition to the loss of
tax revenue, undeclared work by the last two groups may undermine
(because of moral hazard reasons) the integrity of the publicly-
provided services in these vital areas.
Society has not been sufficiently averse to the notion of undeclared
work to seriously attempt to curb it. The costs have not been
explained and the benefits are all too evident to tax-avoiding self-
employed individuals and to employers who have come to rely on
cheap labour. Until now, the Government has been relying on
growth to fund its own activities and budget deficits have been
manageable and within the EU norms. There has, therefore, not
been a very strong reason to try to raise tax revenues through tighter
enforcement of the tax regulations.
There are some indications that the tide may be turning. Illegal
immigration has reached high proportions at a time when labour
supply is increasing due to the participation of Turkish Cypriots
and other EU citizens in the labour market. Unemployment has
been rising somewhat. Illegal immigrants are, therefore, more
dispensable and it may well be that their numbers will gradually
decline. The police now claim that a large proportion of offences is
being committed by illegal workers and there is increased stress on
the possible social problems that may accompany imported and,
particularly, illegal labour.
The budget deficit has become more of a problem and, as a result,
measures to reduce it are being considered. Tax amnesty at a cost is
one such measure but its implications for future compliance have
not been fully considered. The thorny and politically unpopular
issues of making the self-employed contribute their share of the tax
burden and stopping senior management from using company
revenues for personal purposes have not been addressed. Instead,
current measures to reduce the budget deficit are directed at public
sector employees.This is widely viewed as an advantaged class and it
may well be that austerity has to begin at home. However, if it stops
there, it will not offer a long-term solution. The Government
machine faces many challenges and it must be made to work more
efficiently. If it does not, then not only will the budget deficit
continue to rise, but undeclared work will increase further.
Louis N. Christofides
Bibliography
AKEL (2003) E Paraoikonomia sten Kypro: Melete (Nicosia,
Grafeio Oikonomikon kai Koinonikon Meleton, AKEL), pp. 65.
Blanchflower, D. G. (2000)  “Self-Employment in OECD
Countries”, Labour Economics, 7, pp. 471-505 (Special Issue on
Self-Employment).
Brussels, COM (1998) 219 – C4 – 0566/1998 – 1998/2082 (COS) 
Brussels, Committee on Employment and Social Affairs, A5 –
0220/2000 
Christofides, L. N. and P. Pashardes (2002) “Self/Paid Employment,
Public/Private Sector Selection and Wage Differentials”, Labour
Economics, 9, pp. 737-762.
Georgiou G. M. and G. L. Syrichas (1994) “The ‘Underground
Economy’:An Overview and Estimates for Cyprus”,Cyprus Journal
of Economics, Vol 7. No. 2, December, pp. 125-143.
Mateman S. and P. H. Renooy (2001) Undeclared Labour in Europe
(Amsterdam, Regioplan Publication nr. 424, October).
Polites (2004), Daily Newspaper, May 30, 2004, p. 3.
Renooy Piet, S. Ivarsson, O. van der Wusten-Gritsai, R. Meijer
(2004) Undeclared Work in an Enlarged Union. An Analysis of
Undeclared Work: An In-Depth Study of Specific Items, Final Report
(European Commission, Directorate-General for Employment and
Social Affairs).
Schneider F. (2000) “The Value Added of Underground Activities:
Size and Measurement of the Shadow Economies and Shadow
Economy Labour Force All Over the World”, Mimeograph, July,
pp. 48.Autumn 2004 |  European Employment Observatory Review 115
Trends
Introduction
In the recently published EU report, Undeclared Work in an
Enlarged Union, it is recognised that undeclared work goes by a
variety of different names and is sometimes distinguished by
correspondingly different criteria. The report takes “work” as its
main focus and “registration according to national requirements”as
its criterion for the distinction between what is regarded as declared
and undeclared work. Thus “undeclared work” is taken to mean
“any paid, productive activities that are lawful as regards their
nature but not declared to the public authorities, taking into
account the differences in the regulatory system between Member
States”.
In Latvia the Ministry of Welfare has recently published guidelines
“On measures to combat undeclared work in Latvia” (accepted by
the government in January 2004) that define undeclared work on the
basis of the Commission’s definition. Thus the Latvian definition
reads:
“Undeclared workers are those who have not formed a legal work
relationship in accordance with Latvian regulations (that is,
those who do not have an employment contract and do not make
social insurance and income tax payments; or those who do have
an employment contract but the contract does not show the true
level of earnings)”.
Foreigners who work in Latvia without a work permit are also
regarded as undeclared workers.
It should be noted that this definition explicitly includes Latvian
concerns about under-reporting of income in the form of the widely
prevalent  “envelope wage” phenomenon, whereby a worker is
registered to work at or near the minimum wage (currently 80 LVL,
or just over 120 euro) but in practice receives an additional cash
payment in the “envelope”.
The guidelines on undeclared work, and hence the definition given
by the Ministry of Welfare, have emerged only recently reflecting on
the fact that undeclared work as a separate phenomenon of the
informal economy was not widely addressed before. Most previous
studies and statistical data in Latvia have employed the term
informal or shadow economy rather than undeclared work. The
most frequently used definitions are as described below.
The Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia (CSB) follows the EU
methodology and includes the following activities in its definition of
the informal economy: all legal activities (manufacturing, services)
which are not registered and are not accounted for fully or partially.
This definition of the informal economy includes both formal and
informal parts of underground production as defined in the System
of National Accounts 1993. It excludes illegal production and most
production for personal final use (unaccounted).
Another definition used by the Ministry of Finance (MoF) is from
the OECD Handbook on Measuring the Non-Observed Economy,
which is also generally consistent with the EU methodology.
The lack of studies on undeclared work in Latvia is an indication
that it has not been viewed as a national priority before. However,
considerable importance has always been attached in political circles
to aspects of the informal economy, such as the evasion of social
insurance and income tax payments resulting from under-reporting
of income. It should be mentioned that the general public is not
much concerned by this – in a recent survey just over 44% of
respondents believed that in current circumstances the existing
regime of partial tax evasion was justified and this opinion has been
steadily rising from 35% in 2001.
However, with entry into the EU, the government has started to pay
more attention to undeclared work per se and this has resulted in the
recently published guidelines. A policy paper and an action plan for
2005-2009 are in the process of being worked out. These are
expected to contain an assessment of the prevalence of undeclared
work in the economy as well as proposals for measures to combat it.
Prevalence of undeclared work in the economy
Level of undeclared work
The CSB is the main State institution engaged in measuring the
informal economy. To estimate the size of informal economy in
money terms they make adjustments to enterprise accounts (used
for GDP estimation) for activities, which are partially hidden to
avoid income tax and social insurance tax. To estimate the size of
the informal economy and the number of people involved, the
Labour Force Survey (LFS) is used to provide data on employment
and is later compared with the employment numbers reported in the
Enterprise Survey (ES). The discrepancy captures unreported
labour. The CSB estimate of the size of the informal economy in
2000 was 18% of GDP and, in a statement at the beginning of 2004,
the CSB claimed that the informal economy remained at 16-18% of
GDP, although there have been changes in incidence in different
sectors. As for the number of persons engaged in undeclared work,
the CSB 2000 data shows that just under 9% of the work force are
unregistered.
The MoF uses several methods,including the monetary method,the
“method of five indicators” (akin to the “electricity consumption
approach”), data on the discrepancy in collection of social and
personal income tax in public and private sectors (under the
assumption that public sector employees do not evade taxes), and
also data on discrepancies between Latvian trade statistics and
those of its major trading partners. Using these methods, the MoF
has estimated the informal economy in 2001 as 23.2% of GDP,
although in the past their estimate has been as high as 45% of GDP
(1995).
Using the DYMIMIC Method, Schneider (2002) has estimated that
the shadow economy in Latvia in 2000/2001 was close to 40% of
GDP. Local economists also believe that the shadow economy in
Latvia is 40% of GDP or more, largely on the grounds of Latvian
business links with the CIS countries.
Most of the above-mentioned estimates are of a “broadly defined”
informal economy. Some measures capture different parts of the
informal economy – for example, the estimates calculated by the
MoF and Schneider include the illegal economy.
Evaluating different attempts to estimate the informal economy is
difficult, since all of them have serious drawbacks. For example the
MoF estimates are based on the unproven assumption that the size
of the informal economy in GDP was 25% in 1993. The CSB’s
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estimate is especially sensitive to the reliability of data from the
sources used to identify under-reporting of income and salaries.
Typically, no clear detailed methodology is publicly available, but it
appears that many assumptions are made in the process and good
data is often unavailable (expenditure data, for example).
Sectoral analysis
The methodology of measuring the informal economy in Latvia is
quite basic and hence little is known about the detailed
characteristics of undeclared work. The CSB has performed a
sectoral analysis of Latvia’s economy. However, neither the CSB
data nor the data published by any other institution provides an
analysis in regional, demographic or gender dimensions.
Using the methodology of comparing LFS and Enterprise Survey
data, the CSB found that in 2000 around 9% of the employed
workforce (employed in companies plus self-employed) were
unregistered. The sectoral distribution of unregistered labour is
shown in Figure 1, where it can be seen that the “leading” sectors
are: agriculture (with 30% of the unregistered total), manufacturing
(28%) and construction (18%).
The incidence of unregistered labour by sector is shown in Figure 2
which shows that the highest proportions of unregistered labour is
in construction, where 26% of all labour is not registered, followed
by agriculture (18%) and manufacturing (14%).
Reasons behind the prevalence of the informal
economy
It should be stressed again that the phenomenon of (narrowly
defined) undeclared work in Latvia is not what arouses the most
public interest in the country. Rather, it is under-reporting of income
that is more prevalent and generates the greater public interest.
The major motive for under-reporting of income is likely to be tax
evasion. The determinants of registration status, however, are
probably different. In developed countries the stringency of labour
regulations may be an important factor. Thus, illegal immigrant
labour is likely to be unregistered. If labour regulations are too
cumbersome for firms (for example, it is difficult to lay off official
workers),they may choose to hire “unregistered labour”.If labour is
not registered it automatically implies that incomes are not
reported. Non-registered labour with non-reported incomes is likely
to characterise informal economies in many EU-15 countries, where
labour codes are costly to comply with, and are strictly enforced. In
developing and some transition countries, some parts of the
economy may simply exist outside the formal system because of the
small scale and primitive organisation of production.
In Latvia and some other transition countries the situation is
different. Labour codes are not so cumbersome and not as strictly
enforced as in Western Europe and there are very few illegal
migrants. Thus the developed economy type of the informal
economy is not widespread. In the Latvian agricultural sector, there
are around 75,000 farms of less than 5 hectares and more than 67%
of all farms produce nothing for the market.This corresponds to the
developing country type of informal economy. However, by far the
biggest share of undeclared income/work arises in enterprises that
are registered and is undertaken by workers that are also registered.
The typical form of informal economy is a worker who gets a small
wage (subject to minimum taxes) and the rest “cash in hand”. Firms
have little motivation to seek unregistered labour because that way
they may arouse the suspicions of the tax office (too few workers
relative to turnover) and become subject to a tax audit.
There are no in-depth studies that can help to identify the possible
causes of the informal economy in Latvia or to assess the relative
significance of alternative hypotheses.We can only rely on economic
theory, interviews with public officials and “anecdotal evidence”.
Some hypotheses on the causes and persistence of the informal
sector are:
• Tax evasion: for firms, the perceived “cost” of getting caught is
smaller than the benefit of not paying certain taxes such as
corporate tax, social tax and income tax.
• A combination of high social tax rates, structure of
intertemporal preferences (current consumption is preferred to
future  – pensions) and low incomes create incentives for
widespread tax evasion for employees. It must also be stressed
that evasion of social and personal income tax is a result of
collusion between employers and employees in which both have
the motivation and the possibility to evade.
• One reason for the widespread prevalence and persistence of the
system is that once a (possibly quite small) critical mass of firms
practise tax evasion, this will exert pressure on other firms to
evade as well. High inter-firm labour mobility means that non-
evaders would have to incur much higher labour costs to ensure
the same post-tax wages.
• It is possible that registration and compliance costs (e.g.
accounting) discourage some very small businesses from
registering, but this component is likely to be very small.
• There are many non-citizens living in Latvia (about 1/5 of
population). Most of them are employed in the private sector. It
is plausible that part of population feels little or no commitment
to comply with social rules, such as paying taxes.
• It is also often argued that the Soviet past, where evasion from
the pervasive regulations of the State was a norm, has played a
role in the persistence of the informal sector in Latvia.
To date the State has not put much effort into explaining to the
general public what tax revenues are used for. Many businesses do
Figure 1: Distribution of unregistered labour by sectors
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not feel compelled to support the government budget as they
consider it is spent inefficiently.
It has to be stressed that the above mentioned are only theoretical
hypotheses, which have not been subjected to rigorous empirical
testing. Therefore, little can be said about their relative and absolute
significance.
Measures to combat undeclared work
Existing measures
Until the end of 2003 there was no policy in Latvia specifically
designed to transform undeclared work into regular employment.
However, policies indirectly influencing undeclared labour, i.e.
fighting tax evasion and envelope wages, have always been at the
centre of discussions and efforts have been largely focused on
improving tax administration and reducing the rates of some taxes.
Such measures were expected to increase the level of open economic
activity.
The following specific measures have been aimed directly or
indirectly at reducing the level of the informal economy:
Improving the legal and administrative environment
The State Revenue Service (SRS) works on improving legislation
and patching up loopholes as they are identified, to make tax
evasion more costly for businesses and individuals. There is an
ongoing discussion about the need to simplify tax administration
for SMEs. At present SMEs are subject to the same tax declaration
procedure as large businesses, which could be a reason for avoidance
of open activity. The SRS has attempted to improve the situation by
providing consultation and informative leaflets for enterprises.
Creating incentives to declare work on both demand and
supply sides
In the last three years the corporate tax rate has been reduced from
25% to 15%. However, this has been dictated by the need to attract
more foreign investment. One of the motives was also tax
competition with Estonia and Lithuania. Reduction of the
corporate tax rate may have improved compliance,as tax revenues in
the year following tax reduction have actually increased. Although
reduced corporate tax rates might have provided some incentives for
large enterprises to openly declare labour, this does not apply to
single individual firms (self-employed) and small family ventures.
These enterprises are subject to personal income tax, which has
remained unchanged.
There has been a reduction in the social tax rate from 35% to
33.09%. However, it is likely that the reduction has been too small to
result in any noticeable effect on tax compliance.
A move towards more equal shares of employee and employer social
insurance tax contributions was a measure intended to motivate
enterprises to avoid undeclared work, but the shift to a higher share
of social insurance tax is an additional burden on low-paid
employees, which undoubtedly increases their incentive to collude
with tax evasion.
In 2003 the government announced a policy of a gradual increase in
the minimum wage and implemented an initial increase from 70
LVL (102 euro) per month to 80 LVL (116 euro). This was in part
motivated by the belief that it would reduce the incentive to pay the
minimum wage plus cash in hand. However, the gap between the
minimum wage and the minimum level of subsistence (which is
calculated at 98 LVL or 143 euro) undermines the effectiveness of
this measure.
An important step in Latvia to curb evasion of social tax payments
was taken by the implementation of a complete overhaul of the
Figure 2: Share of unregistered labour in specific sectors
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pension system. The main feature of the pension reform is a gradual
transition from a traditional PAYE system to a partially funded
three-pillar system.Linking taxpayers’contributions to benefits was
thought to improve morale and to reduce under-reporting.
There is a general feeling among government officials that pension
reform had a substantial impact on individual motivation to avoid
social tax. On the other hand, it is only persons of above average
income that really benefit from the system; for the rest, the level of
savings is too low to even participate in the third pillar. Many argue
that, given the instability of the social insurance system, they do not
see any motivation to put possible future gains (from making tax
and social contributions) before present gains from evading taxes.
Surveillance and sanctions
The State Labour Inspectorate (SLI) in co-operation with the State
Revenue Service undertake surveillance of enterprises to identify
those that employ workers without work contracts, i.e. who work
without paying taxes to the government. In 2003, 717 enterprises
from different business sectors were inspected. 477 cases were
catalogued where work contracts were not in place, and 182
employers were penalised, with fines totalling 12,660 LVL (nearly
19,000 euro) or just over 100 euro per firm.
Most recently, efforts have been intensified in the fight against
“envelope wages”. Several companies have been “caught in the act”
and these cases were widely publicised in an effort to discourage
other companies. According to the SRS, between April and
November of 2003 there were 11,546 inspections in this context and
in 391 instances it was found that companies were paying envelope
wages.
However, existing surveillance measures are inadequate. Both the
SRS and the SLI recognise that both the administrative capacity
and the number of inspectors is far too low to achieve significant
results. Even though the number of inspectors has grown each year,
the effective improvement has not been great.
Administrative barriers and contradictions in regulations can also
make it complicated for inspectors to carry out inspections in
sectors (such as construction or manufacturing) that are known for
a high incidence of undeclared work. For example, the existing
regulations allow construction engineers or factory managers to
deny access to inspectors if they regard conditions on the site as
unsafe or if an inspection would disturb sanitary conditions at the
plant. Clearly, such practices make it difficult for the inspectors to
do their job.
An additional problem is posed by the fact that business owners and
managers cannot be levied personal fines and held responsible even
when an inspection finds unregistered workers in their firms. At
present only corporate fines can be levied.
Moreover, there is also a problem of enforcement in Latvia, as is the
case in most other transition economies in this region. Hence the
policies relying on fines are unlikely to be very effective, as
enforcement of such fines is weak. The MoF has noted that the
number of court cases against tax evaders is low, and that many
cases of tax avoidance dating as far back as 1996 remain open, with
tax payments and fines still outstanding.
Interestingly, there seems to be some evidence that fiscal
decentralisation has the effect of curbing tax evasion. In Latvia,
local governments receive 71.6% of personal income tax revenue
and therefore have a stake in improved collection of this tax.
Officials have reported that local governments sometimes exert
pressure on large enterprises in their jurisdiction to stop paying
wages in envelopes. However, as admitted by the SRS, local
governments could help more in identifying unreported activities.
Local governments have mixed motivations – often they have
informal ties with the enterprises operating in their jurisdiction and
are therefore unwilling to provide serious help to the tax authorities.
Transnational co-operation between different Member
States
The State Revenue Service has established successful co-operation
with other EU member countries. There is regular exchange of
information regarding cases of undeclared work, and both planned
and spontaneous exchange of information occurs. The SRS is also
conducting simultaneous inspections of enterprises together with
other Member States.
Raising social awareness
The State Labour Inspectorate is the institution responsible for the
dissemination of information regarding labour law and raising
social awareness of the negative aspects of unregistered work. In
2003 the SLI generated 499 informative items, including booklets
and informative programmes in the mass media. Most of these
(34%) covered legal aspects of work relations.The large share of this
theme can be explained by an active interest from society on
employee rights and obligations. For the future, the SLI also
envisages information campaigns for taxpayers.
Effectiveness of existing measures 
Unfortunately, it is not possible to give definitive answers on the
effectiveness of specific policies. In the first place, a culture of
thorough policy evaluation has not yet taken root in Latvia. In
Western countries, academic research often plays the role of
disciplining governments by evaluating the results of their policies.
This is not the case in Latvia, as academic research at the required
level is virtually non-existent.Secondly,many measures have been in
place for a relatively short period of time and it is too early to get
informative data. For both reasons, there has been no formal
analysis of the effectiveness of the policies mentioned above.
Therefore, any evaluation can only be conjectural, based on
informal interviews and anecdotal evidence. There is no firm
empirical evidence to support or reject any particular view.
In general, both the CBS and the MoF believe that over the last two
years the size of the informal economy in GDP has decreased. As
official GDP has also grown, it could indicate a trend towards
transformation of undeclared work to “regular employment”. It is
not clear, however, whether any such effect is due to government
policies or other independent factors.
New policies
At the beginning of 2004 the Cabinet of Ministers accepted the
guideline paper “On Measures to Combat Undeclared Work”. This
represents a new policy initiative and the Ministry of Welfare and
the Ministry of Finance are together working on a policy paper
which will stipulate a set of specific measures to fight undeclared
labour. The proposed measures outlined in the draft of the policy
paper are as follows:
• Changes in the legal base and improvement of the tax system
• • The Ministry of Finance is planning changes in the
Administrative code, with larger fines for tax evasion, as well
as for under-reporting of income. The fines will be 5 LVL
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fines for repeated instances of undeclared work in an
enterprise will range from 500 to 1000 LVL (730 to 1450
euro).
• • Changes in the Criminal Law will make owners and managers
of enterprises criminally liable if they provide fraudulent
information to the State authorities with the aim of hiding
illegal activities.
• • The minimum wage in the country will be gradually raised to
the minimum subsistence level.
• Improvement of surveillance measures
• • More inspections by the State Revenue Service and the State
Labour Inspectorate in industries and activities where the
risk of illegal employment is believed to be high.
• • The number of inspectors in the SRS and the SLI will be
further increased and more attention will be devoted to the
education and motivation of staff.
• • A common database will be set up for the institutions in
charge of implementation of measures against undeclared
work, which is expected to ensure fast and timely exchange of
information and to reduce the number of overlapping
monitoring programmes.
• Raising social awareness and promotion of legal awareness and
compliance
• • More resources will be channelled for dissemination of
information about labour law.
• • Increased attention will be devoted to the explanation of the
tax system and the uses to which taxes are put.
The proposed new policy measures in many ways represent a
“beefing up” of existing measures. However, a positive aspect as
compared with the present is that much more attention and
resources will be allotted to raising social awareness of the harmful
aspects of illegal work and motivating open economic activity,
rather than just increasing sanctions and fines.
Conclusions
The concept of undeclared work as understood by the Commission
is rather new for policy-makers in Latvia but, prompted by EU
accession, has been addressed in the recent guidelines on undeclared
work and accepted by the Cabinet of Ministers at the beginning of
2004.
Estimates of the size of the shadow or informal economy range
from 16-18% by the CSB to 40% or more by private commentators.
Official estimates suggest that unregistered work per se is about 9%
of the workforce.
To date there have been few policies explicitly aimed at undeclared
work.The exception here are surveillance policies undertaken by the
State Revenue Service and the State Labour Inspectorate, but the
evidence suggests that these have produced rather meagre results in
relation to the perceived scale of the problem. Other than this, most
measures have been in the sphere of tax, pension and minimum
wage policy that have indirect effects on undeclared work
Unfortunately, practically no studies have been carried out on the
effectiveness of the measures taken to eliminate the informal
economy. Although the Ministry of Finance claims the size of the
informal economy in recent years has decreased, the CSB claims
that it is unchanged. In any case, there is no indication as to how far
policy has had an influence.
A new policy paper, developed by the Ministries of Finance and
Welfare, promises to address specifically undeclared work issues.
The plan can be viewed positively as it focuses on the elimination of
the economic benefits gained from under-reporting taxes, as well as
education of society on the negative aspects of avoiding open
economic activity.
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Introduction 
The category of “undeclared work” is not used in Lithuania.
Regulations on labour law use the definition “illegal work”,whilst in
scientific research and publications by the Department of Statistics,
the definition “unofficial employment”is used.
Unofficial employment is defined as non-legalisation of employment
relations and non-payment of relevant taxes.
Illegal work is defined as business, economic, financial, professional
activities carried out without the incorporation of an appropriate
legal entity and without obtaining an appropriate business licence,
where a percentage of the salary is paid as “cash-in-hand”, when
persons operate in legal companies without employment contracts
or when the duration of work exceeds the period officially fixed in
employment contracts.
The Lithuanian definitions of “unofficial employment”and “illegal
work” exclude criminal activities, and concentrate on potentially
legal employment that should have been declared.
The aforementioned definitions will be used accordingly in this
article. Whilst analysing material from the State Labour
Inspectorate, the definition of “illegal work” will be used.
Definitions of “unofficial employment”and “undeclared work”will
be applied in the analysis of data from the Department of Statistics
and scientific research.
The first research into the extent and structure of undeclared work
was carried out in 1993-1994.This gave rise to a more active analysis
of this labour market phenomenon and its impact on the
employment and welfare of the population.
Undeclared work is addressed in the Labour Code (2004) and other
enactments.
The Code of Administrative Violations of Law (2004) contains a
specific article on Illegal Work (Article 41(3)) as follows:
Illegal work –
Brings a penalty on employers or their authorised persons from
three thousand to ten thousand litas (870-2900 euro) per illegally
employed person.
The same acts taken by a person with a history of previous penalties
for the violations set forth in the first paragraph of this Article – 
Brings a penalty on employers or their authorised persons from ten
thousand to twenty thousand litas (2900-5800 euro) per illegally
employed person.“
To support the prevention of illegal work, the Government of the
Republic of Lithuania has adopted two additional resolutions “On
the Approval of the Conditions and Procedure of the Performance of
Assistance” (2001) and “On the Approval of the Organisation of the
Procedure for Voluntary Work” (2001), as employers would often
declare to the State Labour Inspectorate that persons working
without employment contracts were in fact relatives or friends that
were helping out on a voluntary basis.
The State Labour Inspectorate, together with the Board of Social
Insurance SODRA, the State Tax Inspectorate, the Financial Crime
Investigation Service and the Police Department at the Ministry of
the Interior,are responsible for the formation of the uniform control
of undeclared work; the collaboration of officers from controlling
authorities and institutions in the organisation of joint inspections,
and the drafting and analysis of methodological material required
for improvement of the legislation.
To tackle the aforesaid issues, an annual Action Plan for the
Reinforcement of Prevention and Control of Undeclared Work has
been adopted to seek to minimise the spread of illegal work.
In addition, measures to minimise undeclared work have been
implemented in Lithuania through implementation of the national
Programme on Increased Employment of the Population, 2001-
2004. These measures are discussed in the National Action Plan
being drafted for the year 2004.
Prevalence of undeclared work in the economy
Undeclared work began to flourish in Lithuania in 1991-1993
during the transition into the market economy. Undeclared work
could be seen to increase real employment and reduce the
unemployment of the population. On the other hand, it reduces
social security for employees, increases the possibilities for
contravening employment relations, and negatively impacts on the
national budget and the implementation of labour market policy.
Official information about employment and unemployment in
Lithuania does not reflect undeclared work. Therefore, specific
research has been carried out to identify its scope and structure. In
1995, such research was conducted by the Institution of Labour and
Social Research. In 1995-1996, the Department of Statistics
developed a study of the “unaccounted for economy”, with
participation from experts from the World Bank. In this study,
undeclared work was addressed as a separate subject. A similar
study was implemented under the PHARE programme in 2002-
2003 with the participation of experts from the Italian Institute of
Statistics. This analysis covered undeclared corporate income,
unofficial employment and pay, the turnover of unaccounted trade
and services. In addition, efforts were made to estimate the extent
and nature of illegal businesses operating in Lithuania. We present
below a brief discussion of the outcomes of the research.
A fairly large percentage of Lithuanian companies fail to report
some of their earned income in their financial and statistical
statements. This was first revealed in 1995 and confirmed in 2003 by
research estimates based on the records of officers of the State Tax
Inspectorate (STI) and official statistical sources.
Employees from regional units of the STI gave their opinions
concerning the share of corporate income omitted by legal entities
in official financial and statistical accounts in 2002. The
summarised information provided a basis for the definition of the
share of undeclared income by the type of business activity, form of
ownership and size of legal entities.
According to STI experts, private enterprises (in particular smaller
enterprises), often fail to declare some income from sales. The
research revealed that the scope of sales declared in 2002 should be
amended and corrected in official statistical estimates, applying
correcting factors from 1% in energy to 25% in textiles, 35.6% in
forestry and 50% in fishery businesses. On average, about 14.3% of
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income is not declared by non-financial companies (including
individual enterprises attributed to households) (see Table 1).
As for the manufacturing sector, which creates about 20% of the
national gross added value in Lithuania, the largest share of
undeclared income may be attributed to companies engaged in
textiles (25.2%), publishing and printing (17.8%), manufacture of
clothing, dressing of fur (16.5%), the furniture trade (15.4%), the
manufacture of food products and beverages (13.3%), and the
manufacture of wood and wood products excluding furniture
(13.2%). As for other types of manufacturing business, the share of
undeclared income is thought to be under 10%, and the average in
all groups is 8-11%. In addition to the research on the opinions of
the STI employees, managers of manufacturing enterprises and
associations were also anonymously polled as experts. In essence,
they confirmed the evaluations of the STI experts.
In the given group of business activities, the share of undeclared
income varies according to the form of ownership. For examples,
the share of undeclared income in individual enterprises engaged in
the production of chemicals,production industry and production of
plastics is found to be from 28.5% to 11.7% respectively, while in
State enterprises engaged in the same activities the share equals zero.
However, the difference in the share of undeclared income in private
limited companies, public limited companies and individual
enterprises engaged in manufacturing seems to be very insignificant
(see Table 2).
It should be noted that the research omitted companies providing
agricultural products and services, and financial and managerial
services, due to peculiarities in the calculation of their production
and added value in the national accounts.
The research shows that fishery and forestry companies may have
the largest share of undeclared income (up to 50% and 35.6%
respectively). However, the added value created by these businesses
accounts only for 0.1% of the national gross added value. On the
other hand, the share of undeclared income may be over 15% in
wholesale, up to 18.3% in construction and around 22.7% in motor
repair and fuel trade business.
Experts from the largest trade companies provided additional
information, through the mediation of the Association of
Lithuanian Trade Companies. The synthesis of this information
and comparison with the results of STI employees’ poll led to the
conclusion that in excess of 0.463 billion euro (or 14.6%) of retail
trade turnover was not declared through official sources in the year
2002. The research also confirmed that small enterprises fail to
declare a larger percentage of their turnover compared to large
enterprises (see Figure 1).
Unaccounted for trade and turnover in second-hand cars was
estimated separately. Opinion polls and estimates from car markets
showed that the unaccounted share of the turnover could reach
from 20 to 30% or about 144.8 million euro in 2002.
In other service companies, the established share of undeclared
income was also quite large. In service sectors that employ a large
number of smaller companies, the level of undeclared income is
higher regardless of whether they provide services to business or
individual customers.
In addition, the fields of healthcare and education services were
analysed in order to estimate unofficial remuneration for medical
services in state healthcare institutions as well as extra-unaccounted
earnings of teachers for tutoring services. The analysis showed that
unofficial remuneration paid to medical professionals in 2002 may
amount to LTL 59 million (17.1 million euros), whilst services
unofficially rendered by education professionals may amount to
Table 1: A share of undeclared income in 2002 (%)
Share of undeclared income
Forestry and logging 35.6
Fishery 50.0
Manufacturing 9.1
Electricity, gas and water supply 2.8
Construction 18.3
Wholesale and retail trade 15.0–16.5
Sale and repair of vehicles, retail 
trade in fuel 22.7
Repair of personal and household 
supplies 26.6
Hotels and restaurants 20.3–21.1
Road transport 19.2
Real estate operations 24.1
Rental of machinery and equipment 
without operator; rent of personal 
supplies 29.9
Other business 35.9
Education 15.1
Healthcare and social work 25.0
Wastewater and waste removal business 10.7
Organisation of recreational, cultural 
and sports events 10.3
Other service business 32.9
In business activities on average 14.3
Table 2: A share of undeclared income in manufacturing enterprises in 2002 (%)
Private limited companies and public limited companies Individual enterprises
Production of foodstuffs and drinks 13.3 13.9
Textiles manufacture 24.9 32.5
Manufacture of clothing 16.3 17.8
Manufacture of wood and wood products
(except furniture) 12.8 15.6
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LTL 27 million (7.83 million euros). It would be beneficial if these
figures were also included in the national GDP.
The above polls lead to the conclusion that small enterprises are
more likely to fail to declare all their earned income. Therefore, it
could be argued that in future statistical data presented by such
enterprises should be corrected through estimations of actual
production and added value.
One part of the research was targeted at the analysis of unofficial
employment and pay. Through the comparative analysis of official
statistical sources, the researchers sought to estimate and define the
number of unauthorised hired employees. The results showed that
the number of unauthorised hired employees may have been
approximately 104,000 people in 2002 (see Table 3). Construction
and manufacturing account for the largest number of such hired
employees (23% each). They are followed by agriculture, hunting
and forestry business accounting for 20% each. The results of the
analysis of unofficial employment confirm the results of the
research into undeclared income that was carried out in parallel.
This is not surprising, given that these two segments of the
unrecorded economy are directly interrelated.
According to the Institute of Labour and Social Research, in 2002
unofficial employment may have reached 190,000 (13%) and fallen
to 150,000-170,000 of the employed in 2003, i.e. 10-12% of the total
number of employed individuals.
Taking into account the different data sources, we can define the
likely margins of the range of undeclared work in 2003: this index
may fluctuate from 100,000 to 170,000. The top estimate is based on
the research carried out by the Institute of Labour and Social
Research. The bottom estimate is based on the data from the
Department of Statistics. The variation may be explained by the
approximate nature of the estimations and differences in the
methodology used.
Measures taken to combat undeclared work
Regulation of the phenomena of undeclared work 
The Government of the Republic of Lithuania makes various
efforts to minimise the extent of undeclared work, to increase social
guarantees for the employed and to improve labour market
statistics. A central co-ordination group for the analysis of
origination and control of illegal work has been functioning within
the State Labour Inspectorate since 2002.
The number of detected cases of illegal work has recently increased.
According to the State Labour Inspectorate (SLI), 1,422 illegally
employed persons (i.e. persons without employment contracts) were
identified in 2003, compared to 1,266 in 2002. Analysis of the
detection of illegally employed persons by economic sector
conducted by the SLI shows that most cases of illegal work were
Figure 1: A share of undeclared turnover in aggregated
turnover of retail trade companies in 2002 (%)
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Table 3: Distribution of unauthorised hired employees by types of businesses
Number of employed Comparative part in %
TOTAL 104512 100.0
Agriculture, hunting, forestry 20518 19.6
Fishery  0 0.0
Mining and quarrying 1543 1.5
Manufacturing 24190 23.1
Construction 24383 23.3
Wholesale and retail trade, repair of motor vehicles,
rent of personal supplies and household appliances 5463 5.2
Hotels and restaurants 3102 3.0
Transport, warehousing and communication 3452 3.3
Education 6326 6.1
Healthcare and social work 3818 3.7
Other utility, social and individual service business 7100 6.8
Private households with hired labour force 4507 4.3Autumn 2004 |  European Employment Observatory Review 123
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found in the following sectors: construction (511 illegal employees
identified in 204 economic entities, leading to 35.94% of all detected
illegally employed persons),manufacturing (293 illegal employees in
133 entities, leading to 20.6% of all detected persons), agriculture
(120 illegal employees in 47 entities leading to 8.44% of all detected
persons) and wholesale/retail trade (139 illegal employees in 94
entities leading to 9.77% of all detected persons). As before, the
largest share of illegal employees is found in companies, with an
overall total of 913 people (64.2%).
Employees were issued with 241 protocols of administrative
violations of law in 2003 (593 in 2002) concerning 499 illegally
employed persons (722 in 2002) based on Article 41-3 (Illegal work)
of the Code of Administrative Violations of Law (CAVL). On the
basis of protocols of administrative violations of law issued by
officers of the State Labour Inspectorate, the courts heard 185
proceedings (76.8%) compared to 234 (70.1%) in 2002.
When imposing milder penalties than is specified in the CAVL, the
courts often take into consideration attenuating circumstances as set
out in the law, in addition to other criteria such as:
• no history of administrative penalties;
• responsibility for minors/children;
• financial difficulties;
• very short employment period;
• no damage caused by the violation;
• loan burdens, etc.
Considering prevention of illegal work to be a key priority, the State
Labour Inspectorate widely informs the population about cases of
illegal employment and consequential problems. The largest
regional publications have released about 70 announcements on this
issue, informing people about a relevant help-line, and identifying
the damage caused by illegal work and consequent liability. Some
units of the SLI published information on court actions issued
against employers and penalties imposed by the courts.
Announcements were broadcast 150 times on the Lithuanian radio
station and roughly 500 times on other radio stations. In addition,
national and regional publications released about 70 articles and
interviews. Information and counselling was published in
publication Lietuvos Profsajungos (Lithuanian Work Unions). The
website of the SLI is also regularly updated.
Important prerequisites for minimisation of
undeclared work
In implementing its tax and labour market policy, the Government
of the Republic of Lithuania seeks to maximise the facilitation of
new job creation and the development of SMEs. The policy includes
the following objectives:
• to increase overall employment of the population;
• to increase employment flexibility;
• to improve social security of employees in the employment
sphere.
All these efforts contribute to the minimisation of undeclared work.
Having regard to these national objectives, the system for the
facilitation of creation of new job opportunities includes:
• specific national, regional and local incentives to develop a
network of business development support, including the
improvement of the competence and capacities of these
organisations;
• the minimisation of barriers to business development, and the
creation of favourable and equal business conditions for all
market operators;
• the improvement of measures to support entrepreneurship and
the minimisation of differences between regions in the
development of new job opportunities.
Within the framework of the national employment programme
2001-2004, a system for supporting small to medium businesses was
created. This system has positively influenced the process of job
creation and the minimisation of undeclared work.
Improvement of the system for facilitation of creation of new job
opportunities. In order to achieve the strategic national goals in this
area, the Law on Profit Tax of the Republic of Lithuania lays down
special provisions for the facilitation of small and medium
enterprises:
•  Small enterprises have the opportunity to apply a lower rate of
profit tax, i.e. in entities where the average number of listed
employees does not exceed 10 persons and income over the
taxable period does not exceed 500,000 LTL (144,800 euro),
taxable profit is levied a 13% tax rate (instead of 15%).
• The first business year after their registration, entities are
exempted from advance profit tax. In addition, a small enterprise
shall be released from payment of advance profit tax for the
taxable period if its taxable income over the last taxable period
did not exceed 100,000 LTL (29,000 euro).
The Law on Value Added Tax also sets forth a threshold for
obligatory registration for VAT, i.e. a person is entitled to abstain
from registration as a VAT payer and withhold VAT for the goods
supplied (except for brand new vehicles supplied to other member
states) and/or services rendered, if gross earnings received for the
services or goods supplied over a year (the last 12 months) do not
exceed 100,000 LTL (29,000 euro).
The Law on Value Added Tax also provides for the opportunity to
increase the taxable period, i.e. to consider a calendar semester as a
taxable period instead of one calendar month.
One more important issue in relation to the minimisation of
undeclared work through the development of self-employment and
small businesses is that the law does not require the establishment of
a legal entity for business activities in all cases.A legal entity must be
established only in such cases when laws governing conditions of
relevant activities specifically identify that the carrying out of
particular activities requires establishment of a legal entity.
The Law on Personal Income Tax provides for flexible rules of
taxation of income generated from individual activities, i.e. it is up
to individual to select the taxation rules to be applied. Furthermore,
it is set forth that individuals may engage in individual activities
after payment of a fixed income tax defined by the Municipal
Councils, i.e. after obtaining a business licence to engage in the
approved types of individual business activities.
Facilitation of small and medium business. The business services
infrastructure in Lithuania is being developed as part of an ongoing
process to ensure the high quality and accessible provision of
business services and the opportunity for small and medium
businesses to gain subsidised access to premises, technical
equipment and loan facilities as well as office services. These
activities should hopefully encourage unofficially employed
individuals to legalise their activities. By the year 2003, business
incubators were established in nearly all counties, providing
premises for in excess of 120 companies which established 315 new
job opportunities. LTL 2.8 million (0.81 million euro) was invested
and in excess of LTL 4.3 million (1.25 million euro) was paid in taxes124 Autumn 2004 |  European Employment Observatory Review
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to the State. In addition, 13 new business information centres were
established. In 2003, business incubators offered accommodation to
76 new companies, which offered 403 new job opportunities.
Improvement of attractiveness of and stimulus to work. When
tackling the issue of improving the attractiveness of employment
and the minimisation of undeclared work, Lithuania emphasises
two basic and highly interrelated problems: increasing interest in
employment and pay, and providing sufficient social support to
ensure acceptable living conditions.
Lithuania takes forward various targeted measures to improve the
attractiveness of employment, including increasing the non-taxable
minimum threshold, reducing the tax burden, increasing the
minimal wage, and providing tax privileges to encourage self-
employment. On the other hand, the system of social support has
also been regularly improved, with an increase in the variety of
social benefits and forms of social assistance. Because of these
simultaneous improvements, the difference between maximal social
benefits and minimal and equivalent pay from employment remains
very slight and this has had a negative impact on the attractiveness
of taking up employment.
Reduction of tax burden. In order to reduce the tax burden, the basic
levels of non-taxable income were increased in 2003. Permanent
residents of Lithuania were not only given the right to a basic non-
taxable income value (BNTIV) every month of LTL 290 (87 euro)
per month instead of LTL 250 per month (72.4 euro).In addition an
additional tax-free income threshold was awarded to permanent
residents of Lithuania with one or two children (including adopted
children) under 18 years old.
In 2004-2006 further efforts will be taken to minimise the tax
burden. The Tripartite Council of the Republic of Lithuania has
discussed reducing income tax from 33% to 29-27%.
The incentive to exchange illegal work for normal work should also
be increased after measures are implemented to simplify business
and taxation conditions for individuals.
The legal employment of individuals is encouraged by a provision of
the Law on Personal Income Tax of the Republic of Lithuania
entitling repayment of some income tax. Life insurance premiums,
pension contributions to pension funds, interest for loans taken to
acquire housing, payments for studies as well as acquisition of a PC
and installation of Internet access may be deducted from income.
Regulation of minimum wage. Though minimum wages (MW) were
not increased until September 2003 (from 1998) and amounted to
LTL 430 (125 euro), the number of employees paid minimal
monthly wages or less has been increasing as a percentage of the
total number of employed. In 1998, persons receiving the minimum
wage accounted for 16% of all employees, whilst in 2003 the figure
was 19%. In the private sector MW is paid to about 30% of
employed people, whilst in the State sector it is received by
approximately 11%.
The increase of the MW is one of the ways to improve the
attractiveness of employment for individuals with lower levels of
qualification. However, before increasing the MW, the Government
has sought to maximise their consultation with the social partners,
taking into consideration real economic conditions and the
economic potential of employers. In 2003, ideas began to develop in
relation to the differentiation of the MW by economic activity. On
September 2003, the MW was increased to LTL 450 (130 euro) and
on May 2004 it was increased to LTL 500 (145 euro). Despite such a
rapid increase of the MW (16% in less than a year), this value
remains one of the lowest in the EU countries.
Poverty minimisation programme. A large number of unofficially
employed individuals belong to disadvantaged groups of the
population who need social support. Therefore, the motivation to
engage in unofficial employment depends on the implementation of
measures relating to the improvement of social support and poverty
minimisation.On November 2002,Lithuania adopted a programme
for the Implementation of the Poverty Reduction Strategy in 2002-
2004. The programme gives priority to active poverty minimisation
measures, such as an increase in the human resources available for
professional training, in addition to education, employment
opportunities and economic activities. Providing direct support in
the form of funds to the poor or individuals on the verge of poverty
is considered to be a last resort, when there is no other way to
strengthen the working capacities of an individual and his/her
chances to earn a sufficient income.
Conclusions
Though the definition “undeclared work” is not applied in
Lithuania, definitions of “illegal work” and  “unofficial
employment”are used instead which do not contradict the concept
of the 1998 Commission Communication on undeclared work.
Undeclared work originated and flourished in Lithuania in 1991-
1993 under the conditions of transition into the market economy.
The privatisation of companies, employee redundancies, reduced
labour and financial control within the public sector, high rate of
inflation and associated decline in living standards encouraged
unemployed people to get involved in illegal economic activities. At
the beginning, the Government did not see this process as
necessarily negative, as undeclared work was felt to be better than
unemployment and poverty. However, according to various surveys
and studies, by the year 1995 undeclared work had reached 300,000-
400,000 individuals. Most of them were people operating on a legal
basis (under employment contracts),but only declaring part of their
income. In 1996-1997 undeclared work started to decrease, and
according to various surveys and studies, amounted to 100-170 in
2003, i.e. 7-12% of the total number of employed individuals.
Before 2000, the Government mainly used administrative measures
to minimise undeclared work. The State Labour Inspectorate, the
Board of Social Insurance SODRA, the State Tax Inspectorate, the
Financial Crime Investigation Service and the Police Department at
the Ministry of the Interior organised raids on employers,
controlled the movement of employees and imposed relevant
penalties on lawbreakers. Since 2000, primary attention has been
paid to:
• prevention of undeclared work (public awareness, training, co-
operation with social partners);
• facilitation of small and medium business development;
• reduction of wage taxation;
• financial issues relating to legalisation;
• improvement of social support and social services.
Efforts are taken not to penalise people for undertaking undeclared
work, but to improve the attractiveness of legal work as far as
possible.
In 2004-2006, various incentives are planned for further legislation
in the field of motivating people to access work.These efforts will be
implemented through:
a) development of knowledge and skills of individuals;
b) development of economic incentives to access work.Autumn 2004 |  European Employment Observatory Review 125
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It should be noted that the Lithuanian system of general education
and professional training only provides a limited amount of
information about the negative consequences of undeclared work
and opportunities to legalise employment relations, etc. On the
other hand, it has to be pointed out that the development of
mechanisms for increasing the attractiveness of legal work and
providing support to SMEs are only just beginning. Within the
framework of the implementation of these measures by 2006, it is
expected that greater priority will now be given to increasing
mechanisms for SME support and motivating people to seek legal,
rather than illegal/undeclared work.
Overall economic growth, and the growth of the average wage in
particular, should have favourable effects on the minimisation of
undeclared work. The government policy to reduce income tax
should also minimise the economic incentives to avoid the
declaration of work.
Dr. Boguslavas Gruzevskis*
* This article was prepared with Dr. Arunas Pocius and Julija Moskvina from the
Institute of Labour and Social Research.
Luxembourg
Introduction
In this report we shall review the legislative arrangements within
which illegal working is defined, detected and sanctioned by the law
in Luxembourg. We shall then look at the case law that has
developed to deal with it, before examining the current focal points
of debate in this area. We shall end with an examination of some
concrete results in the battle against undeclared working and will
formulate a number of conclusions.
The legal framework on undeclared work
Clandestine working is prohibited by article 1 of the law of 3 August
1977. In addition to this simple prohibition, the same law also
includes (within the concept of clandestine working) the pursuit, on
a self-employed basis, of one of the listed occupational activities or
the formation and management of companies without possession of
the required authorisation. This same law also applies to the
performance of paid work when the person performing that work
knows the employer does not possess the authorisation required
under the law of 2 June 1962 or that his/her position as a salaried
worker does not properly conform to the legislation on deductions
from wages and salaries or to social security legislation. In this way,
the two classic patterns of occupational activity – paid employment
and self-employed working – are covered in the law.
So as fully to understand these legal provisions, the occupational
activities mentioned in article 1 of the law of 2 June 1962, which are
referred to here, are as follows:
• traders and industrialists;
• representatives, agents, brokers and commercial travellers;
• carriers transporting persons or things, and the owners of
machines or devices, who are involved in industrial hire on a
professional basis;
• craftsmen;
• freelance architects and engineers;
• landscape gardeners and persons who perform work within that
occupational category for others, horticulturalists, florists and
horticultural seed-growers;
• self-employed accountants.
The law of 3 August 1977 lays down some further prohibitions. It is,
for example, forbidden to use the services of a person or group of
persons for the performance of clandestine work as understood in
Article 1 of the same law, to employ salaried staff for the
performance of work external to the household or external to the
object of the employer’s business when the said work falls within
one of the occupations listed in Article 1 of the law of 2 June 1962
indicated above.
Further, the 1977 law indicates what does not constitute clandestine
work. Within the meaning of the law, clandestine work is not:
• an activity carried out personally for one’s own benefit without
the aid of others;
• an occasional activity of minor importance carried out for
another person;
• an isolated activity carried out for someone else that does not
exceed the bounds of the mutual aid common between relatives,
friends or neighbours.
A new law on the right of establishment, dated 28 December 1988,
further reinforced and specified the conditions of access to certain
occupations. The occupations in question are those of trader,
manufacturer, craftsman and a number of others. The law also
specified the range of qualifications and authorisations required for
a person to be able to pursue these particular occupations. This
raising of the level of occupational entry requirements provided a
new barrier against undeclared working.
As various legal decisions have been made, case law has introduced
the extra-legal notions of pursuit of profit, ignorance or otherwise
of an illegal situation, and services delivered significantly below
market price, and has provided examples of which activities may be
counted as “isolated”or “of minor importance”1.
Undeclared work in the national economy
In an “Action Programme for Craftsmen” of May 20002, the
Chamber of Trades and Federation of Craftsmen, referring to the
Communication from the Commission of 7 April 1998 on
Undeclared Work3, indicated that in the economic context of the
1990s the free operation of competition was constantly hindered by
1 Schintgen and Faber (1996).
2 Programme d’action en faveur de l’artisant (2000).
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clandestine working, breaches of the law governing establishment,
social dumping and bankruptcies. The impact of clandestine work
lay in a range between 7 and 15% of the GDP of the European
Union and between 10 and 28 million work units, i.e. between 7 and
19% of the total of declared jobs. Adapting these figures for
Luxembourg4, this gave a range of between 37 and 80 billion
Luxembourg francs (i.e. between 0.91 billion euro and 1.98 billion
euro) and between 15,000 and 42,000 jobs. The checks carried out in
1999 by the gendarmerie showed that 14% of the workplaces visited
were in breach of the legislation on clandestine working and the law
on establishment.
Unfortunately, it is not possible to provide precise, recent figures on
the place non-declared work occupies in the national economy. We
know this type of work exists, but it is not really possible to quantify
it at the present time. It is, as a consequence, impossible to state with
certainty which groups and sectors of activity are most concerned.
However, this type of work certainly exists and copious press
coverage regularly reminds us of it. It could be mentioned , as an
example, that the phenomenon is well-known in the transport sector
and that this sector has been criticised on these grounds by a major
national trade union5.
In January 2002 the press reported on the “Kralowetz affair”6. This
road transport company with its head office in Luxembourg
employed more than 600 drivers from Eastern Europe. The
company paid no social security contributions and neither paid the
hours nor declared the activity of these drivers.
Undeclared activity also occurs as an effect of clandestine
immigration, but the government of Luxembourg has tackled this
problem by procedures of regularisation or expulsion, where
necessary7.
Measures for detecting, combating and sanctioning
undeclared work
The measures for combating illegal work have developed as the
legislation has evolved. The relevant laws are presented in
chronological order before looking at some figures on the results
achieved.
The Law of 3 August 1977
The law of 3 August, mentioned above, also has a section laying
down legal sanctions for undeclared working.
Article 4 of this law, for example, states that those using the services
of a person or group of persons to carry out clandestine work
within the meaning of Article 1 are jointly and severally liable for
the payment of the contributions due to the social security
authorities as a result of that work.
Article 6 states that breaches of the law are investigated by the
officers and agents of the police and gendarmerie, as well as by the
competent agents of the Inspectorate of Labour [Inspection du
travail et des mines] on the one hand and, on the other, by the agents
and employees of the department delivering authorisations of
establishment duly mandated to that effect by the competent
ministry.
Article 7 adds that the investigating agents are to inform the tax
authorities and the social security bodies of the violations they
record. Article 8 specifies that breaches of the law are punished by a
fine and, in cases of re-offending within five years, by a penalty of
imprisonment ranging between 8 days and 6 months and a fine of
up to twice the maximum penalty, or one of these penalties only. In
all the cases specified in Articles 1 and 2, the cessation of the illegal
working is ordered.
Article 9 creates the possibility of an agreed settlement. The
minister qualified to grant authorisations of establishment has the
power to settle on a fine whenever he takes the view that the
payment of a sum of 25,000 Luxembourg francs (620 euro) or less
represents sufficient punishment. Compromise settlements may be
reached so long as the case has not been brought before the courts.
The minister may delegate the power to arrive at a compromise fine
to one or more civil servants. The document recording the
settlement fine specifies the charges made against the person
concerned, relating these to Articles 1 and 2 of the law. Where a
settlement fine is agreed, the court action lapses.
The law of 28 December 1988
The law of 28 December 1988 on the right of establishment states,in
Article 22, that breaches and attempted breaches of the provisions
of the law are punishable by a term of imprisonment of between
eight days and three years and a fine or by one of these penalties
only.
The grand-ducal regulation of 4 November 1994
A grand-ducal regulation of 4 November 1994 indirectly created
one means for detecting undeclared working. For building sites
where the presumed duration of the works is longer than thirty
working days and more than twenty workers are employed at any
one time, or where the number of workers is more than 500 per day,
the project manager or the contractor must communicate a
certificate of prior notice to the Inspectorate of Labour before the
work begins.
This certificate must state, among other things, the presumed
maximum number of workers on the site, the number of companies
and self-employed persons expected on the site, and must identify
the companies already selected. This enables the Inspectorate of
Labour to carry out the appropriate monitoring.
The Law of 19 June 1998
With regard to social security in particular, the simplified procedure
introduced by the law of 19 June 1998 on nursing-dependency
insurance should also be mentioned. This procedure allows
employers, where relevant, to declare the net remuneration agreed
with the persons whom they employ in their private life for
household tasks, childcare and for providing them with the
assistance and care necessitated by their state of dependency. This
procedure, which makes for simpler relations with the
administrative bodies, is used in 1.2% of declarations of
employees/workers.
The monitoring service of the Common Centre for Social Security
also takes part in the workplace monitoring co-ordinated by the
Inspectorate of Labour.
4 Source: Luxembourg Central Statistical Service (STATEC), 1996.
5 Le Quotidien indépendant luxembourgeois, 26 April 2004, p. 3.
6 Le Quotidien indépendant luxembourgeois, 6 June 2003, p. 2.
7 La Voix du Luxembourg, 9 January 2003, p. 5; Le Quotidien indépendant luxembourgeois, 6 June 2003, p. 2.Autumn 2004 |  European Employment Observatory Review 127
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The Law of 12 February 1999
The law of 12 February 1999 introducing the National Action Plan
for Employment adds a very important element, as it modifies
Article 22 of the law of 12 February 1999 by adding that police
officers and officers of the gendarmerie are responsible for seeking
out and reporting breaches to which legal sanctions are applicable.
Moreover, the Director of the Customs and Excise authority may
charge his agents, from the rank of sergeant upwards, with this same
task.
In carrying out these missions,the agents of the Customs and Excise
authority, from the rank of sergeant upwards, have the status of
police officers. As a consequence, they possess the authority to
record breaches of the law by filing reports which, failing proof to
the contrary, count as evidence. Their competence extends across
the whole territory of Luxembourg.
The same law introducing the National Action Plan for
Employment goes even further down the repressive route, since it
modifies Article 6 of the law of 3 August 1977 by specifying that
breaches of this law shall be detected and reported by the officers
and agents of the police or the gendarmerie, by the agents of the
Customs and Excise from the rank of sergeant upwards, by the
inspection staff of the Inspectorate of Labour and Mines from
middle-ranking officers upwards, and by the agents, from the rank
of commis adjoint upwards, of the department delivering
authorisations of establishment, duly mandated to that effect by the
competent minister.
The Law of 20 December 2002
A law of 20 December 2002 relating to the posting of workers within
the context of the provision of services, which carries a European
directive into Luxembourg law, constitutes a very effective tool in
the battle against social dumping by its economic impact on the
companies doing the posting and the contractors established in
Luxembourg. In fact, a targeted procedure allows the authority
responsible for applying this law to put a stop to any work that has
not been declared in advance. This law also provides for the
inspection of the E101 form and the wages records of all the
companies operating on the national territory. Under this
legislation,failure to possess an E101 form may be considered a type
of clandestine working.
Article 6 of this recent law plays a role in organising transnational
co-operation. The Inspectorate of Labour is designated as the
competent national authority for the application of the law. In
fulfilling this role, it is called upon to co-operate with the authorities
of other States undertaking tasks similar to those defined in the law.
Within the framework of this co-operation, the Inspectorate of
Labour replies to well-founded requests for information on the
transnational supply of workers where those requests originate from
other public authorities designated as liaison bureaux or competent
national authorities. These requests also relate to manifest abuses or
cases of transnational activities presumed to be illegal or such as to
endanger the security and health of workers at work.
Among the range of legal measures taken, the co-ordination
achieved between the various different departments of state in order
to detect clandestine working and combat it should be highlighted.
The political debate
To see the place undeclared work occupies in national debate in
Luxembourg, we should first distinguish between the purely
political debate within the legislative and executive institutions and
the debate within the consultative institutions.
The political debate within the Chamber of Deputies and
the Government
At the political level, a number of parliamentary questions relating
to illegal working have been addressed to sitting governments over
the last twenty years. In 1985, 1993, 1998 and 19998, questions were
asked regarding the results of the so-called “crackdown operations”
as part of the attempt to mount an effective offensive against
clandestine working. The problems which emerged from this were
the absence of authorisations of establishment,the non-observation
of safety measures, the absence of residence authorisation and work
permits, together with non-affiliation to the social security system.
Other questions related to the role of the Inspectorate of Labour in
combating undeclared work.Over twenty years the Government has
been questioned on this subject by the Chamber of Deputies on five
occasions.
National governments have planned, in successive governmental
accords, to tackle the problem of illegal working. For example, in
the coalition agreement between the CSV9 and DP10 parties in
1999,11 combating illegal working was declared a priority for two
different ministries. The coalition agreement in fact stated that the
Ministry of Labour and Employment would “intensify its
campaigning efforts against social dumping and illegal working, as
well as reinforce the oversight of the rules relating to labour
legislation.”Where the Ministry of the Middle Classes,Tourism and
Housing is currently concerned, it is specified that: “It (the
Government) will pursue its efforts to prevent any distortion of
competition in the national market on the part of companies
operating on the territory of Luxembourg which are breaching our
regulations on social security and labour law. To this end, it will
intensify its “crackdown operations”and modify the legislation on
unfair competition and competition law.”
The most recent National Action Plan for Employment,12
negotiated by the State and the social partners (the trade union and
employers’ organisations), also speaks of provisions for combating
illegal working and social dumping within the framework of
Guideline No. 9, “Transforming Undeclared Work into Lawful
Employment.”
The Debate in the Chamber of Trades
The Chamber of Trades, invited to give its opinion13 on the Bill that
will lead eventually to the law of 20 December 2002 on the
temporary posting of workers within the context of the provision of
services, formulated some important remarks, which seem of
relevance here.
For example, the Chamber takes the view that the law of 3 August
1977 on clandestine working, though it is not entirely obsolete,
needs a certain number of adjustments and modifications if it is to
become a more effective means for combating clandestine working.
8 www.chd.lu, 30 June 2004.
9 Christian Socialist Party.
10 Democratic Party.
11 www.gouvernement.lu/gouvernement/programme/accord_coalition_1999_fr.html#4, 1 July 2004.
12 Plan d’action nationale pour l’emploi, rapport national 2003, Luxembourg, October 2003, p. 55.
13 Chambre des métiers, avis du 28 novembre 2000, J-2000-0-0760.128 Autumn 2004 |  European Employment Observatory Review
Trends
In the first place, particularly in so far as the essentially repressive
measures are concerned, the Chamber of Trades believes it would
be best:
• to introduce a presumption of payment. Given that the lucrative
character of an activity (which, alongside its clandestine nature,
makes up illegal working) is difficult to prove, there are grounds
for creating a presumption of payment. With this in place, the
following circumstances would be such as to lead to a
presumption concerning the nature of the work: the frequency or
extent of the work done, the nature or extent of the equipment
used, the professional knowledge required to be able to perform
the activity, and the use of advertising in whatever form for the
purposes of finding custom;
• to create a legal basis establishing a special commission whose
role would be to assist the minister responsible for authorising
establishment in his capacity to decide on settlement demands, as
laid down in the law of 3 August 1977. The establishment of such
a commission, bringing together the various competent
authorities and agencies responsible for sanctioning instances of
clandestine working, is necessary if they are to be able to act and
react effectively in combating it;
• to raise the ceiling for settlement fines.Given that breaches of the
legislation on clandestine working are essentially driven by
economic and financial considerations, a substantial raising of
the ceiling for settlement fines would be in order. The level of this
fine is certainly no longer commensurate with the harm caused to
the community and to legally established companies, on the one
hand, and with the illegal profits derived by those engaged in
clandestine working on the other.
• to modify the level of fines prescribed in the law of 3 August
1977. Given that the law of 12 February 1999 concerning the
implementation of the National Action Plan for Employment
1988 amended Article 22 of the 1988 law on establishment which
relates to penal sanctions, there are grounds for adjusting the
fines laid down in Article 8 of the law of 3 August 1977 to those
specified in the aforementioned law on establishment: namely, a
sentence of imprisonment of between eight days and three years
and a fine or one only of these penalties.
Results
A working group named the “Social Dumping Working Group”was
set up in 1995 within the Ministry of the Middle Classes, Tourism
and Housing to combat unfair competition on the part of
companies operating on Luxembourg soil who are in breach of the
legal and regulatory prescriptions with regard to the law on
establishment, labour law and social security. This group is made up
of representatives of the Ministries of the Middle Classes and
Tourism, of Public Works, of Labour and Justice; of the Common
Centre for Social Security; of the Customs and Excise, Registry,
Contributions and Employment authorities,and of the Inspectorate
of Labour. The gendarmerie, the police, the Chambers of
Commerce and Trades, the Confederation of Commerce and the
Federations of Craftsmen and Industrialists are also members of
this group.
In 2003, workplace inspections by “social dumping” investigators
and “crackdown” operations against illegal working intensified by
comparison with 2002. Several of these operations were carried out
in 2003 on large sites, involving the Inspectorate of Labour, the
Office of Social Insurance, the forces of law and order and the full
range of actors mentioned in relation to the legislative changes cited
above. During these inspections, the following breaches of the law
were found: failure to respect the legislation relating to
authorisation of establishment, to work permits, to residence
permits, to affiliation to the social security system, to hours of
working and to safety measures.
In a very significant number of “social dumping” investigations
carried out at small and medium-sized companies and worksites
across all regions, the grand-ducal police found 220 breaches of the
regulations. The police forces laid more than 380 charges in relation
to these inspections, many of which took place at weekends.
The offensive against breaches of the law on establishment has been
reinforced by checks carried out by agents of the Customs and
Excise authority,who have been trained in recent years in the area of
the law on establishment and clandestine work.
Since these investigations and operations have been carried out
systematically, the figures for breaches of the law have been
considerably reduced and the average number of violations found
per worksite has fallen. These results reveal the effectiveness of
“crackdown” operations and these will now be continued
systematically.
Sanctions applied have included closing down sites where
companies are in breach of safety laws and the law on establishment,
stopping workers without work permits from working and expelling
those without residence permits from the country. Charge sheets
have been drawn up for the breaches committed.
Conclusions
It can be concluded that the definition, detection, combating and
sanctioning of undeclared work in Luxembourg is covered jointly
by legislation that has been in a constant state of development since
1977 and by a case law that has complemented those developments.
The so-called “crackdown”operations have been the most effective
instruments for enforcing the legal provisions. Co-ordination
between the various services of state in carrying through these
operations has further reinforced their impact and effectiveness.
Franz Clément
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Definition of the non-observed economy and
undeclared work
The OECD (OECD, 1986) defined “concealed employment” as
“employment which, while not illegal in itself, has not been declared
to one or more administrative authorities…”. OECD (2002) defined
the  “non-observed economy” and distinguished five main
components of it, as follows:
• Statistical underground production;
• Underground production: those activities that are productive
and legal but are deliberately concealed from the public
authorities to avoid payment of taxes or complying with
regulations;
• Informal sector production: those productive activities
conducted by unincorporated enterprises in the household sector
that are unregistered and/or are less than a specified size in terms
of employment, and that have some market production;
• Illegal production;
• Production of households for their own final use.
The OECD claims that the non-observed economy is already
estimated into the published or measured GDP.
The European Union defines “undeclared work” as ”any paid
activities that are lawful as regards their nature but not declared to
the public authorities, taking into account differences in the
regulatory system of Member States. Applying this definition,
criminal activities would be excluded, as would work not covered by
the usual regulatory framework and which does not have to be
declared.”(EC 1998) The EU definition seems to match categories 2
and 3 of the OECD definition. However, the EU definition is
broader than these since it takes into account those parts of the
underground and informal production which are not inputted into
the official GDP.
In the case of Hungary there is no “official” definition of the non-
observed economy or undeclared work. Recently prepared
government documents and their background materials apply the EU
definition while, both in the media and in academic literature, there is
a mixture of divergent terms, definitions and interpretations used.
Prevalence of non-observed economy and
undeclared work in Hungary
International comparisons
Despite the fact that non-observed activities are rather extensive in
Hungary, there are very few reliable estimates on their size in
different sectors of the economy during recent years. Nevertheless,
the available results confirm the existence of a sizeable undeclared
economy.
The most comprehensive analysis calculates that 15-20% of GDP is
generated in the informal economy (Lackó 1992, 1998, 1999, 2000).
These shares are similar to those estimated by Lackó for the Czech
Republic, Poland and some western EU countries including Greece,
Italy and Belgium, and far lower than estimates for Turkey and
Mexico. In a recently published OECD comparison (OECD 2004)
containing national accounts-based estimates, the estimate for
Hungary (1997) is at 15.4% of GDP, while it is 5.6% for the Czech
Republic (1998),7.3% for the Slovak Republic (1998),and 16.0% for
Italy (2000). The data referring to Hungary comes from 1997 and
unfortunately are much older than data for other countries.
One of the most recent analyses (Renooy at al,2004) identified three
groups of the EU Member States and accession countries according
to the size and chance of prevalence of undeclared work in the
economy. These are: a) countries with low and decreasing levels of
informal activity (8-13% of GDP); b) countries with a medium and
decreasing level (14-23% of GDP); and c) countries with a high and
increasing level (21-22% of GDP). Hungary falls in the second
category.
OECD (2004) also contains calculations for the year 2000 for many
countries, with the help of the theoretical tax liability method. They
estimated theoretical tax liability for compulsory social security
contributions based on wages and salaries in the national accounts.
These estimations were compared with actual receipts of
contributions. These calculations show that the actual social
security receipts in the non-government sector are close to 100% of
the theoretical liability in six countries: the Czech Republic, Japan,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway and the Slovak Republic.
The shortfall in receipts is about 20% in Italy, Poland, Spain and
Turkey. The shortfall in receipts is 30% or more in Hungary, Mexico
and Korea.
Christie and Holzner (2004) followed the Household Income
Taxation Method. In this method, the estimation of income
declaration rates and corresponding undeclared household income
are computed using household consumption data as well as detailed
data on household taxation. Authors calculated the share of
household income which should be subject to taxation, but is not,
despite the fact that it is captured by the official measure of GDP.
Table 1 shows undeclared household income as a percentage of
GDP in the investigated countries in 2001.
Hungary
Table 1: Undeclared household income as a percentage
of GDP (2001)
Countries Undeclared household income
Albania 52%
Bulgaria 34%
Croatia 19%
Macedonia 39%
Romania 46%
Kosovo 45%
Czech Republic 18%
Estonia 17%
Hungary 21%
Latvia 26%
Lithuania 25%
Poland 31%
Slovakia 21%
Slovenia 17%
Source: Christie and Holzner (2004)130 Autumn 2004 |  European Employment Observatory Review
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Hungary: standalone analysis 
Estimations of the time path of the share of the non-
observed economy in the GDP
Results of estimations of the size of the non-observed economy in
Hungary show a continuous increase during the pre-transitional
period (1970-1990).This expansion was accelerated during the years
of transitional crises (1990-1993). Analysis of the post-transitional
period (1993-2003) shows that, in line with the completion of the
legal and institutional framework of the market economy, the
integration of Hungary in the world economy (and especially in the
European Union) and the expansion of foreign businesses, the size
of the non-observed economy began to decrease.
One of the first attempts to calculate the time path of the size of the
informal economy was carried out by Lackó (1992, 1999, Dezséri et
al. 1998). According to the results, the informal economy increased
from 13% to 18% of GDP between 1970-1987. This expansion
accelerated in the pre-transition years. The share of the informal
economy was estimated to as much as 34% in 1990. Most of the
analysis for the years of the transitional crisis estimated the share of
the informal economy at between 25 and 27% (Dezséri et al. 1998,
Kállai 1993). Árvay and Vértes (1994) used sector specific
representative samples and estimated that 27% of GDP was produced
in the informal economy. Their estimations were carried out in
different sectors and found that the share of the concealed economy
was 10% in the public sector, 88% in the domestically-owned private
sector and only 2% in the foreign-owned private sector.
A number of empirical studies in the field of the non-observed
economy investigated the time path of the intensity of tax avoidance
practices of Hungarian enterprises.According to Semjén (1998),tax
reports reveal that a large proportion of unincorporated firms are
established to evade taxes on wages, while two enterprise surveys (of
300 small and medium enterprises in 1994 and 1996) suggest that
small firms are more likely to hire employees at minimum wage
(combined with other forms of remuneration such as sub-
contracting). Small firms are also more likely to sell goods without
paying VAT but the effect of changes in VAT rates would be difficult
to link to specific groups of economic units. The corporate income
tax rate was gradually reduced over the years from 50% in 1989 to
40%, and then to 18% in 1996.
Available evidence from Hungary suggests that administrative
control matters in the case of tax avoidance. Semjén (2001) notes
that, although the volume and efficiency of the supervising activity
of the Tax Authority is rather unpredictable, on balance it is
improving.Increased effort has been devoted to checking large firms
rather than smaller firms, hence improvements in the tax
compliance of smaller enterprises may be slower. Semjén and Tóth
(2002) also report that tax evasion decreased in larger firms and was
partly due to an improvement in tax administration.
Tóth and Semjén (1996, 2002, 2004) made survey-type
investigations about certain aspects of the hidden economy in
Hungary. The authors combined data from three consecutive
enterprise surveys taken in 1996, 1998 and 2001. The investigation
offered a survey-based empirical analysis of changes in contractual
and tax discipline amongst medium sized and large firms in
Hungary during the time span. Changes in the occurrence of some
phenomena related to the undeclared or hidden economy were also
covered. It turned out that the scope of the hidden economy
significantly diminished within the analysed segment of the
economy. There was a reduction in the occurrence of sales without a
receipt both for the business partners (suppliers, sub-contractors)
and for the competitors of the surveyed firms. Contractual and tax
discipline improved, and the soft budget constraint syndrome lost
ground within the enterprise sector. The authors’estimations, based
on the randomised response technique, suggest that there was a
further reduction in the occurrence of tax evasion amongst
medium-sized and large firms between 1998 and 2001. According to
the authors, improving business expectations and an increased level
of integration into the European economy have been key factors in
the reduction of the share of the hidden economy.
Scharle (2002) looks at tax evasion in small businesses in Hungary,
using data from 1992-2000. The paper examines the effect of
changes in taxation and social security contributions on outflows
from self-employment using data from the labour force survey, and
attempts to measure the correlation between the volume of
unofficial activities and the density of small businesses using small
region data on electricity consumption and tax reports. Results
suggest that the survival of small businesses is significantly
influenced by changes in tax rates, that small businesses contribute
significantly to unofficial wealth accumulation and that unofficial
activities tend to be tied to official ones, as was customary in the
second economy of the socialist system. Semjén, Szántó et al. (2001)
explains how the amount saved from not paying social security
contributions can be divided between employers and employees
when the firm uses sub-contracting instead of employing a worker.
A special survey of the Hungarian Central Statistical Office (HCSO,
1998) approached the hidden economy from the consumers’ and
clients’ perspective. The objective was to find out how much money
households pay in one month and in one year for goods, services
and rents without receiving any kind of formal receipt.In relation to
this, the giving of tips and gratuities was studied. According to
HSCO estimates, in 1997, at least 11% of household expenditures
were transferred to the hidden economy. The survey also collected
personal and spontaneous opinions of households on the hidden
economy. The survey showed that the majority of people, regardless
of their age,gender,education or income position (both in Budapest
and in the countryside) regard the presence of the hidden economy
as natural. (Only 7% had an openly negative attitude and 12% a
latent negative. Moreover, a significant part of citizens, 29%, openly
approved of the hidden economy). It was shown also that the
respondents believe that high taxes and social contributions play a
crucial role in the preservation of the hidden economy.
Estimations of the prevalence of undeclared work in
Hungary
The extremely high inactivity rate in Hungary implies that, among
the inactive 15-64 year-olds, the proportion of people who gain
some kind of income through undeclared employment could be
significant. There are approximately 440,000-450,000 persons who
are inactive but are not in education, and do not receive pension,
childcare or unemployment benefits. Meanwhile, the number of
employed (3,900,000 persons) measured by the Labour Force
Survey is at least 500,000 higher than the number of those who pay
income tax (including the self-employed). Based on the above-
mentioned figures, it can be assumed that 15-20% of the employed
are not declared to the public authorities. Ádám and Kutas (2004)
compared the number of employed people with the number of tax
payers in 2002, and found that the share of undeclared employment
was 13% in 2003.
The relatively high undeclared employment in Hungary is often
presumed to be behind the low levels of formal employment and
job-search activity. Nevertheless, there is no straightforward linkage
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employment or job-search intensity. The question of whether
formal and informal jobs are substitutes or complements, and
whether people’s engagement in informal employment is conducive
to lower search intensity, are difficult ones and require disaggregate
data in order to be properly addressed. Such data is scarce and all
conclusions drawn from existing data are tentative.
Köllő and Nacsa (2004) present some rough calculations addressing
how employment and some proxies of the local informal economy
were correlated in Hungary’s micro-regions, in 2000. Results of the
estimations show a statistically significant inverse relationship
between employment (as well as labour force participation) and the
indicators of the informal economy. Regions with a sizeable
informal economy have lower employment rates. However, as soon
as the equations were controlled for the level of education –
considered a proxy of a region’s level of development and ability to
absorb capital investments- all relationships between the informal
economy and labour market outcomes became statistically
insignificant. Hence, variations in the size of the informal economy
actually do not explain variations in formal employment,
unemployment,or search intensity once human capital endowments
are controlled for. According to the authors, the observed
correlations are consistent with the expectation of no causal
relationship between informal and formal employment, or between
informal employment and search intensity.The informal economy is
widespread in regions with low levels of education and a number of
related endowments conducive to low levels of job creation and
employment. In this sense the informal economy is an effect rather
than a “cause”of low formal employment.
Measures taken to combat undeclared work
In recent years, undeclared work has become a major issue in the
political debate in Hungary. Several measures have been taken to
reduce its level and an inter-ministerial working group elaborated an
action plan to introduce further measures and action in this field.
Measures to create a more favourable legal and
institutional environment conducive to the
declaration of economic activity and employment
Undeclared work is highly concentrated in sectors characterised by
temporary or seasonal labour (e.g. construction, agriculture,
catering and tourism). Therefore, a number of measures had been
taken to prepare a new labour legislation, adjusted to the
peculiarities of seasonal employment.A specific “labour certificate”
for temporary workers was introduced, which made it possible for
employers to meet their payment obligations by purchasing a “tax
and contributions voucher”.
In order to consolidate taxpaying discipline, governments
occasionally introduce tax types and rates making tax fraud
pointless, such as the simplified business tax which replaced several
former kinds of tax in 2003 and set a 15% rate for sales returns of up
to HUF 15 million (58,000 euro). The new system generated a far
bigger income for the central budget than planned.
Strengthening incentives and removing disincentives
to declare work on both the demand and the supply
sides
Hungary has one of the highest tax wedges on labour. Thus, it can
be said that low formal employment is a result of tax avoidance by
both employers and employees. Wage related taxes and
contributions have decreased substantially in recent years: the rate
of employers’contributions dropped by 6 percentage points in 1999,
and by a further 2 percentage points in each of the years 2001 and
2002, that is, by a total of 10 percentage points. However, the
amount of the fixed component of the employers’ contribution to
healthcare increased in 2003.
In 2001, the modification of the Labour Code extended the list of
formal criteria concerning employment contracts. Employment
contracts must be settled in written form and include certain
elements, such as the amount of the basic wage, a job description
and the location of the work.
Strengthening surveillance and the application of
appropriate sanctions
During the 90s, one the main forms of undeclared work was the so-
called “double contract”consisting of a formal contract providing
for pay at the national minimum wage and an informal contract
reflecting actual pay. After the late 1990s, new forms of undeclared
employment, the so-called “bogus” civil law contracts became
increasingly widespread. The “bogus” civil law contracts are
contracts not governed by labour law. Instead of making
employment contracts, employers conclude service contracts with
self-employed people acting as micro-enterprises, who are in fact in
a position of dependent employment (“forced entrepreneurs”).
Given that employment attracts a considerable tax and social
security contribution burden,and that there is a lower tax and social
security payment regime for enterprises, it is in the short-term
interest of both employers and employees to avoid normal
employment contracts. Additionally, employers gain important
flexibility advantages in using informal agreements or civil contracts
instead of employment contracts.
It is the task of the National Labour Inspectorate (OMMF) to
supervise how employers follow legal regulations on employment
relationships. In 2003, the OMMF found that in 21% of inspected
cases, employers had not signed correct legal statements to establish
employment relationships with their employees. The most frequent
forms of irregularities were: employment (sub-contracting,
assignment) based on a false contract; employment without an
employment contract, based on a verbal agreement of the parties
concerned; or irregularities stemming from an employment contract
concluded with shortfalls in formal requirements or substance. The
tasks of labour inspection have grown substantially during recent
years, while labour and safety at work inspections cover
approximately 3 to 5% of employers annually.
One of the most important steps to strengthen the information
background of the OMMF was the creation of the Hungarian
Unified Labour Database (EMMA). Since May 2004, employers
have to report any changes in the status of their employees to this
central database. Employers must report the hiring of a new worker
before the employee starts work, while the ending of an employee
relationship will have to be reported within one day after the
termination of the contract. In theory, the database contains up-to-
date information on the employment status of Hungary’s employees
who fall under the jurisdiction of the Labour Code, as well as all of
the employers in the country. EMMA creates the necessary
conditions for a more effective labour inspection system,
contributes to the transparency of the labour market and increases
the legal security of employees. Employers are able to meet their
reporting obligations not just through the traditional mailing
method, but also through a PIN number-protected telephone
number and through the Internet. At the same time, employees are
also able to access the database through the Internet to check their
employment status.132 Autumn 2004 |  European Employment Observatory Review
Trends
Nevertheless, EMMA, as it functions now, provides fewer services
for users than was initially anticipated. For example, EMMA gives
no access to information on social security registration and
contributions which would have been an important service for
employees. These data are available from the database of the
National Pensions Office which holds this kind of information
dating back to 1958, the National Health Insurance Fund and the
Tax Bureau. According to experts in the field of labour law, who
support the original goals for which EMMA was created, it could
have been achieved by the development of the already existing
information systems. HUF 1.6 billion (6.4 million euro) was
invested in EMMA which now seems to be a high cost borne for
such modest output. Nevertheless, the OMMF could in future use
EMMA as an effective tool for the investigation of undeclared
employment.
Strengthening the role of social partners in
combating undeclared work
EIRO (2004) gives a brief overview of the industrial relations
aspects of undeclared work in Hungary. It looks at the activities and
views of the social partners, and the partnerships between social
partners and the public authorities to tackle undeclared work.
According to this evaluation,collective bargaining hardly deals with
issues related to undeclared work as such. The decentralised nature
of Hungarian collective bargaining, the weak administrative
capacities of employers’ associations and trade unions at the
sectoral and national level and their highly fragmented nature
inhibit any major joint action to combat undeclared work.
Nevertheless, in several sectors, most importantly in the food
industry and the construction industry, the main employers’
associations and trade unions have initiated joint efforts to reduce
undeclared work, and to improve health and safety standards. In
these industries, the main employers’ associations are aware of the
negative impact of using undeclared work on the competitiveness of
the industry and thus are seeking to co-operate with unions to
combat it. Those involved hope that the consolidation of sectoral
collective bargaining through recently established sector-level
bipartite social dialogue forums, and the extension of voluntary
multi-employer collective agreements, will open new opportunities
for joint regulation and effective joint institutions to reduce
undeclared work.
Future prospects
In 2003, the government decided to modify the legislative
framework of employment in order to adjust regulations to the
changing employment pattern of recent years. According to the
decision,the following actions will be implemented before the end of
2005:
• As part of the comprehensive review of the Labour Code, the
legal forms of employment will be reviewed;
• A comparative analysis will be drawn up about the regulations
concerning taxes and contributions and credits related to the
various forms of employment;
• Finally, a joint evaluation will be carried out with the social
partners and a joint proposal will be prepared on the necessary
amendments to the regulations.
In 2004, the Ministry of Finance established an inter-ministerial
working group to assess the causes and consequences of the
undeclared economy, to identify major challenges and to prepare a
package of proposals on policy responses for the Economic
Cabinet. The first report of the working group was prepared in May
2004. Based on this report, a work programme will be prepared
defining the tasks in the field of regulation, tax and social security.
The Hungarian National Action Plan (NAP) on Employment
provides a detailed assessment of undeclared work in Hungary and
provides a list of planned policy responses. Three major policy
responses are listed in the document: reducing and harmonising the
costs of employment; improving the efficiency of labour inspection;
and creating an interest for paying social security contributions.
Over the past few years, the Hungarian Government has started to
decrease and unify the tax burden on employment. Most of the
focus is, however, on employer contributions. Legal employment
would also be promoted by decreasing the tax burden on employees
(e.g. by further shifting tax revenues from income to consumption).
The NAP also highlights the importance of raising the awareness of
citizens concerning compliance with the law. The most interesting
and quite promising proposal aims at creating an interest for paying
social security contributions. To strengthen the insurance principle
for cash benefits (e.g. pension, sick-pay, childcare pay), the
Hungarian Government is considering a system to register an
individual’s eligibility. In principle, such a system would give
stronger incentives for employees to pursue legal forms of
employment. However, the details of the proposed system are not
clear at the moment.
Summary and conclusions
Hungary’s sizeable informal economy is often assumed to play a key
role in keeping the level of formal employment and search activity
low. The available results confirm the existence of a sizeable
repressed economy, but estimates are not the highest, by
international comparison. Furthermore, there is no straightforward
linkage between the size of a country’s informal economy and its
level of employment or search intensity.
According to recent estimates, some 15-20% of total employment is
not registered. Most of the analysis identifies the high tax burden as
the major reason behind firms hiring undeclared employees. Social
security and personal income tax contributions are extremely high
by international comparison. The recent documents on the planned
government actions against undeclared work list the necessary
measures for further increasing the burden on the employers:
coverage of non-standard employment, and unified costs for
different kinds of employment contracts. These measures are indeed
necessary in order to make the different forms of employment bear
the same burden. The key challenges concerning undeclared work
are correctly identified by the government, as being to create an
employment-friendly environment and to reinforce labour market
inspection.
Károly Fazekas
Bibliography 
Ádám, S. and J. Kutas (2004): “The development of the number of
employed people based on the personal income tax returns”,
Munkaügyi Szemle, No. 48, (in Hungarian).
Arvay,J.and Vertes,A.(1994):A maganszektor és a rejtett gazdasag
sulya Magyarorszagon, 1980-1992. Osszefoglaló. Gazdasagkutató
Rt., Budapest.
Christie, E. and M. Holzner (2004): “Household Tax Compliance
and the Shadow Economy in Central and Southeastern Europe”,
Spring Seminar 2004, WIIW, Vienna, Austria.
Dezsériné Major, M., P. Futó and L. Kállay (1998): “Mekkora azAutumn 2004 |  European Employment Observatory Review 133
Trends
informális gazdaság Magyarországon?” Budapesti Negyed No. 4.
http://www.bparchiv.hu/magyar/kiadvany/bpn/05/192-
208.html#jegyz7
EC (1998): “Communication of the Commission on Undeclared
Work”, European Commission, Brussels.
EC (1998), “Communication of the Commission on Undeclared
Work”, COM(1998)219 (http://europa.eu.int/comm/
employment_social/empl_esf/docs/com98-219_en.pdf).
EIRO (2004): “Thematic feature – industrial relations and
undeclared work in Hungary”,
European industrial relations observatory online,
http://www.eiro.eurofound.eu.int/print/2004/06/tfeature/hu0406103
t.html
HCSO (1998): “Hidden Economy in Hungary, 1998”, Hungarian
Central Statistical Office, Budapest.
Kállay, L. (1993): “Az informális szektor terjedelme
Magyarországon”, Piacgazdaság Alapítvány, Budapest,
(manuscript).
Koltay, J. (1993). “Tax reform in Hungary. Hungary: an economy in
transition”, (Eds.) I. Székely and D. Newbery, Cambridge
University Press: pp. 249-270.
Köllő, J. and Nacsa, B. (2004): “Flexibility and Security in the
Labour Market – Hungary’s Experience”. ILO-CET, Budapest.
Lackó, M. (1992): “The Extent of the Illegal Economy in Hungary
between 1970 and 1989 – a Monetary Model”, Acta Oeconomica 44
(1-2) pp. 161-190.
Lackó, M. (1998): “The Hidden Economies of Visegrad Countries
in International Comparison: A Household Electricity Approach”,
in: Halpern, L. and Wyplosz, Ch. (eds): Hungary: Towards a
Market Economy, Cambridge University Press.
Lackó, M. (2000): “A Shocking Sector”: the Hidden Economy and
its Impacts in the Post-Socialist Countries Based on Estimations of
the Household Electricity Method“,T ÁRKI-KTI, Budapest, (in
Hungarian).
OECD (1986), “Concealed Employment”, Chapter 3, Employment
Outlook, Paris.
OECD (2002): “Measuring the Non-Observed Economy – A
Handbook”, OECD, Paris.
OECD (2004): “OECD Employment Outlook”, OECD, Paris.
Renooy P, Ivarsson S, Van Der Wusten-Gritsai, O. & Meijer, R.
(2004):
Undeclared Work in an Enlarged Union. “An analysis of
undeclared work: an in-depth study of specific items”,
Malmö/Amsterdam,
INREGIA/Regioplan, pp. 107 & 158.
Scharle, Á. (2002):”Tax Evasion as Innovation in Small Business in
Hungary” paper for the conference on Unofficial Activities in
Transition Countries: Ten Years of Experience, Zagreb
(www.ijf.hr/UE_2002/program.html)
Semjén, A. (1998). “A magyar adórendszer problémái a
vállalkozások szemszögébõl”.
Budapest, Centre for International Private Enterprise.
Semjén, A. (2001). “Az adóadminisztráció eredményessége és a
rejtett gazdaság.”
Közgazdasági Szemle 48(3): pp. 219-243.
Semjén, A., Z. Szántó, et al. (2001). “Adócsalás és adóigazgatás:
Mikroökonómiai modellek és empirikus elemzések a rejtett
gazdaságról”. Budapest, MTA Közgazdaságtudományi
Kutatóközpont.
Semjén, A. and J. Tóth (1996) “Tax behaviour of Small and
Medium Sized Enterprises”Review of Sociology of the Hungarian
Sociological Association, 1996, Special Issue, pp. 67-87.
Semjén, A. and J. Tóth (2002), “Unofficial Economic Activities and
Fiscal Discipline in Hungary as Mirrored in Consecutive Enterprise
Surveys on Tax Behaviour”, paper for the conference on Unofficial
Activities in Transition Countries: Ten Years of Experience, Zagreb
(www.ijf.hr/UE_2002/program.html).
Semjén, A. and Tóth, I. J. (2004): “Hidden economy and the
behaviour of taxpayers”, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute
of Economics, 2004, (in Hungarian).134 Autumn 2004 |  European Employment Observatory Review
Trends
Introduction
The 1998 Commission Communication states that undeclared work
is taken to mean “any paid activities that are lawful as regards their
nature but not declared to public authorities”. Its importance is
highlighted in the employment guidelines specified by the EU to
foster the three overarching objectives of full employment, quality
and productivity at work; and social cohesion and inclusion in the
spirit of the Lisbon Agenda. Guideline nine: “Transform
Undeclared Work into Regular Employment” calls on Member
States to address undeclared work. More specifically, “Member
States should develop and implement broad actions and measures to
eliminate undeclared work, which combine simplification of the
business environment, removing disincentives and providing
appropriate incentives in the tax and benefits system, improved law
enforcement and the application of sanctions. They should undertake
the necessary efforts at national and EU level to measure the extent of
the problem and progress achieved at national level.”
The above definition is in line with the Maltese interpretation of
undeclared work. When local authorities make statements about or
take action on undeclared workers, they are usually referring to
people who earn money in the pursuit of a lawful activity but who
do not declare such activity to the public authorities. Thus, work
which does not have to be declared, such as housework, is excluded.
Three main policy-making and implementation bodies tackle the
issues involved in undeclared work in Malta: the Inland Revenue
Department; the Department for Social Security and the
Employment and Training Corporation (ETC).The Inland Revenue
Department implements the Income Tax Act and is responsible for
revenue collection from personal and corporate tax, and social
security contributions. The Department for Social Security, within
the Ministry for the Family and Social Solidarity, operates the
Social Security Act (1987) which operates both contributory and
non-contributory arms. The ETC has the mandate, under the
Employment and Training Services Act (1990), to maintain a
register of persons in employment and of those seeking
employment. Employers are obliged by law to submit engagement
and termination forms to the ETC when recruiting or releasing
employees.
Political debate on undeclared work generally takes the form of
parliamentary questions on the number of registered unemployed
working illegally and on the number of foreigners found working
without a permit.However,the debate on undeclared work will soon
take a more structured form, when it is included in Malta’s first-ever
National Action Plan for Employment, to be published soon.
Prevalence of undeclared work in the economy
The extent of undeclared work in Malta has not been officially
measured, although it is generally believed to be significant in
particular trades and services. There have been two recent attempts
at quantifying the Maltese underground economy (Briguglio, 1989
and Cassar, 2001). Measures of the underground economy are not
indicative of undeclared work as they also include illegal activity
and work that does not have to be declared such as housework. That
said, Briguglio’s study, which makes use of an indirect estimation
procedure, based on the amount of currency in circulation,
estimates the underground economy at around 25% of GDP, while
Cassar’s index of underground economic activity indicates that
underground activity in Malta tripled, albeit at a decreasing rate,
over the period 1971 to 1997.The motives for such transactions were
identified as a lack of confidence in the government and in the fiscal
system and a strong family-oriented business culture. The lack of
confidence in the government is deeply ingrained in the sociological
and cultural background of the Maltese economy. This is based
partly on a history of foreign occupation, and the existence of a
large and centrally-led public sector forming a barrier to a free
entrepreneurial market, and partly on what is perceived to be
unclear governance. The strong family culture engrained in society
justifies a wide range of means of improving the well-being of one’s
family, including earning undeclared wages.
Further attempts to calculate the level of undeclared economic
activity have been limited. No direct methods are currently utilised
to gauge the size of undeclared work, though indirect methods may
also be applied. By using a common indirect discrepancy method to
determine undeclared work, and comparing the findings of Labour
Force Surveys with demand-side data (in the case of Malta,
employment levels according to employers’ submission of
engagement and termination forms), administrative data tend to
show lower employment levels than the Labour Force Survey. Data
for December 2003 is depicted below. This discrepancy method
therefore indicates that undeclared work is prevalent in Malta;
however it should not be relied upon to derive exact figures.
Malta
Figure 1: Employment in Labour Force Survey and
administrative data, December 2003
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In Malta, undeclared work generally occurs among employed and
unemployed men and women, rather than among self-employed or
retired people for example, although among men it is more likely to
occur in construction and trades, while among women it is more
likely in crafts and in personal and domestic services. Both men and
women are thought to undertake undeclared work in the hospitality
and catering sectors, particularly in the summer months.
In recent years the number of law infringements detected among
people carrying out unreported work, and among people working
and registering for employment benefit, has fallen considerably.
However, this is largely the result of a falling number of Law
Compliance Inspectors within the ETC. Table 1 indicates
infringement by category for the years 1999/2000 to 2002/2003 in
absolute figures. As the table shows, the majority of infringements
generally consist of employment not being reported to the ETC,
followed by people working and registering for work, employment
of foreigners and employment of minors.
The Training and Employment Exposure Scheme (TEES), an ETC
training scheme to help the unemployed over-forties find
employment, was only taken up by 81 out of 1,200 eligible. This low
response level could be due to engagement in the black economy.
The scheme, which offered a wage of 55 Maltese Lira (127 euro) per
week plus bonuses, vacation and statutory sick leave entitlement,
also encouraged employers to offer permanent employment to
TEES participants after the one-year period. Besides a public notice
about TEES in the media; a personal letter was sent to all eligible
people claiming unemployment benefit for at least six months. The
low take-up despite these factors indicates, among other things, that
people may already be working but not informing public authorities.
Research by the University of Malta’s Workers’ Participation
Development Centre (WPDC) , on the factors affecting women’s
formal participation in the Maltese labour market, indicates that
undeclared labour among women is significant. In fact, the study
indicates that for every four Maltese females declaring work in the
labour market, there is (at least) one more who works but does not
declare it1. The study suggests that the female participation rate in
the economy at the beginning of 2003 was 41.7%, 7.2 percentage
points higher than that reported by the Labour Force Survey (LFS)
during the same period.
The key reasons behind the prevalence of undeclared work are high
marginal tax rates, tax distortions, social security contributions,
possible loss of benefits, an inefficient public sector and the current
system of “transfer payments”.These issues will now be discussed in
turn.
The highest marginal rate of personal income tax in Malta is 35%.
The average tax rate – or the amount of tax paid out of income – by
Maltese tax payers is 8.6%, while the marginal tax rate, or the rate of
tax paid on income earned, is on average just over 19%. When
compared to the EU-25, the highest marginal rate of personal
income tax and the average tax rate compare favourably, indicating
that Malta is not among the countries with the highest rates.
However, a comparison of tax rates paid on the last Maltese Lira of
income earned puts Malta among countries with the highest rates.
Thus, the income tax system in Malta is one of the most progressive
in the EU and may be acting as a disincentive to work in the formal
market.
Distortions exist between tax rates on normal employment,
overtime work and part-time work. At present normal and overtime
work are taxed at generally higher marginal rates than part-time
work (taxed at 15%), provided that such part-time work is not
undertaken with the same employer. A further distortion occurs
whereby a couple opting for a married tax computation cannot
benefit from the lower part-time work rate if such work is
undertaken by the partner who does not have a full-time job. This is
perhaps the most likely reason for the absence of declaration of
activity by females.
Women also refrain from disclosing income earned when working
beyond the family household unit to avoid paying social security
contributions. These are statutory for people working a minimum of
eight hours per week. Reporting economic activity would also cause
women to lose out on benefits such as rent subsidies. Furthermore,
some women are not remunerated when working within the family
household unit. Undeclared work among women is also becoming
more common among single or separated women who claim social
benefits while performing remunerated work.
In Malta, public sector employment is often inefficient. A
significant proportion of public sector workers participate in
undeclared activity during working hours due to a lack of
supervision. Privatisation of some public sector organisations may,
to some extent, have reduced the number of workers who take up
undeclared work.
The current system of “transfer payments”may also cause people to
perform undeclared work in order to remain below the necessary
social benefit threshold. The Malta Chamber of Commerce and
Enterprise believes that social benefits which “disincentivise”work
should be removed to eliminate their undesirable consequences. By
the same token, deserved cases should be entitled to benefits which
adequately reflect today’s realities. It is also understood that some
pensioners may be performing undeclared work so as not to affect
their entitlement to the government pension once they reach the
minimum wage level of 543 euro per month.
Besides undeclared labour, there is perceived to be a high level of
under-reporting income, which is as important as non-reporting. In
fact, use of “envelope wages”(paying cash in hand) is deemed to be
widespread as an easy way to avoid taxes. Moreover, there tends to
be undeclared activity by small businesses who give clients the
option to pay VAT or not. Despite government efforts to reduce this
undeclared activity (such as setting up campaigns to encourage
Table 1: Employment Infringements 
Infringements processed by ETC Law Compliance Unit 1999-2000 2000-2001 2001-2002 2002-2003
Unreported employment 2,878 1,558 1,191 1,316
Working while registering 728 534 373 215
Employment of foreigners 161 77 46 96
Employment of minors 134 37 6 11
Source: ETC Annual Report 2003
1 The margin of error for this study was 3.1%136 Autumn 2004 |  European Employment Observatory Review
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people to ask for VAT receipts, monthly lottery and refunding VAT
payments on some purchases), this type of under-declaration is still
practised. More random checks by inspectors and more stringent
sanctions are required.
Measures taken to combat undeclared work
Through the ETC, Malta is already working within the European
Employment Strategy. This means that Malta will be tackling the
issue of undeclared work with even greater determination.
Awareness of undeclared work is also increasing at the political
level. The Prime Minister, Dr Lawrence Gonzi, recently stated that
the government recognises the fact that there are inbuilt
mechanisms preventing female participation and in some cases
pushing females into undeclared work. The Prime Minister singled
out rules regulating part-time work and National Insurance
contributions. The government intends to reduce the incidence of
undeclared work, mainly through measures proposed in the
National Action Plan for Employment.
The National Action Plan for Employment will follow a four-
pronged strategy to reduce the incidence of undeclared work.
Efforts will be made to: make formal work more attractive; reduce
the administrative burden for employers and combat labour market
rigidity; measure undeclared work using reliable methods and
strengthen mechanisms to control undeclared work.
Measures undertaken and planned to reduce
undeclared work
Definition and measurement
Direct methods to estimate undeclared work, when carried out in a
comprehensive and sensitive manner,are generally thought to be the
best way to gather reliable and valid information on undeclared
work. In the second half of 2005, a direct survey will be launched
among Maltese households to obtain estimates of the magnitude of
employment in the undeclared economy. This survey will be
conducted jointly by the National Statistics Office and the
Employment and Training Corporation and technical assistance
will be sought from the Danish Rockwool Foundation which has
already carried out similar surveys in Germany, UK, Sweden and
Denmark. This initiative will utilise highly qualified and carefully
instructed interviewers.
Co-ordinated enforcement
Over the years, the ETC has developed and implemented broad
actions and measures to eliminate undeclared work. The Law
Compliance Unit was set up to identify and act against job seekers
registering for unemployment whilst working, employers employing
persons of compulsory school age, foreigners working without the
necessary work permits, and employers failing to inform the ETC
about the engagement of new employees. The ETC informs the
police of every case for action to be taken and the police fine
employers for employing workers without the necessary permit.
There have, however, been cases where foreign workers have been
found working illegally but ETC officials were not brought in.
Furthermore, the Unit forwards a list of employment infringements
to the Department of Social Security for further investigation. On a
monthly basis, the ETC also submits medical certificates (received
from unemployed persons as reasons for non-registration) to the
Department of Social Security for further investigation.
In 2003, the inspectorate section of the ETC was heavily criticised in
parliament by a Labour MP, for finding too few violations. He said
that the number of persons found working while registering for
employment and the number of foreigners caught working without
a permit was too low to reflect reality. This was attributed to
depletion of staff from the Law Compliance Unit and the lack of
co-operation sometimes experienced with other departments. The
latter problem has since been addressed and better results are now
being registered. In fact, the Law Compliance Unit now has an
established network with the Tax Compliance Unit, the Value
Added Tax Department, Malta Enterprise, the Financial
Intelligence Analysis Unit, and the Commissioner of Police.
Furthermore, the Unit’s officers work in teams in order to address
specific groups of job seekers who are suspected of working illegally.
The Compliance Unit has also launched a free phone service for
reporting illegal employment.
The ETC is also working on improving its profiling system to better
assess the availability for work of job seekers. Those who are
identified as abusing or trying to abuse the system are struck off the
unemployment register.
At present, the Employment and Training Services Act (1990),
which defines the rights and obligations of employers and the
unemployed, as well as the processes both should follow, is being
revised to ensure, inter alia, greater transparency and efficiency in
the control of work during unemployment. A revised Act will be
proposed to the government by January 2005.
In August, 2003, a committee made up of representatives of the
ETC, the Ministry of Social Policy, Ministry of Finance and
Economic Services and the Ministry of Education, was set up in
order to draw up and plan a national campaign against undeclared
work. The committee ensured that data which help each
organisation fight undeclared work, tax evasion or fraud in social
benefit claims are being exchanged. As part of this data exchange
exercise, the Ministry of Social Policy passed on to the ETC a list of
56 persons found working by inspectors of the Occupational Health
and Safety Authority on several worksites. Out of these 56, the ETC
found that one had been registering as unemployed, four were found
to be unemployed but not registering, while another four could not
be traced in the employment register (possibly due to falsification of
personal details). This data exchange came after the ETC gave the
Ministry of Social Policy a list of persons found illegally working in
Gozo. Two of the persons found working illegally were receiving
invalidity pensions which completely precluded them from working.
Strengthening of law enforcement 
With effect from October 2004, the staff complement in the Law
Compliance Unit within the public employment service will be
increased from six to ten inspectors. This is intended to increase
infringement detection. Furthermore, in 2005, all Law Compliance
Officers will be trained in investigative and reporting skills.
Administrative co-ordination between control authorities in various
Ministries will be reinforced. The ETC held a training seminar for
its Law Compliance Inspectors and clerical staff to aid
understanding of the reality of undeclared work. Officials from the
Malta Tourism Authority, the Department of Social Security, the
Tax Compliance Unit, the VAT department, the police force and the
National Employment Authority were invited to address those
present on the pertaining realities that they meet during their
inspections.
Sanctions
The current penalty of 25 Maltese Lira (58 euro) for employers
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of the number of persons employed – will be raised significantly,
coming into force in January 2005. On payment of the fine, the
employer will be compelled to complete the ETC engagement form.
Recently, a worker who had collected unemployment benefits for a
whole year was fined 586 euro. The court also awarded a two-year
jail term and suspended four-year sentence. The worker was found
guilty of defrauding the government and making false declarations
under the Social Security Act and the Employment and Training
Corporation Act.
Fiscal measures
Distortions in the tax system will be removed, encouraging second-
earner spouses working on a part-time basis to move into the formal
economy.
Awareness raising
In 2005, the ETC will be conducting a campaign to inform workers
of their rights and responsibilities with regards to the declaration of
employment, as well as the implications of not doing so in terms of
related issues such as social security contributory records and
entitlement to other benefits.
Domestic service vouchers
In October 2004, a feasibility study will be launched concerning the
introduction of service vouchers for the provision of household
services. Recommendations will be made by July 2005 to be
considered during the budgetary process in late 2005. It is envisaged
that such a scheme will involve the establishment of a managing
company to recruit workers offering household services, including
care of children, disabled and elderly people, domestic work, and
minor household repairs. Households will purchase service
vouchers from local councils.The managing company will deploy its
recruits according to demand, and manage the settlement of their
social security contributions and income tax where applicable. This
project is intended to formalise domestic work, create social
economy jobs that also assist with increasing the female
participation rate, ensure domestic workers are trained (particularly
in health and safety), and allow such workers to amass a social
security contributory record. The benefit for those already using
domestic services to switch to such a scheme have yet to be studied,
and incentives will be designed accordingly.
Conclusions
It is envisaged that turning undeclared to declared work will
improve the overall business environment in Malta, social cohesion
and the sustainability of public finances, as well as social protection
systems. Measures needed to confront the problem of undeclared
work should include labour-tax incentives, better controls and
sanctions, better co-operation between the various authorities and
greater awareness of the rights denied to undeclared workers. Lower
levels of taxation and lower time thresholds for the payment of
social security contributions would raise the incentive to declare
income, thus bringing unreported economic activity to light.
Changing public attitudes towards undeclared work is vital.There is
a need for more detailed public information campaigns against
undeclared work, especially directed towards the younger
population who will ultimately lead the transformation.
Households should be encouraged to use formal labour rather than
undeclared labour. Transforming undeclared work into legal labour
voluntarily should be made more attractive and individuals should
also be given an amnesty for a specific time period, offering
incorporation into the formal economy without fear of retribution.
There is also the need to encourage small-scale entrepreneurs to
announce undeclared work. This should be made attractive in
economic terms and not hindered by bureaucratic obstacles.
Gordon Cordina
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Introduction
In recent years many of the institutions responsible for tax and
benefits have faced drastic reorganisation. One of the aims of this
reorganisation has been to create a national system that is capable,
through information sharing, of fast and efficient fraud detection
and prevention. The latest step in Government policy is the
formation of a national network of inspection and intervention
teams, which fight fraud in a more effective way than the previously
existing regional teams.
Although the Government seems determined to combat all types of
fraud in the labour market, the extent of that fraud is unknown.
Due to its illegal nature, a phenomenon such as undeclared work is
difficult to trace and most existing figures on the subject only apply
to those who have been caught and this can be problematic when
trying to quantify the extent and impact of paid informal work.
Firstly, figures are not representative of the actual incidence of
undeclared work. Secondly, in the Netherlands, these numbers
describe fraud,which is a broader term than “undeclared work”and
also involves minor violations such as workers who report too late
that they are on sick leave. Nevertheless, in this article we shall
attempt to give some indications of the scale of undeclared work in
the Netherlands. Furthermore, we shall describe the various
measures that are taken to combat undeclared work.
Prevalence of undeclared work in the economy
In this section we present findings on the total amount of fraud in
the labour market, wherever possible, broken down for undeclared
work. We distinguish between fraud committed by employers, fraud
committed by employees and illegal employment.
Fraud by the employer
Fraud is defined as giving incorrect or incomplete information as
well as withholding relevant information. In the case of employers,
this usually results in not paying or partly paying premiums (Lisv.,
2001). For the Netherlands, there are only figures about fraud cases
that have been detected. The real incidence of fraud by employers is
hard to estimate, because a fraud investigation is only conducted if
there is a suspicion of fraud. In 2002, 841 employers were
investigated, leading to 481 detected cases of fraud. In total 34
million euro worth of premiums was not declared. Table 1 gives an
overview of the top five economic sectors in which fraud was
detected.
It is noteworthy that fraud is not only committed in low-skilled
professions, but also in high-skilled professions. In 2003 fraud has
been detected in the ICT sector as well as in the healthcare sector
(SIOD, 2004).
Fraud by employees
Employees can commit fraud in numerous ways. Lisv (2001) makes
a distinction between unjustly receiving benefits and concealing
income. Simple fraud occurs when a person unjustly (partly)
receives benefits. This is usually caused by giving incorrect or
incomplete information or by withholding relevant information and
involves hiding income, which can be easily traced through
administrative systems, such as when a person simultaneously
receives benefits and has a registered salary with an employer.
Complex fraud involves concealing income in such a way that it
cannot be detected through administrative systems such as cash-in-
hand working. Table 2 gives an overview of the detected fraud cases
from 1997 to 2000. For the year 2001, another source counts 34,857
cases of detected fraud; however, being from a different source, this
figure cannot be fully compared to the figures in Table 2. Moreover,
some further nuances concerning the displayed figures should be
The Netherlands
Table 1: Number of investigations for employer fraud and
fraud cases at employers, total and top five Dutch sectors,
2002
Sector Investigations Fraud cases
Hotel, restaurants, snack bars 212 140
Employment agencies 82 57
Construction companies 100 52
Transportation of goods land/air 51 34
Agriculture 32 28
Total 841 481
Source: UWV, 2003
Table 2: Benefit fraud (number of investigations and cases of fraud), simple fraud and complex fraud, 1997-2000
Benefit fraud
Year Fraud investigations Cases of fraud
1997 17,531 15,295, of which: simple fraud: 11,987
complex fraud: 692
1998 18,751 15,911, of which: simple fraud: 3,972
complex fraud: 1613
1999 20,021 17,954, of which: simple fraud: 12,711
complex fraud: 764
2000 29,447 26,734, of which: simple fraud: 13,162
complex fraud: 806
Source: Lisv., 2001Autumn 2004 |  European Employment Observatory Review 139
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kept in mind. Although all reported cases involve fraud, this does
not necessarily mean that it involves undeclared work; it may also
involve workers who were on sick leave and did not report in time
that they had resumed working.
All figures in Table 2 involve detected cases, which, of course, means
that they do not represent the actual number of people involved in
fraud. In research amongst (anonymous) benefit recipients and
fraud experts, estimates have been made regarding the scale of
deliberate fraud committed by those in receipt of benefits. Experts
produced higher estimates of the percentage of people involved in
benefit fraud than the benefit recipients themselves. Experts
estimated that 32 to 39% of benefit recipients – depending on the
type of benefit – receive income without notifying the authorities.
Those in receipt of benefits estimated that 20 to 35% of benefit
recipients deliberately withhold information about receiving
earnings (CMC/T11 Company, 2002).
Most employees who have been detected working in the shadow
economy, work via employment agencies (UWV, 2003). Other
investigations reveal that fraud is mostly committed by men
(63.5%), people aged 25-35 (32.3%) and people who receive either
unemployment benefit (41.4%) or are on sick leave (36.2%) (UWV,
2002). In addition to these general figures on fraud, there is some
specific information regarding the occurrence of undeclared work
within the various benefit schemes.
Disability benefit recipients (WAO)
In 2002, a small percentage of disability benefit recipients (WAO)
were involved in various forms of undeclared work (TNS-Nipo,
2003). An estimated 16% did small chores for money via or on
behalf of acquaintances without notification. Mostly men, main
earners of a household, and people expecting greater advantages by
violating the rules, were involved in this kind of fraud. Another 8%
worked on the side whilst receiving disability benefits. Here, the
employment history seems to play a large role in explaining the
behaviour of disability benefit recipients. Notably, people who used
to work on call were tempted to work on the side from time to time
(TNS-Nipo, 2003).
Unemployment benefit recipients (WW)
Fraud by doing undeclared work is more extensive amongst those in
receipt of unemployment benefit (WW) (TNS-Nipo, 2003).
Estimations are that 11% of people work whilst in receipt of
unemployment benefits and 1% have a job or work via an
employment agency without notifying the authorities. An
additional 15% of claimants carry out small chores for money via or
for acquaintances without declaration, especially men and people
who, prior to becoming unemployed, were in either a low-skilled
job,a temporary job or were at work on probation.Next,26% of the
unemployment benefit recipients do unpaid (voluntary) work
without notifying the authorities. This is not undeclared work in the
sense of the definitions used across Europe, as it is unpaid; however,
by doing unpaid work, benefit recipients are in violation of the rule
that they have to be available for the labour market on a full-time
basis. Doing unpaid work tempts mostly men and people who are
the main earners of a household. Moreover, people who have a high
level of education, and people who have had a highly skilled job
before becoming unemployed, are likely to do unpaid work without
notifying the authorities (TNS-Nipo, 2003).
Welfare recipients
Welfare recipients mostly (23%) do small chores for money via or for
acquaintances without notifying the authorities. Working on the
side whilst receiving unemployment benefits is done by some 13%.
Both violations are more likely committed by people who formerly
worked via an employment agency. About 3% of the welfare
recipients have a job or work via an employment agency without
notification (TNS-Nipo, 2003).
A typical activity that accounts for a large amount of undeclared
work is cleaning for private employers. There are only rough
estimations about the number of people who do such work, ranging
from 200,000-400,000 in 1995 (SER, 2000) to 250,000-300,000 in
2001 (Van der Veen, 2001). Based on the latter figures, an estimated
1 to 1.5 million households make use of such cleaners. Mostly, these
cleaners are low-skilled women who clean on a part-time basis
(SER, 2000). It is suggested that in large cities in the west of the
Netherlands, these cleaners are mostly female illegal immigrants. In
other Dutch cities and in the countryside, these women are usually
housewives whose men are the main earners of the household (Van
der Veen, 2001).
Illegal employment
One particular form of fraud is illegal labour. Usually, this concerns
labourers who work in the Netherlands without a permit. This
illegal labour is usually arranged via employment agencies that
operate in various economic sectors. Fighting such practices is not
easy, for once an illegal worker is detected and punished in one
sector, he or she is often simply sent by the agency to work in
another sector (FNV, 2003a). There are no exact figures on illegal
employment in the Netherlands. The estimation is that about 70-
150,000 people reside illegally in the Netherlands, of which two-
thirds work without a work permit or permit of residence (FNV,
2003b). The sectors “hotel, restaurants, snack bars”, “horticulture”
and “construction”, have the highest incidences of illegal workers.
In 2002 the Labour Inspectorates investigated 797 companies in the
“hotel, restaurants, snack bars” sector and found that 28% of the
companies violated the Foreign Nationals Employment Act (Wet
Arbeid Vreemdelingen, WAV); in 2001 this was 30%. Of the 2,294
employees who were checked,more than one third (789 people) were
not Dutch nationals. Of this group 160 worked without having a
work permit and another 188 resided in the Netherlands illegally
(Arbeidsinspectie, 2003a). In the agriculture and horticulture sector,
654 organisations were surveyed of which 18% (119 cases) violated
the Foreign Nationals Employment Act. In these companies 425
employees were from outside the European Economic Area (EEA)1,
of these 64 had asylum seeker status and 75% of these non-EEA
nationalities were male (Arbeidsinspectie, 2003b). In construction,
an estimated 15% of employees worked illegally, of which 40% were
of Polish nationality (Arbeidsinspectie, 2003c).
A large investigation into the practices of employment agencies also
revealed the widespread use of illegal employees in the Netherlands.
The Labour Inspectorates pre-selected 344 employment agencies for
investigation, of which 304 were monitored. Of these agencies, 26%
were charged for illegal employment of foreigners or forgery. In
total, 565 people were found to be working on an illegal basis, of
which 152 originated from Central or Eastern European countries
(Poland, Bulgaria) and 86 from Turkey (Arbeidsinspectie, 2004). It
must be noted that these are only statistics for those who have been
caught and actual figures are undoubtedly higher.
1 At that time still excluding the newly-acceded Member States.140 Autumn 2004 |  European Employment Observatory Review
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Measures taken to combat undeclared work2
In this section we describe some of the measures that are in place to
prevent undeclared work and other forms of fraud in the labour
market. First, we give an overview of the organisations responsible
for preventing and detecting fraud and their main activities. Next,
we describe the co-operation between those organisations and their
European counterparts in a common effort to fight international
fraud. We end this section with an explanation of an initiative to
transform undeclared work into legitimate work.
Organisations responsible for preventing and
detecting fraud
The Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment has developed an
Enforcement Programme spanning four years, 2003-2006, to tackle
the ongoing problem of benefit fraud. The activities implemented
under the Programme include:
• Investing in better methods and techniques to detect fraud, e.g.
by risk analysis;
• Improving co-operation between organisations, i.e. forming a
national network of intervention teams;
• Recruiting more people to enforcement roles.
From this Enforcement Programme, the Ministry has devised a
yearly Detection Policy Plan. This strategy directs the plans for
execution and enforcement by each organisation that is involved in
fraud detection. These organisations are the Social Insurance Bank
(SVB, Sociale Verzekeringsbank), UWV (the agency for workers’
insurance), the municipalities and the Labour Inspectorates. They
are not only involved in detecting undeclared work, but also in
seeking out other forms of fraud that are the responsibility of the
Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, such as identity fraud,
complex fraud and international fraud. In 2002 the Social
Intelligence and Prosecution Agency (SIOD,Sociale Inlichtingen- en
Opsporingsdienst) was formed to undertake general investigations
into serious and organised crime in social security. Usually such
crimes are international and involve identity fraud. Trying to detect
all forms of fraud regarding social security – large or small – various
organisations work together by linking and exchanging
information. Three organisations that are important in preventing
and detecting undeclared work are described in more detail in the
remainder of this section.
UWV 
The UWV is the agency responsible for social insurance (e.g.
unemployment schemes, disability benefits). It provides social
security benefits to 1.2 million beneficiaries and collects premiums
from 4,000,000 employers. The UWV fraud policy distinguishes
between the collecting process (employers) and the distributing
process (employees). The agency is involved in numerous projects to
prevent and detect fraud, a few of which are described below.
To prevent fraud by employers, the UWV takes steps to raise
awareness of the existing regulations. Moreover, regular check-ups,
intensive investigations and strict execution of fine payment are
used as deterrent measures.. To enhance the effectiveness of the
check-ups for fraud,the UWV has developed a risk analysis strategy
to identify those employers most likely to be vulnerable to bad
practice. With the help of such analysis, profiles are made of
employers likely to commit fraud and this process increases the
chance of detecting fraud by 13%.Furthermore,the UWV monitors
organisations to detect indicators of complex fraud. Employers are
selected for monitoring through risk analysis and the monitoring is
preceded by a dossier investigation. The UWV and the SIOD have
established protocol regarding the transfer of fraud cases and
mutual co-operation and support. The UWV also co-operates with
the tax department by linking their information systems to highlight
employers suspected of deception. In addition to this activity,
special operations have been launched to trace illegal employment
agencies.
To investigate the extent of deception by workers, the Ministry of
Social Affairs and Employment executes periodic research under
the title POROSZ. It gives information on the nature, extent and
background of the fraud and the people who commit fraud. To
prevent fraud the UWV gives information to benefit recipients
about their obligations and rights. Additionally, the UWV has
trained its personnel to make them more aware of suspicious
practices. To make check ups for fraud more efficient, the UWV
developed a risk model for unemployment benefit recipients and
disability benefit recipients. These models feature a number of
criteria that generate an expected higher propensity to commit
fraud. Based on these criteria, a search is done in the client database
of the UWV. Other projects by the UWV concern tracing
international fraud and highlighting indications of suspected fraud.
The municipalities 
Municipalities are, amongst other things, responsible for the
execution of the welfare benefit schemes. This responsibility has
been increased further by the new Act on Welfare and Work (Wet
Werk en Bijstand). In a joint agenda for the future, the Ministry of
Social Affairs and Employment and the Association of Dutch
Municipalities VNG formalised their intention to draft an annual
policy plan. This annual plan will contain quantitative and
qualitative aims to prevent and combat fraud and to retrieve the
funds that have been collected.
The 30 largest municipalities strive for high quality enforcement
(Hoogwaardig Handhaven), which aims at spontaneous compliance
with the law, by informing welfare recipients about the regulations,
an optimisation of services, early detection and strict enforcement
and sanctions. There is a knowledge database to support
municipalities that provides information about risk analysis and
enhancing fraud awareness. Large municipalities have their own
fraud detection teams (sociale recherche) and smaller municipalities,
who lack such facilities, generally arrange joint detection teams with
other municipalities. In 2002 they jointly detected 12,770 cases of
simple fraud and 980 cases of complex fraud. In the majority of
cases a tax signal formed the basis to start an investigation.
Labour Inspectorates
The Labour Inspectorates oversee the execution of the Foreign
Nationals Employment Act (Wet Arbeid Vreemdelingen, WAV),
legislation which covers much of the illegal employment that occurs.
Employment is considered illegal when an employer hires labour
from outside the European Economic Area, without having a
permit to do so. Illegal employment disadvantages inhabitants of
the European Union (plus Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein) and
is generally connected to low pay for workers, inferior working
conditions and non-payment of social security premiums. In the
agriculture sector, the Labour Inspectorate gives certificates to
certain labour intermediaries (handmatige loonbedrijven) to prevent
fraud. Furthermore, they support employers in finding competent
employees. This strict reinforcement of rules and preventative ID
2 The information in this section is derived from the reports by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment (2004).Autumn 2004 |  European Employment Observatory Review 141
Trends
check-ups should lead to a lower fraud rate, but figures are currently
unavailable.
The Labour Inspectorate reserves about 19% of its capacity for
investigating illegal employment at employment agencies, focusing
investigations around the use of false identity papers or false social-
fiscal numbers. One third of the capacity is used to conduct checks
in the agriculture and horticulture sector. The employers’
association, LTO Nederland, co-operates with the Labour
Inspectorates to combat illegal employment in these sectors.
Co-operation between organisations
In the previous section we mentioned some of the joint initiatives
between organisations to fight fraud. The Ministry of Social Affairs
and Employment encourages co-operation in order to make fraud
detection more effective and efficient.Detection is much easier when
the databases of the various organisations are linked, especially
when it involves simple fraud that can be traced through these
administration systems. However, not every database is yet
accessible to all agencies, but results have thus far been encouraging,
with many agencies working together. In a recent case of illegal
employment in the poultry industry, the SIOD co-operated with the
Labour Inspectorates, the intelligence service of the tax services
(FIOD-ECD), various regional police forces, UWV, Immigration
and Naturalisation Services, and the Royal Army (Ministry of
Social Affairs and Employment, 2004).
Some employers’ and employees’ associations are also involved in
fraud prevention and detection and usually work with one or more
of the official agencies. The employers’ association for agriculture
and horticulture, LTO Nederland, co-operates with the Centre for
Work and Income (CWI) in the Seasonal Labour project (Project
Seizoenarbeid), helping companies in these sectors to fill their
temporary vacancies. One of the aims of this project is to decrease
illegal employment caused by labour shortages in peak production
periods.
International fraud
Most of the organisations involved in fraud detection also concern
themselves with international fraud. The UWV has an export team
that investigates disability benefit recipients who live abroad. Such
research has been conducted in Belgium,Italy,France and Germany
(UWV, 2002). The Dutch Municipalities have an agreement with
Morocco that allows them to investigate Social Insurance and
Welfare recipients living in that country. In Morocco and Turkey
investigations of welfare recipients have been conducted based on
the suspicion of people having property there whilst receiving
welfare. The Labour Inspectorates investigate employers who are
situated in a foreign country.It also co-operates with foreign Labour
Inspectorate agencies, although this is primarily in the field of
working conditions.
Initiatives to make cleaning for private persons into
regular employment
In 1998 an experiment to transform undeclared private cleaning
work into legitimate employment was conceived. This is known as
the Arrangement of Cleaning Services for Private Persons (Regeling
schoonmaakdiensten particulieren, SVP), and means that cleaning
companies can hire unemployed people who are interested in
cleaning work for private households. This company pays their
salary, and receives a subsidy for this from the Government.
Originally, this arrangement was meant for the long-term
unemployed (> one year) who were willing to work at least 15 hours
per week and was not a great success. At the end of the decade and
in first years of the new millennium, the Dutch labour market faced
shortages of workers, causing a lack of unemployed people who
were willing to clean under the conditions of this scheme. Over the
last few years the Dutch labour market has become less strained,
resulting in a larger group of potential cleaners able to work via the
SVP scheme who may be attracted by the fact that the Dutch
Government has made the rules in the SVP arrangement less rigid.
People can now make use of the arrangement if they have been
unemployed for a minimum of six months and the amount of hours
they are required to work is brought down from 15 to 12 hours per
week. Currently, approximately 1,000 people work via the SVP
arrangement (SVP, 2003, Van der Veen, 2001, SER, 2000).
Conclusion
The Dutch Government is determined to take action against
undeclared work and other forms of fraud in the Dutch labour
market. Although some reports on the progress of fraud prevention
and detection are rather optimistic, it is still too early to draw solid
conclusions concerning the fight against fraud. Dutch organisations
in this area have undergone drastic reorganisation over recent years,
and some organisations, like the SIOD, were only established a few
years ago. However, existing organisations increasingly try to co-
operate by exchanging information and linking databases. Some
also co-operate with foreign services to detect international fraud.
Moreover, the use of risk analysis seems to improve the efficiency of
fraud detection.
Sonja Bekker and Ton Wilthagen
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Introduction
The phenomenon of the “black economy” is known by a wide
variety of terms and expressions. Generally, the black economy or
“clandestine employment” is taken to mean those activities which,
although they do not appear in the official statistics, nevertheless
represent the creation of added value for the purposes of national
macro-economic accounting, even in the absence of any associated
monetary transaction.
According to Friedrich Schneider (2004a), “underground”
economic activities can be divided into the following categories:
• Illegal activities associated with monetary transactions: trading
in stolen goods, drugs production and trading, prostitution and
human trafficking, gambling, smuggling and fraud.
• Criminal activities without monetary transactions: barter
trading in drugs, stolen and smuggled goods, the production or
cultivation of drugs for personal use, theft for personal use.
• Legal activities which involve the evasion or avoidance of taxes
and fiscal charges and which are associated with monetary
transactions: non-declared income from self-employment, non-
declared wages and salaries from employment related to the
production of legal goods and services.
• Legal activities not associated with monetary transactions but
which involve the evasion or avoidance of taxes: these include the
barter trading of legal goods and services and “DIY” work,
neighbourly assistance and honorary activities.
Underground economic activity does not include essential
economic activities within a household (housekeeping, bringing up
children, etc.).
A recently presented study produced by the European Union
entitled “Undeclared Work in an Enlarged Union” defines “illegal
working” as a significant part of the black economy as follows:
“Productive activities that are lawful as regards their nature but are
not declared to the public authorities...”. The same definition is
adopted in this report.
Measurement and valuation methods
Direct and indirect measurement methods
Inherent in the very nature of the black economy in general (and
illegal working in particular) is the fact that those involved have a
strong incentive to conceal their activities or at least that there is no
particular interest in making public the economic details of the
work they carry out. Herein lies the difficulty encountered in
measuring the volume of the black economy. However, even black
economy activities leave traces in various areas. These traces can be
measured and analysed using both direct and indirect methods.
Surveys
Direct methods include surveys of those in employment, the
unemployed and the economically inactive on black economy
activities (in the context of statistical socio-economic surveys, for
example). The results of these surveys can provide information on
the ratio of “official” to “black economy” employment activity at
individual and household level as well as on the distribution and
concentration of illegal working in particular sectors and regions.
The problem with surveys of this type lies in the fact that there is no
way of verifying the actual extent of illegal working, the number of
respondents refusing to provide information or the accuracy of the
information provided.
Tax evasion surveys carried out by the tax authorities
Another  “direct” method of measuring illegal working is tax
evasion surveys carried out by the tax authorities. The random
sampling of individual and corporate taxpayers reveals incomes
higher than those declared in tax returns. The difference between
actual and declared income can be used to draw conclusions as to
the extent of the black economy activities of the individuals and
businesses concerned. In certain countries the results of such
random sampling are extrapolated to estimate the size of the black
economy in relation to the national economy as a whole. However,
since they are based on a random sample of identified instances of
tax evasion, they represent no more than a lower limit.
Comparison of income and expenditure
In addition to direct methods, there are also a number of indirect
measurement methods which can be used to measure activity in the
black economy. For example, the difference between “consumption
plus investment” as calculated in the national accounting system
and “income received”can also be used as a measure of the size of
the black economy. (The national accounting system combines
expenditure on goods and services. Income received shows the
distribution of national income amongst private households,
businesses and the public sector on the basis of tax statistics.) Here,
however, it is important to take into account measurement errors
and differences in collection methods and periods.Autumn 2004 |  European Employment Observatory Review 143
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Measurement of currency in circulation
An important characteristic of black economy activities lies in the
fact that those involved wish to leave as few traces as possible.
Monetary transactions are therefore made in cash since they leave
no identifiable trail (as account movements and cheques would, for
example). If, over the course of time, the amount of cash in
circulation increases above a level deemed to be “normal”, this may
indicate the existence of black economy activity.
Today the currency method is used in almost all OECD countries
and provides entirely plausible results. It operates as follows: Firstly,
currency in circulation is estimated, holding constant those factors
which are seen as the causes of the black economy (e.g. tax burden).
The difference between theoretically determined and actually
observed currency holdings is then multiplied by the currency
circulation rate to determine the extent of the creation of added
value in the black economy. When evaluating this method it is
important to consider the fact that, on the one hand, it is based on a
uniform money circulation rate in both the official and the black
economy and, on the other, that it does not take into account cash
held abroad (illegal money).
Other monetary methods of measuring black economy activities are
based on the number of large denomination bank notes in
circulation, total transaction values and the factors determining
currency demand (interest rate, income, currency substitutes).
Energy consumption as a source of information
Yet another method of valuation is based on the fact that changes in
the consumption of electricity can be used to draw conclusions
about black economy activities. Based on the assumption that there
is an almost constant ratio between GDP and electricity
consumption, short-term changes in the two values can be used to
draw conclusions as to changes in the black economy. When using
this method of estimation, however, it is important to take into
account the fact that not all activities associated with the black
economy involve significant electricity consumption (personal
services, for example) and that technical progress can lead to a
change in the ratio between electricity consumption and GDP.
Moreover, this ratio is also effected by changes in energy costs.
Complex models for estimating “unobservable
variables”
The 1980s saw the development for the first time of complex models
which treat the scale of the black economy as a non-observable
variable. This is charted using indicator variables which depend on
various factors. These factors include the burden of direct and
indirect taxation, other fiscal (social insurance, for example) and
public charges, restrictions enshrined in legislation and standards
and available income. The indicator variables include growth in
GNP, labour force participation, hours actually worked, etc.
None of the measurement and valuation methods detailed above
furnishes exact data on the extent of the black economy. However,
particularly when several methods are used in combination, they do
provide a certain indication as to the approximate size and the
development of the black economy over the course of time.
The scope of the black economy in Austria
Continual expansion of the black economy
The black economy in Austria has increased continuously over the
last 25 years. Whereas in the 1970s the value of “undeclared work”
in Austria stood at less than 1,000 million euro, according to
Friedrich Schneider’s estimate obtained using the currency method,
in 2004 the black economy in Austria is worth some 23,100 million
euro or approximately 11% of “official” GDP (see Table 1). This
puts the size of the black economy in relation to official GDP below
that of Germany (16.7%), but above that of Switzerland (9.4%).
Sectors with a high level of black economy activity
A sector by sector analysis shows clear focuses of black economy
activity. More than one third of black economy activity takes place
Table 1: Size of the black economy in Austria 1975 to 2004
calculated using the currency method
Size of the black economy
Year 1000 million euro % of official GDP
1975 0.9 2.04
1980 2.0 2.69
1985 3.9 3.92
1990 7.2 5.47
1995 12.4 7.32
1996 14.6 8.32
1997 16.0 8.93
1998 16.9 9.09
1999 18.2 9.56
2000 19.8 10.07
2001 21.1 10.52
2002 21.8 10.69
20031 22.5 10.86
20041 23.1 11.00
1 Estimate/forecast Source: Friedrich Schneider. 2004a.
Table 2: Division of the black economy into economic sectors 2004
Sectors Division of the black economy
1000 million euro percentage
Building trade and craft businesses (incl. repairs) 9.0 39.0
Other trade and industrial sectors (motor vehicles, machinery) 3.7 16.0
Service businesses (hotels, restaurants, etc.) 3.7 16.0
Entertainment and leisure sector 2.8 12.0
Other trades and services (private tuition, hairdressing, babysitting, etc.) 3.9 17.0
Total black economy 23.1 100%
Source: Friedrich Schneider 2004a.144 Autumn 2004 |  European Employment Observatory Review
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in the building and building-related trades and craft businesses.
Approximately one sixth takes place in the manufacturing, tourism
and personal services sectors and one eighth in the entertainment
and leisure industry. This distribution by sector corresponds largely
to that encountered in any other European country (Germany, for
example).
Within the “building trade and craft businesses” category, the
building trade accounts for almost nine tenths of activity (3,700
million euro turnover in the building trade, 2,700 million euro in the
building-related trade, 1,400 million euro in craft businesses in the
building industry). The remaining 13% relate to the repair of
electrical and domestic appliances.
Workers in the black economy
The black economy employs a considerable share of the potential
labour force available in Austria. If the volume of work carried out
in the black economy is converted into units equivalent to a full-time
job, the model calculations developed by the University of Linz
show, firstly, that between 1995 and 2004 the number of “full-time
illegal workers”active in Austria rose from some 575,000 to almost
789,000. Further, during the same period, the ratio of this figure to
the total volume of paid work performed in Austria also increased
from some 14% to almost 18%.
This figure for “full-time domestic illegal workers “ is purely
fictitious. In actual fact, the volume of employment performed in
the black economy is distributed over an ever greater number of
individuals who vary greatly in their relationship to the labour
market.The section of the population active in the black economy is
very varied and comprises the following groups:
Fully integrated employees (i.e. those working full-time and paying
full social security contributions) who perform their black economy
activities as a sideline to their main jobs.
Self-employed individuals who perform part of their business
activity as undisclosed paid employment in order to avoid paying
tax and social security contributions.
Unemployed people for whom income from the black economy
activities plays a significant part in achieving an acceptable standard
of living.
Those not in gainful employment (students, housewives, those
having taken early retirement and pensioners) who are flexible in
terms of time and for whom illegal working is often the only source
of income (except for social security benefits).
Foreign nationals and those present illegally in Austria for whom
black economy activities are often the only access to paid
employment.
During the same period, the number of foreigners employed
illegally (in black economy activities) increased from 75,000 to some
114,000. This corresponds to approximately one fifth of working
foreigners in Austria. This percentage increased continuously until
2000 since when it has fallen slightly.
Causes and consequences of the black economy 
The causes of the consistently high level of black economy activity
can be found, on the one hand, in the burden of taxes and fiscal
charges, particularly in relation to the work factor and, on the other,
in the inability of the labour market to absorb the potential
workforce. Further causes of the shift from the “official”economy
to the black economy include the over-regulation of the economy
and the labour market (through trade and industry and employment
legislation, etc.) and the social security system which creates
negative incentives in relation to disclosed employment.
In addition to these factors, the European Commission has also
Table 3: Division of the black economy in the building trade
and craft businesses 2004
Sectors Division of the black economy
1000 million euro percentage
Building trade 3.7 41%
Building-related trade 2.7 30%
Craft businesses in the 
building industry 1.4 16%
Other repairs (televisions,
electrical appliances,
domestic appliances) 1.2 13%
Total building trade and 
craft businesses (incl. repairs) 9.0 100%
Source: Friedrich Schneider 2004a.
Table 4: Development of illegal working in Austria
Year
1995 4,064,000 575,000 14.15 395,000 75,000 18.99
1996 4,074,100 617,000 15.14 401,900 83,000 20.65
1997 4,107,100 623,000 15.17 411,100 86,000 20.92
1998 4,190,500 634,000 15.13 423,400 89,000 21.02
1999 4,243,100 667,000 15.72 441,100 93,000 21.08
2000 4,286,400 703,000 16.40 468,200 99,000 21.14
2001 4,315,700 734,000 17.01 494,500 104,000 21.03
2002 4,344,500 746,000 17.17 518,000 109,000 21.04
20031 4,381,800 769,000 17.55 547,200 112,000 20.47
20041 4,420,000 789,000 17.85 580,000 114,000 19.66
1 Estimate/forecast Source: Equivalent full-time illegal workers and illegally employed foreigners: Friedrich Schneider 2004a.
Officially working population and officially working foreigners: Monika Kalmár et al. 2004.
Illegally employed
foreigners 
Percentage of
officially working
foreigners
Officially working
foreigners
Percentage of
officially working
population 
Equivalent full-time
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cited the small-scale structure of businesses and low levels of
competitiveness in certain sectors of the economy as possible causes
of the black economy. In locations dominated by a few large
businesses the black economy plays a minimal role. However, the
more strongly local economies are characterised by a number of
small businesses, the more common is undisclosed employment,
generally in the form of illegal working organised by the businesses
themselves rather than individual (self-employed) illegal working.
In sectors with stagnant or declining growth patterns, the
undisclosed employment of workers is seen as an essential method
of cost-cutting without which businesses believe they would be
unable to compete in the marketplace.
The consequences of undisclosed employment can be sub-divided
into individual consequences and consequences for the economy
and the public authorities. Individuals working in the black
economy are not insured against accident and illness, nor do they
contribute to a pension fund during periods of undisclosed activity.
Any illness-related costs must be borne by the illegal workers
themselves unless they are performing their black economy
activities as a sideline alongside disclosed employment or are
insured with their spouse/parents. In principle, accident-related
costs incurred while working illegally are not covered by general
accident insurance and, during periods of illegal working, no
contributions are made towards the general Austrian state pension
(“ASVG”pension).
These contributions are lost to the public purse along with the wage
and income tax contributions and wage-related employers’
contributions evaded during illegal working.At the same time,some
individuals working in the black economy are also claiming social
security benefits which have to be financed by the public authorities
(and thus from the taxes and fiscal charges paid in the official
economy). Thus a rise in illegal working can increase levels of tax
and fiscal charges.
Measures to combat the black economy
In principle there are two groups of measures for combating the
black economy:
• Audit measures designed to identify individuals and businesses
working in the black economy and the application of punitive
measures;
• Measure designed to prevent the black economy.
The work programme of the Austrian Government sets out the
protection of Austria as an economic location and the creation of
jobs as particular focus points. In implementing this programme, on
30 September 2003 the Council of Ministers passed an action plan
for the concerted combating of fraud which puts particular
emphasis on combating illegal work, illegal earnings and illegally
operating businesses. In this context the Federal Ministry for
Finances has recently implemented a series of concrete measures.
“Reverse charge” systems
The  “reverse charge” system has been introduced in the
administration of value added tax. This means that in a chain of
businesses only the primary contractor is entitled to deduct input
tax. This method is designed to prevent sub-contractors from
claiming back input tax from the tax authorities without having
paid VAT and then ceasing trading or filing for bankruptcy.
Audit measures
A number of auditing bodies have been introduced to combat the
black economy at operational level. The Audit Office for the Illegal
Employment of Foreign Nationals (KIAB = Kontrolle illegaler
Ausländerbeschäftigung) has been operating within the Federal
Ministry for Finances since 1 July 2002 and is part of the customs
administration. On the basis of the Austrian Employment of
Foreign Nationals Law (AuslBG) and the 2003 Budget
Implementation Law (BBG) just under 200 agencies have been set
up to carry out inspections in businesses and on building sites.These
audits focus mainly on firms operating in the building trade, the
restaurant and hotel trade and the haulage business and on service
businesses of all types on the basis of previous investigations of
illegal workers by themselves or other agencies.
In 2003 the KIAB carried out over 21,000 inspections designed to
combat illegal working, identifying just under 5,700 illegal workers.
In total, more than 3,500 notices were served on business owners. In
2003 over 9 million euro worth of penalties were imposed by the
administrative authorities.
In this area the KIAB works in co-operation with the Vienna Rapid
Intervention Squad for the Building Trade (SEG = schnelle
Eingreiftruppe Wien-Bau), which deals primarily with tax fraud,
carrying out inspections on site while projects are under way. Thus it
is possible to take action against outstanding debts owed by
questionable firms to primary contractors by means of execution
Table 5: Audits carried out under the Employment of Foreign Nationals Law (AuslBG), notices served and illegal workers
identified by Bundesland
Bundesland  Inspections under AuslBG  Notices Illegal workers  
Jan-Jun 2003  Jul-Dec 2003  Jan-Jun 2003  Jul-Dec 2003  Jan-Jun 2003  Jul-Dec 2003 
Burgenland 1,416 1,606 81 92 154 139
Kärnten 871 1,000 136 199 159 391
Niederösterreich 1,971 2,645 188 319 352 543
Oberösterreich 1,092 1,284 148 161 233 268
Salzburg 422 502 150 133 164 185
Steiermark 1,217 1,194 299 317 444 513
Tirol 661 1,033 107 103 169 171
Vorarlberg 204 178 68 68 103 141
Vienna 2,320 1,524 570 449 863 698
Austria 10,174 10,966 1,747 1,841 2,641 3,049
Source: Federal Ministry for Finances146 Autumn 2004 |  European Employment Observatory Review
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before these firms are wound up and disappear. In 2003 some 5.2
million euro in turnover tax and 9.9 million euro in wage tax were
ordered to be paid and 32.1 million euro worth of debts were
attached. Instead of paying these sums to sub-contractors, general
contractors must pay them over to the tax authorities.
About one third of the notices served in the course of KIAB
inspections relate to businesses in the building and building-related
trades. Just under 40% of illegal employees are employed in firms in
these sectors. A further third of notices affect restaurant and hotel
businesses which were also responsible for one quarter of illegal
workers. Approximately one in ten notices is served on firms in the
services sector and one tenth of illegal workers are employed in this
industry.
An “Anti-Black Economy Action Day”was held on 22 June 2004 as
part of which an army of inspection teams was deployed across the
whole of Austria involving a total of 875 officials from the tax
authority, the KIAB and the tax investigation office. They audited
1,958 businesses, visited 592 building sites and checked 2,875
workers. In so doing they identified 34 illegal firms, discovered 135
unofficially employed workers and served attachment orders worth
7.2 million euro. The additional costs of the action day were
between 150,000 and 200,000 euro.
By strengthening auditing and prosecuting activities, the Federal
Ministry for Finances hopes to achieve not only a better success rate
in combating illegal working, but also an improvement in attitudes
to tax and a deterrent effect on potential illegal companies and
workers.
Preventive measures and options
In addition to proper auditing procedures and the implementation
of the relevant legislation, reducing levels of illegal working and
transferring black economy activities into the regulated economy
also requires a range of other measures and strategies. These
measures and strategies may cover:
• the tax system,
• the labour market,
• systems for regulating the economy,
• social security systems,
• the integration of foreign nationals,
• information and awareness-raising amongst the population.
(Excessively) high rates of tax and fiscal charges are cited as a
significant cause of the occurrence of black economy activities. For
this reason, the “Communications of the European Commission on
Undisclosed Employment” include a call to reduce VAT rates for
work-intensive services and a call for lower taxation on employment
both in terms of costs to employers (non-wage costs) and in relation
to the available income of the individual employees. In particular,
the Austrian Government is planning a reform of the wage and
income tax system and a reduction in non-wage costs as part of its
work programme.
In terms of the labour market, the options range from a call for
employment legislation to be tailored to the development of new
forms of working to the creation of incentive systems designed to
bring black economy jobs into the regulated employment market for
particular services which are relevant and desirable in terms of
social policy. With this in mind, some EU Member States have
introduced service credit notes or cheques which can be used to pay
for private services (such as housekeeping, cleaning, childcare, etc.)
in particular, and which guarantee a basic level of social security for
the individuals carrying on these activities without noticeably
increasing the costs to the individual employers.
In the countries of northern Europe, on the other hand, tax
reductions and allowances for certain services have been introduced
in order to encourage households to officially register the
individuals they employ. Although measures of this type have been
mooted on numerous occasions in Austria by both experts and
politicians (in particular employee-elected representatives), no draft
laws or bills have as yet been tabled. Over recent years, however,
Austria has made the inclusion of as many different (and unusual)
types of employment as possible the focus of its social policy in the
social security system. For example, free contracts of services and
the “new self-employed”as well as marginal employment have been
integrated into the social security system.
The restructuring of the supply side in certain sectors and the
resulting profiling of occupations can lead to the transfer of black
economy activity into the regulated economy. For example, the
expansion of the network of public childcare establishments in
some countries has led to the elimination of almost all illegal
working in this sector. In the 1990s Austria itself elected to follow
this route (albeit for different motives) for nursery education
funding, childcare allowances, etc., although it then failed to pursue
it in the course of budgetary consolidation.
An important area of the fight against illegal working deals with
measures relating to foreign nationals. Many individuals who have
no or limited access to the Austrian labour market due to their
nationality feel obliged to finance their basic needs through black
economy activities. Since the last major influx of immigration at the
end of the 1980s and start of the 1990s, Austria has severely
restricted access into the country by limiting it to certain groups.
Although certain groups of potential workers of non-Austrian
nationality have been granted unrestricted access to the Austrian
labour market since its accession to the European Union in 1995,
access for those from the major source countries of growth in cross-
border labour supply (Turkey, Bosnia Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia
as well as its eastern neighbours and Poland) is still only possible
through employment authorisations, work permits or exemption
certificates.
Even after EU enlargement, thanks to the transitional provisions
Table 6: Notices served and illegal workers identified by
economic sector 2003
Economic sector Notices Percentage Illegal Percentage
workers
Building trade 604 17.21% 1,186 20.94%
Building-related 
trade 562 16.02% 988 17.44%
Restaurants and 
hotels 1,097 31.26% 1,461 25.79%
Transport 177 5.04% 190 3.35%
Farming and 
forestry 209 5.96% 414 7.31%
Service industries 316 9.01% 593 10.47%
Industry 100 2.85% 166 2.93%
Others 444 12.65% 667 11.77%
Total 3,509 100% 5,665 100%
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negotiated by Austria, states such as the Czech Republic, the
Slovakian Republic, Slovenia and Poland do not yet enjoy the same
unrestricted rights as individuals from the original 15 EU Member
States. Over the next few years, however, during which these
restrictions will gradually fall away, legal employment opportunities
will open up for individuals from the enlargement states, in
particular, who are currently working illegally in the black economy
in Austria.
In addition, the burden of taxes and fiscal duties and the lack of
flexibility in employment law, over-regulation in the field of trade
and industry law and high levels of bureaucracy in relation to
company start-ups are cited as further causes of the level of activity
in the black economy. Austria is endeavouring to respond to this
argument by simplifying trade and industry law and the
administrative procedures involved in company start-ups. Were it
successful in transferring areas of the black economy into the
official economy in this manner, it would be able to achieve several
economic goals at once, including an increase in the number of self-
employed workers, the promotion of company start-ups as one of
the prime producers of employment growth, and an increase in the
official creation of added value and thus in direct and indirect tax
revenue.
However,none of these measures will really begin to take effect until
the players involved (both businesses and individuals) have been
convinced that undisclosed work is not only unfair and anti-social
because it damages the public sector (and legal businesses and
workers via the tax system), but also disadvantageous to those
working in the black economy (stringent penalties, lack of social
protection, no employees’ rights). Finally, it is also necessary to
inform consumers of black economy goods and services that using
illegal work and illegal workers represents a considerable risk since
there is no possible recourse in the event of damages and no
insurance protection against burglary and damage to property when
using unregistered illegal businesses. The Austrian executive has
failed to take any significant action in this area thus far. However,
there has been an apparent increase in information activities by the
social partners over recent months.
Roland Löffler, Ursula Lehner and Michael Wagner-Pinter
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Introduction
Until 1989, the informal economy1 in Poland – understood as
economic activity carried on outside what was permitted by the
communist state, without the benefit of registration and of taxation
– had a different character to that experienced in market economies,
mainly because of the small number of private enterprises. Private
enterprises were limited to handicrafts/small manufacturing
workshops and privately-run farming operations. The State kept a
firm hand on all forms of employment, and the space in which an
informal economy could develop was limited. Individual
households, which constituted the principal entity in the informal
economy, turned to this economy to supplement their incomes and
to secure goods and services that were hard to come by in the
official, State-planned market. Other instances of the informal
economy included the under-reporting of production in workshops,
the non-registration of those workshops, speculation on goods, and
the private importation of goods from abroad for resale in Poland,
an underground currency market and corruption. All of these
activities can be seen to have underpinned the official economy of
Poland during the communist period to some extent.2
From 1990 onwards, the “grey economy” in Poland began to
change. More “parasitical forms” of economic activity (such as
profiteering on the basis of the scarcity of basic consumer goods)
and activities contravening the basic economic order (e.g. the
parallel foreign exchange market) were dramatically reduced, as
they did not fulfil a purpose within the market economy.3 However,
with the arrival of private enterprise, new forms of informal
economic activities began to emerge, such as the avoidance of
registration of employees, the non-declaration of turnover, and tax
evasion.
Some commentators point to certain positive aspects of the
informal economy during the early stages of economic
transformation, suggesting that it provided a safety margin in
difficult times.4 For many small and medium-sized enterprises
established in the early 1990s, resorting to the informal economy
was the only chance for sustained growth under conditions of
runaway inflation and the dramatic reorganisation of the fiscal
system.The informal economy enabled them to reduce expenses and
to accumulate capital. Employment in the informal economy,
meanwhile, compensated for the falling demand for labour, the
emergence of unemployment as a major economic and social
problem, and falling incomes in the official economy occasioned by
the transformation recession. As the scale of their operations grew,
many of these companies “came clean”, formalising all aspects of
their business.
Prevalence of undeclared work in the economy
Proportion of undeclared work in the economy
The value of the informal economy as a proportion of the overall
Polish economic output continues to be high, although the Central
Statistical Office for Poland (GUS) estimates that it is gradually
shrinking. According to estimates recently verified by GUS, the
informal economy accounted for 14.5% of Polish GDP in 1999,
14.3% in 2000, 14.1% in 2001, and 13.4% in 2002.5 The pecuniary
value of informal economy output in 2001 grew to 107.2 billion
PLN(26.7 billion euro), making for a 3.6% increase since 2000. In
2002, meanwhile, informal economy output shrank to 104.6 billion
PLN (26.1 billion euro).
Schneider, an informal economy expert from the University of Linz,
estimates the value of the informal economy as a percentage of
overall output at a considerably higher level, although he agrees that
it is on the decline. According to Schneider, the average involvement
of the informal economy in overall Polish GDP averaged 27.4% in
2000-2001,down to 26.3% in 2003 and to a projected 25.1% of GDP
in 2004.
A study carried out amongst enterprises by the Polish
Confederation of Private Employers in 2003 has likewise pointed to
a fall in turnovers and employment in the informal economy. Survey
respondents estimated that companies concealed an average 17.4%
of their revenues from the tax authorities in 2003 and hired 15.4% of
their workforce outside the official system. The same figures for
2002 were: 20.2% of revenue unreported and 18.6% of personnel
working unofficially.
Some experts, however, point out that state claims on income in
Poland have not decreased, and it is this high cost of labour that
constitutes the most important contributing factor behind
undeclared work.6 Such experts also point out that Poland has been
experiencing an increase in the amount of cash in circulation to the
tune of 14 to 16% every year; while cash transactions account for a
negligible proportion of turnovers in the official banking systems,
they predominate in the informal economy.
The estimates of the importance of the informal economy within
the national accounts drawn up by GUS comply with the
methodology set out in the European System of Accounts 1995.
These only take into account hidden production, not illegal
production.
The category of hidden production comprises the manufacture of
products or provision of services which, while not proscribed by the
law, are concealed in whole or in part from the State authorities
(fiscal, customs, social insurance, and statistical).
Poland
1 In Poland the term “grey economy” is commonly used in the meaning of “informal economy”. 
2 M.Bednarski, Drugi obieg gospodarczy w Polsce. Kontynuacja czy zmiana ?, “Kultura i Społeczeństwo”, 1991, no 3. 
3 Ibidem.
4 K. Kloc, Szara strefa w Polsce w okresie transformacji, Raporty CASE, Warsaw 1998.
5 Data adjusted by GUS, data of F. Schnider and PKPPcited after A.B?aszczak, Powolne wychodzenie z cienia, “Rzeczpospolita”, June 17 2004.
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GUS discerns between two sub-categories of hidden production:
• Under-reporting of production, turnovers, etc., by registered
economic entities;
• Unregistered economic activity pursued on a self-employment
basis.
Estimates of the impact of the informal economy on overall Polish
GDP suggest that, in the years 2000-2001, the largest component of
informal economy consisted of commercial activity pursued by
registered economic entities that did not declare their entire
turnover on their tax returns. These entities accounted for roughly
10% of GDP in Poland. The greatest levels of undeclared activity
occurred in businesses operating in the commercial, construction,
real estate and company service fields.
Undeclared work definitions and measures applied by
the Central Statistical Office for Poland (GUS)
GUS makes use of two methods for estimating the number of
people working in the informal economy, relying on three sources of
information:
• Surveys of economic activity among the population (BAEL –
Polish equivalent of the LFS);
• Statistics of employed persons – drawn up on the basis of records
maintained by employers;
• Registered unemployment data – obtained from the State labour
offices.
The method applied by GUS to gauge employment in the informal
economy is based on disparity analysis. The possibility for using
disparity analysis was first recognised when the BAEL – LFS survey
results became known. The first round of such research was
executed in Poland in May of 1992 and, since that time, BAEL
studies have been carried out once every quarter.
According to GUS estimates, there were 805,000 people working in
Poland’s informal economy in 1995 and 910,000 people in 2002.These
figures capture only those individuals for whom undeclared work
constitutes their principal source of income. The number of persons
employed in the informal economy began to increase as of 2000,when
employment in the official economy began to lag (Table 2).
In order to fine-tune their data, GUS undertook a further two
questionnaire-based surveys exclusively focused on undeclared
work and incomes in 1995 and 19989. Each survey extended to some
11,000 households. Another edition of this study is planned for later
on in 2004.
In the surveys, GUS distinguished between work in the informal
economy which constitutes the worker’s main source of support and
work which augments other, legal income. This survey presented the
first occasion when information was solicited from:
• Informal economy workers (supply of labour), with information
gathered directly from persons who declared involvement in
unregistered work in the year of the study;
• Employers relying on unregistered work (demand for undeclared
work); households and persons pursuing business activity
(private companies) were asked about their utilisation of
unofficial labour (also provided by foreigners).
According to the results of this study, more than half of the people
working in the informal economy viewed this as a secondary source
of income (56.7% of workers in 1995, 53.7% in 1998), (Table 3).
Employment in the informal economy as a principal source of
income was more prevalent among young people aged up to 24
(64.5% in 1995, 61.6% in 1998) and among persons aged 60 and
above, and also among the less educated. The jobs in question were
low skilled, many consisting of simple manual labour.
Employment in the informal economy as a secondary/additional
source of income, meanwhile, was more frequent among
respondents aged 25 to 59. In terms of education, the most
significant groups working in the informal economy to supplement
official incomes consisted of workers educated to post-secondary
and higher level (83.6% in 1995, 74.1% in 1998).
The most significant sectors involved in undeclared work were:
gardening and agricultural work (24.7% in 1995, 20.3% in 1998),
Table 1: Estimated share of the informal economy in GDP ,
2000-2001 (current prices)8
2000 2001
%
Gross domestic product 
(without informal economy) 100.0 100.0
Gross domestic product 
(with informal economy) 114.6 114.3
Combined share of informal economy: 14.6 14.3
– In registered entities 10.6 10.4
– Unregistered work 4.0 3.9
Industry 1.3 1.2
Construction 2.5 2.4
Commerce; hotels and restaurants 6.2 7.2
Transport, warehouses, communications 0.9 0.4
Services for real estate and companies 2.2 2.0
Other categories 1.5 1.1
Source: National Accounts by Institutional Sectors and Sub-sectors 2000-2001, GUS,
Warsaw, 2003, p. 348.
Table 2: Total employment and estimates of unregistered
employment, 1995-2002
Year
1995 15,486 805
1996 15,842 850
1997 16,295 870
1998 16,267 830
1999 16,009 820
2000 15,489 885
2001 14,996 895
2002* 14,924 910
* Data adjusted after the National Population and Housing Census 2002.
Source: Roczniki Statystyczne 1996-2003, GUS.
Employment (BAEL),
in 000s
Estimated unregistered 
employment, in 000s
8 Estimates of the scale of Poland’s grey economy before the verification carried out by GUS in 2004.
9 The data cited below is derived from GUS: M. Kałaska, J. Witkowski, S. Kostrubiec, Praca nierejestrowana w Polsce 1995, GUS, Warsaw 1996; Praca nierejestrowana
w Polsce 1998, S. Kostrubiec (ed.), GUS, Warsaw 1999.150 Autumn 2004 |  European Employment Observatory Review
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what are known as “neighbourly services” (13.0% and 17.3%),
construction and installation services (14.1% and 15.9%), and
refurbishment and repair work (11.3% and 14.5%), (Table 4).
Some categories of work primarily involved men (construction and
installation work, gardening and agricultural work, refurbishment
and repairs, and odd jobs done on a neighbour-to-neighbour basis)
while others were more typical for women (gardening and
agriculture, in babysitting and care jobs, in garment production and
repair, in commerce, and in “neighbourly services”).
Clearly, the various categories of work performed in the informal
economy required different qualifications and skills. The largest,
most frequent category of undeclared work consists of simple tasks
that could be competently handled by unskilled workers or by
people with rudimentary skills. Persons educated to higher or post-
secondary level engaging in undeclared work, meanwhile, were most
likely to offer private home lessons, for instance to secondary school
pupils preparing for university entry examinations. Some better-
educated unregistered workers also worked in narrowly specialised
capacities, such as legal or accountancy services or translations.
The largest category of undeclared worker employers in Poland for
the year 1998 was comprised of private individuals (68.9%).
Privately owned businesses came a low second at 16.8%, and the
third largest category consisted of persons working on their own
account, usually involved in additional work rather than the
principal source of income (12.6%). Work in State-owned
enterprises or in community/co-operative entities accounted for a
mere 1.7% of undeclared work
It should be noted here that the largest category of enterprises in
Table 3: Numbers and percentages of workers relying on
the informal economy for their principal income and for
additional income, 1995 and 1998.
Principal Additional
1995 1998 1995 1998
In 000s 880 662 1,154 769
In % 43.3 46.3 56.7 53.7
Age:
To 24 64.5 61.6 35.5 38.4
25-34 36.0 41.2 64.0 58.8
35-44 37.3 37.3 62.7 62.7
45-59 36.3 43.1 63.7 56.9
60 and above 45.7 56.5 54.3 43.5
Education:
Elementary, incomplete 
elementary 51.0 59.3 49.0 40.7
Basic vocational 43.2 41.0 56.8 59.0
Secondary 40.0 42.3 60.0 57.7
Post-secondary, higher 16.4 25.9 83.6 74.1
Source: Summary on the basis of the GUS publication Praca nierejestrowana w
Polsce 1995, Praca nierejestrowana w Polsce 1998, after M. Kabaj, Zatrudnienie w
“szarej strefie” w polskiej gospodarce. Fakty, tendencje, mity i nieporozumienia,
“Polityka Spoleczna”, no 1, 2004
Table 4: Informal economy workers, subdivided by type of work, gender, and education (as a percentage of all informal
economy workers).
Type of work 1995 1998
Commerce 8.2 5.8 2.9 12.6 2.5 8.7 5.0 5.3
Construction and installation services 14.1 15.9 22.4 0.7 6.2 9.4 17.1 19.9
Refurbishment and repairs 11.3 14.5 20.5 0.7 8.6 9.1 19.8 12.3
Vehicle maintenance and repairs 6.3 5.3 7.6 - - 5.7 7.7 2.8
Transport services 5.2 5.2 7.1 0.7 7.4 4.7 5.2 5.0
Electronic equipment repairs 1.6 1.2 1.7 - - 3.4 1.0 0.2
Medical and nursing services 2.3 1.4 0.1 4.4 7.4 4.0 - 0.4
Hairdressing and beauty services 1.1 0.7 0.1 1.9 - 0.3 1.3 -
Tourism and catering services 1.9 2.5 1.1 5.8 1.2 2.0 3.2 2.0
Accountancy and legal advice 1.1 1.3 0.6 3.0 8.6 4.0 - -
Private lessons 3.8 3.2 1.8 6.5 34.6 4.4 0.2 0.9
Translations 0.3 0.1 - 0.2 1.2 - - -
Garment production and repairs 6.9 4.4 0.4 13.7 3.7 4.4 4.9 3.9
Household work 3.1 3.8 1.2 9.8 2.5 3.4 2.4 6.1
Care for children, for the elderly 4.3 4.5 0.2 14.4 3.7 5.7 2.9 6.1
Security – guarding property 0.7 0.6 0.8 0.2 - 0.7 0.3 0.9
Gardening and agricultural work  24.7 20.3 22.2 15.6 3.7 15.1 19.5 27.5
Production activity 3.1 3.3 2.6 4.9 - 5.4 3.4 2.4
Neighbourly services 13.0 17.3 19.5 12.3 4.2 16.4 20.3 16.0
Other work 2.7 3.2 3.9 2.5 7.4 5.0 1.3 3.7
Source: Summary on the basis of the GUS publications Praca nierejestrowana w Polsce 1995, Praca nierejestrowana w Polsce 1998.
Elementary,
incomplete
elementary
Basic 
vocational
Secondary
vocational and
general
Higher, post-
secondary
Women Men
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Poland consists of “micro-enterprises”employing up to nine people,
which account for 95% of Polish companies..10
The typical “micro-enterprise” is active in the field of commerce,
transport, construction, or of services for real estate and for
companies. The “micro-enterprises” provide jobs for between 3.2
and 3.5 million people,i.e.to 20% of all people working in the Polish
economy. They are particularly vulnerable to shifts in the business
climate, and they often have difficulty adapting to changes in the
law.
Asked about the reasons for which they took up work outside
Poland’s legal economy, most of the respondents cited the low
incomes offered by official employers, lack of jobs, and the high
labour costs exacted by Polish payroll taxes and by social insurance
contributions, (Table 5).
GUS has suggested that work in the informal economy is often of
an ad hoc temporary nature rather than being part of a lifetime
career path. People resorted to the informal economy because they
had no job offers from the official economy or because they needed
additional income to support their families. However, it should be
noted that, during the periods in question, estimated wages in the
informal economy were substantially lower than average
remunerations in the national economy.
Household income studies, questionnaire-based
surveys
Drawing on household budget studies as a basis, GUS has analysed
the break-down of household incomes, expenditures and savings
over the years 1998 and 1999, with informal economy earnings
factored in.11 The authors formulated a hypothesis to the effect that
undeclared incomes occur most frequently in households whose
heads engage in occupations conducive to undeclared work. These
households are most likely to be those where expenditures exceed
their income. The greatest probability of falling into this category
arose for households whose heads belonged to the following
vocational groups:
• Specialists in the natural sciences and in healthcare (49%12);
• Mid-level agricultural and healthcare personnel, vocational
teachers and instructors (45%);
• Farmers, gardeners, foresters, and fishermen (44%);
• Office/secretarial staff (42%);
• Cash handling and customer service personnel (41%);
• Teachers, personal services and security workers (40%).
For the most part, these jobs do not attract high remunerations in
Poland, but they do create possibilities of securing undeclared
income; a teacher, for instance, may offer private home lessons,
nurses may keep watch over bed-ridden patients at home or after
hours at the hospital in consideration for money paid by the
patient’s family. This group also includes farming households.
Under the Polish tax laws, farmers are exempted from the personal
income tax as paid by other workers.
Various polling and public opinion survey institutions in Poland
also address the issue of undeclared work on a more or less regular
basis. For example, a survey carried out for the “Rzeczpospolita”
Daily by PBS (April 17-18, 2004) indicated that, in the space of the
past 12 months, 12% of Poles had derived some manner of income
from the informal economy. The greatest number of admissions to
undeclared work came from the unemployed (27%), from young
people aged 18 to 24 (27%), commerce workers and unskilled
labourers (20%), and from employees of private companies (18%).
As regards the geographic spread, undeclared work was most
prevalent in the voivodships of Pomerania (27%) and Małopolska
(19%) (along Poland’s coast and close to Cracow, respectively). The
lowest incidence of undeclared work, meanwhile, was noted in the
voivodship of Wielkopolska (2.3%).
Another survey from April 2004,by CBOS indicated that,according
to 55% of the respondents, the existence of the informal economy
contributes to the continuing high unemployment rate in Poland13.
27% of the respondents believed that pervasive unemployment
pushes encourages people to take up undeclared jobs without
insurance or welfare entitlements.
Taken together, the results of various surveys show some
ambivalence towards undeclared work.While many Poles regard the
“grey economy”as one of the causes for high joblessness in Poland,
there are also many people who view undeclared work as the last
resort under circumstances where no legal jobs are available.
Reasons behind involvement in the informal economy
Employment in the informal economy is encouraged by the dearth
of vacancies and by the lack of a safety net for the jobless (only 15%
of unemployed persons in Poland receive unemployment benefits).
Such aid as is available from the social assistance system also has a
limited and selective character.
It would seem that most of the adaptation strategies which generate
undeclared work, in general, are observable in the Polish setting.
The low level of social security and the rudimentary welfare state
structure result in high incidence of the “survival”strategy.14 This is
readily noticeable in the form of unregistered retail trade pursued
on a large scale in the streets of Polish cities, along rural roads, and
in open-air markets – often on a distinctly seasonal basis. Such
commercial activity was particularly prevalent at the outset of
10 Entrepreneurship in Poland 2004, MGiP, Warsaw 2004.
11 I. Kudrycka, M. Radziukiewicz, Rozkłady dochodów, wydatków i oszczędności z uwzględnieniem dochodów z szarej strefy, zeszyt 278, GUS, Warsaw 2001.
12 Probability that a household will qualify in Group I, composed of those households whose expenditures exceeded their income. 
13 Polacy o rynku pracy oraz o przyczynach i skutkach bezrobocia, CBOS, BS/68/2004, www.cbos.pl.
14 Strategy typology adopted from: A. Portes, The Informal Economy and Its Paradoxes, [in] N.J. Smelser, R. Swedberg (eds.), The Handbook of Economic Sociology,
Princeton, New Jersey 1994.
Table 5: Opinions of undeclared workers concerning
reasons why undeclared work is taken up.
1995 1998
Insufficient income from official work 65.6 59.0
Impossibility of finding jobs 42.1 47.2
Excessive taxes 25.9 23.8
Undeclared work offers higher remuneration 18.4 22.2
High social insurance contributions 16.0 17.4
Fear of losing benefits (e.g. unemployment 
benefits) 9.0 7.8
Family circumstances, other predicaments 7.4 6.5
Unwillingness to commit oneself to a single 
place of work 1.9 2.0
Other 0.2 0.4
Source: Summary on the basis of the GUS publications Praca nierejestrowana w
Polsce 1995, Praca nierejestrowana w Polsce 1998.152 Autumn 2004 |  European Employment Observatory Review
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Polish reforms, when it was viewed in terms of an “eruption of
unleashed entrepreneurship”, but structural unemployment has
caused it to continue on quite a large scale. This refers also to more
“traditional” and widespread forms such as household oriented
services.
The second strategy which leads Polish workers and enterprises out
of the official economy and into the informal is that of “dependency
exploitation”. The idea behind dependency exploitation is to seek
savings and added management flexibility by subcontracting tasks
to minor dependent subsidiaries and co-operating entities. Such
smaller entities, given the modest scale of their operations, are less
exposed to inspections, and they keep their own expenses low by
unofficial hiring. In competition-intensive sectors such as
construction, contracts are awarded through a bidding process, and
price competitiveness is a critical issue (also ones bankrolled by the
public sector). It should be noted in this context that the past few
years have witnessed growing participation of small companies in
the Polish economy.
The third “growth strategy” observable in Poland refers to the
“parallel economy”, familiar from the communist period. This
involves networks of small companies co-operating with one
another and taking short cuts in order to pursue growth and the
accumulation of capital which will enable them ultimately to enter
the realm of official business and declared employment.
None of the strategies mentioned above is the exclusive purview of
post-communist countries; they occur on a global scale, and in
different social settings. An aspect which, perhaps, is unique for
post-communist economies and transformation societies, however,
is comprised in the element of accumulation – in the simultaneous
occurrence of the various strategies in a single setting across a brief
period of time.
Employment of foreigners in the informal economy
Reliable information concerning the undeclared employment of
foreigners in Poland is difficult to come by. According to the GUS
nomenclature, informal economy work by foreigners in Poland
occurs when foreign nationals, who require work permits or similar
documents, take up paid employment without completing the
requisite paperwork. This includes the unofficial hiring of
household help.
According to research by GUS, the scale of this phenomenon is
comparatively modest.15 In 1998, only 0.6% of Polish households
(approximately 8,000) admitted to retaining unregistered workers
from abroad; 6 out of 10 such households were urban ones, and
every fourth was a rural household. There were 18,000 foreigners
working in Polish households in 1998, 13,000 of them in the cities.
The results of this particular study are clearly at odds with
widespread perceptions as to the scale of the phenomenon.
Looking at the results of questionnaire-based surveys, employment
in Polish households appears to be considerably larger. A CBOS
survey involving a representative sample of 1,000 adult Poles carried
out in 2001 indicates that 7.1% of households retained domestic
help; in every tenth of these, the worker in question was foreign.16
This would mean that no less than 90,000 Polish households
benefited from such services. As a norm, such work for households
went unregistered and untaxed. The results of this survey point to a
high degree of tolerance and permissiveness for such practices.
According to the same survey, three quarters of the domestic
workers held Ukrainian citizenship, every eighth had Belorussian
citizenship, and every tenth was Russian; only one household
worker in 30 hailed from a different country. Thus, Polish
households usually hire help from the countries immediately to the
east.
Measures taken to combat undeclared work
The business climate
All Polish employer organisations concur that there has been a
steady deterioration in the general environment in which Polish
entrepreneurs operate, placing barriers on the creation of legal jobs.
According to Eurostat analysis of the development levels of
European Union Member States, Poland is the second-poorest
country in the EU after Latvia, with the average Pole earning a mere
46% of the EU average after enlargement.17 Polish companies also
have to grapple with a legal and administrative environment less
favourable than that taken for granted in other countries. According
to World Bank estimates, the commencement of economic activity
in Poland entails expenditures of US$ 925 (718 euro) for the would-
be entrepreneur. The typical business start-up cost in Slovakia,
meanwhile, is US$ 401 (311 euro), in Lithuania – US$ 231 (179
euro), and in the United States US$ 210 (163 euro).18
Evidence shows that Poland also experiences considerable problems
relating to corruption. Surveys by GfK19 indicate that more than
90% of Poles believe that Poland is affected by widespread
corruption, although 78% of the respondents state that they
themselves have never offered a bribe. Only 15% of Poles declares
that, were they to witness a bribe changing hands, they would report
this fact to the police.
Poland has in recent years experienced a curtailing of economic
freedom according to a survey by the Heritage Foundation. It is
hoped that a new legislative Act regarding freedom of economic
activity enacted on July 2, 2004, will curtail the influence of the
State and of its various institutions on the day-to-day workings of
businesses. The Act introduces limitations on the number and
duration of inspections of private businesses as well as mechanisms
to streamline the process of company registration, the provision of
licences and the enforcement of debts and obligations.
Fiscal measures have also been introduced to promote
entrepreneurship in Poland:
• As of January 1, 2004, the corporate income tax rate (CIT) has
been reduced to an across-the-board 19% (down from 27%);
• As of January 1, 2004, private individuals pursuing business
activity in their own name outside of agriculture are entitled to a
uniform income tax rate of 19%, thus opting out of the
progressive brackets system (PIT: 19%, 30% and 40%) normally
applied.
These measures are regarded as a chance to cut back corruption in
the economic sphere and to curtail the informal economy. On the
other hand, employer circles have been expressing disquiet at the
proposals for increasing mandatory social insurance contributions
by entrepreneurs.
15 Praca nierejestrowana w Polsce w 1998, S. Kostrubiec (ed.), GUS, Warsaw 1999. 
16 Z. Morecka, E. Domaradzka, Zatrudnienie obcokrajowców w polskich gospodarstwach domowych, “Polityka Społeczna”, no 3, 2004.
17 Cited by: J. Bielecki, Za Polska tylko Lotwa, „Rzeczpospolita”, June 5-6 2004.
18 Cited by: P. Cizkowicz, A. Rzońca, Koszty, przepisy, swobody, “Rzeczpospolita”, June 5-6 2004.
19 Study carried out in late 2003 and early 2004, involving a sample of 15,000 people from 15 countries, www.gfk.pl.Autumn 2004 |  European Employment Observatory Review 153
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Other measures for lowering of declared work costs
Over the period 1993-2001, labour costs in Poland climbed more
than in any other OECD country, with the increase of labour costs
outstripping that of Polish GDP. The high payroll taxes applied in
Poland are perceived by the business community as a major obstacle
to increasing legal employment. An employee whose employment
contract stipulates remuneration equal to the national average in
Poland, i.e. 2,330 PLN (553 euro) as of the first quarter of 2004,
receives a net figure of 1,540 PLN (366 euro). The monthly cost of
retaining this employee borne by the employer, meanwhile, amounts
to 2,850 PLN (676 euro), meaning that it exceeds the employee’s net
pay by 85%.20
A number of proposals for the deregulation of labour relations have
been advanced in Poland within the frameworks of the general
debates concerning “simplification of the State” or “doing away
with big government”.
It is also hoped that the establishment of special economic zones (on
the basis of the legislative Act of October 20, 1994) will contribute
to reducing labour costs and kick-starting business development in
areas afflicted by particular economic decline. Fourteen special
economic zones have been delineated around the country.
The Polish Government has also endeavoured to reduce the cost of
official employment through offering subsidies for the employment
of jobless persons. These are partly addressed to specific target
groups particularly at risk of being left without work. The First Job
programme (2002) for unemployed graduates,for instance,provided
various forms of subsidies including reimbursements of salaries
paid to graduates, graduate internships, loans for the creation of
new jobs, and special programmes.
The new legislative Act of April 20, 2004, regarding promotion of
employment and labour market institutions, introduces provisions
which enable eligible unemployed persons to take up paid work in a
limited scope while continuing to draw a part of their
unemployment benefits (the equalising benefit).
In addition, the amended version of the legislative Act regarding
employment and counteraction of unemployment (originally
adopted on December 20, 2002) introduced the concept of
temporary work into Polish labour law. Temporary staffing agencies
are treated as an instrument for introducing greater flexibility to
employment, hopefully with the effect of reducing unemployment
and limiting employment in the informal economy (the legislative
Act regarding employment of temporary workers was passed on
July 9, 2003).
The general objectives of facilitating employment of jobless persons
and of promoting entrepreneurship are finding concrete expression
in a number of statutory provisions. However these commitments
have not always been translated into actions, partly because of
insufficient funds. Financial shortages, for instance, caused the
range of active labour market policy programmes (ALMP) carried
out in 2002 to reach only 253,096 of the more than three million
registered unemployed.
Increased oversight
At the ideological level, the Polish State is committed to
counteracting employment in the informal economy, which is
regarded as a breeding ground for exploitation and for the unfair
treatment of workers.
Polish law21 sets out specific provisions concerning the formalities
which must be attended to in order to work or to pursue gainful
activities; failure to abide by these requirements attracts penalties.
The general rule is that, wherever labour and/or services are
provided, an employment contract or other civil law contract must
be executed. The employer is also obliged to disburse remuneration
to the employee, to provide her/him with recreational leave
commensurate with the duration of her/his employment and with
parenthood leave, to issue the employee with a work certificate upon
termination of employment, and to abide by a number of other
duties. An employer found to be in breach of any of these duties, as
laid down in the Polish Labour Code, is liable to a fine. Violations of
employee rights are addressed in Chapter XXIII of the Polish
Labour Code and in a number of specific statutory instruments,
such as the legislative Act regarding social labour inspection from
June 24, 1983, or the legislative Act regarding the state labour
inspection from March 6, 1981. The principles of criminal liability
for such labour law violations are regulated by the general
provisions of the Polish Misdemeanours Code.
Cases concerning alleged violations of employee rights are ruled
upon on the basis of motions brought by the labour inspector, who
acts in the capacity of the public prosecution service (although the
public prosecution may also lodge motions in misdemeanour cases).
A labour inspector visiting an employing operation may levy a fine
by issuing a citation. Particularly flagrant violations of employee
rights may qualify as full-blown criminal offences.
Separate liability occurs under the legislative Act of October 13,
1998, regarding the social insurance system. Possible offences
include failure to remit social insurance contributions within the
applicable deadlines, failure to report data subject to a filing duty,
and filing of inaccurate data (the fine for every such offence may
reach 5,000 PLN – 1,187 euro). The Polish Criminal Fiscal Code,
meanwhile, issues penalties for failure to report the arisal of a tax
obligation.
The legislative Act of April 20, 2004, regarding promotion of
employment and labour market institutions, defines a number of
offences which amount to illegal employment. Cases concerning the
above are considered in reference to the Polish Misdemeanours
Process Code.
Control of the legality of employment is attended to by inspection
units informally known as the labour police; as of January 1, 2002,
these are subordinated to the voivod. The inspectors’ mandate
comprises control proceedings with respect to all employers, self-
employed individuals, and any other institutions and private
individuals as regards their retaining of Polish nationals as well as of
foreigners. The labour police may work in conjunction with the
State Labour Inspection, the social insurance institution, the tax
offices, the police, and with other bodies, as appropriate.
The labour police carried out a total of 25,766 inspections in the
year 2003, (24,581 inspections in the year 2002)22. These inspections
revealed 7,922 cases of illegal employment. This number includes
among others: 2,711 foreigners and 1,891 who were officially
registered as unemployed. The inspections resulted in the
legalisation of employment relations for 4,679 people; in 2,199 of
these cases, employment contracts were drawn up, and another
2,480 involved legalisation by way of other contracts.
The State Labour Inspection also has a control capacity with regard
to employment relations. The State Labour Inspection’s report for
20 Cited by: P. Cizkowicz, A. Rzońca, Koszty, przepisy, swobody, “Rzeczpospolita”, June 5-6 2004.
21 Overview of the legal regulations prepared with Anna Semenowicz of the Legal Office of the Polish Senate.
22 Data from the Ministry of the Economy and Labour, www.praca.gov.pl.154 Autumn 2004 |  European Employment Observatory Review
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the year 2002 speaks of inspections carried out at 110 employing
operations with an aggregate work force of 3,476 persons23. For 17
% of these employers, some cases related to lack of written
confirmation of employment were discovered.
This data testifies to the modest success rates as regards discovering
informal employment and enforcement of the pertinent labour laws.
In the case of many informal economy workers, their employing
entity is simply a private household; for all intents and purposes,
households are beyond the reach of official inspections, and survey
results suggest that many Poles take a very liberal view of the
unofficial hiring of household help or nannies.
Conclusions: low security, low flexibility, high
risk
The Polish Government is declaring war on the informal economy
as part of the implementation of the European Employment
Strategy (EES). New statutory instruments such as the legislative
Act regarding freedom of economic activity, the legislative Act
regarding promotion of employment and labour market institutions
and the legislative Act regarding employment of temporary workers
are assisting this effort, along with the recent reduction of the
corporate income tax rate (CIT) from 27% to 19% and the
institution of a 19% flat-rate tax for private individuals pursuing
business activity (outside of agriculture) in their own name.
The weak state of public finances in Poland and the growing
numbers of public debt, however, give rise to doubts as to whether
these fiscal reforms can be consistently carried through. The current
over-regulation of economic activity is also a key concern. Reduced
but more effective regulation which is more attuned to the social and
economic reality in Poland is essential. Poland also presently has
what is de facto a deregulated social security system, with low
unemployment benefits, the lack of a compensation system for lost
earnings and the lack of security as regards medical care. The
prevailing situation is therefore one of low social security and low
flexibility in the labour market. Any initiatives designed to curtail
undeclared work need to address both these policy concerns.
Ewa Germanowska
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Introduction
In Portugal, the fight against undeclared work only recently emerged as
a priority. The European Employment Strategy (EES) has helped to put
this issue on the political agenda.
The goal of fighting undeclared work is frequently associated with that
of combating the informal economy, especially in relation to tax
evasion, and these two issues are related to efforts to reduce and
eliminate illegal immigration.
Portugal does not have a specific definition or recent national statistics
measuring  the  phenomenon,  as  the  Employment Action  Plan  for
2003/2006 recognises: “the scale and nature of the undeclared work
phenomenon is not known with any great accuracy” (p. 42). This
situation can be related to the performance of the Portuguese labour
market in the last years. It has presented one of the highest employment
rates and one of the lowest unemployment rates in the European Union
(EU). Some of the goals defined within the Lisbon and Stockholm
European Councils for 2005 and 2010 have already been achieved. It is
this performance that has allowed the Government not to place too
much emphasis on fighting undeclared work so far.
Thus,  the  definition  used  in  the  present  article  will  be  the  same
presented by the European Commission (2004) – “any paid activities
that are lawful as regards their nature but not declared to the public
authorities” (p. 8).
The informal economy and undeclared work –
an overview
The informal economy
According to data from the World Bank, the size of the informal
economy in Portugal was about 22.5% in 2001/2002. In 1989/1990 it
was 15.4% and since 1994/1995 the value has always been above 20%.
Comparing the situation with the other European countries, Portugal is
one of the four countries that present the highest percentages. It is also
important to note that most of these countries belong to the so-called
group of Cohesion Countries (Spain, Greece and Portugal).
According  to  a  recent  study  (Farrel,  2004)  covering  eleven
countries/regions  (sub-Saharan Africa,  India,  Indonesia,  Pakistan,
Philippines, Brazil, Thailand, Turkey, Mexico, Chile and Portugal), the
activities  where  the  informal  economy  is  more  significant  are
construction (more than 80%), clothing and textile, and retail.
Impact on productivity
Portuguese productivity is almost half of the average of the most
productive European Union countries: according to the “Portugal
2010”1 report, the differential is about 48 percentage points.
According to that report, 16 percentage points of that differential
are due to structural factors and is related to the low level of the
Portuguese per capita income. But the other part of the differential
is explained by non-structural reasons: six main factors were
identified and the most important of them is informality (fiscal
Portugal
Figure 1: Size of the informal economy (in % of GDP) using Currency Demand Method
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1 McKinsey Global Institute (2003) – “Portugal 2010: to speed up the growth of the productivity”. The report was a request from the Portuguese Government in order
to make a diagnosis and to identify the necessary measures to improve the Portuguese productivity.156 Autumn 2004 |  European Employment Observatory Review
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evasion; evasion of social obligations, namely, social security
payments; evasion of market norms like security and quality norms
on products). Indeed this factor is responsible for 28% of the total
differential referred to above.
Undeclared work
Although it was not possible to obtain fully comparable
international data on the incidence of undeclared work, according
to the National Institute for Statistics the incidence rate of the
undeclared work in Portugal was about 5% of GDP in 1996. This
percentage is one of the lowest ones, when compared to the values
from other European countries.
Taking into account more recent data2, in Portugal about 30% of
the employees who work in non-agricultural activities work in
enterprises whose activities are legal but do not fulfil their tax
obligations.
Table 2 compares calculations of the theoretical liability3 for
compulsory employee and employer social contributions with
actual receipts of contributions (reported in OECD Revenue
Statistics). These results are based on detailed contribution
schedules, as reported in the OECD report on Taxing Wages, taking
into account the contribution floors and ceilings in cases where
contributions are not exactly proportional to earnings (OECD,
2004).
In Portugal, the ratio of actual receipts to theoretical liability, either
when based on wages and salaries or on labour costs, is about 0.60.
This translates into a revenue shortfall of 40 percentage points. So
the actual social security contributions received are below the
calculation of the theoretical expected amounts. However, this
situation also occurs in the great majority of the countries analysed.
A possible general reason for this fact is that some Government
employees do not pay contributions to the main social security
scheme. Therefore, the last column estimates the ratio tax receipts to
theoretical tax liability for the non-Government sector alone
(OECD, 2004).
Figure 2: Estimated share of value-added activities that are informal, by industry, in the eleven countries (% of GDP)
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Table 1: Incidence of undeclared work
Country Year Size (% GDP)
AT 1995 1.5
BE 1995 3-4
DK 2001 5.5
FIN 1992 4.2
FR 1998 4-6.5
DE 2001 6.0
GR 1998 >20
IE n.a. n.a.
IT 1998/2002 16-17
LU n.a.* n.a.*
NL 1995 2.0
PT 1996 5.0
ES n.a.* n.a.*
SE 1997 3.0
UK 2000 2.0
* n.a. = Not available
Source: European Commission (2004) – “Undeclared work in an enlarged Europe”
2 Farrel, D. (2004) – The Hidden Dangers of the Informal Economy in The McKinsey Quarterly, 2004
3 Theoretical liability is calculated first on the basis of national accounts figures for wages and salaries, which approximate the true tax base, then on the basis of labour
costs (with corresponding adjustments to the theoretical calculation) so as to be able to provide some results for countries where OECD National Accounts do not
report wages and salaries (OECD, 2004).Autumn 2004 |  European Employment Observatory Review 157
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Thus, Portugal presents a ratio of 0.84, which means unexplained
social security revenue shortfalls of 16%. This value seems to
correspond quite well with other measures of the size of the
informal economy (see Figure 1).
On the other hand, and remembering that 30% of employees in
Portugal work in enterprises which do not pay their tax obligations,
it is important to make reference to some data regarding tax evasion
in Portugal. When the contributor does not fulfil tax obligations
within the legal time limits foreseen by the law, the so-called coercive
collection is activated. According to a recent article (Serra, 2001),
the level of tax evasion in Portugal is estimated to be between 4.7%
and 7.2% of GDP – this is between 10.9% and 16.75% of total tax
revenue. In 2003 tax evasion continued to increase: the tax shortfall
was about 916 million euro (+34% more than in 2002). This is
mainly due to non-payment by companies (DGCI4, 2003).
The communication from the European Commission on undeclared
work (1998) states that, in Portugal, the great majority of
undeclared workers are illegal immigrants,women,and unregistered
workers. Women are employed in less autonomous jobs, earn less
and tend to have informal jobs out of economic necessity, rather
than to earn extra cash on the side as men do (European
Commission, 2004).
With regard to illegal immigration, in June there was another legal
period in order to proceed to the regularisation of illegal
immigrants and the number of requests was about 50,000. Despite
this, the Government foresees that only about 20,000 requests will
be accepted. That is due to the fact that the rules became more
restrictive within the new law of immigration approved in February
2003. According to the law, only immigrants who have paid taxes
and social security contributions for three months and who have a
current contract of employment or who have held such a contract in
the past will be legalised. In face of these requirements, it is evident
that the result could be the presence of illegal immigrants5.
On the other hand, the labour inspectorate has detected many
foreign workers without regular employment contracts. In light of
this situation, the IDICT6 has tried to proceed with the
regularisation of their situation, namely by demanding that
enterprises offer employment contracts to such workers and
communicate to the authorities that they are integrated in the labour
market.
Looking at specific sectors, those more affected by the undeclared
work phenomenon are the construction and textile sector and retail
trade (European Commission, 1998). The construction sector
presents the highest incidence of informal work. In fact the entity
that regulates the sector (IMOPPI7) registered about 43,132
legalised construction companies , and the National Institute for
Statistics states that the number of construction companies is about
60,000 (Dias, 2004). Besides this sector, informal work is found
mainly in the hotel and catering sector and in personal and domestic
services. The former is a sector where temporary and seasonal work
predominates.
Related to the sector analysis is the false self-employment
phenomenon,which is also difficult to measure.Self-employed work
without employees, although in slight decline, represents, in the
most relevant sectors of the economy, a substantial proportion in
terms of the overall figure for the self-employed, representing nearly
Table 2: Total receipts of compulsory social security
contributions compared with the theoretical liability arising
on wages and salaries as recorded in national accounts,
2000
Ratio of actual receipts to theoretical liability
AT 0.81 0.79 0.94
BE 0.72 0.72 0.86
DK 0.37 0.35 0.60
FIN 0.89 0.88 0.94
FR 0.76 0.76 0.90
DE 0.87 0.82 0.90
GR 0.84 0.83 1.26
IE 0.73 0.75 0.84
IT 0.82 0.80 0.80
LU 0.82 0.80 0.96
NL 1.00 0.90 1.08
PT 0.62 0.60 0.84
ES 0.78 0.78 -
SE 0.89 0.87 0.88
UK 0.78 0.74 0.78
Source: OECD, Employment Outlook 2004
Based on wages
and salaries
(employers plus
employees)
Based on labour
costs (employers
plus employees)
Re-estimated for
non-Government
sector
4 DGCI – Department of taxes – Financial Ministry.
5 It is estimated that, at present, approximately 11% of the 450,000 immigrants who work in Portugal are illegal (Portuguese Employment Action Plan 2003/2006).
6 IDICT – Institute for Development and Inspection of the Labour Conditions.
7 IMOPPI – Institute for Construction markets and real estate
Figure 3: Regularisation of foreign workers (contracts) and
inflation rate 2000–2003 (% change on year early)
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50% in the manufacturing industry, over 55% in construction, and
more than 65% in services. The self-employed are essentially
comprised of workers with low qualifications (agriculture, fishing,
handicraft, domestic service) – and accounted for more than 80% in
2001. The remainder includes primarily senior staff, although there
has been a slight annual decline of approximately 6% since 1998.
According to these data it is not possible to draw conclusions about
the level of fake self-employment, but the number of self-employed
workers in Portugal is significant.
Child labour
Another important aspect of undeclared work is child labour which
is still significant in Portugal. In 2001, according to the Statistical
System of Information on Child Labour (SIETI), the number of
children working reached 28,228.
According to the SIETI, the industrial sector registered the highest
number of child labourers. The textile sector had 36.6% of the total
of working children. To address this situation, the Portuguese
Government presented the PETI (Programme for the Prevention
and Elimination of the Exploitation of Child Labour) in March
2004. This programme intends to provide the opportunity for
working children to finish compulsory education in order to become
better integrated in the labour market in future. As the present
working children could be the future undeclared workers, this
policy, if effectively implemented, may become a good means to
prevent it.
Measures taken to combat undeclared work
Throughout the implementation of the EES,Portugal has foreseen a
set of policies that intends to combat undeclared work and
transform the informal economy into regular activity. According to
the Portuguese Employment Action Plan for 2003/2006 efforts have
been made to:
• Facilitate the licensing process for new companies and other
administrative procedures;
• Strengthen the intervention of the Inspection of Labour (IGT),
which has undertaken actions for the regulation of illegal
situations;
• Combat illegal practices, verifiable through a decrease in fake
self-employment and undeclared work.
Unfortunately, little can be said about the results and the impact of
these efforts on undeclared work. However, it is possible to provide
data (qualitative and quantitative) regarding two of the goals listed
above.
Significant advances were made in the reduction of administrative
and overhead costs in the whole creation and development process
of enterprises, during the first phase of the EES. In fact, the recent
Business Formalities Centres (CFE) have been increasing their role
in terms of response capacity and, as the respective network of
centres establishes itself, have widened their scope to
complementary areas. However, there is still a need for expansion
into other areas, such as dissolution of enterprises, and the
reduction of the average time to set up an enterprise, as this has not
yet reached the target fixed in the NAP 2002 (20 days).
Regarding the regulation of illegal immigration it is important to
note that a new framework regarding immigration policy was
presented in February 2003. This new law proposes to achieve three
objectives: 1) to promote legal immigration according to the real
possibilities of the country, 2) to integrate immigrants effectively
and 3) to combat illegal immigration.
In this context, binding annual maximum limits have been set for
immigration, which will be elaborated from time to time by the
Government. Special work visas have also been created for
specialised staff.
The Portuguese NAP for 2003-2006 contains a number of other
measures aimed at tackling undeclared work:
• Providing information and raising public awareness concerning
the negative effects of undeclared work and the stimulation of
active citizenship;
• Removing the disincentives to declare work, minimising the
effects of the tax and benefit systems that favour undeclared
work;
• Minimising the tax effects that favour the creation of fake self-
employment;
• Strengthening the prevention of illegal immigration;
• Providing incentives for legal hiring, starting from the country of
origin to the stage of permanency in Portugal;
• Strengthening the operations of the Labour Inspectorate (IGT),
in association with other inspection systems, in the area of
prevention and the fight against illegal work and clandestine
immigration;
• Reviewing the system of criminal sanctions which prevents and
curbs illegal acts related to clandestine immigration and the
exploitation of foreign labour in an unregulated situation;
• Developing a basic information system to understand and
monitor the phenomenon;
• Creating a social security database and co-ordinating with other
databases that prevent social security evasion.
These proposed actions can be divided into two types of measures:
those aimed at combating undeclared work and those aimed at
transforming undeclared activity into regular work. The first set of
measures contains the following:
Figure 4: Number of children who were working (by age
group) in 2001
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• Public information and awareness campaign against undeclared
work;
• Inspection operations and other inspection systems, in the
domain of prevention and the fight against illegal work;
• Information system in relation to undeclared work.
The second set of measures includes:
• Tax and benefit systems favourable to declaring work;
• Re-evaluation of the legislative framework governing self-
employment.
Another reason for the existence of undeclared work which is
frequently mentioned is the rigidity of labour legislation. In relation
to this, Portugal has made significant improvements through the
New Code of Labour, whose main goals are to promote collective
bargaining and to make labour legislation more flexible. For
example, the new legal framework increases the number of years
that a worker can be working in the same enterprise with a fixed
term contract. Thus, the worker can continue to hold a fixed-term
contract for three years with a maximum number of two renewals
but, at the end of the three years or of the foreseen renewals, the
contract can be drawn out, for a period of between one and three
years.On the other hand,the employer’s social security contribution
increases in companies where more than 15% of their workers have
fixed-term contracts.
Conclusion
In Portugal, in spite of the lack of data, the available statistics point
to a significant number of undeclared workers. A large proportion
of these workers are illegal immigrants. This makes it more difficult
to measure the phenomenon. The sectors most affected by
undeclared work are the construction sector, the hotel and restaurant
sector and personal and domestic services. This is a critical situation
not only because of the revenues that the State does not receive, but
also because it means weaker social protection for the workers and
often constitutes a trap, offering little prospect to improve careers.
The Portuguese authorities intend to transform undeclared work
into regular employment through several means, including the
strengthening of interventions of an informative nature, raising
awareness of its disastrous effects, removing excessive red tape and
making the tax and benefit system favourable to declared work, and
reinforcing inspection operations.
It is also expected that the new regulatory framework for
immigration, based on a policy of working visas, will contribute
towards a reduction in the illegal migratory flows. The new Code of
Labour has also been significant in that some undeclared workers
can now establish a regular labour relation with their employers. In
this case the active involvement of the social partners will be
essential.
Helena Miranda and António Caetano
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Introduction
In the first half of the 1990s, the Slovenian economy experienced
rapid changes and the growth in the share of the “hidden or grey
economy”. The transition to the market economy and
modernisation of industry brought high rates of unemployment.
One of the policy measures taken to actively reduce unemployment
was helping unemployed people to become self-employed, through
financial support and counselling. Many of the unemployed took
the opportunity to start their own business without registering it. A
similar problem occurred with people choosing to set up companies
after early retirement. To begin with, this kind of economic
behaviour was tolerated since it was regarded as one of the solutions
for maintaining social security and social peace. The growth of
small businesses was not accompanied by any changes to the legal
system. Eventually the majority of the small entrepreneurs legalised
their businesses and the state modernised its legal system through
the introduction of VAT and the strengthening of activities to
reduce tax evasions. However, regardless of these improvements,
undeclared work and employment remain an unresolved issue in
Slovenia.
In July 1997, the Slovenian Government adopted the
“Programme for exposing and preventing illegal work and
employment”1. Under this programme numerous activities were
launched to reduce the share of the hidden economy. The
Government also set up a new Commission to co-ordinate the
common activities of many agencies (bodies)2 that are responsible
for the supervision of different areas of the Slovenian economy.
The Commission is based in the Ministry of Labour, Family and
Social affairs. A state secretary responsible for the issue was
appointed at the same Ministry. In 2000 an Act was passed on the
“Prevention of illegal work and employment”.
When setting up these initiatives, the term “illegal work and
employment” was used to refer to activities that are defined by the
European Commission as “undeclared work”. In Article 3 of the
Act, for example, “illegal”work is where:
• a legal entity3did not register its activity with the court register or
did not have all the required documents for the registered
activity;
• a small entrepreneur performs an activity that is not reported to
the authorities or does not have all the required documents for
the registered activity;
• a legal entity or small entrepreneur performs an activity
regardless of a temporary prohibition against performing this
activity;
• a foreign legal entity or small entrepreneur performs an activity
in Slovenia without complying with requirements or announcing
the activity to the tax authorities;
• an individual performs an activity or work that is not registered
or reported to the authorities according to this or other legal acts.
In Article 5,“illegal employment”is defined as when a legal entity or
small entrepreneur:
• did not sign an employment or work contract with a worker
according to the regulations and did not register him/her at the
Health Insurance Institute of Slovenia and Pension and
Disability Insurance Institute;
• employs a foreigner or an individual without citizenship in
contradiction with the regulations on employing foreigners.
In Article 7 exceptions from illegal work and employment are
defined as:
• mutual neighbourly assistance;
• performing work for exclusively personal needs;
• emergency work for preventing natural and other disasters;
• performing humanitarian, voluntary or charity work;
• performing personal supplementary work.
Since the Commission states in its yearly reports (for the period
1.7.2001- 31.12.2002 and for the year 2003) that the main motive for
illegal work and employment is avoiding paying taxes and acquiring
required documents for performing legal activities, the similarity
between two definitions is further emphasised. The term
“undeclared work and employment” will be used from this point
onwards in the text.
Regardless of the fact that the Government and the social partners
have given great significance to combating undeclared work and
employment, the issue is not among the main topics that currently
preoccupy Slovenian politics. It is mentioned occasionally, mostly
with reference to a specific case of undeclared work and
employment or a specific occasion (such as elections, or business
conferences).
Most of the government activities in this area are performed
“behind the scenes”. However, once a year representatives of the
social partners in the Economic and Social Council of Slovenia
discuss the yearly report to the Commission.
Prevalence of undeclared work in the economy
As yet, there is no official measurement of undeclared work in
Slovenia. Nevertheless, there are different estimates according to
which undeclared work generated from 17% to 24% of the Slovenian
GDP in 2003. While the official estimate according to the European
Commission (2004) and Slovenian official sources is 17%, other
social partners in Slovenia still operate with much higher figures –
Slovenia
1 The “Program odkrivanja in preprecevanja dela in zaposlovanja na crno”. There are some inconsistencies in terminology between the official translation of the title
and the content and intent of the programme. Using official translation of the Act on Prevention of Illegal Work and Employment that was passed in 2000, the
programme (and the commission) would be called “Programme for exposing and preventing illegal work and employment”. However since its content and its
intention are similar to the European Commission’s definition of the undeclared work, it could be more correct to translate it as the “Prevention of undeclared work
and employment”.
2 Labour Inspectorate, Market Inspectorate, Traffic Inspectorate, Tax Administration, the Police, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of Labour,
Family and Social Affairs and others.
3 Organisation, co-operative or institution.
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up to 24%. Thus, representatives of the Chamber of Crafts claimed,
at a round table4 dedicated to this issue, that there are almost
250,000 undeclared workers in Slovenia who generate almost 24% of
the Slovenian GDP. At the same time the Slovenian Minister of
Labour, Family and Social Affairs estimated the share of
undeclared work and employment at 20% of GDP.
Trends in the share of undeclared work and employment in the
Slovenian economy show a constant decrease of such activities from
the establishment of the Commission in 1997 onwards. The
situation was worse at the beginning of the period of systematic
work on the issue during the 1997-1998 period. In this period, cases
of undeclared work were found in 68.9% of all inspected cases,
undeclared employment in 35.4% and violations of the tax laws in
47% of all inspected cases.
In the past few years the Commission intensified their activities to
reduce the occurrence of undeclared work and employment.
In the period 2001-2002, the Commission co-ordinated numerous
joint actions in which 1,350 (847 in the year 2002 alone)
organisations were inspected. From those inspections it was
established that in 16.8% of inspected cases (13.1% in 2002)
undeclared work was present. In 15.5% inspected organisations
(15.8% in 2002 alone) undeclared employment was found. In the
same period 20.7% (24.1% in 2002) of inspected organisations
violated the tax and book-keeping regulations.
In the year 2003, supervisory bodies registered 2,742 cases of
violation of the Act on Prevention of Undeclared Work and
Employment.
Legal entities and small entrepreneurs (2,092 cases) were mainly
responsible for violations of the Act, while individuals violated the
Act in 650 cases. Most of the violations were related to undeclared
work (1,877 cases or 68.4%), while the share of undeclared
employment was 30.2%.
The Market Inspectorate has been most successful in detecting
violations of the Act, identifying 1,070 cases of undeclared work.
Almost half of these cases involved legal entities performing
activities without documents that would prove that they were
fulfilling legal requirements. The Market Inspectorate also detected
602 cases of undeclared work by individuals.
On the other hand, the Labour Inspectorate5 was responsible for
detection of all cases (827) of undeclared employment. In 743 cases
the employer failed to sign a contract with the worker and did not
register the worker at the Health Insurance Institute of Slovenia and
Pension and Disability Insurance Institute of Slovenia. In 77 cases
the employer employed a foreigner or an individual without
citizenship in contradiction to the regulations on employing
foreigners. The majority of violations were reported in trade,
construction and catering.
Institutions such as the National Employment Office of Slovenia
also participate in the fight against undeclared work. Out of 740
persons that worked or had been employed in undeclared work in
2002, the National Employment Office found that 198 persons were
on the register of unemployed people. After reviewing the situation
of each case, 90 persons were deleted from the register and 39
persons left the register of their own accord. For 69 persons the
procedure was still not finalised at the end of the year 2002. The
right to unemployment benefit and unemployment assistance was
taken away from 19 individuals.
In 2003, supervisory bodies caught 677 unemployed persons in
undeclared work and employment. The National Employment
Office inspected 571 cases and found 164 persons in the register of
unemployed people. From that figure, 97 persons were deleted from
the register, and in 11 cases the right to unemployment benefit and
unemployment assistance was removed.
The effectiveness of the fight against undeclared work and
employment depends greatly on the efficiency of the judicial and tax
administration systems and their responsiveness to cases of
undeclared work and employment identified by the agencies on the
field. In the year 2000, 2,391 cases were reported to the
misdemeanours judges and from this number only 806 cases were
concluded with the appropriate fine; 443 cases fell under the Statute
of Limitations and 1,614 cases were classified as a
“misdemeanour”..
In the year 2001, misdemeanours judges received 1,826 cases from
which 369 persons were found guilty, 42 cases fell under the Statute
of Limitations and 754 cases were categorised as misdemeanours.In
2003 supervising bodies issued 1,296 mandatory fines (if paid
immediately the mandatory fine is halved), 1,569 provisions and
1,778 proposals to the misdemeanours judges.
Based on the findings of the tax administration, 1,114,508,998 SIT,
or 4.7 million euro, should have been collected in 2003 in additional
liabilities (taxes and contributions) from economic subjects involved
in undeclared work and employment.
As can be seen from figure 1, 75.9% of the total amount represents
the additional liabilities related to undeclared work and
employment. A very low share of finances is actually collected from
fines issued by misdemeanours judges6.From a possible 138,805,000
5 In the year 2003 the Labour Inspectorate alone performed 17623 inspections related to labour relations (9095) and to health and security at work (8528). The work
was done by 76 inspectors in 14 local offices.
6 The President of the Senate for Misdemeanours stated that there is low financial discipline amongst those individuals fined by misdemeanours judges. However, at
the same time, coercive exactions are often unsuccessful, as there is a growing number of unemployed people among those that are fined. In addition, as a rule,
seizures of movable property are not implemented and, in 2003, the misdemeanours judges did not use the possibility of changing fines to imprisonment. The Senate
expects that the new electronic exchange of the data within the tax administration should improve the effectiveness of the exactions. (MDDSZ, 2004:10-11)
Table 1: Violations of the Act on Prevention of Undeclared Work and Employment in 2003
Legal entity or 
small entrepreneur  1253 10 9 82 2092
Individuals 624 13 6 7 650
Total 1877 23 15 827 2742
Source: MDDSZ, 2004:4
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employment
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SIT (585,508 euro or 12.5% of 4.7 million euro) the tax
administration only recovered 12.5%. The tax administration was
only successful in exacting payments from mandatory fines where
all fines were paid immediately (thus receiving only half of the
expected amount – only 273,807 euro instead of 547,613 euro).
Measures taken to combat undeclared work
The creation of a legal and administrative
environment which is favourable to the declaration of
economic activity
The basis of the legal and administrative framework on this issue
was created in 2000 through the passing of the Act on Prevention of
Undeclared Work and Employment.
In the year 2002, a Regulation on work activities identified as
“personal supplementary work”and the procedure for notification
of these work activities came into force. An individual can perform
personal supplementary work if:
• their annual income does not exceed their annual minimum wage
from the previous year;
• the work is defined as appropriate in the Regulations (household
assistance, collecting and selling forest fruits and herbs, making
and selling home-made products);
• the individual must perform the work alone and must be
registered as a personal supplementary worker.
There were 1,928 individuals in the year 2003 registered to perform
personal supplementary work.The majority of them were collecting
and selling forest fruits and herbs. The procedure for registering has
been simplified; however, there is a strong move not to allow a
further increase in the number of registered personal supplementary
workers.
In 2002 the Commission on the Prevention of Undeclared Work and
Employment also contributed to the preparation of a new General
Offences Act, especially in respect of the need for rapid proceedings
and the timely and relevant professional education and training of all
those involved in the proceedings. Improvements related to:
• staffing of the judicial bodies, particularly increasing the number
of employees;
• rewarding the judicial bodies that will take over the burden of
proceedings from the judges;
• technologically and technically equipping such bodies;
• defining the execution of the transitional provisions of the Act;
• optimising proceedings, measures and co-operation between
judicial bodies and bodies that are responsible for the successful
enforcement of sentences and recovery of fines.
More recently, supervisory bodies have detected frequent violations
of the Societies Act regarding appropriate profitable activities of
societies and, in some cases, farms. These violations relate, in
particular, to the catering activities that are described in Article 3 of
the Catering Act, to the establishment of societies for mechanical
processing in agriculture and to assistance for older people. The
Commission has suggested appropriate amendments to the new
Societies Act and to the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of
the Economy.
The Commission has also pointed out violations in the field of
agriculture. These are related to farm tourism, cargo transports, the
mechanical processing of soil and repairs to mechanical goods. In
all mentioned areas, activities exceeding the definitions in Article 7
of the Act on Prevention of Undeclared Work and Employment
have been identified. The Commission has suggested more detailed
specification of the conditions for performing such activities to the
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Food.
Strengthening incentives and removing disincentives
to declare work
The draft version of the Slovenian National Action Plan on
employment for 2004 (under the strategic goal of improving the
quality and productivity of work) envisages the following measures
for strengthening incentives and promoting employment:
• the abolition of administrative obstacles for the registering of
companies, which includes changes to legislation and the
establishment of an information system to make it easier for
companies to register (one of the tasks is reducing the period for
administrative procedures from one month to 14 days);
• changes to tax legislation in terms of collecting contributions, in
order to reduce the administrative burden on companies and in
particular on small companies;
• the establishment of measures to promote entrepreneurship and
to develop an entrepreneurship-friendly environment;
• easing access to sources of finance for companies and making it
easier to establish new business start-ups.
In Slovenia’s NAP (National Action Plan for employment) it was
also stated that exposing and preventing undeclared work would
function not only to reduce the number of registered unemployed
but also to promote the transition of undeclared work to regular
employment. It was also intended that pension reform should not
promote early retirement and consequent transition to undeclared
work and employment.
Figure 1: Additional liabilities and fines related to
undeclared work and employment in 2003
Additional liabilities 
(taxes and contributions)
Mandatory fines
Fines issued by 
misdemeanours judges
75.9%
11.6
12.5
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At the same time supervisory bodies have stressed the need for
additional regulations in the Value Added Tax Act to improve
supervision of foreign legal entities and small entrepreneurs with
headquarters outside Slovenia that wish to provide public transport
services in Slovenia. Such regulations should support the
registration of foreign legal entities and small entrepreneurs with
the Slovenian authorities and consequently ensure the payment of
value added tax in Slovenia.
Strengthening surveillance and the application of
appropriate sanctions
Besides the individual actions of different supervisory bodies, the
Commission for exposing and preventing undeclared work and
employment co-ordinated and conducted many joint actions (267 in
the year 2003) where the participation of at least two supervisory
bodies facilitated the inspection of:
• more subjects in one economic activity in different locations;
• more subjects in different economic activities in a small
geographical area;
• more subjects in one economic activity in a small geographical
area;
• more subjects in different economic activities in a wider
geographical area;
• one subject that performs one or more economic activities in
different locations;
• one or more subjects in a specific environment (e.g. without
interrupting the programme in nightclubs or discotheques, where
up to 1,500 people could be gathered).
One of the benefits of such joint actions is that the supervisory
bodies can perform two tasks simultaneously: inspection regarding
undeclared work and employment can be carried out alongside
other inspections relating to their own particular field of interest.
Such joint actions can involve mobile groups, which can perform
“ad hoc” inspections on the spot and can move quickly to other
locations or region.
The following organisations have a special role in detecting and
preventing undeclared work and employment:
• The police – they have a double function: either acting as a
supervisory body, especially in the case of foreigners, or simply
giving assistance to other supervisory bodies in performing their
tasks;
• The tax administration, which continues to perform its activities
long after the other supervisory bodies have concluded their
work.
Strengthening transnational co-operation between
competent bodies in different Member States aimed
at combating undeclared work
In 2003, in the context of Slovenian preparations for accession to
the EU, special attention was given to the following areas:
• Undeclared employment of foreigners especially in construction,
cargo transport, hotels and restaurants (especially Chinese
restaurants), entertainment (especially night clubs) and in
agriculture (especially hop growing). In areas such as
construction and agriculture workers from other ex-Yugoslavian
countries and from Eastern Europe often work without signing
contracts or reporting to the authorities. Unemployed Slovenian
people are often reluctant to perform such “dirty”work for less
than the unemployment benefit, and foreign workers are often
ready to work in bad conditions for less money.In addition,there
is a shortage of skilled workers in some areas (especially in
construction).
• The performance of various services by foreign legal entities and
small entrepreneurs on Slovenian territory.
It was concluded that Slovenian supervisory bodies were well
prepared to supervise foreign legal entities, small entrepreneurs and
individuals. This preparedness has also been demonstrated in the
context of international actions to prevent and detect undeclared
work and employment.
Raising social awareness of the costs of undeclared
work
The Chamber of Crafts and Chamber of Commerce have organised
several round tables on this issue. These were an opportunity for
representatives of small entrepreneurs as well as of larger
organisations to express their opinions on the current situation and
to suggest measures and actions for reducing undeclared work and
employment. Principal suggestions to the Commission and to the
Tax Administration were to strengthen inspections and to impose
financial discipline on those employers that use undeclared work
and employment and evade tax payments, since this represents
unfair competition. Some of the opinions and suggestions were
accepted by the Commission and are already mentioned in this text.
At the same time it was pointed out that more information about the
consequences of undeclared work and employment on employers,
employees and the unemployed is needed.
In the year 2003 the Commission and the Ministry of Labour,
Family and Social Affairs organised seven regional workshops to
exchange the experiences of many supervisory bodies and to
strengthen the co-ordination between them on a local level.
Conclusions
Despite considerable efforts and some success in tackling
undeclared work and employment, the estimated share of this
employment is still relatively high compared to the situation in the
majority of European countries. There are still many areas where
improvement is both possible and necessary.
Some recommended improvements include:
Firstly, a reliable indicator of the scale of undeclared work and
employment in the Slovenian economy should be created.
Secondly, the efficiency of the judicial system and tax
administration should be enhanced. Problems with the high number
of cases that have fallen under the Statute of Limitations and a lack
of financial discipline amongst some economic subjects have not
only had a financial effect on the country’s budget, but also on the
country’s morale.This issue devaluates the work and efforts of many
supervisory bodies and gives the impression to potential offenders
that there are more advantages (such as profit) than disadvantages
(fines) in becoming involved in undeclared work and employment.
Finally, more efforts should be put into informing the public about
activities to reduce the undeclared work and employment, and
about the consequences of the undeclared work and employment
for the society.
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Slovak Republic
Introduction
Undeclared work has been an important element of the Slovak
labour market over the past few decades. The presence of this
phenomenon, which in Slovakia is most often referred to as “black
or illicit work”, is partly based on the motivation of labour market
actors to earn more money or attain higher profit1.Being involved in
undeclared work brings benefits including lower costs associated
with the non-reporting of productive activities, tax and payroll tax
evasion, and infringement of related legal and administrative rules.
Until now no legislation has existed to define and regulate
undeclared work in Slovakia. A special law on illicit work is
currently under preparation by the Ministry of Labour, Social
Affairs and Family (MOLSaF). The draft Act on Illicit Work and
Illicit Employment was submitted for an inter-ministerial review
process in mid-June 20042. MOLSaF has as yet not specified a date
when the law should become effective3.
The main aim of the Act is to decrease undeclared labour and
facilitate the regulation of employees and employers at workplaces
by competent inspection authorities. The Act defines two categories
– illicit work and illicit employment – which are prohibited under
the law. Illicit employment is specified as a situation:
• when an employer employers somebody without an employment
contract or other legal relationship specified by separate law;
• when an employer does not fulfil his/her obligation to report this
employment to the Social Insurance Agency or health insurance
company;
• when an employer employs a foreign worker who has no work
permit and no temporary residence permit for employment
purposes.
Illicit work is defined similarly. According to the draft Act, illicit
work occurs;
• when a person carries out work for an employer without a
concluded employment relationship (employment contract or
other legal relationship specified by separate law);
• when a foreigner works without a work permit and without a
temporary residence permit for employment purposes;
• when a job applicant does not fulfil his/her obligation to report
to the labour office.
The most relevant existing definition of undeclared work can be
taken from the Agreement on co-operation in co-ordination and
execution of illicit work inspection (so-called 12-Agreement)4. The
objective of the Agreement is collaboration of involved institutions
in disclosing:
• employers who employ persons without a concluded
employment relationship in written form, and pay remuneration
for work without ensuring payment of income tax, social
contributions for health insurance, sickness insurance, pension
security and unemployment insurance;
• persons working without a concluded employment relationship
in written form, persons registered in unemployment records
who perform individual gainful activity;
• persons who carry out entrepreneurial activities without relevant
certification of entrepreneurship;
• foreigners who are employed in the Slovak Republic without a
work permit and residence permit for employment purposes.
In fact, the definition of illicit work proposed in the above-
mentioned draft Act corresponds with the specification of the
content of the 12-Agreement. In the context of these documents,
illicit work is regarded as unlawful because it is not reported to the
1 It is believed that there is a dual motivation of employers to engage in undeclared work in Slovakia. While some people work in the informal economy to seek
additional/higher income, others work unlawfully merely to survive and pay for basic necessities (or pay back debts), being unable to access employment in the official
labour market. On the part of the employers, a driving factor is the effort to decrease labour costs and avoid administrative restrictions.
2 At present (August 2004), comments received on the draft Act on Illicit work and Illicit Employment are being processed. This information is therefore based on the
wording of the draft Act.
3 It should be noted that a law on illicit work was drafted in the first half of 2002, but the legislative process came to a halt after the law was negotiated at Government
level in September 2002, prior to the parliamentary election. The Act was one of the tasks set down by the Government Resolution No. 366/2001, which included a
set of measures focused on fighting illicit work by means of improved labour inspection (amended Act on Labour Inspection), changes in the Labour Code and the
Act on Employment. The tasks were accomplished only partially.
4 The 12-Agreement was signed in April 2000 by the following institutions: National Labour Office (note: since 1 January 2004, transformed to Headquarters of
Labour, Social Affairs and Family), Social Insurance Agency, and health insurance companies. The agreement was effective till 31 December 2002.Autumn 2004 |  European Employment Observatory Review 165
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relevant public institutions. This interpretation concurs with the EU
concept of undeclared work,which understands undeclared work to
be “paid activities that are lawful as regards their nature, but are not
declared to the public authorities, taking into account the
differences in the regulatory system between Member States5.A
recent report published by the EU Commission uses a slightly
amended definition, where “productive activities”is used instead of
“paid activities”, meaning that certain unpaid activities can be
productive and regarded as unlawful when not declared (EC, 2004).
As undeclared work is not included as one of the priority areas of
the EU acquis, national definitions and methods of dealing with
undeclared work differ significantly between the Member States.
Slovakia is at the stage of building up national legislation in this
area. Evaluations of the state of undeclared work in Slovakia, and
measures taken to combat undeclared work, draw attention to the
fact that the existing legal framework is unable to effectively combat
such activities. The number of disclosed cases of illicit work
suggests the low efficiency of regulatory mechanisms in this area.
The absence of a special law on illicit work, which would integrate
the different institutional, regulatory and other mechanisms
operating in this area, is also often highlighted.
However, relatively little attention is devoted to addressing the
reasons for unlawful behaviour on the labour market, i.e. the
prevention of undeclared work. A survey on undeclared work,
conducted among officials from tax offices, labour offices and trade
registers, confirms this fact: reinforced inspection of undeclared
work (38% of respondents) and stricter sanction against such
behaviour (26%) are considered more effective measures than
lowering the burden of taxes and social contributions (22%) and
support to entrepreneurship (14%) (Bednárik, Danihel and Sihelský,
2003).
There is a large degree of public awareness of the existence of illicit
work, coupled with a high degree of tolerance and acceptance that
this is as a common and even “skilful”way of improving one’s life.
This general attitude also influences political debate. National
policies, institutions, and legislation only address undeclared work
in a limited way. The protracted process of developing a special law
on illicit work from 2002 onwards is perhaps one example of the low
political priority given to combating undeclared work. However,
several new reforms implemented by the current Government6
across a wide range of policies have had a positive effect on the
transparency and applicability of labour and business legislation
and decreased the opportunities for misuse of the social system.
Undeclared work is not a topic currently receiving much attention
from the research community. There have been several attempts to
conceptualise and measure the informal economy and undeclared
labour in Slovakia, notably by researchers from public institutions
such as the Research Institute of Labour, Social Affairs and Family
(now Centre for Work and Family Studies) and INFOSTAT
(Institute of Informatics and Statistics). This research has as yet
only had limited impact on the policy process. Professional
organisations, employer associations, and trade unions have also
not been significantly involved in actively combating undeclared
work.
Prevalence of undeclared work in the economy
The phenomenon of undeclared work in Slovakia is apparently
more widespread than would be suggested by the level of
importance given to this issue in the political debate. Given the
hidden nature of undeclared work, it is perhaps understandable that
there is no precise information on the scale of the problem.
Available estimates vary due to the different definitions and
methods applied.
One nationally-applied methodology is labour force balancing,
which is used by INFOSTAT as a subsidiary method for estimating
the hidden economy within the System of National Accounts. The
measurement is based on the comparison of numbers of employed
persons on the demand and supply sides. Demand is represented by
the volume of labour force in enterprises and institutions (using
reports from enterprises and trades people). Supply is represented
by data gathered directly from households within the Labour Force
Survey (LFS). LFS data on employment is more complex and it is
assumed that surveyed individuals have fewer restraints on
indicating the nature of their employment, even if it is hidden. Data
from the LFS is adjusted to properly reflect the real situation (e.g.
inclusion of persons living in so-called collective and institutional
households and those who come to work in Slovakia from abroad;
exclusion of persons working abroad; adjustments concerning
employees of embassies, persons on maternal leave, etc.). The
comparison of the two data sets shows that LFS data on employees
exceeds the number declared through the demand side by 171
thousand (2001). When adjusted to reflect methodological
differences, the estimate of undeclared labour decreases to 140
thousand persons (120 thousand in 2000). The comparison does not
include persons who might have a secondary job in the informal
sector. INFOSTAT acknowledges that further methodological
refinement of the measurement model is needed. (Bednárik,
Danihel and Sihelský, 2003)
The Research Institute of Labour, Social Affairs and Family has
estimated the size of hidden employment amongst the registered
unemployed at 66 to 71 thousand persons, representing 12.4-13.2%
of the total number of registered unemployed in 2000. The cost of
undeclared work, carried out by persons who at the same time
receive social benefits, is estimated at SKK 4 billion annually (100
million euro).7
The results of a joint regulatory action by MOLSaF, Ministry of
Interior, Ministry of Finance, Social Insurance Agency, National
Labour Office, and the National Labour Inspectorate, conducted in
2,929 organisations, served as the basis for a further estimate of
85,152 illegally employed persons8.
Table 1 gives an overview of attempts to quantify the level of
undeclared/illicit work in Slovakia.
This comparison of different estimates supports the fact that
caution is required when presenting unambiguous conclusions
about the scale of undeclared work. Available domestic and
international measurements suggest that Slovakia is a country with
relatively low levels of undeclared work, especially in the regional
context9. The estimated size of undeclared work in the country
ranges from 5 to 20% of total employment, reaching around 15% of
GDP. Since most of the existing estimates do not include persons
5 For more information see Communication of the Commission on undeclared work: http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/employment_analysis/work_comm_en.htm
6 The second Mikuláš Dzurinda Cabinet (October 2002 ongoing)
7 “Black work: People will get work IDs”. Pravda Daily, 18 June 2004
8 Source: Hajnovic ˘ová, V.: Estimation of illicit work in GDPmeasurement. Presentation at the Social Discussion Forum of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Bratislava, 25 June
2003.
9 Several international sources, although admitting limited comparability, rank Slovakia among countries with a lower level and decreasing share of undeclared work in
the context of Central and Eastern Europe (transition economies). See for example Schneider (2002) and EC (2004).166 Autumn 2004 |  European Employment Observatory Review
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with a secondary job in the informal sector (potentially a significant
number), the upper-bound estimates may be considered as a more
fitting picture of the actual situation.
The highest incidence of undeclared work is reported in sectors of
the economy with a high share of manual, seasonal and occasional
work. Such jobs are concentrated predominantly in the private
sector. The National Labour Inspectorate considers business
services, construction, agriculture and forestry to be the sectors with
the highest concentration of illicit work. According to the recent
Commission report on undeclared work (EC, 2004), construction
(with a 17% share of undeclared work on total employment in this
industry), trade (15%), hotels and restaurants (13%), transport
(9%), and the real estate and business services (6%) are the most
affected industrial sectors in Slovakia.
The above-mentioned questionnaire survey, conducted in tax
offices, labour offices, and trade registers gives an interesting
estimate of the profile of undeclared work in Slovakia (see Table 2).
The figures in the table would suggest that a typical picture of illicit
work in Slovakia would include an unemployed middle-aged person
with a lower level of educational attainment, who is undertaking
occasional work in the construction sector and/or small business.
The Slovak country study presented in the recent Commission
report on undeclared work (EC, 2004) specifies three main forms of
undeclared work in Slovakia:
• fully unregistered employees who are often formally unemployed
and take up seasonal or otherwise temporary jobs;
• partly unregistered employees who are registered as earning a
minimum wage, while in reality they have extra, cash earnings for
the same job (the employee may also have a part time contract,
while in reality they are working full time);
• self-employed people who undertake activities without a licence
or permits.
The National Labour Office points to the fact that undeclared work
mainly concerns entrepreneurs registered in the commercial register.
Undeclared employment in state enterprises, budgetary and
contributory organisations rarely occurs. However, it is thought that
Table 1:Summary of estimates of undeclared work in Slovakia
Source Year Definition/Methodological note Value
Notes:
1. Data provided by INFOSTAT/Statistical Office of the SR, published in EC (2004).
2. STAT Working Paper No. 1 – 2002: ILO compendium of official statistics on employment in the informal sector.
3. Schneider, F.: The Size and Development of the Shadow Economies of 22 Transition and 21 OECD Countries. IZA, Bonn (2002)
INFOSTAT 2001 Number of employees engaged in illicit work (labour  force
balancing, System of National Accounts)
140,000 (6.6% of total
employment)
Research Institute of
Labour, Social
Affairs and Family
2000 Number of registered unemployed who work “hidden” (expert
estimate based on questionnaire survey)
66-71,000 (12.4-13.2% of total
unemployed)
National Labour
Inspectorate
2000 Number of illegally employed persons (direct estimation method
based on survey)
85,152 (4.1% of total
employment)
European
Commission 1
2000 Share of undeclared work on GDP (combination of various
methods, e.g. enterprise surveys, household
surveys)
13-15%
ILO 2 1999 Individual entrepreneurs (small tradesmen) not registered in the
Business Register, and the persons employed by them (official
estimate)
450,000 (23% of total
employment)
F . Schneider 
(2002) 3
1998/1999 Shadow economy labour force (as % of working age population,
16-65 years) DYMIMIC method
16.3%
Table 2:Selected features of undeclared work in Slovakia (in % of answers)
Sector Percent 1 Type of work Percent Type of person Percent Qualification of person Percent Age of person Percent
Agriculture 41.0 Occasional 57.2 Unemployed 94.0 Without 11.4 - 25  6.0
Industry 13.9 Seasonal 38.6 Foreigner 1.8 Lower 81.2 25-35 59.0
Construction 96.4 Long-term 3.0 Employed 2 2.4 Medium 6.0 35-50 29.5
Transport 9.6 High – 50+ 0.6
Retail trade 54.2
Hotels, restaurants 48.2
Notes: Source: Bednárik – Danihel – Sihelsk´ y (2003)
1. Respondents could indicate three sectors.
2. Employed, who have a secondary job in the informal sector.
Respondents were officials from tax offices, labour offices and trade registers.Autumn 2004 |  European Employment Observatory Review 167
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the self-employed have a high tendency to get involved in illicit
work,and these groups are frequently registered with trade registers.
In addition, although undeclared work may not occur frequently in
the Government sector, state and public officials have the same
conditions and incentives to engage in informal activities, for
example in a secondary undeclared activity.
The prevalence of undeclared work in Slovakia has numerous
reasons and determinants, which are typical for most countries in
the region. The main factors influencing the phenomenon in
Slovakia include:
• Underdeveloped formal and informal rules –i.e. (a) in relation to
formal rules: unstable legal and institutional framework,
insufficient law enforcement, missing legal regulation of
undeclared work, low efficiency of labour inspection; (b) in
relation to informal rules: public tolerance and acceptance of
illicit activities, low trust in public institutions, insufficient
knowledge of negative effects of unreported activities,
discrepancy between what citizens expect to receive from public
goods and how much they are willing to contribute to its
financing;
• Economic and social transition – emergence of the private sector,
unbalanced economic development, insufficient job creation in
the formal sector, unstable legislation, non-transparent
privatisation, social uncertainty, legacy of socialism, corruption;
• State of business environment – high burden of taxes and social
contributions, administrative and procedural restrictions to
entry the formal sector (e.g. setting up of businesses, legal
restrictions on hiring and firing of employees);
• Labour market conditions – high unemployment, resulting in an
ample supply of a potential informal labour force;
• Social system – particularly the demotivating relation between
various social standards: average wage, minimum wage,
unemployment benefit, and the social assistance benefit (notably
in less developed regions with relatively low average wages),
leading to misuse of the social system and disincentives to take
up formal employment.
The influence of these factors is changing over time. To generalise, it
is apparent that “formal” factors (e.g. changes in labour and
business legislation, implementation of concrete policies to reduce
misuse of social transfers) tend to change more rapidly, while more
informal contextual factors change less frequently and require a
longer time to develop (e.g. tolerance and lack of concern regarding
undeclared employment).
Tables 3 and 4 give an insight into the motives which lead employers
to make use of illicit work and employees to carry it out, using data
from Bednárik, Danihel and Sihelský, 2003.
The tables confirm that employers are motivated to take on
undeclared employees mainly to reduce or avoid high labour costs
and administrative restrictions. They are also able to take advantage
of a large supply of mostly unemployed persons who are willing to
carry out undeclared work to create an income for themselves or to
supplement their existing income.
Measures taken to combat undeclared work
Combating undeclared work is not a top political priority in the
Slovak Republic. It is dealt with in a rather fragmentary manner by
policies aimed primarily at addressing issues of broader significance
(unemployment, abuse of social system, reform of social insurance
and pensions, business environment improvement) and measures
that focus directly on restriction of undeclared work (control,
sanctions). What is missing is an integrated strategy to combat
undeclared work by means of legislation, institutions and policies,
covering both prevention and restriction.
Existing measures that directly or indirectly seek to combat
undeclared work in Slovakia can be divided into two main
categories: preventive tools and restrictive tools.
Preventive tools
Preventive tools include policies and measures supporting the
creation of an environment that is favourable to the declaration of
economic activity in both the demand and supply sides. Several
important reforms have been implemented and/or launched over the
last two years in this area.
Perhaps most noteworthy is the complex tax reform, which
introduced a 19% flat tax rate for all corporate and individual
income. The new Income Tax Act10 abolished progressive taxation of
individuals, removed tax bands ranging from 10 to 38%, and
decreased the corporate tax rate of 25%. The Act also abolished a
large number of tax exemptions and tax benefits and introduced a
new system of higher deductible items, resulting in no taxpayer
having to pay higher taxes than before the change (including the
lowest income groups). According to the opinion of independent
experts, the relatively low tax rate and simple tax system will bring
new vigour to the economy, supporting healthy economic growth,
rendering stimuli for local business and foreign investment,
Table 3:Incentives leading employers to illicit employment
Incentive Answer (in %)
Excessive labour costs in relation to productivity 39.8
Fierce competition 5.4
High social security contributions costs 91.0
Dependence of entrepreneur on dominant producer 3.6
Large supply of “black” labour 58.4
Low qualification of labour 7.8
Local restrictions on activity 10.8
Barriers on setting up business 4.8
Administrative restrictions, burden of legal norms 35.5
Note: Respondents were officials from tax offices, labour offices and trade
registers.
Source: Bednárik – Danihel – Sihelsk´ y (2003)
Table 4:Incentives leading employees to illicit work
Incentive Answer (in %)
Increase of income 69.9
Debt pay-off 6.0
High tax burden 6.0
Struggle to survive 69.9
To live freely and independently 2.4
Note: Respondents were officials from tax offices, labour offices and trade
registers.
Source: Bednárik, Danihel and Sihelsk´ y (2003)
10 Act of the NC SR No. 595/2003 Coll. on income tax, effective as from 1 January 2004.168 Autumn 2004 |  European Employment Observatory Review
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increasing motivation to work, and discouraging taxpayers from tax
evasion. (Zachar, 2004)
The new Act on Social Insurance11 introduced substantial changes to
the PAYG12 pension scheme. Among the most important is the
increased link between contributions and benefits where, contrary
to the previous system13, the rule “the higher the contribution, the
higher the pension” is applied. The new pension scheme should
motivate people to work in the formal sector. The reform also
brought a new division of social security contributions to various
funds and a decrease of the overall rate paid by employers by
approximately 3% (+0.6% for employees).
The strategy of promoting employment growth through changes in the
social system and labour market14 outlined a new concept of social
and labour market policy, based on the following principles:
• Reducing disincentive effects caused by the tax and payroll tax
burden (pension and healthcare reform);
• Strengthening motivation of the individual to find and retain a
job (this should also lead to transfer of a part of undeclared
activities into the formal sector);
• Increasing labour market flexibility (flexibility of employment
relations, simplified administrative procedures related to
payment of taxes and social contributions);
• Improving efficiency of state administration and services in the
labour market and social affairs (including gradual
decentralisation of the social agenda to administrators who have
a better knowledge of who is in need and who is misusing the
system);
• Reducing social system abuse (surveillance and sanction of
undeclared work carried out by the registered unemployed,abuse
of social assistance, etc.).
The amended Labour Code15 has improved the flexibility of
employment relations, mainly through giving both parties the right
to more flexibly conclude and terminate an employment
relationship and by deregulating working time. The law also
abolished a special type of temporary work contract (the so-called
“work activity agreement”), which was suspected of being abused
for undeclared activities. In a survey conducted among businesses,
the Labour Code was evaluated as clearly beneficial to the business
environment because of improved flexibility and applicability. The
respondents said that the law partially stimulates the creation of
new jobs. However, the contribution to the elimination of
undeclared work is relatively insignificant.16 The National Labour
Inspectorate points to the fact that an employment contract does
not always have to be concluded in a written form, which leaves
room for illicit employment. Also, the special form of short-term
contract (the so-called “work performance agreement”) is suspected
of being misused for undeclared work as there is no obligation to
keep records of hours worked as it is the case with a regular
employment contract.
Two recent legislative measures are expected to positively influence
the business environment: the Act on Business Register17 and the
amended Act on Trade Register18. Both legal norms significantly
simplify and speed up the process of new business registration,
entering changes and deleting records in the registers. The Business
Register will administer applications within a fixed term of five
working days, the Trade Register within seven days (30 days for
licensed trade). Insufficiently defined rules in the past led to
intentional obstructions and gave rise to widespread corruption.
The legislative changes should increase transparency and facilitate
the entry of new businesses into the market. (Zachar, 2004)
Amendments of the Act on Social Assistance19 aim towards the
better targeting of social assistance and reduction of its abuse.
However, some experts believe that lowering social assistance
benefits for people without a working income may not result in an
increased motivation to work; instead, it may lead to a higher
motivation to take up illicit activities, particularly for people with
low education levels. These experts feel that other methods would be
more effective, such as providing support for the creation of new job
opportunities and lowering social contributions for part-time
workers.
Restrictive tools
Restrictive tools primarily involve measures to detect, stop and
penalise existing examples of undeclared work.
The  Act on Labour Inspection20 specifies competencies in the
National Labour Inspectorate (NLI) and local labour inspectorates
in the area of supervising compliance with labour laws governing
the creation, amendment and termination of legal relations,
working conditions of employees, provisions for securing safety and
health protection at work and provision of wages. The Act specifies
obligations of employers, entrepreneurs and employees towards the
labour inspectorate and the authorisation of the inspectorate to
impose penalties for violation of these laws.These include,inter alia,
the obligation of the employer to notify in writing regarding
commencement of activities, to enable free access of inspectors to
the workplace and create conditions for a swift inspection,to submit
upon request the identity of persons present at his/her workplace
and documents proving a labour relation to such persons. Any
person present at the workplace of an employer is obliged to prove
his/her identity and explain the reason for such presence at the
workplace.However,as reality shows,it is not difficult for employers
and employees who engage in undeclared activities to avoid
sanction. In many cases it is not possible for the inspector to prove
that a person is not just helping out a friend (e.g. at a construction
site). The NLI admits that such a form of work is not considered to
be illicit work.21 The Labour Inspectorate has recently issued an
informative brochure, which aims to draw the attention of
employers and employees to the negative consequences of
undeclared work.22
11 Act of the NC SR No. 461/2003 Coll. on social insurance, effective as from 1 January 2004 (certain provisions as from Slovakia’s accession to the EU).
12 Pay-As-You-Go scheme, first pillar of pension system, administered by the Social Insurance Agency.
13 Within the previous PAYG system even major differences in the amount of social contributions paid resulted only in minute differences in the pensions, which
motivated employers to pay just a small portion of wages officially (e.g. minimum wage) and the rest unofficially.
14 Document submitted by the Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Family, was adopted by the Government of the SR in July 2003.
15 Act of the NC SR No. 311/2001 Coll. Labour Code, effective as from 1 July 2003, as amended.
16 Business Alliance of Slovakia, survey conducted in the 4th quarter of 2003, published on 16 February 2004.
http://www.alianciapas.sk/pas/menu_pravidelne_nazory_pas_160204.htm 
17 Act of the NC SR No. 530/2003 Coll. on business register, effective as from 1 February 2004.
18 Act of the NC SR No. 455/1991 Coll. on trade licence entrepreneurship, effective as from 16 June 2004, as amended.
19 Act of the NC SR No. 195/1998 Coll. on social assistance, as amended.
20 Act of the NC SR No. 95/2000 Coll. on labour inspection and on the amendment and supplement to selected laws, effective as from 1 July 2000 (certain provisions as
from 1 July 2001).Autumn 2004 |  European Employment Observatory Review 169
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The forthcoming Act on illicit work and illicit employment (see also
the introduction to this article) will nominate the labour
inspectorates as the competent authority to carry out surveillance
over illicit work and illicit employment. The special law requires the
amendment of several related laws, including the Labour Code, Act
on Labour Inspection, Act on Social Insurance, Act on Employment
Services. The most important changes in these laws concern
improvements in the mutual co-operation of competent bodies in
combating illicit work, the setting of penalties for illicit work (up to
SKK 10,000 for a naturalised person, up to SKK 1 million for a
legal immigrant; 250 euro and 25,000 euro, respectively) and the
introduction of work identification cards23.
The Act on employment services 24 specifies, inter alia, the obligation
of registered unemployed people to actively search for jobs and
produce evidence for this. Stricter conditions of unemployment
support provision and the new rules of co-operation between the
labour offices and unemployed people have led to a mass de-
registration of unemployed people from the records. It is thought
that many of those who became excluded from the register due to
non-cooperation with the labour office (66 thousand persons in
2003, representing approximately 15% of the total number of de-
registered unemployed) were actually engaged in undeclared
activities. This undeclared labour may have included persons who
worked some distance from their permanent residence (e.g. abroad)
and thus were unable to present themselves regularly at the
respective labour office, and also those for whom the new rules
decreased the motivation to work in the informal sector.25
The NLI and the Headquarters of Labour, Social Affairs and
Family (former National Labour Office) have signed an Agreement
on co-operation in combating illicit work. Based on a written notice
from the National Labour Inspectorate, the labour offices exclude
from the unemployment register persons who have carried out work
without an employment contract.
The programme of community service jobs, realised in 2000-2001
with the aim to decrease long-term unemployment, had an
important side effect: the ex-post evaluation of this programme
suggests that the public works were more efficient in disclosing illicit
work than controls by the labour offices. The labour office provided
mayors of the municipalities with lists of long-term unemployed
recipients of social assistance benefits and asked the mayors to
identify those who had expressed an interest to participate in
community work.The mayors could then identify those who worked
unlawfully. This was mainly relevant to small municipalities where
people live in less anonymity.
Other authorities which have the competency to supervise
compliance with declarations of economic activity within their field
of operation include labour offices, the Social Insurance Agency,
health insurance companies, tax authorities, trade licensing offices,
and the police force. The total number of disclosed cases of illicit
work26 suggests that existing control mechanisms are unable to
significantly reduce the size of the problem. The NLI detected 145
cases in 2003.Table 5 gives an overview of accomplished inspections
of illicit work during the first half of 2004.
There is no reliable estimate of the number of foreign people
engaged in undeclared work in Slovakia.27 Published cases mainly
concerned illicit workers from the Ukraine and the Balkans. During
the first half of 2004, the Police Corps detected 25 cases of illegal
residents and 48 people were expelled from the country due to
violation of the rules of residence.
Conclusions 
Undeclared work is an omnipresent problem in Slovakia. There are
multiple reasons behind its existence, which reflect economic and
social conditions and the formal and informal rules and regulations
that operate in Slovakian society. The estimated scale of the
phenomenon, its consequences for society, and current measures to
address it suggest that policies are needed which recognise the
importance of combating undeclared work in an integrated manner.
Our recommendations to reduce the problem include:
21 “Do you want to work ‘ black’?” SME daily, 17 August 2004
22 http://icop.safework.gov.sk/nip/publikacie/chces_pracovat_nacierno.pdf
23 The work IDs will be issued by the Social Insurance Agency to every employed and registered unemployed by end of 2006. The card will contain precise data on
employment, payment of social security contributions, whether the person is registered as unemployed and/or receiving social assistance. People will be obliged upon
request to present the card to inspectors. The Ministry of Labour expects the cards to become an efficient tool in fighting undeclared work.
24 Act of the NC SR No. 5/2004 Coll. on employment services, as amended, which substitutes the Act on employment.
25 As from 1 February 2004, a differentiated periodicity of reporting to the offices was introduced: long-term unemployed who are not involved in any activity, will have
to present themselves at the office every seven days; unemployed, involved in programmes and activities organised by the office, will have to report monthly; for other
applicants the 14 days periodicity remains.
26 Not included are insurance companies and labour offices.
27 Act of the NC SR No. 48/2002 on stay of aliens and on the amendment and supplement to selected laws regulates terms of entry and stay of foreign citizens in
Slovakia, including different permits. The Act on employment services regulates employment of foreigners.
28 1 SKK = 0.026 euro
Table 5:Results of controlling illicit work (1st half of 2004)
Institution Number of inspections Detected cases of illicit work Imposed penalties Amount of penalties (in SKK)28
National Labour Inspectorate 2,551 69 20 1,246,600
Trade licensing offices 12,996 225 5,833,700
Police Corps 961 36 37 0
Tax offices 786 7 0 0
Ministry of Health 8 0 0 0
Total 17,302 337 - 7,080,300
Source: Report on illicit work in the 1st half of 2004. (Draft document). National Labour Inspectorate, Bratislava, August 2004.170 Autumn 2004 |  European Employment Observatory Review
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In the area of prevention:
• decrease social security contributions to further reduce tax;
• simplify and integrate the obligation to report to different public
institutions;
• further simplify administrative procedures necessary to enter the
market, particularly for tradespersons;
• attempt to incorporate informal workers into the formal sector
by granting them a transitional period;
• consider support of micro-credit schemes for low-income
groups;
• decentralise competencies to local governments, which have
better knowledge of local problems;
• raise public awareness of the effects of undeclared work.
In terms of restriction:
• evaluate efficiency of labour inspection from a cost-benefit
perspective and promote successful methods;
• import good practices from abroad;
• refine and supplement existing legislation to make it more
applicable to the fight against undeclared activities (e.g. through
a special law on illicit work and illicit employment);
• improve data sharing and exchange of information between
competent authorities;
• involve different stakeholders (e.g. businesses, trade unions,
insurance companies) in the drafting and implementing of
measures;
• further develop and improve the measurement of undeclared
work.
Lubos Vagac
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Finland
Introduction
The Finnish Government’s interest in the prevention of economic
criminality and black economy stems from the 1990s, when Finland
experienced its deepest recession of the century. Concern about the
informal economy and its negative effects on society surfaced and
have remained a concern of government programmes ever since.
In 1996, the government of Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen made a
decision-in-principle on the first Action Programme for the
prevention of black economy and economic crime. It included
measures to increase surveillance and sanctions, measures that
raised the risk of being caught, as well as research and information
campaigns. Legislative changes were made accordingly and
resources for investigation of economic crimes were increased. The
focus was on preventative measures, established through
collaboration between different authorities.1 To continue this work,
the government made another decision-in-principle on the second
Action Programme for the prevention of black economy and
economic crime in 1998.
In 2001, the second government of Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen
launched the third Action Programme targeting economic crime for
2001-5. The aim of the programme is to substantially reduce
opportunities to commit economic crimes and to operate in the
black economy and therefore to minimise the damages economic
crimes cause. The programme focuses on the prevention of harmful
practices that have a negative effect on public financing and on
economic life.
As part of government policy, a nationwide development project to
develop co-operation between public authorities against the black
economy called VIRKE2 was launched for 2000-5. In 2002, at the
request of the Parliamentary State Auditors, VIRKE published a
report on the situation of the black economy in Finland.3 In the
report, the black economy is defined as “economic activity that is
lawful as regards to its nature, but is not declared to public authorities
in order to avoid paying taxes and fees related to this activity”. This
can be called a fiscal definition of black economy. Compared with
the definition of undeclared workby Renooy et al (2004),the Finnish
definition of the black economy is broader, including economic
activities that are not directly related to labour such as double billing
in foreign trade and income from international capital investments
that have not been declared to public authorities. According to
Finnish legislation, if undeclared work is being performed in
enterprises, it fulfils the characteristics of economic crime, even
though the work as such is lawful.
In the public debate not only undeclared work but also illegal work
has been a general concern. In particular, both the government and
social partners have been concerned about illegal foreign workers
that EU enlargement may bring about. At the beginning of 2004, as
a response to this concern, a new body was set up at the National
Bureau of Investigation, the purpose of which is to control the use
of illegal foreign labour.
1 Parliamentary State Auditors (2002).
2 VIRKE comes from the initials from the Finnish name for the development programme (Viranomaisyhteistyön kehittämisprojekti).
3 Viranomaisyhteistyön kehittämisprojekti (2002).Autumn 2004 |  European Employment Observatory Review 171
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Prevalence of undeclared work in the economy
In 1994, the Ministry of Finance nominated a working group on the
prevention of black economy. In the final report of this working
group, the size of undeclared work in Finland was estimated to be
4.2% of GDP in 1992 which, according to the tax authorities,
corresponded to 80,000 person-years of labour.4 In 1971 it was
estimated that the black economy corresponded to 5% of GDP and
in the beginning of the 1980s to 7% of GDP. In 2002, VIRKE
estimated that the share of the black economy has remained at the
1992 levels, which amounts approximately to 5 billion euro
annually.5
The main sectors in which undeclared work takes place in Finland
are construction, the restaurant sector, transport, shipyard industry
and cleaning work.Of these,construction and restaurant sectors are
the most prominent. In shipyard industry and cleaning work the
share of foreign labour and subcontractors has been on the rise.
It has been estimated that 9% to 16% of production in the
construction sector was undeclared in 1998, corresponding to EUR
500-840 million in the value of production. The share remained at
roughly the same level between 1995 and 1999. It was equivalent to
17,000-23,000 person-years of labour in 1998. Work in construction
is heavily male-dominated.
Undeclared work in construction is common in building one-family
and holiday houses and in renovations that households have
ordered. However, the bulk of the informal economic activity in the
construction industry takes place in the chains of sub-contractors
on large building sites. It has reportedly become common practice
for these companies to forge receipts and outsourcing contracts in
order not to disclose the true amount of work performed at their
sites. This allows them to pay part of the wages illicitly.
Currently, there are no estimates of the overall involvement of legal
or illegal immigration in undeclared work in Finland. In the
construction industry, the Finnish Construction Trade Union
suspects that only half of the estimated 9,000-10,000 foreign
workers are working legally. The estimate of the Confederation of
Finnish Construction Industries is, however, lower even as regards
the legally working foreigners and the employers do not want to give
an estimate of the amount of illegal workers.6
In the restaurant sector the share of the informal economic activity
(in 1999) has been estimated to account for over 21% of production,
which corresponds to 330 million euro as hidden wages and is
equivalent to over 18,000 person-years of labour. The hidden
income of self-employed entrepreneurs increases the total share of
undeclared labour by 50-100 million euro in the restaurant sector.In
1995, the undeclared labour in the restaurant sector was about 200
million euro corresponding to less than 20% of its production.7 The
restaurant sector is female dominated.
The main forms of black economy in the restaurant sector are
hidden wages that undeclared sales of food and alcohol have made
possible. Also, social security payments are left unpaid and
entrepreneurial income may partly be hidden. According to a recent
study, the hidden income of entrepreneurs increased in the 1990s.8
In 1999, the average hourly wages for entrepreneurs in the
restaurant sector was estimated to be 3.9 euro, while an average
wage-earner received 9.7 euro per hour. In 1993, the corresponding
figures were much closer to one another; 5.7 euro compared to 8.1
euro.
In the restaurant sector there are firms that have not registered with
the tax authorities and systematically fail to fill in tax forms and pay
their taxes.Bankruptcies are commonly used to avoid taxes and,due
to this, the turnover of the firms is quite high in this sector. The bulk
of black economy in the restaurant sector is in restaurants offering
fast food or beer but, according to VIRKE, the growing number of
ethnic restaurants is becoming a problematic group as well.
In transport the black economy is concentrated in road transport, in
taxis and in charted bus transports. It has been estimated that the
black economy in road transport was 100-150 million euro in 1994,
and 50 million euro in 1996. According to VIRKE, this drop in the
black economy is partly artificial. Part of the Finnish-owned firms
in road transport have now been registered in Russia. The Finnish
tax authorities have also found quite systematic concealment of
incomes in the taxi business.
There is some scattered information on the share of black economy
in other industries. In business services there is information on
technical services, in which it has been estimated that the amount of
the black economy is 15-85 million euro annually. In education and
training the corresponding amount has been estimated to be 15
million euro, and in barbers and hairdressers 15-50 million euro,
which corresponds to one quarter of the turnover in this industry.9
Measures to combat undeclared work
Legal and administrative environment for businesses
In 2002, there were about 230,000 enterprises in Finland. The
majority (99%) of enterprises were SMEs with under 50 employees,
and 93% employed less than 10 people. About 44% of all company
employees worked in SMEs. The promotion of entrepreneurship
has been an important target in the past and present government
programmes.
In 2000, the second government of Prime Minister Lipponen
launched an Entrepreneurship project. It involved about 120
concrete measures. These focused on the crucial stages in a
company’s lifecycle, e.g. market functioning, how to become an
entrepreneur, the critical years of a company and corporate growth.
In particular, it focused on diminishing administrative burdens on
entrepreneurship. It was believed that excessive bureaucracy formed
obstacles to corporate growth, to hiring new employees, and to
founding new companies.10
In order to lighten the administrative burden, a new Companies Act
was introduced, making it easier to found companies and enabling
shareholders to make unanimous decisions without formal
meetings. A new Company and Organisation Register enables
companies to submit data concerning their founding, address
change and dissolution to the registers of several authorities
4 Finnish Ministry of Finance (1995); see also Renooy et al (2004). This estimate was based on the comparison of studies on working time and earnings, and it was
corrected according to expert assessments.
5 Lith (1997).
6 Kuusisto (2004a).
7 Parliamentary State Auditors (2002).
8 Lith (2002).
9 Parliamentary State Auditors (2002).
10 Finland’s National Action Plan (NAP) for Employment 2002.172 Autumn 2004 |  European Employment Observatory Review
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through one notification. In the amendments to the Accounting
Act, the criteria concerning turnover and balance sheet total for
small companies legally required to keep accounting record have
been almost doubled. These changes have made it easier for small
companies to submit information on the profit and loss account,
balance sheet and other information. Small limited-liability
companies have been entirely exempted from having to draw up a
separate annual report.
It was further decided that, to support the founding of new
companies and to operations of existing companies, at least 50
regional business service points will be set up in 2002-7. The service
points will combine the advisory and development services of
central and local government and enterprise agencies.
In 2003, the government of Prime Minister Vanhanen launched its
own Entrepreneurship Policy programme. The main objectives of
this programme are to safeguard a stable and predictable
operational environment for enterprises and to ensure that the
resources available for promotion of entrepreneurship in various
administrative branches will be utilised to the full. According to this
programme, the aim of promoting entrepreneurship will be taken
into consideration in preparing new legislation. The Ministry of
Trade and Industry will systematically monitor preparation of new
legislation from an entrepreneurial perspective.
According to this programme, the publicly-funded business
advisory services will focus on improving business management
skills of SMEs. The Employment and Economic Development
Centres will start a programme for drawing up business plans.
Furthermore, the system of start-up grants will be improved. In
2004, to reduce bureaucracy and to make it easier for occasional
employers and small companies to deal with their employer
obligations, an Internet payment system is being set up. In 2006, a
“tax account system”will be introduced, which enables companies
to combine their main tax payments and to minimise actual
payments and notifications.
Over the next decade, several tens of thousands of entrepreneurs
will be giving up their business operations due to ageing. In 2004, to
support the generation change, the government has reduced the tax
payable in generation change.
The government has also made changes to the value-added tax to
promote growth of the smallest companies. As of the beginning of
2004, a gradual scale will be introduced to VAT liability, under
which VAT reduction will decrease as turnover grows in scale,
ranging from zero at a net turnover of 8,500 euro to full VAT at a net
turnover of 25,000 euro.
Strengthening incentives to declare work
Finland’s labour market can be characterised by a low number of
labour-intensive jobs requiring only a low level of expertise and
training. As a result of the progression of labour costs, low-skilled
jobs have been the first to become unprofitable. In 1996, the
government initiated “incentive trap”reforms to improve the appeal
of these jobs. As a result, the threshold salaries for those on
minimum benefits and for unemployed persons living alone have
dropped,making it economically more feasible to seek employment.
The government is determined to improve incentives for being both
an employee and an employer, particularly in low-productivity
sectors. Decisions on tax subsidies for low-pay fields will be
prepared during 2004 for introduction in the budget for 2005. The
tax wedge in low-pay fields will be decreased by cutting the income
taxes of low-income earners and by cutting employer
contributions.11
To increase supply of labour for the low-income earners, the
government will raise the maximum amount of work-related
deduction and earned income deduction in municipal taxation. The
earned income deduction and similar deductions in municipal
taxation will also be increased. The tax relief that will be carried out
will narrow the tax wedge for a low-income earner by about one
percentage point to 50% in 2004. The tax wedge on labour has
already narrowed by 5.5 percentage points since the mid-1990s.12
In 2003, the tax deduction allowed for household service work was
increased to 1,100 euro per year (from 900 euro in 2002) as part of
the comprehensive incomes policy settlement at the beginning of
2003. This deduction can be made for household work, care work,
and repairs and renovations on a home or leisure dwelling. A
household can deduct either the social security contributions on the
household worker’s pay or 40% of the wages paid if services are
bought from a company.
The household work deduction was launched in 1997 as a
temporary experiment. The system was made permanent in 2001. It
has been estimated that the household work deduction has had a
positive impact on employment and has reduced undeclared work.
New small companies, co-operatives and associations providing
household services have emerged to provide these services. Since the
introduction of household work deduction, increasing numbers of
households have started to claim it (Table 1). In 2002, the number of
households claiming this deduction was increased almost fivefold
compared to their number in 1998.
Strengthening surveillance 
In Finland, both the government and social partners have been
concerned about clandestine labour. In particular, social partners
have been active in construction and hotels and restaurants in which
undeclared labour has been used more extensively than in other
sectors.
Government actions
The action to combat black economy and economic crime has been
stepped up in Finland in recent years. The government has regularly
11 Finland’s National Action Plan (NAP) for Employment 2003.
12 Finland’s National Action Plan (NAP) for Employment 2003.
Table 1:. The use of household work deduction 1997-2002
1997, 3 months 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Number of households 4,600 19,300 24,000 31,500 73,800 89,500
Deduction, 1,000 euro 656 7,972 10,007 13,606 32,571 42,514
Source: The Finnish tax administration (2002).Autumn 2004 |  European Employment Observatory Review 173
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approved programmes for this purpose. It continues to further
measures to fight the black economy and economic crime, primarily
by improving co-operation between authorities. One of the aims of
the VIRKE project (on co-operation between public authorities
against black economy) is to suggest how this work should be
organised in Finland in future.
The government emphasises that to help in fighting black economy,
the working conditions of foreign workers should be monitored
more efficiently. It aims at using the following means to do this:
• Promoting co-operation between authorities;
• Rectifying shortcomings in the legislation that make monitoring
difficult (Act on Equality, Penal Code, Act on Employment
Contracts, Aliens Act and Act on the Supervision of
Occupational Safety and Health and Appeal in Occupational
Safety and Health Matters);
• Increasing information provision to foreign workers;
• Adding more efficient monitoring of the working conditions of
foreign workers to the programme to combat the black economy.
According to VIRKE, the tax administration has a central role in
combating black economy in Finland. However, the efforts of tax
administration are by no means regarded enough. For the fight
against undeclared economy to be successful, co-operation of
several authorities (police, prosecutors, enforcement authorities,
customs etc.) is required.13
The chosen line to rely on co-operation between different
authorities has been deemed in Finland more efficient than the
establishment of a separate organisation, the purpose of which is to
tackle the informal economy (as has been done in some other
Nordic countries). It is regarded that the complexity of undeclared
work makes it difficult for one organisation to fully tackle it.
However, there has been a growing need to put more resources on
the surveillance of undeclared economy in Finland. At the
beginning of 2004,a new body employing nine workers was set up at
the National Bureau of Investigation (KRP) to control the use of
illegal foreign labour.The new body is temporary but it is hoped that
it will be made permanent in 2005. The Ministry of the Interior has
noted that the resources for preventing economic crime have been
cost effective in Finland. In 2002, each person-year of labour to
prevent economic crimes has yielded 112,000 euro for the
government and society.
Efforts by social partners
The prospective influx of foreign temporary agency workers has
caused concern among Finnish trade unions. The Central
Organisation of Finnish Trade Unions (SAK) and some of its
affiliates have expressed their fears that employment agencies may,
unlawfully, pay their workers wages that are below those agreed in
Finnish collective agreements.They also worry that the enforcement
of labour standards will be inadequate. The Service Union United
(PAM) has pointed out that advertisements of a temporary
employment agency offering underpaid labour have already been
circulating among some service sector undertakings. According to
the TNS Gallup survey, 27% of Estonians would agree to take up
illicit work if they worked in Finland.14
Several steps have been taken in Finland in order to increase the
control over illegal foreign labour. As mentioned above, a separate
unit has been established at KRP to this end. Among labour market
organisations, SAK has demanded that foreign-based temporary
employment agencies should be required to register with the Finnish
tax administration and disclose any information about wages. SAK
has also negotiated with two employers’ organisations, the
Employers’Confederation of Service Industries and its affiliate, the
Private Employment Agencies Association (HPL) on how to curb
illegal employment. The three of them agreed that contracts
between HPL-affiliated temporary employment agencies and their
customers will include collectively agreed terms and conditions of
employment. Consequently, in cases of ‘social dumping’15,a n
employment agency can be held responsible for a breach of contract
and its payments can be frozen.
The Finnish Construction Trade Union on the employee side and
the Confederation of Finnish Construction Industries on the
employer side have been actively seeking to curb illicit activities in
the construction industry. They have agreed bilaterally that:16
• Companies must demand proof of payment of tax and pension
contributions from prospective contractors when they call for
tenders. If these payments have not been met, it is justifiable to
reject a bid;
• Information about contracts must be delivered quarterly to the
tax administration;
• Electronic pass systems must be used for workers and contractors
at building sites.
It appears that in assessing the state of the black economy, the
electronic pass system has proved the most effective of the measures
in the construction industry. It has made it possible to monitor all
contractors and workers at building sites effectively. As a result,
illicit activity is now easier to detect. The other two agreed measures
have not been so successful. By setting up a new firm with a clean
record, breaches of tax and pension contribution payments can be
easily hidden. It is very easy to establish a new company and this is
commonly done in the construction industry.
Furthermore, the Finnish Construction Trade Union has
unilaterally conducted inspections of building sites in order to
gather details of outsourced firms and their adherence to collective
agreements. It has forwarded this information to the tax authorities.
In addition, social partners in construction have co-operated in
informing construction firms about the proper use of foreign
labour. In May 2004, they published a guidebook on the subject.
This followed EU enlargement, which had prompted concerns
about an influx of foreign temporary agency workers to Finland.
In 2000, the Finnish Hotel and Restaurant Association (SHR)
launched a programme to curb the black economy in the hotels and
restaurants sector. The programme includes lobbying for lower
taxation as well as providing training and information to the
member companies of SHR. As part of this programme, SHR also
requested its member companies for letters of attorney, which
allowed it to check that companies’ payment of tax liabilities and
pension contributions are in order.17
The social partners in their European-level multi-annual work
programme have agreed to organise a seminar on undeclared work
in 2005.
Despite the fact that social partners have been quite active in
13 Viranomaisyhteistyön kehittämisprojekti (2002).
14 Kuusisto (2004b).
15 An expression to describe the superior competitiveness of another country arising from lower labour costs, less job protection or less regulation.
16 See Kuusisto (2004a) for more details on this.
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preventing undeclared economy, there is a common failing among
all the measures introduced by the social partners. The problem is
that only organised firms are effectively covered by them, leaving
out undertakings which are either unorganised (by an employers’
organisation) or categorised as being outside the sector. In
construction, this problem is particularly marked in building one-
family houses and in renovations that households have ordered. In
hotels and restaurants, black economy is concentrated on small
enterprises selling fast food or beer.
Conclusions
Despite the fact that the share of undeclared work in Finland is
among the lowest in EU, there is a large consensus that more efforts
need to be made in preventing black economy and economic crime
in our country. The government has introduced programmes which
aim to promote entrepreneurship and to increase incentives to
declare work. It is also well recognised that more resources need to
be directed to the surveillance of undeclared work. In this field, the
social partners have also been active in their respective industries.
The chosen policy line is to improve co-operation between different
authorities in the prevention of undeclared work and economic
crime. The evidence shows that these types of inputs have been quite
efficient. Illegal foreign labour has become a new policy concern,
and it is expected that tackling this problem will be the focus of
policy-makers and social partners alike in the coming years.
Reija Lilja
Bibliography
Finland’s National Action Plan for Employment 2003, In
accordance with the EU’s Employment Guidelines,
http://www.mol.fi/english/reports/nap2003english.pdf
Finland’s National Action Plan for Employment 2002, In
accordance with the EU’s Employment Guidelines,
http://www.mol.fi/julkaisut/nap2002english.pdf
Finnish Ministry of Finance (1995), Harmaan talouden
selvitystyöryhmän loppuraportti, VM:n työryhmämuistioita 6/1995,
Helsinki.
Finnish Tax Administration (2002), Verohallinto vuosikertomus
2002, http://www.vero.fi/nc/doc/download.asp?id=2759;1277614
Aleksi Kuusisto (2004a), Social partners co-operate to tackle
undeclared work in construction,
http://www.eiro.eurofound.eu.int/2004/06/feature/fi0406202f.html
Aleksi Kuusisto (2004b), Increase in foreign temporary agency
workers due to EU enlargement, http://www.eiro.eurofound.eu.int/
2004/05/inbrief/fi0405201n.html
Parliamentary State Auditors (2002), Annual Report 2001 (in
Finnish), Helsinki.
Pekka Lith (2002), Majoitus- ja ravitsemisalan harmaat markkinat,
Suunnittelu- ja tutkimuspalvelut Pekka Lith, Tutkimuksia ja
raportteja 2/2002, Helsinki.
Pekka Lith (1997), Harmaan talouden miljardit – Raportti Suomen
piilotalouden laajuudesta ja ilmenemismuodoista, Government
Institute for Economic Research, VATT-Discussion Papers No 142,
Helsinki.
Renooy, Piet, Staffan Ivarsson, Olga van der Wusten-Gritsai, and
Remco Meijer (2004), Undeclared work in an enlarged Union. An
Analysis of Undeclared Work: An In-Depth Study of Specific Items.
Final Report, European Commission, Directorate-General for
Employment and Social Affairs, Manuscript completed in May
2004.
Viranomaisyhteistyön kehittämisprojekti (2002), Harmaan talouden
tilannekatsaus 2002, Mimeo.
Sweden
Introduction
The term “undeclared work”is accepted throughout the EU as “any
paid activities that are lawful as regards their nature but not
declared to the public authorities”. In Sweden this is known
colloquially as “svartarbete” (“black work”). Both the National
Audit Office and the tax authorities (Skatteverket) see this as a
concept distinct from tax avoidance of income from financial
transactions and the avoidance of taxes from, for example,
“moonshine” alcohol and smuggling. Thus there should be no
confusion in using the Commission’s concept in Sweden.
Given the high level of tax in Sweden, the issue of undeclared work
is sometimes mentioned in the Swedish debate to argue for lower
income taxation. It does not appear, however, that undeclared work
and marginal income taxes are related in any obvious fashion
(Skattestatistiska Årsbok 1999). In the last decade, the single most
debated (and controversial) aspect of undeclared work in Sweden is
that related to domestic activities (hushållsnäratjänster) such as
childcare, cleaning and repairs. In part the controversy is due to the
gender issues involved. The government has recently proposed that
house repairs are made tax deductible in a bid to incorporate this
type of work into the legitimate economy. The issue of undeclared
work has recently been high on the political agenda, particularly in
the debate on transition rules for workers from the new Member
States. Several recent court cases indicate that current legislation is
not sufficient to prevent undeclared work by foreign nationals.Work
permits have historically been issued only in very limited numbers
and related almost exclusively to types of work which could not
realistically be done by Swedes, such as foreign correspondents in
the media and cooks in restaurants that serve foreign cuisine,
although this situation has changed in recent years in the face of
skills shortages in connection with the new economy. Under
Swedish law, employers who use workers not possessing a work
permit can be penalised as well as the workers themselves.Autumn 2004 |  European Employment Observatory Review 175
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There would appear to be some agreement between various studies
on the extent of undeclared work in Sweden. It is generally agreed
that between 11% and 14% of the population undertake undeclared
work; and those who do so are predominately young males; most
often these people are students or the owners of small businesses.
Some workers with declared jobs also take part in undeclared work,
attracted by increase earnings and evasion of tax on this second
income and social contributions. For employers, the attraction of
undeclared work is a reduction in costs. Contrary to popular
assumption, the National Audit Office found that the unemployed
were not involved in undeclared work to any major extent.
Prevalence of undeclared work in the economy
In the late 1990s the National Audit Office (RRV) published four
reports on undeclared work in Sweden.The tax authorities have also
done some more recent work on this issue and this is reported below.
However, the RRV studies are by far the best studies in Sweden and
are cited extensively in this article. The RRV project used several
methods in order to estimate the amount of undeclared work. When
trying to ascertain hours of work or the category of people involved
in undeclared work (as opposed to measuring the shadow
economy’s share of Gross National Product) the most direct and
appropriate method is by interviews. RRV conducted two interview
studies in 1997. The following was asked of a random sample of the
population between 18 and 74 years of age:1
There are clear indications that a sizable proportion of the
population accept undeclared work and business without a
receipt. The questions concern not only work when one receives
cash payment but also the exchange of services between friends,
acquaintances, neighbours or family members outside of one’s
own household. It also includes the sale of goods without a
receipt such as at market places or other undeclared business.
Have you, during the last 12 months, done such work or sold
goods without giving a receipt? [Author’s translation].
One can note that this is a rather wide-ranging but also a very
specific definition of undeclared work. They found that about
700,000 people, 12% of the population and aged between 18 and 74
years, had performed some form of undeclared work that year. This
corresponds to about 5% of all work performed and roughly 3% of
Swedish GDP. (A year later the RRV put this figure higher, at 4.6%).
Among the youngest members of the labour force (18-19 years of
age) the corresponding figure was 25%. Those involved worked an
average of five undeclared hours a week with average yearly income
from undeclared work of SEK 25,000 (2,786 euro). The cost to the
public budget was estimated to be a loss of between SEK 20 to 40
million per year(2.2 million euro to 4.4 million euro).
The National Tax Authority (Riksskatteverket) has also conducted
similar interviews in order to ascertain the level of undeclared work
in Sweden in 1998 and 2001. These were directed to employed
persons (not self-employed). The question was simply “I have
personally carried out undeclared work during the last year”(agree,
do not agree, do not know). In 1998, 7% of the respondents
answered that they agreed with this statement and in 2001 the
corresponding figure was 6%. These are lower figures than found in
the above-cited RRV survey from 1997. Possibly this is due to the
respondents in the National Tax Authority’s investigation not
considering this to include “exchange of services between friends,
acquaintances, neighbours or family members outside of ones own
household. It also includes the sale of goods without a receipt such as
at market places or other black business” as in the RRV
questionnaire. One can also note that the tax authorities addressed
their questions to the employed while RRV asked a sample of the
population.
The RRV survey also has information on the self-reported labour
market status of those performing undeclared work.
According to categories in Table 1, undeclared work is most
prevalent among students (23.5% of student responses) and the self-
employed (17.5%). It is not obvious how one should interpret these
figures in relation to the official reporting of labour market status in
the Swedish labour force surveys and thus in the European labour
force surveys. Whilst the RRV investigation found that 5% of all
work (hours) distributed among roughly 11% of the population was
undeclared, it is difficult to interpret this figure in relation to impact
on employment in the legitimate economy. To do so, one would first
require an estimate of how much of this work would be performed
at all if it were to be performed with the extra costs (taxes, social
security contributions and maybe even wages), if this work were to
be forced out of the black sector. Even if all the work could be
transferred without loss to the legitimate economy, the impact on
employment rates requires an estimate of how much would result in
more hours by the already employed and how much would result in
new jobs. Presumably the main impact on official labour market
statistics is on the number of hours worked and not on labour
market status. One can note from Table 1, for example, that the
unemployed perform undeclared work to a lesser extent than the
employed. However, the table also shows that there would appear to
be some potential for undeclared work to be transferred to those
groups with higher employment rates, particularly students.
Whilst there is some discrepancy in the total figures in the RRV
studies and those conducted by the tax authorities, the breakdown
by characteristics is rather similar. Men are twice as likely as women
to have performed undeclared work and the young perform
undeclared work appreciably more often than older persons. The
market research company Observer found, in an investigation in
1 Note, however, that this method cannot capture the extent of undeclared work performed by foreign nationals not registered in the country and thus not included in
the sample frame. The issue of undeclared work by illegal foreign labour is currently very prominent in the public debate and is addressed below.
Table 1: Labour market status of those performing
undeclared work
Labour market status of those 
performing undeclared work Percentage
Self-employed 17.5
White collar 7.2
Skilled blue collar 15.8
Other blue collar 13.4
Unemployed 10.6
Pensioners 3.3
Students 23.5
Others 7.8
Total 11.1
Source: RRV (1998)176 Autumn 2004 |  European Employment Observatory Review
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2000, that undeclared work was most prevalent among non-
unionised, blue-collared male workers in the private sector.
However, the RRV study provides some indication that the well
educated are also over-represented among those performing
undeclared work. This is primarily due to numerous fringe benefits
that should be seen as constituting a component of the wage and
thus should be liable to tax but remain undeclared, thus tax is
(illegally) not paid.
RRV found that whilst undeclared work can be found in all sectors
of the economy, it is most prevalent in the construction trade
(including repairs) and in the hotel and restaurant sectors. It is also
relatively highly prevalent in activities closely related to domestic
life, such as household cleaning, childcare and the repair of cars and
houses. The tax authorities have interviewed firms asking if
competition from companies that perform undeclared work has a
negative impact on their business. (Skattestatistisk Årsbok 2001).
The highest affirmative response rate was found for hairdressers
(54% of firms interviewed), trucking companies (43%), restaurants
(37%), construction (37%) and taxi firms (31%). The average figure
was 16%.
Data from a variety of sources (tax authorities, RRV and official
government investigations), appears to indicate that, during the last
20 years, the amount of undeclared work has remained much the
same and may even have declined slightly (Sjöberg, 2000).
Reasons for undeclared work in Sweden
There are numerous factors behind the extent of undeclared work in
the economy such as the extent and form of social control, the level
and structure of the tax system, conceptions of solidarity with
society, social norms and values etc. It is difficult to speculate which
of the many factors lie behind the extent of undeclared work in
Sweden. However, the RRV investigations have simply asked why
people did undeclared work. Table 2 provides the responses for both
those who did and did not perform undeclared work. Tax avoidance
is by far the most often cited reason for undeclared work.
The tax motive is particularly prevalent amongst men, the self-
employed and the well educated. It is less often cited by the
unemployed and students. Both these groups, to a higher degree
than others,state that they “had no choice”,although the root cause
of this response may well be the level of tax that this work would
incur.
The risk of detection is, of course, an important factor. The RRV
study showed that 90% of those doing undeclared work believed
there to be little or no risk of being caught. Women experienced a
higher risk than men.
Given that taxes in Sweden constitute the highest share of GDP in
all OECD countries (roughly 55% of GNP), it would appear
obvious to attribute undeclared work to taxes. However, RRVs
review of the academic literature concludes that there is no scientific
evidence of such a relationship. Whilst a cursory comparison
between Sweden and other countries may provide some indication
that this may indeed be the case (very high Swedish taxes, very high
employment rates and with lower undeclared work than in many
countries), the responses in Table 2 indicate that taxation is surely of
some importance. One can also note that 60% of the respondents in
the RRV survey considered taxes in Sweden to be unreasonably
high.
Undeclared work in Sweden appears to be strongly related to
services used by households (for example building repairs and
cleaning services). In this context the issue is not only taxes but also
social security contributions that are paid on all declared work,
regardless of working hours. This is a major topic of debate and
some policy initiatives. Given that one can expect the relative prices
of such services to increase over time, this is an issue that almost
certainly will continue to be a matter of concern and policy debate
for many years to come. One should, however, underline that the
Swedish welfare state provides many services free of charge or with
very low fees for activities that may otherwise be undeclared,such as
childcare.There are no reliable estimates of the extent of undeclared
work for household related services.
Measures taken to combat undeclared work
According to the Swedish NAP 2003, combating undeclared work is
a “high priority”. The government sees undeclared work to be
problematic as it distorts competition, undermines the legitimacy of
the tax system and, in the long run, threatens welfare.
It has been pointed out above that the issue of services sold to the
household may be of particular relevance to the extent of
undeclared work in Sweden. This was the subject matter of a major
governmental investigation published in the Service Sector Taxation
Report from 1997 (Tjänstebeskattningsutredningen SOU 1997:17).
The investigation made a number of recommendations. Most
controversially it discussed the possibility of the exemption of social
security contributions for domestic services. The various proposals
led to practically no legislation. However, very recently the
government has taken some limited action (Press Release Tax
Authorities 2004-07-02). The “ROT” tax deduction proposal
Table 2: Reason for performing undeclared work
Reason Performed undeclared work % Did not perform undeclared work %
To avoid tax 76.5 76.7
To avoid bureaucracy 5.4 3.1
Had no choice 10.7 10.7
To avoid higher fees 0 1
To avoid lower benefits 2.1 2.4
To annoy the authorities 0.8 0.3
Other reason 4.5 2.0
No response 0 3.8
Source: RRV (1998)Autumn 2004 |  European Employment Observatory Review 177
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addresses the issue of undeclared work related to the repair of
dwellings. Whilst it has yet to become law it passed Parliament’s
Taxation Committee in July 2004 and is backed by a Parliamentary
majority. The tax deduction applies to those who build or repair
their dwelling between 15 April 2004 and 30 June 2005. 30% of the
labour costs are tax deductible (maximum SEK 10,500 – 1,170 euro
– for a house and SEK 5,000 – 557 euro – for an apartment and the
minimum in both cases is SEK 2,000 – 223 euro). These rules are
very similar to the previous ROT tax deduction system that was in
operation between 1996 and 1999.
The design of the social security system may be of great importance
in providing incentives to perform undeclared work. Practically all
social security payments in Sweden are linked to previous (declared)
income. The closer the relationship between contributions and
entitlements, the more an individual will lose by working outside the
system. The 1998 reform of the pension system reinforced the
relationship between declared work and pension payments. In the
new system all declared income throughout a person’s working life
impacts on the pension paid upon retirement. In the previous
system this was only the case for the best 15 years of income. Thus
the new system makes it more costly for an individual to operate
“outside the system”.
Concerted efforts to raise social awareness of undeclared work have
been undertaken through a joint campaign by the tax authorities
and the recently founded Economic Crime Authority
(Ekobrottsmyndigheten). This started in 2000. The co-operation also
involves branch organisations and trade unions in various sectors of
the economy. Throughout 2000 they focused mostly on the
construction sector. In 2004 the tax authorities declared particular
focus would be placed on restaurants, taxis, cleaning firms,
hairdressers and haulage companies. (Aftonbladet 2004-03-17).
The authorities identified clusters of firms involved in undeclared
work that were largely based in Stockholm, Göteborg and Malmö.
These clusters involved around 300 businesses. The initiatives
resulted in several convictions. The first took place in Stockholm in
August 2000 and the accused were sentenced to between two and
four years in prison. More recently (March 2004), and also in
Stockholm, the Court sentenced six people to up to five years in jail
for performing undeclared cleaning services within the company
Swede Serviceföretagen. These activities were related to bidding for
tenders of outsourced cleaning services by the regional public health
authorities.
As young people generally have more tolerant attitudes to
undeclared work, the authorities have targeted them through both
information campaigns and tax control. The campaigns have been
broadly cast and included, for example, an Internet café at the
country’s largest rock festival (Hultsved). It also involves informing
the young, (though cinema advertisements) on the useful social
purposes for which tax income is utilised. In 2004 the tax authorities
declared that young men are to be investigated more carefully in
their examination of tax returns.Investigations of youth attitudes to
undeclared work (conducted by the market research company GfK
Sverige AB) show that the percentage of young people who think,
“it is unacceptable to perform undeclared work”has increased from
42% in 2002 to 55% in 2004.This is a statistically significant increase
and may well be influenced by the aforementioned campaigns. This
was based on 2,000 telephone interviews with people between the
ages of 16 and 20. The tax authorities see this as evidence of a clear
break in the trend regarding young people’s attitudes towards
undeclared work (Director of Information, Sten Eriksson, National
Tax Authorities).
The issue of undeclared work using labour from abroad has been
much debated with the accession of the new Member States in May
2004. Sweden was unique among the EU-15 in not introducing
special transition rules for labour from the new Member States.
However, during the transition rules debate in parliament, the
government declared that it would subsequently present a Bill to
Parliament with suggestions on how to monitor the implementation
of collective agreements even at workplaces with unorganised
labour. This was seen to be a means of identifying and preventing
some undeclared work using labour from abroad.
There have been a number of court cases that have highlighted the
legal problems involved in this issue. An important case was that of
a Lithuanian women (without a work permit) who had performed
cleaning services for four women in Gothenburg on several
occasions. In a lower court the four women were found guilty of tax
fraud. However, the higher court acquitted the four women on
grounds that it could not be proved that they were the employer.The
Public Prosecutor decided not to appeal. In July 2004 there was a
similar “not guilty” ruling on a woman accused of using foreign
labour for house repairs. The woman was cleared of the accusation
of hiring foreign workers without a work permit. Again, the reason
was that one could not prove that there was an employment
relationship in place. In comments on the case the trade union
representing construction workers appears resigned to the fact that
the current law is not able to deal with these matters. Their strategy
is to report these incidents to the police and to visit the sites and
demand to negotiate a collective agreement.According to the union,
when this occurs the foreign workers usually choose to leave the job.
(Dagens Nyheter 8 July 2004).
As a result of the cleaning services case, the government set up a
working group in March 2004 comprised of representatives of the
Ministries of Finance, Justice and Foreign Affairs to examine its
consequences for the exploitation of foreign workers and
undeclared work. The group is to examine whether there are gaps in
the current legislation.
While most of the public debate on foreign workers has focused on
low wage and low-skilled work, there are also taxation issues
pertaining to high-wage foreign workers. In January 2001 the
government introduced tax exemptions for “foreign key personnel”
(for example, executives, experts, and researchers). The main feature
of the tax relief legislation, which was advocated by business and
industry, is that it provides a 25% reduction of taxable income for
“foreign key-persons”. This means that a key foreign individual’s
income tax is now based on only 75% of his or her income. The
reduced tax applies to all salaries and “perks”, such as employers’
contributions to housing and living costs. The tax reduction also
applies to stock options and other special compensation, provided it
is offered by the Swedish employer.The reduction applies to the first
three years of employment in Sweden.
Conclusion
It would appear that 5% of all hours worked in Sweden are
undeclared. Roughly 11% of the population perform some form of
undeclared work every year. This appears to have remained stable
during the last two decades.The major recent issues of public debate
are undeclared work related to household services and (currently)
undeclared work from foreign labour. These are particularly
relevant issues in Sweden due to the high level of taxes and social
contributions on wages and to the fact that Sweden did not
introduce any transition rules on labour from the new Member
States. There have been very few recent legislative initiatives
explicitly introduced to prevent illegal work. The exception is the178 Autumn 2004 |  European Employment Observatory Review
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soon-to-be-introduced ROT deduction for repair work on dwellings.
However, this is merely the reintroduction of a measure in operation
in the late 1990s. One could, however, also underline the potential
impact of the major pension reform (1998) that strengthens the
relationship between contributions and benefits, thus making
undeclared work more costly for the individual in the long term.
Since 2000 the tax authorities have tightened their control of tax
returns and conducted campaigns to increase social awareness of
the issue, particularly amongst the young. No transition rules on
labour from the new Member States were introduced and a number
of court cases have shown that the Public Prosecutor has not been
able to obtain convictions concerning cases of undeclared foreign
labour. This has led the government to investigate whether new
legislation is required and it is likely that reform may be
forthcoming.
Donald Storrie
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United Kingdom
This article gives a selective overview of literature and data on
“undeclared work” in the UK. We begin by looking at how the
concept of “undeclared work”, as found in various European
Commission communications, relates to concepts used in the UK,
before turning to recent debates and policy developments.
Definitions of undeclared work in the UK
The UK literature contains a plethora of terms, used
interchangeably with “undeclared work”, including: “paid informal
work”; “underground economy”; “hidden work”; “shadow
economy”; “unobserved sector”; and  “cash-in-hand work”
(Williams and Windebank, 1998). Despite this variety, in practice
these terms tend to be defined in similar ways to “undeclared work”,
as used by the Commission. The key feature in common to the
various definitions is that they refer to:
“…. the paid production and sale of goods and services that are
unregistered by, or hidden from the State for tax, social security
and/or labour law purposes, but which are legal in all other
respects…….. Such work covers only activities which are illegal
because of their non-declaration to the State for tax, social
security and/or labour law services. It excludes activities in
which the goods and/or service itself are illegal (e.g. drug
trafficking, prostitution). Hence this sphere covers only activity
where the means do not comply with regulations, but the ends
(goods and services) are legitimate” (Williams and
Windebank, 2003, p.283)
Also consistent with the Commission’s approach are the various
categorisations of undeclared workers themselves found in UK
literature and policy debates. In particular, undeclared workers in
the UK include:
• people who are officially “inactive” or “unemployed” but are
working while claiming benefits;
• second and multiple job-holders;
• immigrants working illegally.
A further type of work mentioned in UK policy debates relates to
individuals engaged in legal, declared activities, but who (in
agreement with an employer or otherwise), misreport their
employment status. An example is construction workers who report
themselves as self-employed, but are consistently contracted by the
same employer and should, arguably, be more accurately classified
as dependent employees. This enables the employer to avoid tax and
social insurance obligations, and may also offer the worker
advantages with regard to income tax (and where relevant, VAT)
obligations1.
The policy debate on undeclared work in the UK
Political debate on undeclared work has gathered pace in more
recent years, given impetus by a public inquiry in 2000 by Lord
Grabiner2. Grabiner’s report focused on the scarcity of cross-
governmental working, emphasising the need for a combined effort
to tackle undeclared work by all affected government departments:
the Inland Revenue (IR); Her Majesty’s Customs and Excise
(HMCE); and the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP).
Grabiner recommended new initiatives in addition to enhancements
of existing measures. Subsequently, the UK Government has
1 There have been a number of important measures introduced in the UK to reduce the amount of “false self-employment”of this kind. As, however, this area is not
one given significant focus in the European debates on undeclared work, and given limited space in the current article, we do not cover these measures here.
2 Full report available at: http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/media//60F77/74.pdfAutumn 2004 |  European Employment Observatory Review 179
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intensified its efforts to tackle undeclared work, and nearly all
Grabiner’s recommendations have been implemented in some way,
although it is too early to assess their impact.
Prevalence and nature of undeclared work in
the UK
Wide range of macro-level estimates
There is no consensus on the size and economic value of undeclared
work in the UK. The UK’s National Action Plan for 20033 used
National Accounts4 to estimate undeclared income at £14 billion
(20.3 billion euro), or 1.5% of GDP (for the year 1999). A recent
Commission report (Renooy et al. 2004), puts the figure at 2%,
lower than in most other EU Member States. However, as Table 1
shows, these figures are much lower than those in a range of
economic studies over the years, many of which give an estimate of
around 12-13% of GDP – though many criticisms have been made
of such estimates on the grounds of methodological flaws, and lack
of a theoretical basis (see Tanzi 1999, Thomas 1999, Dixon 1999
and Schneider & Enste 2002).
A more recent consensus emerges in comparative studies (Renooy et
al. 2004, and OECD 2004, Chapter 5) that the share of GDP
accounted for by undeclared work is rather modest in most northern
European countries (including the UK), and much lower than
suggested by the various macro-economic proxy estimates
summarised in Table 1.
Faced with a lack of robust data on the extent of undeclared work,it
is notable that the Grabiner report (2000) avoided attempting to
quantify the problem, and simply chose to assume that the “hidden
economy is a major problem, involving billions of pounds”.
Official focus on measuring “benefit fraud”
Grabiner did, however, note that more progress had been made in
measuring undeclared work due to benefit fraud – the part given
most prominence in UK Government statements. Thus, in 2000, the
government estimated social security fraud at £2-4 billion (2.9
billion-5.8 billion euro)5 per annum. The methods used to calculate
benefit fraud have been criticised (Sainsbury 2003), on the grounds
that whilst official statements use the concepts “benefit fraud”and
“undeclared work” interchangeably, official estimates include all
types of fraud, not just failure to declare earnings. Other types of
fraud (e.g. non-declaration of income from occupational pensions,
claiming benefits as a single person whilst cohabiting, and not
declaring savings) account for up to 70% of benefit fraud among
working age people (Sainsbury, 2003). Yet fraud data can be
misleading, since it often includes “claimant error” (Sainsbury
2003).
How much undeclared work?
Estimates of the numbers engaged in undeclared work are also
subject to methodological difficulties. Whilst any estimates of the
absolute extent of undeclared work should be treated with caution,
recent surveys (Pederson 2003) in five countries (Denmark,Norway,
Sweden, Germany and Great Britain), using a standardised
methodology, offer the possibility of a comparative picture between
Member States. Results confirm that reported participation in the
undeclared economy in the UK is the lowest of the countries studied
(affecting only 7.8% of the 18-74 year-old population in 2000). The
research gives little indication of the reasons for the UK’s low
incidence, but it is likely to reflect a range of institutional, legal and
3 The NAP is available at: http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/employment_strategy/nap_2003/nap_uk_en.pdf
4 UK National Accounts: The Blue Book (2002). Available from http://www.statistics.gov.uk/downloads/theme_economy/BB_2002.pdf
5 Estimate used by Alistair Campbell in 2000, DWP Press Release http://www.dwp.gov.uk/mediacentre/dss/pressreleases/2000/jul/17-07-00-1.asp
Table 1: Selected estimates of prevalence of undeclared work/shadow economy
Year Estimate as % of GB/UK Source/notes
1960 0.0% GDP UK Feige 1981, cited in Thomas, 1999
1970 2.0% GNP GB Schneider & Enste, 2002 (cash approach), Table 4.6
1975 14.0% GDP UK Feige 1981, cited in Thomas, 1999
1980 8.4% GNP GB Schneider & Enste, 2002 (cash approach), Table 4.6
1986-90 9.7% GDP UK Tanzi, 1986, cited in Lysiotou et al., 2004, Table 3 (currency demand method)
1986-90 13.2% GDP UK Enste & Schneider (19978), cited in Lysiotou et al., 2004, Table 3 (physical input —
electricity, method)
1989-90 9.6% GNP GB Schneider, cited in Schneider & Enste, 2002 (cash approach), Table 4.3
1989-90 13.6% GNP GB Schneider, cited in Schneider & Enste, 2002 (electricity consumption method),
Table 4.3
1990 10.2% GNP UK Schneider , 1997a, cited in Dixon 1999 (currency demand method).
1990 12.4% GDP UK Schneider, 1997, cited in Lysiotou et al., 2004, Table 3 (currency demand method)
1990-93 11.2% GNP GB Schneider, cited in Schneider & Enste, 2002 (cash approach), Table 4.3
1990-93 7.2% GNP GB Johnson et al, cited in Schneider & Enste, 2002 (cash approach), Table 4.3
1995 12.6% GNP GB Schneider & Enste, 2002 (cash approach), Table 4.6
1999 1.5% GDP UK National Action plan for Employment (derived from National Accounts data)
2000 2.0% GDP UK Renooy et. al., 2004, (European Commission), Tables 1 and 4.1
2001-02 12.5% GDP GB Schneider and Klinglmair, 2004 (Currency Demand and DYMIMIC method), Table 3.5
2002-03 12.3% GDP GB Schneider and Klinglmair, 2004 (Currency Demand and DYMIMIC method), Table 3.5180 Autumn 2004 |  European Employment Observatory Review
Trends
policy factors: it is notable, for example, that compared with many
Member States, the UK has relatively low rates of income tax, and a
deregulated environment for the start-up and operation of small
businesses, alongside (see below) a major recent policy impetus to
reduce social security fraud.
The characteristics of undeclared workers
Research on the characteristics of undeclared workers is sparse in
the UK. The Commission’s Communication (1998) stated that
undeclared work across the EU is generally present in sectors
involving low-profit, labour-intensive work such as agriculture and
construction, industries where costs are a major factor of
competition (e.g. manufacturing), and in modern innovative sectors.
The Communication stated that such work in the UK is dominated
by men.
A recent study of two UK local labour markets suggests, however,
that women play a major part in the undeclared economy (Williams
& Windebank, 2003). Informal work in lower income areas was
particularly concentrated in: hairdressing, childcare, window
cleaning, car repair, appliance maintenance and plumbing. Whilst
women tended to do traditionally female tasks (childcare, domestic
affairs, etc.), men in the informal economy undertook jobs such as
plumbing and car maintenance.
The five-country study of Pederson 2003 provided further
comparative evidence of the characteristics of undeclared workers
(see Renooy et al. 2004, Tables 4.3 and 4.4). It confirmed that,
although in all countries undeclared work was more common
among men than among women, the gender difference was less
marked in Great Britain than the other four countries. In the UK, as
in other countries, the incidence is higher among young people, but
the UK stands out as having a particularly high incidence of
undeclared work among students (at 30.2%, the highest of the five
countries), which may reflect high levels of debt amongst students.
Also interesting (in the light of the emphasis on benefit fraud,
discussed below) is the low incidence of undeclared work amongst
the unemployed and pensioners (at 9.2% and 1.1% respectively, the
lowest of all five countries — although these results should be
treated with caution as sample sizes are small).
Motivations for undeclared work
Macro-level studies say little of individual motivation for
undeclared working. A common assumption in the policy debate is
that motivations are largely cost-driven. Some UK evidence,
however, suggests other reasons. Williams and Windebank (1998)
note clear gender difference in the extent to which participation is
financially-driven: whilst 72% of the tasks conducted by men were
done for financial reasons, the equivalent figure for women was just
18%. Only 5% of women performed undeclared work for a formal
business, with the vast majority undertaking tasks (childcare and
similar) on behalf of friends and relatives, the stated motivations
being less about money and more about helping others, or forging
social networks.
Such rationales for undeclared work suggest that any deterrence
methods will need to be coupled with the provision of alternative
coping mechanisms, such as affordable alternative childcare, in
order to limit negative effects on both employers and working
parents (Williams, 2001).
Measures to combat undeclared work in the UK
Recent UK measures to tackle undeclared work have been largely a
response to the recommendations of the Grabiner (2000) report,
embodying two main approaches:
• a proactive approach to prevent people joining the undeclared
economy (e.g. schemes to make it easier for businesses to declare
themselves, and harder for people to cheat the benefits system).
• a reactive approach — detecting and taking sanctions against
those involved in the undeclared economy.
Reducing legal and administrative burdens on
businesses
Whilst much help was already available to new businesses (e.g.
through the Business Links network), the government responded in
2001 to Grabiner’s recommendations of reducing the tax
compliance burden on business, with a “Starting up in Business”
campaign. This included a streamlined procedure for registering
with the IR, and improved guidance for new businesses on tax,
National Insurance Contributions (NICs) and VAT, a guidance
video, direct support from IR Business Support teams and a
Helpline.
Grabiner also recommended encouraging businesses to register as
soon as possible with the IR to avoid getting their finances confused
and slipping into the informal economy. With effect from January
2001, anyone becoming self-employed/eligible to pay Class 2
National Insurance Contributions (NICs) was required to register
with the IR within three months (reduced from six) in order to avoid
a £100 fine (145 euro).
A 2002 evaluation of the Starting Up in Business campaign7 showed
improvements. Prior to 2001, 33% of businesses delayed registration
until more than three months after start-up. This fell to 20% by
2002. The evaluation also suggested increasing use of the new
support provisions, and positive user responses.
However, a report by a parliamentary committee (the Public
Accounts Committee) on the IR’s performance in 2003-20048
criticised the department for not further easing the business start-up
process (e.g. by allowing payment of tax and social contributions in
instalments). The compliance strategy was criticised as out-dated,
and for not being revised to take account of changing business
circumstances. The committee also presented evidence suggesting
that fines for late registration had not been implemented effectively.
Between May 2001 and August 2002, 92,600 notifications were
received outside the three-month time limit, but in 60% of these, a
penalty was not imposed or was waived due to low earnings.
Increasing incentives
Prior to the Grabiner Report, there were already a number of
initiatives in place in the UK that aimed to make working in the
formal economy more attractive. These included the National
Minimum Wage (introduced in 1997), followed by the Working
Families Tax Credit (effectively, an in-work benefit regime, recently
combined with other tax credits as the Working Tax Credit).
Grabiner noted that the success of such initiatives would depend on
effective publicity.The government set up a comprehensive publicity
campaign on tax credits which ran until September 2002. According
to the UK NAP for 2003, by July 2003, some 5.75 million families
had taken advantage of tax credits. The overall impact of tax credits
7 Full report available at: http://www.inlandrevenue.gov.uk/startingup/starting_up_in_business_evaluation.pdf
8 HM Treasury Minutes on the report available at: http://www.official-documents.co.uk/document/cm61/6130/6130.pdfAutumn 2004 |  European Employment Observatory Review 181
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has yet to be assessed, and although there were a number of
administrative problems in their introduction, there is preliminary
evidence that they have had a positive effect on the labour market
participation of certain groups (e.g. lone parents). There is no clear
evidence, however, on the extent to which tax credits have affected
the proportion of work which is undeclared.
In his report, Grabiner criticised the current benefit system and
rules for failing to adapt to new patterns of work, which are often
flexible and temporary in nature (see also Sainsbury 2003). He
noted that many claimants starting work prefer not to risk coming
off benefits and having to reapply if the new job fails to last.
(Rowlingson et al. 1997 also note the “economic rationality” of
benefit claimants who fail to declare their income). Research shows
that anxiety surrounding transition from benefits is cited by half of
all job-seekers as a concern about starting work (Bottomley et al.,
1997). Steps have been taken, through the introduction (and
extension) of “linking rules” (enabling claimants starting work to
return to their same benefit rates and terms automatically if the job
fails within a certain period), but there is no evidence on how far
these steps have alleviated such anxieties.
Whilst some benefit “run-ons”(for lone parents and the long-term
unemployed) were available prior to the Grabiner Report, these
were not comprehensive. The UK NAP 2003 detailed new benefit
run-ons, including the Job Grant (an automatic payment to
jobseekers aged 25+, covering the transition period between leaving
benefit and starting work), and an extension of housing benefit for
those moving into work. However, there is no evidence of either the
uptake or the effectiveness of these schemes in encouraging people
into the formal economy.
Deterring benefit fraud
As well as removing disincentives to leave benefits, Grabiner argued
strongly for effective deterrence measures against those working and
claiming benefits. Whilst the IR, HMCE and DWP all had fraud
teams in place, Grabiner raised concerns about their effectiveness,
noting that in 1998/1999 the Department for Social Security (now
DWP) prosecuted 6,000 individuals (and 362 collusive employers)
for not declaring income when receiving their benefits, but only 7%
were punished (other than by a reduction or termination of benefit
payment). Grabiner recommended improved working methods
(stronger partnership working, improved surveillance technology
and new systems of penalties).
Key examples of such methods relate to Jobseekers Allowance
(JSA). Although JSA requires claimants to interact frequently with
officials, the regular timetable of appointments made it easy for
fraudsters to arrange working lives around them. In 2001, the More
Frequent Attendance (MFA) regime was introduced, requiring
those suspected of fraud to attend extra advisory meetings arranged
at unpredictable times, to disrupt any routine undeclared working
activity. However, an evaluation of MFA (Garland et al. 2002)9
showed that it had little impact. It is questionable whether MFA
would act as an effective deterrent, given research (e.g. Williams and
Windebank 2003) suggesting that much undeclared work is of a
type that can be re-arranged even at short notice.
Some similar initiatives appear, however, to have had a disincentive
effect on benefit fraud. For example, an evaluation of the New Deal
Plus by Wilson (2002)10, which involves weekly meetings and case
conferences with Jobcentre staff, showed that one effect was the
exposure of those in the informal economy.
Partnership working
Grabiner 2000 stressed the importance of joint investigation and
action to combat “combined tax and benefit fraud”. In 2001, 20
Joint Shadow Economy Teams (JoSETs) were established with staff
from several branches of government, including HMCE, the Inland
Revenue, and Jobcentre and DWP officers, to tackle colluding
employers involved in complex fraud and tax evasion cases. Similar
teams were established to focus on fraud in the clothing sector and,
more recently, Operation Gangmaster has been set up to work in
agriculture.
Whilst no independent evaluation of the impact of these measures
exists, DWP11 reported that between April 2002 and January 2003,
the teams found 535 instances of fraud, worth £610,413 (886,269
euro). In the year to January 2004, JoSETs made 667 prosecutions,
collecting fines worth £4.2 million (6.09 mllion euro)12.
Surveillance
Grabiner recommended that the government consider ways of
sharing information held on clients, and using conflicting or
inconsistent data from other sources, such as financial institutions,
to check for fraud. Prior to Grabiner, data-sharing had been
piecemeal, due partly to data protection legislation, and a lack of
understanding across government departments of what the law
allows.
The Social Security Fraud Act (2001)13, however, provided
government officials with new powers to investigate and punish
benefit fraud. Officials can use information from private
organisations, including banks, insurance companies and utility
companies, when they have “reasonable grounds”to do so. Between
April 2003 and February 2004, 217,501 “inconsistencies”in data for
further investigation were identified, amounting to total “savings”
of £39 million (56.6 million euro) (DWP Departmental Report
2004). However, it is not clear whether all these “inconsistencies”
refer to undeclared work.
In terms of tax evasion, the UK NAP 2003 described how the IR’s
investigations had identified 22,959 people who had not declared
their income and 10,332 people who had failed to declare their
income from part of their activities. The additional liabilities
resulting from these investigations totalled £23.1 million (33.5
million euro).Whether these outcomes can legitimately be described
as “savings”is open to question since, as shown below, it is unlikely
that these liabilities will have been recouped through fines. Any
savings may, therefore, be longer-term in nature through a deterrent
effect.
Fines/penalties
Whilst Grabiner argued for a “strong environment of deterrence”,h e
stressed that this should not involve increasing fines, since most
people working in the hidden economy do not have the means to pay
large penalties, and enforcement faces practical problems. In the
case of benefit fraud, typical sanctions involve reducing benefit
payments, or payment in small instalments over a long period.
9 Summary report available at : http://www.dwp.gov.uk/jad/2002/esr105su.pdf
10 Full report available at: http://www.dwp.gov.uk/jad/2002/wae111rep.pdf
11 Full Report available at: http://www.dwp.gov.uk/publications/dwp/2003/dwpreport/index.asp
12 Full report available at: http://www.dwp.gov.uk/publications/dwp/2004/dr04/home.asp
13 Details of the Act available at: http://www.legislation.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts2001/20010011.htm182 Autumn 2004 |  European Employment Observatory Review
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Sanctions for tax evasion
Grabiner reported that the process of sanctioning tax offenders
worked well, but that too few prosecutions were made and only for
serious cases, through the slow and expensive Crown Court process.
In accordance with his recommendations, a statutory offence of
knowingly failing to meet basic tax obligations was introduced
under Section 144 of the Finance Act 2000. Any such case can be
tried in a magistrate’s court.
In 2004 the PAC Report on the IR’s performance criticised the
service for its limited use of the new offence, with only 60
prosecutions a year, even though financial returns (estimated at
12:1) suggest it would be worthwhile to bring more.
Sanctions for benefit fraud
Grabiner argued that there was no reason why persistent benefit
fraudsters should not lose their right to benefit for a fixed period, so
long as the vulnerable remained protected. The Social Security
Fraud Act (2001) introduced a new “Two strikes” scheme. With
effect from April 2002, benefits can be removed for 13 weeks from
those caught fraudulently claiming benefits twice within a three-
year period. The Act also introduced discretionary powers to fine
employers between £1,000 and £5,000 (1,452 – 7,258 euro), as an
alternative to prosecution.
There is little evidence of use of the new sanctions, although
aggregate statistics show that between April 2003 and February
2004, the DWP sanctioned 23,002 people for benefit fraud, of
whom 8,212 were successfully prosecuted (DWP Departmental
Report 2004). The UK NAP 2003 stated that, in total, DWP
involvement in teams working across government aimed at tackling
the informal economy led to the application of sanctions in 654
cases and to 2,371 adjustments to benefit (combined, these were
worth £5 million, or 7.3 million euro).
Amnesties
Grabiner warned against the use of amnesties to encourage people
to join the formal economy, on several grounds. Firstly, amnesties
for VAT evasion are problematic because most businesses have
already collected the tax from their customers. Secondly, amnesties
can create bad feeling amongst honest workers. Finally, they can
create the expectation of future amnesties, and further reduce the
incentive for undeclared workers to come forward.
Nonetheless, in April 2003, the government announced a six-month
amnesty for VAT registrations. Businesses were able to register
without the normal late penalties (of 15%) until September, after
which the government planned a strong crackdown. It was the first
time the UK Government had offered such an amnesty.
Unfortunately, no data is available on the impact of this.
Raising social awareness
A key recommendation of Grabiner was to improve publicity about
initiatives to tackle undeclared work. In particular, the public
should:
• be aware of the sanctions they may face by working in the
undeclared economy;
• be aware of what steps they can take to join the formal economy;
• be educated about the effects of undeclared work on the
unprotected worker, and on society as a whole.
In practice, most effort has been focused on the first of these
objectives. Substantial funds have been put into the Targeting
Benefit Fraud campaign14, encouraging people to “stop or shop”.
Prominent advertisements are accompanied by a benefit fraud
hotline, and a dedicated website. Between April 2003 and February
2004, some 190,827 responses to the hotline and website were made,
resulting in 161,916 fraud referrals (DWP Departmental Report
2004).
The government outlined a long-term strategy to change public
attitudes towards benefit cheats, and some evaluation evidence
shows a lower climate of public tolerance of fraud (UK NAP
2003)15. However, in the same NAP, the government admitted that
there has been little attempt to raise awareness of the benefits of
working in the legitimate economy.
The IR was criticised by PAC in 2004 for not undertaking similar
national campaigns against tax fraud. Arguably, even more
publicity is needed here, since research (Adams & Webley 2001) into
attitudes to VAT compliance shows that many perceive the VAT
collection process to be inequitable, and regard VAT monies as a
legitimate part of their business turnover.
Conclusion
There is little robust data on the scale of undeclared work in the
UK, although what evidence exists suggests that it is likely to be
lower than in many Member States. The bulk of the measures taken
to date to tackle undeclared work are focused on combating benefit
fraud, although we have found little evidence either that benefit
fraud is the most important part of undeclared work in the UK
(rather than for example, the activities of multiple job holders or
working students), or that the UK has a particularly large problem
of benefit fraud.
Furthermore, the political rhetoric concentrates on the “problem”
of benefit fraud being rooted in individual claimants’ aberrant
behaviour,rather than being a product also of a hugely complex and
relatively ungenerous social security system (Sainsbury 2003); and
the worry remains that increasing focus on benefit fraud will
stigmatise legitimate claimants and lead to continuing non-claiming
of benefits (Sainsbury, 200116). A further danger relates to the
possibility of “mixed messages” undermining other strategies to
reintegrate economically inactive groups. Thus, for example, the
government has made much of the new Permitted Work Rules for
Incapacity Benefit claimants17, now allowed to undertake limited
amounts of work without jeopardising their benefits, the objective
being to encourage them to “try out”labour market activity. There
is clearly considerable scope for confusion among this vulnerable
group if, at the same time as being encouraged by DWP to
undertake “permitted work” while receiving benefit, they are also
aware of wider campaigns in society encouraging citizens to report
people suspected of both working and claiming benefit.
Nigel Meager and Alice Sinclair
14 Please refer to the Targeting Fraud Website: www.christchurch.gov.uk/resources/benefits/fraud.htm
15 But see also the evidence from surveys of social attitudes, showing that the proportion of the population who think that benefit recipients are claiming fraudulently
was already at an all time high by 2000 (Hills, 2001)
16 “Getting the measure of fraud”available at: http://www.cpag.org.uk/info/Povertyarticles/Poverty108/fraud.htm
17 See, for example, http://www.dwp.gov.uk/lifeevent/benefits/pwr.aspAutumn 2004 |  European Employment Observatory Review 183
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Introduction
Undeclared work is defined in this article as paid activities that are
not declared to the public authorities in order to evade taxes and
social security contributions, or to obtain or keep public income
support. In this definition, which accords with the approach
adopted in the most important Norwegian surveys in this field, the
activities themselves are not illegal. The only illegal element is that
the work is not declared to the tax authorities. The Norwegian
equivalent of undeclared work can be directly translated as ‘black
labour’.
The Norwegian definition of undeclared work is very similar to that
given in the 1998 European Commission Communication on
undeclared work, where it is defined as any paid activities that are
lawful in nature but not declared to the public authorities. Both
definitions exclude criminal activities and all types of unpaid
activities. The Norwegian definition, however, is slightly stricter in
requiring that paid activities should be declared and that not doing
so is a criminal act.
In the European Commission report Undeclared Work in an
Enlarged Union, the term “paid activities” is substituted with
“productive activities”. Thus, unpaid productive activities such as
building your own house are included in the concept of undeclared
work. This coincides with the concept of the “non-observed
economy” as defined by the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD, 2002). However, this is a much
broader concept than is used in this article.
Nevertheless, it is difficult to draw a clear line between the types of
activities that should be included in the undeclared economy and
those which should not. In Norway, productive activities that are
paid for in kind, for example through barter of services and goods,
should be declared to the tax authorities except for some cases of
help between friends and neighbours. Deciding which activities
should be excluded is obviously difficult.
Combating economic crime has a high priority in Norway, and
combating undeclared work is one aspect of this. Although the term
‘black labour’was not mentioned in the national budget for 2004 or
in the White Paper on tax reform (March 2004), the government’s
action- plan to tackle economic crime (presented in June 2004) sees
combating undeclared work as one aspect of combating tax evasion.
Undeclared work has attracted increased attention since European
Union enlargement on 1 May 2004. Although Norway is not a
member of the EU, it is included in the free labour market through
its membership of the European Economic Area. Citizens of the
new Member States can now travel to Norway to seek employment,
and may remain there if they get a job. There is anecdotal evidence
of a possible increase in undeclared work carried out by migrant
labour from some of the new Member States.
Prevalence of undeclared work in the economy
The prevalence of undeclared work in Norway was surveyed in
1980, 1989 and 2001, using an almost identical questionnaire each
time. The results of these surveys were published by Sporastøyl
(1982), Isachsen and Strøm (1989), Goldstein (1990) and Goldstein
et al (2002). For each of the three surveys, the data comprised
responses to a questionnaire mailed out to a random sample of the
Norwegian population aged 15 and over.
The proportion of people who had participated in undeclared work
was measured by their response to the following question:
Have you during the last 12 months performed work where the
income from this work has not or will not be declared to the tax
authorities?
Those answering ‘yes’to this question were either self-employed and
had not declared all or some of their work, or were employed by an
employer who had not declared all or part of their wages, salaries
and assets from employment, either with or without their
knowledge.
Table 1 outlines the main results regarding participation in
undeclared work. The overall proportion of people performing
undeclared work was 20% in 1980,rising slightly to 22% in 1989,but
falling markedly to 13% in 2001. The same trends were evident for
both men and women. Looking at the figures for 1980 and 2001,
Table 1 shows a decreasing proportion of people working
undeclared for almost all groups.
The results of the surveys suggest that men take part in the ‘black
economy’ roughly twice as often as women, and that the
participation rate decreases with age. The participation rate is lower
for those with university education than for those with secondary
school education, and highest in the construction sector (see
Table 1).
Following the survey question on participation in undeclared work,
two further questions aimed to provide data for estimating the total
income received from undeclared work:
Approximately how many hours have you performed in such
work?
What average wage per hour did you get from this work?
The estimated income from undeclared work is shown in Table 2.
Undeclared income increased from 1980 to 1989 and decreased
from 1989 to 2001. However, the decrease shown in the figures
between 1980 and 2001 is not statistically significant (Goldstein et
al, 2002).
The estimated level of total income originating from undeclared
work in 2001 equalled 6.8 billion Norwegian Kroner (NOK) (0.8
billion euro), or 0.6% of gross domestic product (GDP) for
mainland Norway (excluding petroleum and shipping). Goldstein et
al (2002) also estimated the total income from undeclared work,
interest, dividends and other kinds of income. Their estimate for
2001 came to NOK 11 billion (1.4 billion euro), or 0.9% of
mainland Norway’s GDP. About 60% of the ‘black economy’
income measured by the questionnaires was related to undeclared
work.
The surveys found that the prevalence of undeclared work depended
on the following factors:
• How much could be gained
The main motivating factor behind undeclared work was the
profit made from not paying taxes or from avoiding the loss of
public income support. Goldstein et al (2002) found that the
NorwayAutumn 2004 |  European Employment Observatory Review 185
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probability of undeclared working increased with the level of the
perceived marginal tax rate.
• The risk of being caught and punished
Goldstein et al found that the probability of working undeclared
was higher where the perceived risk of being caught was smaller.
In 2001, about half of the survey respondents indicated that they
would probably not have been caught if they had had the
opportunity to receive undeclared income and had chosen not to
notify the tax authorities.
• Social morals
In the 2001 survey, about 63% of respondents said that they
would have worked undeclared if they had had the opportunity.
• Restrictions on the opportunities not to declare work
Goldstein et al found that about a quarter of those who would do
undeclared work if they had the opportunity perceived that
they actually had the opportunity.
The falling rate of participation in undeclared work between 1980
and 2001 can be explained by several factors:
• The marginal tax rate on income from work was reduced during
this period.
• The tax authorities have increased the emphasis on combating
undeclared work.
• The proportion of people perceiving that they had the
opportunity to work undeclared fell from 27% in 1980 to 23% in
2001.
• A smaller proportion of people in 2001 (63%) stated that they
would have worked undeclared if they could, as compared with
1980 (78%).
An important contributory factor behind the falling percentage of
women participating in undeclared work is the considerable increase
in the female participation rate in the overall labour force. This has
reduced the supply of services associated with the ‘black economy’,
such as childcare and housework. At the same time, the demand for
such services has also been reduced because of longer paid
maternity leave, increased capacity in kindergartens, earlier
mandatory school starting and simplified, more attractive tax rules
for private childcare services.
Table 2 also indicates a decrease between 1980 and 2001 in total
income from undeclared work by women. On average, women
gained less income from the ‘black economy’ in 2001 than in 1980
(2001 prices). A contributory factor was that they had fewer
available hours to use in ‘black economy’ activities, as a result of
higher occupational participation.
The participation rates in undeclared work and incomes from such
work were higher in 1989 than in both the earlier and later surveys
(1980 and 2001). Goldstein et al argued that the high figures for this
year were because of special circumstances in 1989 and several of
the preceding years. Undertaking undeclared work probably
became a more attractive option because of a strong increase in
unemployment from 1988 to 1989, a debt crisis in the latter half of
the 1980s, and a wage freeze in 1988 and 1989.
Undeclared work by citizens of the new Member States has possibly
increased since EU enlargement on 1 May 2004. This supposition is
based on reports, rumours in newspapers and assertions by trade
union representatives, drawn from local observations. It has not yet
been measured in a systematic way.
Schneider and Enste (2000) have provided estimates of the size of
what they call the ‘shadow economy’ relative to GDP for selected
countries, including Norway. Using the currency demand approach,
they found that the shadow economy in Norway was 18.2% of GDP
in 1994-5, increasing to 19.4% in 1996-7.
The shadow economy includes all forms of tax evasion and criminal
activities, not just undeclared income from work. Schneider and
Enste’s estimated figure relative to GDP should therefore be higher
than that of Goldstein et al (2002). However, the difference is
extremely large – 19.4% of GDP compared with 0.9%. Goldstein et
al (2002) made several critical comments on the methods used by
Schneider and Enste and the assumptions made in their
Table 1: Percentage of people aged 15 and over
performing undeclared work during the previous 12
months
1980 1989 2001
Females 11 16 8
15-29 12 11
30-49 13 9
50+ 7 6
Males 28 32 18
15-29 47 33
30-49 24 28
50+ 15 7
Total 20 22 13
15-29 32 21
30-49 19 17
50+ 12 6
Primary school (1-6) 14 6
Lower secondary school (7-9) 26 12
Upper secondary school (10-12) 27 20
University level (13+) 15 10
Primary 20 18
Construction 65 48
Manufacturing 26 23
Trade 18 10
Transport 36 13
Health and social services 7 9
Education 15 11
Financial mediation, legal activities,
police/defence and public administration 13 4
Other services 22 21
Source: Goldstein et al (2002)
Table 2: Total income from undeclared work, 2001 prices in
billions of NOK; Euro equivalent added in brackets
1980 1989 2001
Females 2.8 (0.3)  4.6 (0.6) 1.7 (0.2)
Males 5.1 (0.6) 8.6 (1.1) 5.1 (0.6)
Total 7.9 (1) 13.2 (1.6) 6.8 (0.8)
Source: Goldstein et al (2002)186 Autumn 2004 |  European Employment Observatory Review
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calculations. The estimates of Schneider and Enste are therefore not
considered as realistic and are not used in the Norwegian debate on
undeclared work.
Measures taken to combat undeclared work
Taxes, social security contributions and public income support are
to a large extent based on self-declaration of the economic
circumstances of people and enterprises. This trust-based system
includes a risk of misuse. Controls and sanctions are therefore an
integral part of administering the system.
In January 2000, the government presented an annual action plan to
tackle economic crime. A new plan was presented in June 2004.
Combating undeclared work is one aspect of combating tax
evasion.
Measures to combat undeclared work fall mainly into four
categories:
• Implementing procedures and rules that are more favourable to the
declaration of paid work. The action plan supports simplification
of the tax system in order to clarify the duties of each person and
each enterprise. The costs of complying with the regulations will
be studied in order to identify possible improvements.
•. Strengthening incentives to declare paid work.Paid work in private
houses and holiday homes is exempted from the employer’s
element of social security contributions when a household’s total
wage payment is less than a certain amount.The income limit has
increased significantly since 2003, from NOK 30,000 (nearly
3,700 euro) to 50,000 (6,150 euro). This equals about 15% of the
annual income of a manufacturing worker. A tax reform
presented by the government in March 2004 aims to reduce
marginal tax rates on labour incomes. The reform was passed in
parliament in June. One of the motivating factors for this
measure is to provide incentives for working more and
postponing retirement. At the same time, reduced marginal tax
rates will decrease the profitability of not declaring extra work.
• Strengthening surveillance and sanctions. The action plan states
that the tax authorities will increase the actual and perceived risk
of detection if people are committing economic crime, including
doing undeclared work. Measures will include random visits to
employers to check the information given, co-operation in
linking the information provided by different sources, and a
concentrated effort in selected sectors such as taxi driving,
restaurants and construction. A new team will be set up at the
Norwegian National Authority for Investigation and
Prosecution of Economic and Environmental Crime to work on
cases concerning the misuse of public support schemes.
• Raising social awareness. A co-operation forum to combat
undeclared work was established in 1992, involving the
Confederation of Trade Unions, the Confederation of Business
and Industry, the Association of Local and Regional Authorities
and the tax administration. An important aim is to strengthen
attitudes against undeclared work through information and
campaigns locally and in specific branches.
Conclusions
The proportion of people aged 15 and over who have participated in
undeclared work has fallen from 22% in 1989 to 13% in 2001. The
total income from undeclared work in 2001 equalled 0.6% of GDP
for mainland Norway. Undeclared work by citizens from some of
the new EU Member States has possibly increased since 1 May 2004,
but this supposition has not yet been measured systematically.
Combating economic crime is a high priority in Norway.Combating
undeclared work is one aspect of tackling tax evasion and the
misuse of public income support schemes. The campaign to combat
undeclared work has gradually been intensified through
simplifications in procedures and rules, better incentives to declare
work, more efficient surveillance, and improved information about
the consequences of undeclared work, both for the individual and
for society.
Knut Arild Larsen
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Introduction
The Commission Communication on the “concept of undeclared
work” (1998)1 corresponds to the second and third parts of the
nationally accepted definition, where the accent falls on labour.
In the first half of the 1990s, research conducted in Bulgaria mainly
included studies related to the clarification of the concept,
conditions, awareness and methodological approaches for
measuring the scale of the hidden economy. Since the second half of
the decade,the studies include measurements of the scale and effects
of the hidden economy and employment.
When considering the informal economy (whatever the differences
in its scope or the accepted labelling concept), the purposes are to:
present partially evaluated and included in GDP components
and/or unaccounted components of the production system; cover
the economic activities in a comprehensive manner; provide an
overview of the scope, place and functions of atypical behaviour of
the economic units.
Many authors accept the creation and allocation of incomes out of
public control, performed within activities and relations in illegal
and/or hidden forms, as the main features of the informal sector.2 It
is underlined that the “informal economy is closely connected with
the formal economy”. The shadow sector “entrepreneurs”do utilise
the State services, capital and labour without entering into formal
relations as economic units3.
The main reasons behind the existence of undeclared work are the
concealing of income and the reduction of the volume of the taxes
due. Under high rates of unemployment and low flexibility of the
labour market, the concealment of income is a profitable prospect,
both for the employer and the employee. Because of the heavy tax
burden for companies with medium/low incomes/profits and the low
reciprocity from the State (what it pays the citizens and the
businesses back in exchange for the taxes paid), this logic can easily
guide the behaviour of both the corporate managers4 and the
population. Other reasons include the political environment and the
level of links with illegal and criminal structures; the status of the
national economy and the adopted “philosophy” of privatisation;
social reasons originating from the levels of living standards,
unemployment,poverty,insurance culture and behaviour;quality of
the social services and access to them; legal framework; capacity of
the institutions in the public sphere and the judicial system; scope of
crime-generating conditions; various forms of crime – including
organised economic crime.
As the results from undeclared work include not just the “leakage”
(loss) of GDP value, but also contribute to the illegal enrichment of
particular groups of people, the issue has become a subject of
permanent political debate. In Bulgaria, among the most popular
topics are the control over the customs offices, illegal import/export,
the drugs trade; prostitution, corruption, the protection and
compensation of labour, etc. It is still not possible to claim the
complete eradication of the tendencies created in the initial years of
the transformation period for the subjection of State economic
policy to the interests of criminal or para-criminal structures.
The publicity of the political debates on undeclared work is not as
high as it is for the criminal activities. Despite its unfavourable
consequences, throughout the years of the transformation and
under high unemployment, undeclared work provided large parts of
the population with income (including “in kind”). Without these,
the scale of poverty would have become considerably bigger. At the
same time, in the beginning of the 1990s, the informal sector
provided employment and chances for the development of
entrepreneurial skills.
It should be underlined that employees in the informal economy in
Bulgaria belong to the culture of independence and of private
initiative. Research shows that they are rather satisfied with their
current status and plan to improve it by climbing several levels
higher when registering their own businesses and themselves as
owners.5 At the same time, there is always a risk. Since informal
economy employees could enter criminal activities in order to
increase profits, the creation of favourable conditions for legalising
such businesses has become another popular issue in the political
debate.
During the last couple of years, the issues connected with
undeclared work have been discussed in connection with the general
goals of acceding in the European Union with higher employment
rates. Other considerations are the evaluation of the real incomes
levels of the population and the scope of poverty, changes in labour
legislation, tax reforms and the improvement of their rates of
collection, determining the scope and nature of employment in
agriculture and the necessary subsidies, etc.
Prevalence of undeclared work in the economy
During 1998-1999, the rate of undeclared work in Bulgaria was
estimated at 30.4%, which is the second highest level among the
Central and Eastern European countries after Macedonia, which
was 35.1%. For comparison, the rates are lowest in the Czech
Republic (12.6%) with Hungary (20.9%).6
According to a publication of the Centre for the Study of
Democracy (2004), the size of the informal economy is decreasing,
since the study estimates that the share of undeclared work was 16%
of GDP in 2002.
Objective information on undeclared employment
The comparison between the number of employed in 2000 and in
Bulgaria
1 http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/employment_analysis/work_en.htm 
2 Christoskov, G., Shopov, I., Beleva (1996),
3 The Hidden Economy in Bulgaria, (to be published) Centre for the Study of Democracy, Sofia, 2004 
4 The problems at managerial level are connected not just with the social insurance of the employees, but also with the payment of high amounts in case staff are
dismissed.
5 The Grey Economy in Bulgaria – Reasons, Consequences, Policies, E. Dajnov (ed.), Sofia 2002, p. 24-25
6 Schneider, F. (2003), The Development of the Shadow Economies and Shadow Labour Force of 21 OECD and 22 Transition Countries. Dice Report, Journal for
International Comparison, Vol. 1, No 1, p. 19: the hidden unemployment indicator is calculated as the ratio between the relative share of the unregistered labour force
within the total number of the population of working age (16-65 years) in 1998-1999.188 Autumn 2004 |  European Employment Observatory Review
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2003 coming from the supply and demand side of the labour market
(labour accounts method), shows that, from the demand side, the
scope of undeclared work is diminishing. Under limited economic
growth and the stabilisation of the economy, this is not surprising.
According to the Labour Force Survey (LFS), carried out by the
National Statistical Institute (NSI), the number of employed
without a labour contract decreases, while the number of the hired
employees is increasing (Table 2). The change is due to the reduction
of undeclared employment in the private sector, which is the main
employer within the grey economy. With the improvement of the
business climate and the recent increase in the activity of the private
sector, the share of employees without labour contracts is
decreasing.
Men have always been dominant in the gender structure of
undeclared work. Nevertheless, in 2003, the number of men
employed without a labour contract decreased. Women tend to
prefer stable employment (with labour contract) in the public sector.
The share of services (44.4%), followed by industry (31.7%),
agriculture and forestry (24%) dominates the structure of
undeclared work by sector. However, in agriculture and forestry the
share of the employed without a contract in the overall number of
the hired is the highest (19%)7, which proves that undeclared work is
most popular in these two sectors. The proportions are stable and
Table 1. Number of employees in 2000 and 2003*
Period /Year
Survey of Enterprises ** Labour Force Survey 
Q3 2000 1,903.4 2,371.1 467.7
Q3 2003  2,068.9 2,453.1 384.2
* The data in the table compares the number of the employees in the same period of the year – Q3.
**The Survey is carried out every 3 months. It presents data about those employed with labour contracts at the end of the month. For comparability, in this table the
average monthly employment is calculated for Q3 in 2000 and 2003.
Difference
(in thousands)
Number of Employees (in thousands) according to:
Table 2: Employees by type of contract with type of enterprise and gender
Type of contract Number – thousands Structure –%
Total Male Female Total Male Female
Third Quarter 2000
Total 2344.9 1202.3 1142.6 100.0 100.0 100.0
With labour, civil or other contract 2231.4 1134.3 1097.1 95.2 94.3 96.0
Without contract 113.6 68.0 45.5 4.8 5.7 4.0
In private enterprises 1005.6 541.5 464.2 100.0 100.0 100.0
With labour contract 898.9 476.8 422.1 89.4 88.0 90.9
Without contract 106.8 64.7 42.1 10.6 12.0 9.1
Third Quarter 2003
Total 2453.1 1253.7 1199.4 100.0 100.0 100.0
With labour contract 2355.0 1192.4 1162.6 96.0 95.1 96.9
Without contract 97.7 61.0 36.7 4.0 4.9 3.1
Unknown 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0
In private enterprises 1477.8 780.9 696.9 100.0 100.0 100.0
With labour contract 1384.7 722.2 662.5 93.7 92.5 95.1
Without contract 92.9 58.7 34.2 6.3 7.5 4.9
Unknown 0.2 - 0.2 0.0 - 0.0
2003/2000
Total (%) 104.6 104.3 105.0
With labour contract 105.5 105.1 106.0
Without contract 86.1 89.7 80.6
In private enterprises 241.1 242.2 238.3
With labour contract 154.1 151.5 157.0
Without contract 87.0 90.7 81.3
Source: NSI.
7 According to LFS Q3/ 2003.Autumn 2004 |  European Employment Observatory Review 189
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have remained at the same levels in previous years, although the
share of undeclared work has been higher.
The LFS (Q3, 2003) reads that 15.5% of the economically inactive
persons (515,000 people) are willing to start work. The biggest shares
belong to the discouraged and to the people attending schools or
training. For the last three years, the number of the discouraged has
increased by about 30,000 people. This is the group that is the most
seriously threatened by the risk of “starting a job without a
contract”. It is even stronger for young people who have not yet
completed their education8.
The administrative statistics of the EA provides data on the number
unemployed who have resigned from registration at the LO. It is
considered that in most cases, the unemployed allow themselves to
terminate their registration only if they are engaged in undeclared
work. In 2003, the number of people with terminated registrations
was 2.5% lower than in 20029, which could be considered an
indication for the decreasing share of undeclared work. On the
other hand,in 2003,the number of people with renewed registration
within the inflow of the unemployed increased 1.5 times. Evidently,
those who are looking for jobs do prefer the legal way, namely,
through labour contacts.
Certain activities that remain unaccounted for by national statistics
take place in households. The share of unpaid family workers was
about 1.5% to 2.3% during 2002-2003. Two-thirds of them were
women 
Information from Sociological Surveys
Data from national representative surveys in 1996 and 2002-2003 is
cited to trace the changes in undeclared work.
The study of the team led by J. Christoskov10 included a
representative survey and in-depth interviews with more than 30
employers. The study concludes the following:
• Almost one-third of the employed labour force in the country is
hired in the “black”(entirely hidden) or “grey”(partially hidden)
economy; every tenth person receives additional hidden
remuneration;
• Incomes from additional economic activities remain almost
entirely undeclared – 73% of the people practising additional
economic activity do not declare the incomes received from it,
and another 6% declare the incomes partially.
• The private sector has the largest share of non-institutionalised
employment – 60% of the self-employed in this sector do not
declare their incomes; 87% work without contracts;
• The main sectors where non-institutionalised employment
prevails are agriculture (80% of the self-employed), trade and
construction.
• Men prevail among the individuals engaged in non-
institutionalised employment while women prefer legal economic
behaviour (they represent two-thirds of the individuals who
entirely or partially declare their incomes from additional
activity). However, women are more often hired without a
contract.
Research from the Centre for the Study of Democracy and the
“Vitosha Research” Agency (2002-2004) show a tendency for the
shrinking of the informal economy11 and the employment in it.
Representative questionnaire surveys on undeclared incomes are
carried out on the population and on representatives of businesses.
According to the average estimations of the entrepreneurs, the share
of employees who work without a contract was 25% in December
2002 and 16.7% in March 2003. The highest shares were in
construction (29.1%) and in services (25.3%), while in industry it
was just 19%.
The data from the survey of the population reveals somewhat more
stable results. In November 2002 and January 2003, the share of
persons (excluding the self-employed, owners and freelancers)
working without a contract was about 6.0%-6.5%. The differences
with the estimations of the entrepreneurs could be due to the
unwillingness for declaring the real current employment status.
Not declaring the full extent of the remuneration proved to be far
more popular than hiring without a contract. The survey among the
entrepreneurs shows that about one fourth to one third (33.3% in
December 2002 and 22.6% in March 2003) of the employees with
labour contracts have been receiving higher salaries than officially
declared.
Moreover, according to the March 2003 survey on entrepreneurs,
the share of salaries paid from the “black cashier”is about 18%. In
small companies, with a single employee (the interviewed person
who is also the owner), this share is 29%.
The comparison of data from the cited surveys shows that although
the scope of undeclared work is decreasing, its structural
characteristics remain the same. Different sources confirm that
usually undeclared work is practised in the private sector, more
frequently by men,being highest in agriculture, trade, services and
construction. Most often, incomes remain undeclared in small and
the one-person businesses.
Measures taken to combat undeclared work
Creation of a legal and administrative environment
which is favourable to the declaration of economic
activity and employment
The Law on the Reduction of the Administrative Influence and
Control over the economic activity has been in force since December
2003. The goals of the Law are to: improve the conditions for
starting and carrying out economic activities and to improve the
business climate. The number of licences and the necessary
administrative procedures for starting business are reduced and
simplified.
The conditions for foreigners who are willing to start their
businesses in Bulgaria are also improved. The Law on the
Amendments of the Law on Foreign Investment (2003) postulates
unified conditions for investing in the country and lifts the
protection for local investors. The co-ordination and co-operation
between all competent central and local authorities is also
improved. All these measures stimulate job creation and the
legalisation of undeclared work.
The Ministry of Economy itself has also proposed a programme of
8 According to data from the Inspectorate on Labour.
9 The Labour Market in 2003 – Yearly Review 2003, Employment Agency, p. 29 
10 J. Christoskov, G., Shopov, I., Beleva (1996) 
11 Source: The Hidden Economy in Bulgaria, (forthcoming) Centre for the Study of Democracy, Sofia, 2004. The information utilised for the analysis is a result of the
efforts of experts from the National Statistical Institute, National Insurance Institute, Bulgarian National Bank, Ministry of Finance, Agency for Economic
Analyses and Forecasts, Centre for the Study of Democracy and Agency “Vitosha Research”.190 Autumn 2004 |  European Employment Observatory Review
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measures for fighting the grey economy. This includes creating a
department for fiscal investigations, fighting the illegal sales of
excise goods, creating a National Tax and Insurance Collecting
Agency (NTICA), increasing the customs and tax control, reducing
fraud connected with the payment of VAT, and fighting the
distribution of illegal software.
The pilot stage for the collection of taxes and social insurance by
one institution, the NTICA12, is supposed to begin within the next
four years. The plans include the elaboration of a unified
information system that will allow the payment of taxes via the
Internet. All things being equal, this is expected to increase the rates
of their collection.
One of the major administrative regulations that brought about the
reduction of hidden employment is the requirement for the
registration of all labour contracts upon their termination or
modification at the National Insurance Institute (NII). As a result,
the number of insured people increased in 2003 by more than
300,000.
Furthermore, the Law on Obligatory Social Insurance and the Law
on the State Budget (including the NII budget) introduced rates for
minimal insurance income for the different industries and for nine
separate personnel categories. This measure facilitates the reduction
in the number of the people who are insured for the minimum salary
and the legalisation of the real wages.
The progress of the health reform and the introduction of
limitations for the access to health services for people who have not
been paying their insurance contributions, are expected to further
enhance the registration of the activity of the self-insured.
Strengthening incentives and removing disincentives
to declare work on both the demand and the supply
sides
Reviewing and reforming tax and benefit systems
In Bulgaria, personal incomes taxation is progressive and the tax-
free amounts for 2003 are up to BGN 1440 (approximately 720
euro).The current policies are for the further increase of the tax-free
rate and for the decrease of the taxation rates for the lowest income
categories (in 2001 this rate was 20%, in 2002 – 18%, in 2003 – 15%
and in 2004 – 12%). Hopefully, this will also be an incentive for the
registration of undeclared incomes.
The insurance contributions paid by the population are rather high.
For example, in 2004, the contributions for the third category of
labour, the most popular one, were 42.7% of the gross salary.
Recently, proposals have been made for the reduction of the
insurance burden and for the introduction of a flat tax rate of 10%.
However, calculations show that this would deteriorate the stability
of the pension system and of the remaining insurance funds. For the
time being, this proposal is seen as unacceptable and is considered
populist. Control over the behaviour of the insuring and the insured
persons; the cited obligatory registration of the labour contracts
and the minimal insurance rates will remain of prime importance
for the regular and correct payment of State social insurance.
The amount of corporate tax rate was reduced from 25% to 23.5%
for 2003 and to 19.5% for 200413. In 2003 several changes in the
corporate taxation system were made. A unified tax rate was
adopted. The profit tax and the municipal tax were transformed
into one corporate tax.
Companies investing in high unemployment areas are entitled to a
tax exemption. This measure will stimulate higher investors’interest
in these areas. In 2003, jobs in the sewing and textile industries, as
well as in industry, the production of furniture and food
processing14were created in just half of the municipalities entitled to
the cited exemptions. Evidently, these are important for the
reduction of undeclared work in regions with critical
unemployment.
Setting up suitable policies for employers and the
unemployed 
Since 2002, the principles for the intervention on the labour market
have been radically changed. The main goal is the creation of
employment. Labour market policies are being activated, while the
unemployment benefits are administered by the National Insurance
Institute.
Of prime importance for the successful realisation of this policy is
the “From Social Benefits to Employment”programme. Starting in
2003 and for a period of three years, it provides employment to
117,000 people of working age who have previously been receiving
benefits. The programme provides funds that cover the minimal
remuneration and insurance, thus removing the incentives for
undeclared work without labour contracts.
The encouragement of entrepreneurship among the unemployed is
regulated by the Law on the Employment Promotion (2002).For the
implementation of the programmes and the measures decided,
employers are provided with funds for payment of salaries and
social insurance (the share to be paid by the employer) for the hired
unemployed. Further, the provision of professional qualification,
motivation and training and the territorial mobility of the registered
unemployed are also subsidised. Other measures include favourable
leasing plans and low interest rates on loans taken by people with
reduced capacities to work.
The package of services offered by the LOs to people who are
willing to start their own businesses is considerably extended. Free
advice, market research data, facilitation of the access to grants,
training and consultations on Phare projects are now regularly
offered. The mediating role of business incubators is also
intensified.
All these stimuli for starting own businesses looks far more
attractive than the employment in the informal economy.
Subsidies for the employers for hiring the unemployed are of both
preventive and of direct importance for combating undeclared
work. The benefits are distributed in the cases of part-time hiring of
the unemployed; the employment of people in disadvantaged
positions on the labour market; of unemployed who have been
receiving benefits for more than five months and of long-term
unemployed. The employers of micro companies are compensated
for the insurance payment for the first five new job positions. The
salaries and insurance for internships and apprenticeships are
covered for a period of six months.
Employers applying for these subsidies should not be indebted to
the State (i.e. to have due payments of taxes, insurance, etc.). The
subsidies cover newly-created job positions and require the
12 The project is financed through a loan from the World Bank – 31.8 million euro, as well as with funds from the budget – about 11 million euro. It is planned than the
NTICA will start operating in January 2005.
13 According to the broadcasted plans of the Government for 2005 the corporate tax will be reduced to 15%.
14 The Labour Market in 2003 – Yearly Review 003, EA, p. 31.Autumn 2004 |  European Employment Observatory Review 191
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conclusion of a labour contract with the hired unemployed. Each of
the above conditions are in line with the requirements for the
legitimacy of the employer.
The interest of the employers for utilisation of the above subsidies
correlates with their expectations for the near future. Unfortunately,
these are not optimistic enough and most of the unemployed are
hired only for the duration of the benefit.
Strengthening surveillance
The overall control over the observance of the labour legislation in
all sectors is done by the Executive Agency of the CLI15.
Administrative measures and responsibility16 are enforced/sought in
the case of disclosure of violations. In 2003, 28.8% of the violations
were related to the hiring, utilisation and dismissal of staff. 17
The opinions of labour unions and employers’ organisations
regarding the dangers from undeclared work and labour market
irregularities that it causes are coinciding. For the legal employers it
is a kind of unfair competition; for the labour unions – a
disincentive for the increase in the price of labour and a social
dumping factor. Both the labour unions and the employers’
organisations support the initiatives and measures of the
Government and, at the same time, insist on the further reduction of
the tax and insurance burdens, which will contribute to the further
reduction of the shadow sector.
Strengthening transitional co-operation to combat
undeclared work
Bulgaria has signed agreements for official employment with the
governments of Germany, the Czech Republic, Portugal and Spain.
All of these agreements aim to reduce undeclared work of
Bulgarians abroad.
Several initiatives for the regulation of employment conditions and
for the limitation of social dumping are being negotiated between
labour unions from Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey.
Raising social awareness of the costs of undeclared work 
There are several areas of interest related to the limitation of
undeclared work that are common for the State and for the
population. These include the poor or non-existent working
conditions/safety and the absence of social insurance. These spheres
should become the focus of control from the administrative bodies,
NGOs and the media (with national PR campaigns). The provision
of information on the risks from carrying out undeclared work
could play an important preventive role.
Conclusions
The results of all the research on undeclared work are favourable. It
is shrinking, but its structural characteristics remain unchanged.
The limitation of undeclared work is carried out under the overall
revival of the local economy, increasing employment rates and
alongside the widening of the administrative and legal measures
against undeclared work, with positive results so far.
Dr. Betty Loukanova
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Introduction
This article examines the issue of undeclared work in Romania.
While undeclared work is not just found in developing countries or
those in transition, for Central and Eastern European countries
which have recently undergone the transition to a market economy,
it has some distinctive characteristics.
The article explores the multiple dimensions of undeclared work,
and argues that a definition of undeclared work appropriate for a
more developed economy may be too rigid for an emergent,
transitional economy such as Romania’s. It is also worth noting that
the mix of policies employed in Romania during its transition have
played their part in allowing the phenomenon of undeclared work
to thrive – even in an economic environment characterised by
sustained growth and enhanced macro-stability. Finally, the paper
explores the link between globalisation and undeclared work,
looking at the issue of employment migration abroad, undertaken
through ‘informal channels’.
The article draws on the findings of the first comprehensive study of
this issue in Romania: the National Labour Research Institute’s
(NLRI)  Best Practices for the Combating and Prevention of
Undeclared Work (Ghinaruru et al, 2004). It also draws on the Joint
Assessment Paper on Employment Policies (JAP), developed by the
Romanian Ministry of Labour, Social, Solidarity and Family and
the European Commission’s (EC) Directorate General for
Employment and Social Affairs at the end of 2002. This latter
document included a first assessment of the scale of employment in
the non-observed/non-registered economy in Romania (‘the
informal sector’).
Although undeclared work takes place in the context of the non-
observed/non-registered economy, not all work undertaken in this
particular sector of the national economy falls under this label.
Prevalence of undeclared work in the economy
The  ‘stop-go’ type of transition that persisted in Romania
throughout the 1990s has generated a high prevalence of undeclared
work. The lack of sufficient numbers of consecutive years of
economic growth and a second transition recession in the mid-late
1990s, which was associated with achieving the critical mass of the
transition process, have induced a propensity towards engaging in
undeclared work.This propensity is part of a survival strategy as well
as a result of the economic strategy pursued in the transition process.
Overall, the government was forced to focus first and foremost on
macro-economic stability and tightening monetary and fiscal
anchors rather than on growth, which risked feeding into
persistently high inflationary pressures. The necessary but harsh
reform measures pushed large segments of the population into
income poverty. It is estimated that the poverty rate (calculated at
50% of the median income) surged, albeit briefly, to 50% in 1997.
The measures also pushed income inequality higher than before.
As a result of these developments, undeclared work increased in
scale. Evaluations of the contribution of undeclared work and the
non-registered economy in terms of gross domestic product (GDP)
suggest that undeclared work probably reached a peak during the
late 1990s, after which some decline occurred. However, this decline
is thought to have been only in the ‘informal agricultural’ sector
(small family farming). Undeclared work associated with non-
agricultural activities has probably remained at the same levels or
even increased marginally. There is uncertainty because the
evaluations carried out have varied in the methodology employed
and the results yielded.
The most comprehensive evaluation was carried out by the National
Labour Research Institute1 in March-May 2004. This study
employed a mixture of direct observation and econometric
modelling, using the share of wages in total household disposable
income as an explanatory variable. The findings suggest that
undeclared work equates to around 30% of Romania’s GDP. Some
of this can be accounted for by subsistence-type agriculture, which
could be considered as an element of ‘visible’ GDP, despite being
defined as undeclared work in the EC report Undeclared Work in an
Enlarged Union (2004). However, around half of the above
estimated share of GDP might be accounted for by activities in the
non-agricultural/non-subsistence part of the economy.
The share of Romania’s GDP which can be accounted for by the
non-registered/non-observed economy has declined from
approximately 35% in 2000-1. These values are broadly convergent
with the estimates of Professor Schneider (2002), who identified a
decline from 40% of total employment in 2000 to an estimated 30%
in 2003, with a figure of 34% in 2004. This decline can partly be
explained by an increase in the wage economy and a marked
decrease in agricultural employment, which has traditionally been
based on subsistence agriculture.
Undeclared work in the non-observed/non-registered economy was
estimated in the NLRI study2 to involve around 2.2 million people.
This includes around 1 million (roughly equivalent to 11% of total
employment) thought to be involved in ‘underground’ non-
agricultural non-declared activities (i.e. legal in nature but not
declared) as well as around 1.2 million (roughly equivalent to 14% of
total employment) involved in informal non-agricultural activities
(see Table 1).
There is some confusion as to whether subsistence agriculture
should be included as undeclared work (informal sector). If it is
included, the above estimates would have to be increased to include
the work undertaken in the very large agricultural sector, which
currently employs around 3.15 million people – equivalent to
approximately 35% of total employment in 2003. These individuals
are mostly employed in family farms, which fall almost entirely into
the category of ‘household production for own consumption/own
use’. Adding this figure to that for informal non-agricultural
employment would yield a total of around 4.4 million people, or the
equivalent of 49% of total employment. Adding the 1 million
individuals involved in non-agricultural activities in the
‘underground’ sector would result in a total of approximately 5.4
million individuals or the equivalent of almost 60% of total
employment in Romania.
Romania
1 Dr Catalin Ghinararu, Ana Maria Zamfir, Cristina Mocanu and Miriam Munteanu, under the asupices of the NLRI (2004) Best Practices for the Combating and
Prevention of Undeclared Work, Bucharest, Romania: RO MEDIA.
2 At the time of writing (August 2004), the National Institute for Statistics had not been able to publish any data on this phenomenon. Therefore the only estimates
available are those from the NLRI. The author of this thematic article and the Institute are also the source of the JAP (2002) data on this issue.Autumn 2004 |  European Employment Observatory Review 193
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However,a number of experts argue that small farming is in practice
‘informal but declared work’. Those involved in such work declare
their activities to the public authorities, and are considered as
employed according to the definitions of the Labour Force Survey
(EUROSTAT methodology). This means that they are not covered
under the definition of undeclared work in the 1998 Commission
Communication. In addition, individuals’ involvement in
agriculture, even at a small, subsistence scale, is based on legal
tenure of the land. An additional 1.2 million individuals involved in
‘informal non-agricultural activities’ should perhaps also not be
included in estimates of undeclared work, as in most cases these
marginal, small-scale activities do not have to be declared to the
public authorities.
Applying the above restrictions, the number of people involved in
undeclared work can be estimated at around 1.1-1.3 million, which
comprises roughly 13-14% of total employment in Romania.
Romanian agriculture has mainly been subsistence farming since
the most comprehensive agricultural reform in Central and Eastern
Europe in 1921, which ensured that small peasant farms were the
main form of agricultural producer.Communism saw a break in this
tradition with the creation of collective farms, which were later re-
privatised. Agricultural employment increased during the
transition, as urban unemployment and income poverty supported
a large-scale shift from urban to rural areas. Agricultural
employment, as a form of ‘buffer employment’, reached its peak at
around 42-45% in 1999-2000.
During the last four to five years, economic growth has been more
sustainable and is likely to continue for the foreseeable future.
Subsistence agriculture continues to dominate. However, with this
economic growth, agricultural employment is decreasing by roughly
one percentage point per year. It is estimated that by maintaining the
current rhythm of growth, agriculture’s share of total employment
will fall to around 28-29% in 2014, with predictions of 23% or even
20% by 2014 should growth accelerate at an even faster rate.
Certain sectors of the economy display a greater propensity for
undeclared work. On the basis of NLRI estimates, construction
may account for around 14% of undeclared work in non-
agricultural sectors, followed by commerce (especially small
retailers) at around 12%. The lower-value manufacturing sectors of
textiles, clothing, shoe and leather industries, which dominate
Romania’s economy, comprise about 11% of non-agricultural
undeclared work.
A large proportion of non-agricultural undeclared work is
concentrated in small and micro-enterprises with low productivity.
Undeclared labour, including child labour, flourishes in these firms
and the distinction between capital and labour is frequently blurred.
The NLRI study estimates that this particular sector of the
economy accounts for around 19% of the non-agricultural
undeclared work in Romania.
In all, the sectors mentioned above account for 57% of the non-
agricultural undeclared work. The rest is thinly spread across other
sectors of the economy. The energy and telecommunications sectors
have the lowest concentration of undeclared work because of the
prevalence of large companies, including multinationals.
Undeclared work in the small and micro-enterprises sector often
goes hand in hand with attempts to evade legal obligations.A strong
correlation has been identified between the prevalence of
undeclared work and recourse to tax evasion,bribes,corruption and
other phenomena associated with the ‘shadow economy’–  The
NLRI study identified that the higher the prevalence of undeclared
work, the greater the recourse to tax evasion and bribes in order to
escape paying taxes or avoid inspections and controls. The
correlation is a two-way process, with recourse to tax evasion,
Table 1: Estimates of undeclared work and employment in the non-observed/non-registered economy in Romania
Employment in the 
informal sector 3,150 71.4 (100) 35 1,260 28.5 (50.5) 14 4,410 100 (78.1) 49
Employment in the 
‘underground’
(legal but 
undeclared) sector - - - 1,000 100 (40) 11* 1,000 100 (17.7) 11*
Employment 
in the illegal sector - - - 235 100 (9.4) 2.6** 235 100 (4.2) 2.6**
Total employment 
in the non-observed/
non-registered economy 3,150 55.8 (100) 35 2,495 44.1 (100) 27.7 5,645 100 (100) 63
* ‘Real undeclared employment’; % = equivalent percentage of total employment, since individuals engaged in undeclared work can be employed, unemployed or
inactive above or in some cases below the minimum working age.
** Employment in the ‘illegal sector’of the non-observed economy, which is disregarded for the purposes of this article.
Source: Dr Catalin Ghinararu et al (2004) Best Practices for the Combating and Prevention of Undeclared Work
Total employment in the non-observed/
non-registered economy
Employment in non-agricultural non-
observed/non-registered economy 
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bribery and corruption explaining to a large extent the propensity
for engaging in undeclared work.
Undeclared work is particularly concentrated in low-productivity
sectors of the economy which are only able to maintain their market
niche by evading legal obligations and lowering to the minimum the
cost of labour. This can partly be explained by the state of the
overall economy during the transition. A long period of high
inflation and perceptions of unpredictability encouraged small to
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) to engage in the shadow
economy, at least partially, as a mean of ensuring their economic
survival. The current economic growth should begin to generate
more job opportunities in the formal, visible economy – as long as
this growth remains sustainable over a number of years.
Some argue that the tax burden on labour should be reduced. The
aim would be to make it affordable for companies with low
profitability to declare work, and to encourage companies that are
viable and have real job-generation potential to renounce practices
such as ‘cash-in-hand’payments. The combination of declared low-
income work and undeclared cash-in-hand payments is particularly
pervasive in Romania. It deprives employees of a significant part of
their social security benefits, particularly with regard to pensions.3
In parallel, it is argued that the minimum wage – which about 20%
of Romania’s employees receive – should be increased in order to
provide these workers with sufficient motivation to become formally
employed. At 35% of average gross salary, Romania now has one of
the highest ratios of minimum wage to average salary in Europe.
This is a positive factor, except that Romania’s average gross salary
(at the equivalent of 200 euro) is one of the lowest in Europe.
Around 40% of the country’s exports depend on sectors of the
economy where the minimum wage is prevalent and where labour
productivity is reduced because of the large subsistence farming
sector. Policies have been adopted with the aim of increasing the
level of the minimum wage and raising living standards for around a
fifth of the total number of workers. But these moves have been
tempered by efforts to keep jobs in low-productivity sectors in the
‘visible’ economy and prevent companies from moving to ‘cheaper’
countries such as Moldova or Ukraine.
It is important to pursue an adequate mix of salary and labour
taxation policy in the years to come, to encourage formal
employment in the low added-value sectors of the economy. These
sectors will receive the bulk of the workforce gradually released
from subsistence agriculture. Increases in the minimum wage will
need to be made with restraint in order to maintain competitiveness
and encourage investments in both capital and labour, to support
greater productivity and a shift towards higher added-value sectors
of the economy. In the meantime, some sort of fiscal relaxation may
be necessary to maintain as much employment as possible within the
formal economy.
To conclude this section:
• Informal work in the subsistence agricultural sector cannot easily
be classified as undeclared work as it is known to the public
authorities and is based on private land tenure.
• Outside this sector, undeclared employment thrives in low-value
retail, manufacturing, construction and even service
establishments.
• The existence and subsequent development of undeclared work
is one of the most pernicious legacies of the ‘stop-go’ transition
economy of the 1990s.
• It is expected that as the economy moves more towards a
‘functional market economy’ and economic growth with a
background of ever lowering inflation gains pace, the scale of the
phenomenon should diminish.
• However, one should not underestimate the effects of salary and
labour taxation policy, which will be important for ensuring that
growth is reflected in formal rather than informal forms of
employment.
• Finally, it is important to note that levels of undeclared work in
Romania would possibly be higher if people were not able to go
abroad for employment. This phenomenon may be partially
responsible for Romania’s low unemployment rate but rather
high inactivity rate for the working-age population.
Measures taken to combat undeclared work
Although there is no national definition of undeclared work in
Romania, the government and the public authorities consider the
extent of the phenomenon to pose a significant risk to Romanian
society. Undeclared work is recognised as having an important
impact on the functioning and growth of the economy, as well as on
the social security of the workforce and on social cohesion.
Measures have already been enacted to combat ‘real undeclared
work’ in non-agricultural sectors. The business community has
repeatedly mentioned high labour taxation as a factor encouraging
firms to resort to undeclared work. As a result, the government has
reduced employers’social security contributions by three percentage
points in 2004 as against 2003 levels.This comprises a 2.5 percentage
point reduction in contribution rates to the state social security fund
(pensions) and a 0.5 percentage point reduction in contribution
rates to the unemployment insurance fund.Taking into account that
a further reduction of the contribution rates occurred in 2003, the
tax burden on labour is now eight percentage points lower than its
2002 level.
Part of this reduction has been offset by a nominal increase in the
contributions as a result of increasing the minimum wage. However,
in relative terms the aggregate tax burden on labour has decreased
from 48.2%, as calculated for the average gross salary in 2002, to
45.5% in 2003. Therefore, for an employee earning the gross average
salary, with two dependent children, the tax burden on labour has
been reduced from 42.8% to 40.2%.For an employee earning 67% of
the average gross salary, with no dependants, the tax burden on
labour has been reduced from 45.5% in 2002 to 42.7% in 2003.
A new fiscal code has recently enhanced the coherence of the fiscal
regulatory framework, thereby providing for more stability.
However, in spite of these measures, the government has not
succeeded in promoting an anticipated amendment enforcing a flat
rate income tax of 19%. Some changes are envisaged in relation to
tax brackets, which currently penalise middle and middle-to-high
income earners, potentially opening another channel for undeclared
work in high added-value activities.
A new labour code was introduced at the beginning of 2003,
including important changes to labour contracts. Fixed-term and
part-time contracts have been properly recognised and regulated,
and the concept of temporary work has also been recognised.
Subsequently, as of June 2004, this has resulted in the adoption of a
law regarding temporary work agencies. In the meantime, the scope
of so-called ‘civil conventions’ has been reduced to its original
function, with usage limited to the provisions of the civil code.
These civil conventions are a type of common-law agreement widely
3 Old-age pensions in the public system (the only form of pension currently operational in Romania) are calculated on the basis of contributions made throughout
entire working life and also on the amount of contribution paid into the system. Therefore, a low-income employee can expect a low pension in old age.Autumn 2004 |  European Employment Observatory Review 195
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seen as a form of ‘informal’ labour contract and therefore an
important element of undeclared work.
It is debatable whether these measures have yet had a tangible
impact in reducing undeclared work. The business community,
especially SMEs, complain that the newly enacted regulations –
including the labour code – add new rigidity instead of promoting
much-needed flexibility. While new labour regulations, especially
the labour code, actually enhance labour-market flexibility, the
successive increases in the minimum wage have potentially had a
negative impact on competitiveness. This in turn is reflected in low
generation of jobs and the virtual standstill of the share of wages as
a percentage of GDP (currently around 40% for formal salaries,
increasing to around 65-67% when cash-in-hand payments are taken
into account).
Measures have been taken to support some of the costs associated
with the creation of new jobs, especially via employment-generation
policies financed through the Unemployment Fund. Fiscal
incentives are granted to employers hiring unemployed people,
provided that such workers remain in employment for at least six
months after hiring. In addition, unemployed people who find a job
prior to expiry of the period of unemployment benefit continue to
receive 30% of their benefit on entering employment until the
statutory end of the paid unemployment period. This is to
discourage people from seeking to supplement their income through
undeclared work. It is estimated that more than 100,000 people have
benefited from this measure, which is expected to yield significant
results in combating undeclared work. This measure is
complemented by the flat-rate unemployment benefit (75% of
minimum wage, or 50% for young graduates with no prior
employment record), which acts as an incentive for active job-
seeking.
Control has also been strengthened through the Labour
Inspectorate, which acts under the auspices of the Ministry of
Labour. It has engaged in a national campaign against undeclared
work, acting jointly with the police, tax authorities, local authorities
and the fraud squad. Its actions have had a limited effect, however,
as evasion techniques are growing ever more sophisticated.
It is important to note that while the potential for undeclared labour
in Romania remains considerable, because of the reservoir of cheap
labour provided by subsistence agricultural employment, actual
undeclared work only involves around 1 million people. On the
other hand, it is clear that the current economic and policy context
in Romania is encouraging the existence and spread of a ‘disguised’
form of undeclared work. ‘Disguised’ undeclared work formally
observes minimal legal requirements while using ‘undeclared
payments’to evade legal obligations.
To combat irregular channels for migration for employment abroad,
the government has strengthened the powers of the National Office
for Labour Force Migration and issued new regulations to increase
the protection of migrant workers against the malpractices of
private employment agencies. The Labour Inspectorate has been
entrusted with full responsibility for ensuring compliance with
current legislation, and has been given the authority to take action
against those in breach of the law.
As stated in the introduction, evaluation in the area of informal and
undeclared work in Romania has mainly been restricted to the two
reports on which this article is based (Best Practices for the
Combating and Prevention of Undeclared Work and the Joint
Assessment Paper on Employment Policies). The National Institute
for Statistics does not yet conduct such evaluations, but does
provide (albeit not on a regular basis) estimates of the scale of the
non-observed/non-registered economy as a percentage share of
GDP. Other more partial evaluations have been carried out by
research institutes belonging to the Romanian Academy. Some
evaluations have also appeared in various economic journals.
Conclusions
Undeclared work in Romania is in part a product of the nature of
the transition to a market economy, and to a certain extent derives
from historical developments which took place before and during
the communist period.
Apart from subsistence-type agricultural employment (which can
only to a limited extent be considered as undeclared work) the
phenomenon is most persistent in sectors such as construction,
small retail, commerce and manufacturing.
The level of undeclared work in Romania does not currently surpass
10-12% as a share of total employment. However, calculations by
the National Labour Research Institute have shown that a one
percentage point increase in the average rate of economic growth
could deliver a 2.8 percentage point reduction in subsistence
agricultural employment. This would produce a pool of labour both
for undeclared work in the domestic labour market and for
migration for employment abroad through irregular channels.
In the meantime, the same calculations have pointed out that a one
percentage point reduction of the tax burden on labour results in a
0.04 percentage point increase in economic growth. This proves that
fiscal relaxation can really contribute to the acceleration of growth,
which in itself is the most important determinant of net job
generation in the formal economy. A reduction of the tax burden on
labour will also provide a competitive advantage in the bid to attract
more foreign direct investment (FDI). It is estimated that the
productivity growth generated by increasing FDI as a share of GDP
will contribute to a reduction in low-income jobs (which largely
serve as a means of concealing undeclared work) as a share of the
total number of jobs by 0.03 percentage points.
To combat undeclared work, a stronger partnership is needed
between the central authorities, local authorities and social
partners, through better control procedures, more focused
inspections and improved tax collection. A mix of policies also
needs to be put in place to harness the benefits of economic growth
and macro-stability for more vigorous generation of jobs in the
‘formal economy’. This would also create a disincentive for both
labour supply and demand to engage in undeclared work practices.
Dr Catalin Ghinararu
Bibliography
European Commission (2004) Undeclared Work in an Enlarged
Union: Final Report Brussels: EC, Directorate General for
Employment and Social Affairs 
Ghinararu, Dr Catalin et al, for the National Labour Research
Institute (2004) Best Practices for the Combating and Prevention of
Undeclared Work, Bucharest, Romania: RO-MEDIA Publishing 
Ministry of Labour, Social, Solidarity and Family (Romania) and
EC Directorate General for Employment and Social Affairs (2002)
Joint Assessment Paper on Employment Policies (JAP)
Schneider, F (2002) The size and development of shadow economies in
22 OECD countries and 21 transition countries, IZA Discussion
Paper, No. 514, Bonn, Germany: Institute for the Study of Labour
(IZA)196 Autumn 2004 |  European Employment Observatory Review
Trends
Introduction 
The European Union (EU) concept of ‘undeclared work’1 is very
close to the Turkish concept of ‘kaçak isçilik’ (literally,
clandestine/illicit workmanship) or ‘kaçak çalisma’(clandestine/ illicit
labour/work). The extensive national debate on this topic
distinguishes between undeclared work and ‘informal (unregistered)
employment’. The latter term is used to describe those workers who
are not known to the authorities. All informal employment is
therefore undeclared work, but the full scope of undeclared work is
wider than just unregistered employment. Criminal activities are,
however, excluded from the concept of undeclared work.
Undeclared work is sometimes discussed as an issue in academic
reports or news items.However,it is more common to find it analysed
in detailed reports on the ‘unregistered economy’, or sometimes more
specifically in reports on unregistered employment. The official
documents setting out information on these issues are the Special
Expertise Commission Reports of the State Planning Organisation
(SPO). These are prepared every five years for the corresponding
periods of development plans. The latest plan covers the period 2000-
2004. The SPO report (2001) on the unregistered economy has four
parts: national accounts, taxation, employment and criminal
activities. Fully or partially undeclared work is covered in the
employment section of the report.The definitions closely follow those
used by the EU and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD).
Scope of the phenomenon 
As a result of frequent economic crises in recent years and still being
under austerity measures sanctioned by the International Monetary
Fund (IMF), the employment performance of the Turkish economy
has not been satisfactory.The recent macro-economic recovery has
not brought about an increase in jobs.The phasing out of agricultural
subsidies and large regional disparities in income are likely to bring
about another wave of rural-to-urban migration. As a result,
unemployment is steadily rising.
Given the lack of marketable skills (in particular low levels of
education) of most Turkish workers, the work environment is
conducive to unregistered work. Non-compliance with the rules
allows for flexibility (minimal hiring and firing costs) for unskilled
workers in low added-value, low-productivity activities such as
working from home in the garment industry, and clothing industry
production of brand names in small firms. The smaller the firm, the
more likely there is to be non-compliance with labour and tax
regulations. Larger firms may register themselves but not all of their
workers. Many registered employees receive ‘envelope wages’in cash
over and above the legally registered minimum wage. This
arrangement is commonly found in Central and Eastern European
(CEE) states. This type of fully or partially undeclared work probably
comprises the bulk of the phenomenon in Turkey.
A second undeclared work arrangement is driven by the ‘extra income
effect’. This is the dominant type of undeclared work in EU countries
such as Austria or Belgium where the share of unrecorded activities is
below 5% of gross domestic product (GDP) (European Commission
(EC), 2004). Such ‘moonlighting’ (second jobs) by workers in the
formal employment sector (e.g.public employees and teachers driving
cabs or selling from market stalls) exists in Turkey. However, the level
of such activity is almost negligible, and the market for such services
can only exist in a few big cities.
The final significant component of the phenomenon of undeclared
work in Turkey is work carried out by illegal immigrants, who can be
found in the construction industry and in textile workshops in the
northwest of the country. The majority of these illegal workers
originate from Romania. However, in the construction sector, which
has traditionally been a focus for unskilled young men, informal
employment and undeclared work have been steadily declining in
Turkey. Over the past two decades and until recent years, this sector
constituted 8% of urban employment on average (Ercan,
forthcoming). The current figure is 4%.
Enforcement against undeclared work is weak in Turkey. Work by
illegal immigrants is largely viewed as a police matter, as such workers
are deported. However, this problem is not generally a police priority.
In 2002, the Ministry of Labour estimated the number of illegal
foreign workers to be 1 million (4% of the total workforce).
Undeclared work in the political debate 
Officials from the Turkish Ministry of Finance and Ministry of
Labour routinely speak out against the unregistered economy and
undeclared work. Avoiding taxation and social security contributions
creates unfair competition for law-abiding companies, from low-
productivity firms to large, formal, unionised businesses in the highly
competitive food and textiles and clothing sectors.Ministers therefore
pay some heed to the problem in meetings with employers’
organisations. Recently, for example, the Ministry of Finance
declared its support for a research grant competition jointly organised
by the private Sabanci University and the Turkish Council of
Shopping Centres. The theme is ‘The registered and regulated
economy and retailing’. Defining and measuring the unregistered
economy and its impact on the formal economy and comparisons
with the EU are the research topics.
However,real inroads into the problem of tax evasion and undeclared
activities are hampered by the practice of offering tax or social
security amnesties following a number of years of non-payment.
Political parties generally offer such amnesties ahead of elections.
This and other practices such as under-declaration of income (see
Apak, 2004) have undermined public trust in the state authorities’
powers to address the problem of undeclared work.
Prevalence of undeclared work in the economy 
Size of the informal economy 
The SPO report of 2001 discusses direct and indirect methods of
measuring the informal economy along the same lines,for example,as
Undeclared Work in an Enlarged Union (EC, 2004). It also reports
Turkey
1 The concept is defined in the 1998 Commission Communication on undeclared work and is often quoted in later related EU documents: “The concept of ‘undeclared
work’is taken to mean any paid activities that are lawful as regards their nature but not declared to the public authorities, bearing in mind that differences in the
regulatory system of Member States must be taken into account. Applying this definition, criminal activities would be excluded, as would work which does not have
to be declared.”Autumn 2004 |  European Employment Observatory Review 197
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estimates of the size of the informal economy in relation to national
income. Since the SPO report was written before the OECD’s
Handbook for Measurement of the Non-observed Economy (2002), a
number of estimates based on unreliable sources are also included.Us
(2004) has conducted a more recent study which analyses existing
estimates as well as providing its own analyses using various methods.
This article places less emphasis on estimates derived from
approaches relating to tax collection. These estimates are published
by the Revenues Directorate of the Ministry of Finance
(www.gelirler.gov.tr). They derive from information regarding the
number of tax inspections conducted and the pre- and post-
inspection amounts declared. In 2002, for example, 113,000 tax forms
were inspected, which cumulatively declared an income tax base of
13,863 trillion Turkish lire (TL) (7.7 billion euro). It was concluded
that there was an under-declaration of income of TL 7,971 trillion
(4.4 billion euro), which was 57% of the figure for declared income.
This is the starting point for the Revenues Directorate’s estimate of
the size of the unregistered economy. However, it ignores the fact that
only tax forms already seen as ‘problematic’are assessed.
If monetary approaches (such as wage payments, fixed ratio) are not
used, estimates of the unregistered economy decline significantly.
Using an employment methodology, Bulutay (1998) reported that in
1992 the informal sector’s share of the economy was 16% (26% in
non-agricultural activities). Using econometric modelling, Çetintas
and Vergil (2003) estimated the size of the unregistered economy
between 1971 and 2000 as 18-30% of gross national product (GNP),
depending on the models used. Using a similar methodology, Us
(2004) has estimated the size of the unregistered economy for 1978 to
2000 at about 10%. She also reports the results of two older studies
yielding similar results: 8% and 12%. Çetintas and Vergil’s (2003)
results are high for econometric estimations, which generally yield
more conservative estimates. Us (2004) also reports the results of a
method that uses electricity consumption as a measure for estimating
the size of the unregistered economy. This method yields an estimate
of 20-22% of GNP in the period 1978 to 2000.
Close reading of existing studies and their methodologies indicates an
estimate of 20% as a realistic minimum for the unregistered economy,
which puts Turkey in the same league as Greece and Italy. The real
figures are more likely to be around 30+%,which moves Turkey closer
to Bulgarian and Romanian figures. The ‘true’ figure may be even
higher; employers and trade unions often quote the size of the
unregistered economy as being half or two-thirds of the registered
one. However, their methodologies are not well documented.
In terms of unregistered employment, Bulutay (1998) reported a
figure of 30% of total employment in 1992. Us (2004) reports the
results of an exercise that uses the quarterly Labour Force Survey
data of the State Institute of Statistics (SIS). Based on a number of
assumptions,Us (2004) estimates that 3% of the total population (2.1-
2.2 million people) were employed as unregistered workers between
2000 and 2003.This figure is about 10% of the total workforce of 22.5
million and 17% of the non-agricultural workforce. There are no
studies to assess the incidence of undeclared work (as opposed to
unregistered employment) or surveys specifically designed for this
purpose (such as Pedersen’s, quoted extensively in EC (2004)).
Sectoral distribution 
The sectoral distribution of informal employment in Turkey reflects
the usual sectors in a developing economy, such as textile production
in households and small and medium-sized enterprises, and personal
services. However, undeclared work occurs across the board as a
result of the Turkish legal code, which exempts small-scale farmers,
small-scale vendors and artisans from taxes;all street vendors are also
exempt.Vendors and artisans in one or two-person operations are not
covered by employment legislation. The same applies for agriculture.
As a result, agriculture should not be included in meaningful
comparisons with the rest of the EU.
The output of one-third of the total labour force’s work – i.e. in
agriculture – is typically non-observable. Almost all self-employment
in Turkey is likely to be either unregistered or partially or fully
undeclared. This probably also applies to the majority of
professionals such as doctors and lawyers; these groups often only
declare incomes at the minimum level. In addition, more than half of
urban employment is in services. All told, the work environment in
Turkey is highly conducive to undeclared work.
The importance of the retail and restaurant sectors in undeclared
work is similar to CEE countries. One may also stretch definitions a
bit and talk about subsistence agriculture. The difference would be
that Turkish farmers do not generally sustain themselves with the
food they grow. The produce sold in markets or bought by public
companies does not provide a comfortable living.Undeclared ‘second
jobs’carried out by professionals is not a widespread phenomenon in
Turkey, unlike in CEE countries. Also unlike CEE economies, the
incidence of the informal economy is high in the manufacturing
sector.This is because most of it is on a small or micro scale in Turkey,
and textiles are very important in industrial revenue and exports.
Table 1 provides information on the sectoral distribution of the
economic activities carried out by individuals found guilty of illegal
activity. The data come from the Istanbul office of the Ministry of
Finance and are likely to reflect the broader picture in sectors outside
agriculture.
The SIS (2000) conducted an informal sector survey of small urban
enterprises. It reported the following distribution of employment in
the informal sector: 20.3% in industry, 58.4% in trade, and 21.3% in
services. Table 1 roughly matches this distribution in the totals for
industry (small manufacturing), trade and services. The SIS survey
revealed that the largest age group involved in such activity was the
31-40 group (30%). The majority of these workers only had primary
education (62%, which is higher than the workforce average of 50%).
The SIS currently reports (first quarter of 2004) employment in the
informal sector as 1.34 million (12.5% of urban non-agricultural
employment). This low figure is the result of the severely restricted
definition applied to the concept of the informal sector by the SIS.
The informal sector is defined as those non-agricultural economic
entities that are unincorporated (personal ownership or simple
partnership) and that pay either no taxes or are nominally taxed by
occupation, not by income. This definition categorically rejects the
existence of informality or undeclared work in formal establishments
and does not attempt to measure it. It also ignores social security
status. SIS Labour Force Survey results for the first quarter of 2004
reveal that 4.5 million non-agricultural workers have no social
security coverage whatsoever. This is 30% of the non-agricultural
workforce of 15 million.
Perceived causes and effects
As noted above, one-third of total employment in Turkey is in
agriculture. Workers in this sector tend to be uneducated and
unskilled. When they migrate to urban areas (as agricultural price
supports have mostly been phased out), women are not likely to
participate in the labour force at first.Younger women go to school or
find employment in textiles until they get married; this is almost the
norm in the sector. Young uneducated men work in construction if
they can. This means that low-skilled agricultural employment and
urbanisation will continue to provide fertile grounds for informal198 Autumn 2004 |  European Employment Observatory Review
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employment and undeclared work for at least another decade – and
possibly longer – in Turkey. This may be an important reason for the
authorities not to crack down on undeclared work. Formal
employment-growth performance in Turkey has been very poor
relative to the growth in unskilled working-age population. The
strategy may be one of “look away and maybe the problem will go
away”. Frankly, this may be an expedient strategy for the time being,
until Turkey mandates more schooling (from eight to 12 years) and
educates its younger population.2
The second important possible cause is the dominance of small and
micro enterprises in Turkey (SPO, 2001). Low levels of human and
physical capital imply low productivity. Exemptions in the tax code
and employment legislation for self-employment and micro firms
provide an environment for informality in the non-agricultural sector.
Surveillance is in any case difficult in small-scale services and
manufacturing.The exemptions can therefore be seen as an admission
by the state authorities that resources are lacking for effective policing
of the system.
The SPO report (2001) states that lenient official attitudes towards the
unregistered economy go back several decades. In the process of
capital accumulation and providing incentives for entrepreneurs,
many tax exemptions were granted and the Turkish private sector
mostly grew up automatically requiring such preferential treatment.
These attitudes are now ingrained, reinforced by frequent amnesties
on tax and social security payments. The tax collection system has
become distorted and is continually revised and re-revised. The
perception of fairness has become a casualty along the way as
governments have routinely collected ‘supplementary’taxes for one
reason or another. Matters may only improve when trust is re-
established between the citizen and the government. This will be a
function of stable macro-economic conditions.
Finally, employers’organisations complain about red tape and non-
wage labour costs.3 These are both high in Turkey relative to OECD
averages. The Turkish Employers’ Unions Confederation (TISK)
makes a strong case for simplifying the rules and regulations to reduce
the administrative burden on employers. TISK claims that these
pecuniary and administrative costs encourage informal employment
and discourage entrepreneurship. Law-abiding establishments suffer
unfair competition as a result. Trade unions counter with the ‘levels’
argument. Hourly pay in Turkey is a fraction of that in other
industrialised countries. However, this does not take into account
differences in productivity.
An important effect of the above picture relates to productivity.
Informal employment and most undeclared work in Turkey are
associated with low levels of human capital. Even if capital
investment per capita goes up (and it has been rising since the end of
2003), workers on the shop floor or at the computer terminal will not
be able to make the most use of such an increase because of their low
skills base. The achievement of higher levels of education and
training correlate positively with growth and further development of
human resources. This would assist in combating undeclared work
and the informal economy, which are concentrated in low-skilled
sectors. In turn, this would lead to improvements in social security
and increase tax revenues.
Measures taken to combat undeclared work 
Political attitudes regarding undeclared work have been discussed
above. The general attitude has historically been lenient, and this
situation continues today because it is expedient. At the same time,
finance and labour ministers are obliged to agree with employers and
trade unions that the authorities should crack down on unregistered
employment. Some important steps have been taken to tackle the
informal economy and are described below. However, the list remains
a short one at present.
Given time, measures which are not necessarily aimed at combating
undeclared work will eventually contribute to its reduction. To quote
from the EC report on undeclared work (2004): “Therefore, in the less
advanced of the new Member States and candidate countries, efforts
should be targeted at state formation, development of democratic
institutions and stabilisation of the general socio-economic situation.
Policy targeted towards undeclared work is of later concern.”If ‘state
formation’is replaced with ‘institution building’, and ‘development of
democratic institutions’with ‘strengthening democratic institutions’,
the same conclusion would be reached for Turkey.
Legal and administrative environment
The main measure to combat unregistered employment has been the
Social Security Reform law in 1999. Among other regulations
regarding basic retirement and social security administration,
unemployment insurance was instituted for the first time in Turkey.
Contributions to the unemployment insurance fund began in 2000,
Table 1: Unregistered workers and their economic
activities (January-July 2002)
Sector Number %
1 Textiles and clothing 725 12.8
2 Barbers and hair stylists 500 8.8
3 Restaurants 271 4.8
4 Markets 271 4.8
5 Transportation 254 4.5
6 Associations 224 4.0
7 Open market vendors 195 3.4
8 Auto repair 157 2.8
9 Real estate agents 132 2.3
10 Concession stands 121 2.1
RT Other retail trade (jewellery, clothing etc) 1,232 21.7
PS Other personal services and repairs 
(electricians, tailors etc) 572 10.1
SM Other small manufacturing and repairs 
(shoes, furniture etc) 354 6.3
Total retail trade = 3 + 4 + 7 + 10 + RT 2,090 36.9
Total personal services = 2 + 5 + 6 + 8 + 9 + PS  1,839 32.5
Total small manufacturing = 1+ SM  1,079 19.2
Other 413 7.3
Source: Raw data (of 70 activities) are reported at 
www.ist-def.gov.tr/birim/vdbb/kayitdisi.htm and have been classified and totalled by
the author.
2 This is the author’s personal opinion, which usually meets with resistance from other scholars. Opponents are correct in the sense that everyone deserves decent social
security coverage and related benefits.
3 The website of the Turkish Employers’Unions Confederation (TISK) (www.tisk.org.tr) is full of bulletins and reports making this case. TISK declared the size of the
unregistered economy to be 66% of the registered one in 2003, compared with 40% in 2001. The computational methodology and what accounts for the jump are not
discussed in TISK sources.Autumn 2004 |  European Employment Observatory Review 199
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and payments started in 2002. This move was intended to encourage
formal employment contracts so that workers would qualify for
unemployment benefits.No mass formalisations of employment have
so far resulted, but it is nonetheless a significant step.
Employers have long complained about the rigidity of Turkish labour
legislation. Regulations were characteristically only applied by public
employers and large,unionised private-sector companies,which make
up the minority of employers. Small manufacturing and retail trade
typically responded to this rigidity by remaining informal, and hence
flexible. The new labour law of 2003 acknowledged for the first time
the existence of flexible employment arrangements such as part-time
work and working from home. This is the second major measure to
tackle informal employment.
Surveillance 
From 2003, any payment for goods and services in excess of TL 10
billion (5,500 euro) should be made through a bank. All people and
firms have tax ID numbers, and transactions may therefore be traced.
This can also be seen as a step in the right direction in combating the
informal economy.
Conclusions 
Socio-economic factors fuelling the existence of undeclared work and
unregistered employment in Turkey are as follows:
• There is macro-economic instability and volatile growth. A series
of anti-inflationary, demand-contracting IMF programmes have
finally reduced inflation and achieved growth,but the recovery has
so far been unable to generate jobs.
• A related factor is that the economic environment is unsuitable for
foreign direct investment,as foreign capital complies with the rules
and avoids undeclared work (EC, 2004).
• Unemployment has risen steadily, and people are more willing to
accept informal work contracts.
• Agricultural subsidies have largely been phased out. Rural-to-
urban migration of unskilled agricultural workers may well
accelerate.
• Privatisation has de-formalised some former public-sector
employment.
• Turkey’s excessively lenient regulations on retirement age have
recently been tightened up. However, there is still a young retiree
population in their late forties and fifties. They are more likely to
engage in undeclared work to supplement their pensions.
• Income distribution is highly skewed. The top 20% of households
receive half the income. The bottom 20% receive 6%. Poverty is a
powerful motivator behind undeclared work.
Institutional factors also contribute to the high level of undeclared
work:
• There is a high tax burden and high social security contributions.
The state does not contribute for individuals, but ends up paying
the deficit lump sum from the budget. The social security gap
already comprises 4.5% of GNP,despite favourable demographics.
• Tax controls are inadequate. The government has traditionally
been unwilling to crack down on small enterprises, which account
for the bulk of employment.
• There is excessive red tape. The Turkish Employers’ Unions
Confederation states that 172 signatures are needed to open up a
business and the process takes 2.5 months. Nor does it end there.
This level of bureaucracy tends impedes entrepreneurial activity.
Cultural factors must also be cited:
• People have come to mistrust tax collection authorities (and the
government). ‘Supplementary’ taxes are the norm, and
‘temporary’taxes have stayed in place.
• Transgressors have received too many amnesties on tax and social
security payments. This has led to a deep-rooted feeling of
unfairness in law-abiding citizens and enterprises. The state does
not just let the market eliminate inefficient operations, and
governments routinely cave in to popular demands. This is
detrimental to the business environment in the longer term.
• Small businesses are routinely and conveniently ignorant of tax
revenues coming back to them in the form of benefits (e.g. roads,
water and electricity). The problem is not only undeclared work –
theft of electricity and transmission losses make up 20% of total
consumption.
• Former agricultural workers are not accustomed to asking for
their rights.
Unsurprisingly, Turkey has so far achieved few results in tackling
undeclared work. Cultural attitudes towards it are not sufficiently
discussed. Employers’organisations emphasise the importance of tax
cuts and reductions in social security contributions, while trade
unions call for mandatory unionisation. However, greater economic
development and political stability are needed as first steps in the fight
against undeclared work – as advocated in the EC report on
undeclared work (2004).
Hakan Ercan
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